Part 895

"With the military resources of France, which then counted 130 departments, with the contingents of her Italian kingdoms, of the Confederation of the Rhine, of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and with the auxiliary forces of Prussia and Austria, Napoleon could bring a formidable army into the field. On the first of June the Grand Army amounted to 678,000 men, 356,000 of whom were French, and 322,000 foreigners. It included not only Belgians, Dutchmen, Hanoverians, Hanseats, Piedmontese, and Romans, then confounded under the name of Frenchmen, but also the Italian army, the Neapolitan army, the Spanish regiments, natives of Germany. … Besides Napoleon's marshals, it had at its head Eugene, Viceroy of Italy; Murat, King of Naples; Jerome, King of Westphalia; the princes royal and heirs of nearly all the houses in Europe. The Poles alone in this war, which recalled to them that of 1612, mustered 60,000 men under their standards. Other Slavs from the Illyrian provinces, Carinthians, Dalmatians, and Croats, were led to assault the great Slav empire. It was indeed the 'army of twenty nations,' as it is still called by the Russian people. Napoleon transported all these races from the West to the East by a movement similar to that of the great invasions, and swept them like a human avalanche against Russia. When the Grand Army prepared to cross the Niemen, it was arranged thus:—To the left, before Tilsit, Macdonald with 10,000 French and 20,000 Prussians under General York of Wartenburg; before Kovno, Napoleon with the corps of Davoust, Oudinot, Ney, the Guard commanded by Bessières, the immense reserve cavalry under Murat—in all a total of 180,000 men; before Pilony, Eugène with 50,000 Italians and Bavarians; before Grodno, Jerome Bonaparte, with 60,000 Poles, Westphalians and Saxons, &c. We must add to these the 30,000 Austrians of Schwartzenberg, who were to fight in Gallicia as mildly against the Russians as the Russians had against the Austrians in 1809. Victor guarded the Vistula and the Oder with 30,000 men, Augereau the Elbe with 50,000. Without reckoning the divisions of Macdonald, Schwartzenberg, Victor, and Augereau, it was with about 290,000 men, half of whom were French, that Napoleon marched to cross the Niemen and threaten the centre of Russia. Alexander had collected on the Niemen 90,000 men, commanded by Bagration; on the Bug, tributary to the Vistula, 60,000 men, commanded by Barclay de Tolly; those were what were called the Northern army and the army of the South. On the extreme right, Wittgenstein with 30,000 men was to oppose Macdonald almost throughout the campaign; on the extreme left, to occupy the Austrian Schwartzenberg as harmlessly as possible, Tormassof was placed with 40,000. {2769} Later this latter army, reinforced by 50,000 men from the Danube, became formidable, and was destined, under Admiral Tchitchagof, seriously to embarrass the retreat of the French. In the rear of all these forces was a reserve of 80,000 men—Cossacks and militia. … In reality, to the 290,000 men Napoleon had mustered under his hand, the Emperor of Russia could only oppose the 150,000 of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly. … At the opening of the campaign the head-quarters of Alexander were at Wilna. … They deliberated and argued much. To attack Napoleon was to furnish him with the opportunity he wished; to retire into the interior, as Barclay had advised in 1807, seemed hard and humiliating. A middle course was sought by adopting the scheme of Pfühl—to establish an intrenched camp at Drissa, on the Dwina, and to make it a Russian Torres Vedras. The events in the Peninsula filled all minds. Pfühl desired to act like Wellington at Torres Vedras." But his intrenched camp was badly placed; it was easily turned, and was speedily abandoned when Napoleon advanced beyond the Niemen, which he did on the 24th of June. The Russian armies fell back. "Napoleon made his entry into Wilna, the ancient capital of the Lithuanian Gedimin. He had said in his second proclamation, 'The second Polish war has begun!' The Diet of Warsaw had pronounced the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, and sent a deputation to Wilna to demand the adhesion of Lithuania, and to obtain the protection of the Emperor. … Napoleon, whether to please Austria, whether to preserve the possibility of peace with Russia, or whether he was afraid to make Poland too strong, only took half measures. He gave Lithuania an administration distinct from that of Poland. … A