Part 898

"Everywhere unsuccessful in Europe, the Russians were more fortunate in Asia. Towards the close of 1854, the Turkish army at Kars was in a wretched and demoralised condition. Its unsatisfactory state, and the reverses it had experienced, resulting, it was well known, from the misconduct of the Turkish officials, induced the British government to appoint Colonel Williams as a commissioner to examine into the causes of previous failures, and endeavour to prevent a repetition of them. … Colonel Williams, attended only by major Teesdale and Dr. Sandwith, arrived at Kars at the latter end of September, 1854, where he was received with the honour due to his position. Kars, in past times considered the key of Asia Minor, is 'a true Asiatic town in all its picturesque squalor,' and has a fortress partly in ruins, but once considered most formidable. On inspecting the Turkish army there, Colonel Williams found the men in rags; their pay fifteen and even eighteen months in arrear; the horses half-starved; discipline so relaxed that it could be scarcely said to exist; and the officers addicted to the lowest vices and most disorderly habits. … Though treated with an unpardonable superciliousness and neglect by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador at Constantinople, Colonel Williams succeeded in promoting a proper discipline, and in securing the men from being plundered by their officers. In the January of 1855, the Turkish government granted Colonel Williams the rank of terik, or general in the Ottoman army, together with the title of Williams Pasha. The inactivity of the Russian army at Gumri excited much surprise; but notwithstanding the condition of the Turks, they permitted spring to pass away, and summer to arrive, before active hostilities were resumed. … During this period, the Turks at Kars had been employed, under the direction of colonel Lake, in throwing up fortifications around the town, which gradually assumed the appearance of a formidably intrenched camp. Early in June the Russians left Gumri, and encamped within five leagues of Kars. They were estimated at 40,000 men; while the Turkish troops amounted to about 15,000 men, who had been familiarised with defeat, and scourged by fever and the scurvy. In addition to this, their provisions were insufficient to enable them to sustain a siege of any considerable duration, and their stock of ammunition was very low The Russians made a partial attack on the town on the 16th of June, but they met with a repulse. … The road to Erzeroum was in their possession, and the supplies intended for the Turks fell into their hands. {2779} In effect, they had blockaded Kars by drawing a cordon of troops around it. A period of dreary inaction followed this movement of the Russians, broken only by trivial skirmishes at the outposts. Want was already felt within the town, and the prospect of surrender or starvation was imminent. … Omar Pasha, and a large body of Turkish troops from the Crimea, had landed at Batoum, and it was expected that they would soon arrive to raise the siege of Kars. This circumstance, occurring shortly after the arrival of the news of the fall of Sebastopol, induced many of the officers of the besieged army to believe that the Russians were about to retire. This surmise was strengthened by the fact, that, for several days, large convoys of heavily laden waggons were observed leaving the Russian camp. General Williams, however, was not deceived by this artifice, and correctly regarded it as the prelude to an extensive attack upon Kars. An hour before dawn on the 29th of September, the tramp of troops and the rumble of artillery wheels was heard in the distance, and the Turkish garrison made hurried preparations to receive the foe. Soon the dim moonlight revealed a dark moving mass in the valley. It was an advancing column of the enemy, who had hoped to take the Turks by surprise. In this they were deceived; for no sooner were they within range, than a crushing shower of grape informed them that the Moslems were on the alert. The battle commenced almost immediately. The assailants rushed up the hill with a shout, and advanced in close column on the breastworks and redoubts. From these works a murderous fire of musketry and rifles was poured forth, aided by showers of grape from the great guns. This told with terrible effect upon the dense masses of the foe, who fell in heaps. … Riddled with shot, the Russians were completely broken, and sent headlong down the hill, leaving hundreds of dead behind them. … Had not the Turkish cavalry been destroyed by starvation—a circumstance which rendered pursuit impossible—the Russian army might have been almost annihilated. The Turks had obtained an unequivocal victory, after a battle of nearly seven hours' duration. Their loss did not exceed 463 killed, of whom 101 were townspeople, and 631 wounded. That of the Russians was enormous; 6,300 of them were left dead upon the field, and it is said that they carried 7,000 wounded off the ground. Though the Russians had suffered a severe reverse, they were not driven from the position they held prior to the battle … and were enabled to resume the blockade of the city with as much strictness as before. The sufferings of the unhappy garrison and inhabitants of Kars form one of the most terrible pictures incidental to this war. Cholera and famine raged within the town; and those who were enfeebled by the last frequently fell victims to the first. The hospitals were crowded with the sick and wounded, but the nourishment they required could not be obtained. The flesh of starved horses had become a luxury, and the rations of the soldiers consisted only of a small supply of coarse bread, and a kind of broth made merely of flour and water. … Children dropt and died in the streets; and every morning skeleton-like corpses were found in various parts of the camp. The soldiers deserted in large numbers, and discipline was almost at an end. … As all hope of relief from Selim Pasha or Omar Pasha had expired, general Williams resolved to put an end to these miseries by surrendering the town to the foe. … Articles of surrender were signed on the 25th of November. … The fall of Kars was a disgrace and a scandal to all who might have contributed to prevent it."