last attempt to negotiate a peace had failed. … Napoleon had proposed two unacceptable conditions—the abandonment of Lithuania, and the declaration of war against Great Britain. If Napoleon, instead of plunging into Russia, had contented himself with organising and defending the ancient principality of Lithuania, no power on earth could have prevented the reestablishment of the Polish-Lithuanian State within its former limits. The destinies of France and Europe would have been changed. … Napoleon feared to penetrate into the interior; he would have liked to gain some brilliant success not far from the Lithuanian frontier, and seize one of the two Russian armies. The vast spaces, the bad roads, the misunderstandings, the growing disorganisation of the army, caused all his movements to fail. Barclay de Tolly, after having given battle at Ostrovno and Vitepsk, fell back on Smolensk; Bagration fought at Mohilef and Orcha, and in order to rejoin Barclay retreated to Smolensk. There the two Russian generals held council. Their troops were exasperated by this continual retreat, and Barclay, a good tactician, with a clear and methodical mind, did not agree with Bagration, impetuous, like a true pupil of Souvorof. The one held firmly for a retreat, in which the Russian army would become stronger and stronger, and the French army weaker and weaker, as they advanced into the interior; the other wished to act on the offensive, full of risk as it was. The army was on the side of Bagration, and Barclay, a German of the Baltic provinces, was suspected and all but insulted. He consented to take the initiative against Murat, who had arrived at Krasnoé, and a bloody battle was fought (August 14). On the 16th, 17th, and 18th of August, another desperate fight took place at Smolensk, which was burnt, and 20,000 men perished. Barclay still retired, drawing with him Bagration. In his retreat Bagration fought Ney at Valoutina; it was a lesser Eylau: 15,000 men of both armies remained on the field of battle. Napoleon felt that he was being enticed into the interior of Russia. The Russians still retreated, laying waste all behind them. … The Grand Army melted before their very eyes. From the Niemen to Wilna, without ever having seen the enemy, it had lost 50,000 men from sickness, desertion and marauding; from Wilna to Mohilef nearly 100,000. … In the Russian army, the discontent grew with the retreating movement; … they began to murmur as much against Bagration as against Barclay. It was then that Alexander united the two armies under the supreme command of Koutouzof. … Koutouzof halted at Borodino. He had then 72,000 infantry, 18,000 regular cavalry, 7,000 Cossacks, 10,000 opoltchénié or militiamen, and 640 guns served by 14,000 artillerymen or pioneers; in all, 121,000 men. Napoleon had only been able to concentrate 86,000 infantry, 28,000 cavalry, and 587 guns, served by 16,000 pioneers or artillerymen. … On the 5th of September the French took the redoubt of Chevardino; the 7th was the day of the great battle: this was known as the battle of Borodino among the Russians, as that of the Moskowa in the bulletins of Napoleon, though the Moskowa flows at some distance from the field of carnage. … The battle began by a frightful cannonade of 1,200 guns, which was heard 30 leagues round. Then the French, with an irresistible charge, took Borodino on one side and the redoubts on the other; Ney and Murat crossed the ravine of Semenevskoé, and cut the Russian army nearly in two. At ten o'clock the battle seemed won, but Napoleon refused to carry out his first success by employing the reserve, and the Russian generals had time to bring up new troops in line. They recaptured the great redoubt, and Platof, the Cossack, made an incursion on the rear of the Italian army; an obstinate fight took place at the outworks. At last Napoleon made his reserve troops advance; again Murat's cavalry swept the ravine; Caulaincourt's cuirassiers assaulted the great redoubt from behind, and flung themselves on it like a tempest, while Eugène of Italy scaled the ramparts. Again the Russians had lost their outworks. Then Koutouzof gave the signal to retreat. … The French had lost 30,000 men, the Russians 40,000. … Koutouzof retired in good order, announcing to Alexander that they had made a steady resistance, but were retreating to protect Moscow." But after a council of war, he decided to leave Moscow to its fate, and the retreating Russian army passed through and beyond the city, and the French entered it at their heels.