_T. Gaspey, History of England, George III.-Victoria, chapter 56 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN: _T. H. Ward, Humphrey Sandwith, chapter 9._

_S. Lane-Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, chapter 31 (volume 2)._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854-1856. Unfruitful peace negotiations at Vienna. Renewed bombardment of Sebastopol. Battle of the Tchernaya. Repulse of the English from the Redan. Taking of the Malakhoff by the French. The congress at Paris. Peace.

In November, 1854, the Czar, Nicholas I., authorized Gortschakoff, his Minister at Vienna, to signify to the Western Powers his willingness to conclude peace on the basis of "the four points" which the latter had laid down in the previous spring. These "four points" were as follows:

"(1) The protectorate which Russia had hitherto exercised over the Principalities was to be replaced by a collective guarantee;

(2) the navigation of the mouths of the Danube was to be freed from all impediments;

(3) the treaty of 1841 was to be revised in the interests of the European equilibrium; and

(4) Russia was to renounce all official protectorate over the Sultan's subjects, of whatever religion they might be. …

The Czar's new move was not entirely successful. It did not prevent Austria from concluding a close arrangement with the Western Powers, and it induced her, in concert with France and England, to define more strictly the precise meaning attached to the four points. With some disappointment, Russia was doomed to find that every successive explanation of these points involved some fresh sacrifice on her own part. The freedom of the lower Danube, she was now told, could not be secured unless she surrendered the territory between that river and the Pruth which she had acquired at the treaty of Adrianople; the revision of the treaty of 1841, she was assured, must put an end to her preponderance in the Black Sea. These new exactions, however, did not deter the Czar from his desire to treat. By no other means was it possible to prevent Austria from taking part against him; and a conference, even if it ultimately proved abortive, would in the interim confine her to neutrality. Under these circumstances, Nicholas consented to negotiate. … The conference which it was decided to hold in December did not assemble till the following March. The negotiation which had been agreed to by Aberdeen, was carried out under Palmerston; and, with the double object of temporarily ridding himself of an inconvenient colleague, and of assuring the presence of a statesman of adequate rank at the conference, Palmerston entrusted its conduct to Russell. While Russell was on his way to Vienna, an event occurred of momentous importance. Sore troubled at the events of the war, alarmed at the growing strength of his enemies, the Emperor of Russia had neither heart nor strength to struggle against a slight illness. His sudden death [March 2, 1855] naturally made a profound impression on the mind of Europe. … {2780} Alexander, his successor, a monarch whose reign commenced with disaster and ended with outrage, at once announced his adherence to the policy of his father. His accession, therefore, did not interrupt the proceedings of the Conference; and, in the first instance, the diplomatists who assembled at Vienna succeeded in arriving at a welcome agreement. On the first two of the four points all the Powers admitted to the Conference were substantially in accord. On the third point no such agreement was possible. The Western Powers were determined that an effectual limitation should be placed on the naval strength of Russia in the Black Sea; and they defined this limit by a stipulation that she should not add to the six ships of war which they had ascertained she had still afloat. Russia, on the contrary, regarded any such condition as injurious to her dignity and her rights, and refused to assent to it. Russia, however, did not venture on absolutely rejecting the proposal of the allies. Instead of doing so, she offered either to consent to the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the ships of war of all nations, or to allow the Sultan a discretion in determining whether he would open them to the vessels either of the Western Powers or of Russia. The Western Powers, however, were firm in their determination to prevent the fleets of Russia from passing into the Mediterranean, and refused the alternative. With its rejection the Conference practically terminated. After its members separated, however, Buol, the Austrian Minister, endeavoured to evolve from the Russian offer a possible compromise. …The rejection of the Austrian alternative necessitated the continuance of the war. But the struggle was resumed under conditions very different from those on which it had previously been conducted. Austria, indeed, considered that the rejection of her proposal released her from the necessity of actively joining the Western Powers, and, instead of taking part in the war, reduced her armaments. But the Western Powers obtained other aid. The little State of Sardinia sent a contingent to the Crimea; later on in the year Sweden joined the alliance. Fresh contingents of troops rapidly augmented the strength of the French and English armies, and finer weather as well as better management banished disease from the camp. Under these circumstances the bombardment was renewed in April. In May a successful attack on Kertch and Yenikale, at the extreme east of the Crimea, proved the means of intercepting communication between Sebastopol and the Caucasian provinces, and of destroying vast stores intended for the sustenance of the garrison. In June the French, to whose command Pelissier, a Marshal of more robust fibre than Canrobert, had succeeded, made a successful attack on the Mamelon, while the English concurrently seized another vantage-ground. Men at home, cheered by the news of these successes, fancied that they were witnessing the beginning of the end. Yet the end was not to come immediately. A great assault, delivered on the 18th of June, by the French on the Malakhoff, by the English on the Redan, failed; and its failure, among other consequences, broke the heart· of the old soldier [Lord Raglan] who for nine months had commanded the English army. … His capacity as a general does not suffer from any comparison with that of his successor, General Simpson. That officer had been sent out to the Crimea in the preceding winter; he had served under Raglan as chief of the staff; and he was now selected for the command. He had, at least, the credit which attaches to any military man who holds a responsible post in the crisis of an operation. For the crisis of the campaign had now come. On both sides supreme efforts were made to terminate the struggle. On the 16th of August the Russian army in force crossed the Tchernaya, attacked the French lines, but experienced a sharp repulse. On the 8th of September the assault of June was repeated; and though the British were again driven back from the Redan, the French succeeded in carrying the Malakhoff. The Russians, recognising the significance of the defeat, set Sebastopol and their remaining ships on fire, and retreated to the northern bank of the harbour. After operations, which had lasted for nearly a year, the allies were masters of the south side of the city. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to prolong any further the narrative of operations which had little influence on history. The story of the defence of Kars and of the bombardment of Sweaborg have an interest of their own. But they had no effect on the events which followed or on the peace which ensued. Soon after, the Vienna Conference was dissolved, indeed, it became evident that the war was approaching its close. The cost and the sacrifices which it involved were making the French people weary of the struggle, and the accidental circumstances, which gave them in August and September the chief share in the glory, disposed them to make peace. The reasons which made the French, however, eager for peace, did not apply to the English. They, on the contrary, were mortified at their failures. Their expectations had been raised by the valour of their army at Alma, at Balaklava, and at Inkerman. But, since the day of Inkerman, their own share in the contest had added no new page of splendour to the English story. The English troops had taken no part in the battle of the Tchernaya; their assaulting columns had been driven back on the 18th of June; they had been repulsed in the final attack on the Redan; and the heroic conduct of their own countrymen at Kars had not prevented the fall of that fortress. Men at home, anxious to account for the failure of their expectations, were beginning to say that England is like the runner, never really ripe for the struggle till he has gained his second wind. They were reluctant that she should retire from the contest at the moment when, having repaired her defective administration and reinforced her shattered army, she was in a position to command a victory. Whatever wishes, however, individual Englishmen might entertain, responsible statesmen, as the autumn wore on, could not conceal from themselves the necessity of finding some honourable means for terminating the war. In October the British Cabinet learned with dismay that the French Emperor had decided on withdrawing 100,000 men from the Crimea. About the same time the members of the Government learned with equal alarm that, if war were to be continued at all, the French public were demanding that France should secure some advantage in Poland, in Italy, and on the left bank of the Rhine. In November the French ministry took a much more extreme course, and concerted with Austria terms of peace without the knowledge of England. … {2781} It was impossible any longer to depend on the co-operation of France, and … it was folly to continue the struggle without her assistance. The protocol which Austria had drawn up, and to which France had assented, was, with some modifications, adopted by Britain and presented, as an ultimatum, to Russia by Austria. In the middle of January, 1856, the ultimatum was accepted by Russia; a Congress at which Clarendon, as Foreign Minister, personally represented his country, was assembled at Paris. The plenipotentiaries, meeting on the 25th of February, at once agreed on a suspension of hostilities. Universally disposed towards peace, they found no difficulty in accommodating differences which had proved irreconcilable in the previous year, and on the 30th of March, 1856, peace was signed. The peace which was thus concluded admitted the right of the Porte to participate in the advantages of the public law of Europe; it pledged all the contracting parties, in the case of any fresh misunderstanding with the Turk, to resort to mediation before using force. It required the Sultan to issue and to communicate to the Powers a firman ameliorating the condition of his Christian subjects; it declared that the communication of the firman gave the Powers no right, either collectively or separately, to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects; it neutralised the Black Sea, opening its waters to the mercantile marine of every nation, but, with the exception of a few vessels of light draught necessary for the service of the coast, closing them to every vessel of war; it forbade the establishment or maintenance of arsenals on the shores of the Euxine; it established the free navigation of the Danube; it set back the frontier of Russia from the Danube; it guaranteed the privileges and immunities of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia; it similarly guaranteed the privileges of Servia, though it gave the Sultan the right of garrison in that province; and it undertook that Russia and Turkey should restore the conquests which they had made in Asia [Kars, etc.] one from another during the war. Such were the terms on which the war was terminated. Before the plenipotentiaries separated they were invited by Walewski, the Foreign Minister and first representative of France, to discuss the condition of Greece, of the Roman States, and of the two Sicilies; to condemn the licence to which a free press was lending itself in Belgium; and to concert measures for the mitigation of some of the worst evils of maritime war."

See DECLARATION OF PARIS.

_S. Walpole, History of England from 1815, chapter 24. _

ALSO IN: _E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, volume 2, documents 263-272._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1855. Accession of Alexander II.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1859. Improved treatment of the Jews.

See JEWS: A. D. 1727-1880.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1859-1876. Conquests in Central Asia. Subjugation of Bokhara, Khiva and Khokand.

"The original cause of Russia's appearance in Central Asia or Turkestan may be considered either the turbulence of the Kirghiz tribes, or the ambitions and clearly defined policy of Peter the Great. … Although the Czarina Anne received in 1734 the formal surrender of all the Kirghiz hordes, it was not until the present century had far advanced that the Russian Government could so much as flatter itself that it had effectually coerced them. … When the Kirghiz were subjugated Russia found no difficulty in reaching the lower course of the Jaxartes, on which [in 1849] … she established her advanced post at Kazala, or Fort No. 1. With her ultimate task thus simplified, nothing but the Crimean War prevented Russia's immediate advance up the Jaxartes into Turkestan. … The conquest of the Khanate of Turkestan began with the siege and capture of the forts Chulak Kurgan and Yani Kurgan in 1859; its successful progress was shown by the fall of the fortified towns of Turkestan and Auliata in 1864; and it was brought to a conclusion with the storming of Tashkent in 1865. The conquest of this Khanate, which had been united early in the century with that of Khokand, was thus speedily achieved, and this rapid and remarkable triumph is identified with the name of General Tchernaieff."

_D. C. Boulger, Central Asian Questions, chapter 1._