_A. Rambaud, History of Russia, volume 2, chapter 12._

{2770}

"The facts prove beyond doubt that Napoleon did not foresee the danger of an advance upon Moscow, and that Alexander I. and the Russian generals never dreamed of trying to draw him into the heart of the country. Napoleon was led on, not by any plan,—a plan had never been thought of,—but by the intrigues, quarrels, and ambition of men who unconsciously played a part in this terrible war and never foresaw that the result would be the safety of Russia. … Amid these quarrels and intrigues, we are trying to meet the French, although ignorant of their whereabouts. The French encounter Neverovski's division, and approach the walls of Smolensk. It is impossible not to give battle at Smolensk. We must maintain our communications. The battle takes place, and thousands of men on both sides are killed. Contrary to the wishes of the tsar and the people, our generals abandon Smolensk. The inhabitants of Smolensk, betrayed by their governor, set fire to the city, and, with this example to other Russian towns, they take refuge in Moscow, deploring their losses and sowing on every side the seeds of hate against the enemy. Napoleon advances and we retreat, and the result is that we take exactly the measures necessary to conquer the French."

_Count L. Tolstoi, The Physiology of War: Napoleon and the Russian Campaign, chapter 1._

ALSO IN: _C. Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I., volume 2, chapter 4._

_Baron Jomini, Life of Napoleon, chapter 18 (volume 3)._

_Count P. de Segur, History of the Expedition to Russia, books 1-8 (volumes 1-2)._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (September). The French in Moscow. The burning of the city.

"With rapid steps the French army advanced towards the heights whence they hoped to perceive at length the great city of Moscow; and, if the Russians were filled with the utmost sadness, the hearts of the French were equally inspired with feelings of joy and triumph, and the most brilliant illusions. Reduced from 420,000 (which was its number at the passage of the Niemen) to 100,000, and utterly exhausted, our army forgot all its troubles on its approach to the brilliant capital of Muscovy. … Imagination … was strongly excited within them at the idea of entering Moscow, after having entered all the other capitals of Europe with the exception of London, protected by the sea. Whilst Prince Eugene advanced on the left of the army, and Prince Poniatowski on its right, the bulk of the army, with Murat at its head, Davout and Ney in the centre, and the Guard in the rear, followed the great Smolensk road. Napoleon was in the midst of his troops, who, as they gazed upon him and drew near to Moscow, forgot the days of discontent, and uttered loud shouts in honour of his glory and their own. The proposal submitted by Miloradovitch was readily accepted, for the French had no desire to destroy Moscow, and it was agreed that not a shot should be fired during the evacuation, on condition that the Russian army should continue to defile across the city without a moment's halt. … The Russian rear-guard defiled rapidly to yield the ground to our advanced guard, and the King of Naples, followed by his staff and a detachment of cavalry, plunged into the streets of Moscow, and, traversing by turns the humblest quarters and the wealthiest, perceived everywhere the most profound solitude, and seemed to have entered a city of the dead. … The information which was now obtained—that the whole population of the city had fled—saddened the exultation of the commanders of our advanced guard, who had flattered themselves that they would have had the pleasure of surprising the inhabitants by their kindness. … On the morning of the 15th September, Napoleon entered Moscow, at the head of his invincible legions, but passed through a deserted city, and his soldiers were now, for the first time on entering a capital, the sole witnesses of their own glory. Their feelings on the occasion were sad ones. As soon as Napoleon had reached the Kremlin, he hastened to ascend the lofty tower of the great Ivan, and to survey from its elevation the magnificent city he had conquered. … A sullen silence, broken only by the tramp of the cavalry, had replaced that populous life which during the very previous evening had rendered the city one of the most animated in the world. The army was distributed through the various quarters of Moscow, Prince Eugene occupying the northwest quarter, Marshal Davout the southwest, and Prince Poniatowski the southeast. Marshal Ney, who had traversed Moscow from west to east, established his troops in the district comprised between the Riazan and Wladimir roads; and the Guard was naturally posted at the Kremlin and in its environs. The houses were full of provisions of every kind, and the first necessities of the troops were readily satisfied. The Superior officers were received at the gates of palaces by numerous servants in livery, eager in offering a brilliant hospitality; for the owners of these palaces, perfectly unaware that Moscow was about to perish, had taken great pains, although they fully shared the national hatred against the French, to procure protectors for their rich dwellings by receiving into them French officers. … From their splendid lodgings, the officers of the French army wandered with equal delight through the midst of the city, which resembled a Tartar camp sown with Italian palaces. They contemplated with wonder the numerous towns of which the capital is composed, and which are placed in concentric circles, the one within the other. … A few days before, Moscow had contained a population of 300,000 souls, of whom scarcely a sixth part now remained, and of these the greater number were concealed in their houses or prostrated at the foot of the altars. The streets were deserts, and only echoed with the footsteps of our soldiers. … But although the solitude of the city was a source of great vexation to them, they had no suspicion of any approaching catastrophe, for the Russian army, which alone had hitherto devastated their country, had departed, and there appeared to be no fear of fire. The French army hoped, therefore, to enjoy comfort in Moscow, to obtain, probably, peace by means of its possession, and at least good winter-cantonments in case the war should be prolonged. But, on the afternoon they had entered, columns of flame arose from a vast building containing … quantities of spirits, and just as our soldiers had almost succeeded in mastering the fire in this spot, a violent conflagration suddenly burst forth in a collection of buildings called the Bazaar, situated to the northeast of the Kremlin, and containing the richest magazines, abounding in stores of the exquisite tissues of India and Persia, the rarities of Europe, colonial produce, and precious wines. The troops of the Guard immediately hastened up and attempted to subdue the flames; but their energetic efforts were unfortunately unsuccessful, and the immense riches of the establishment fell a prey to the fire, with the exception of some portions which our men were able to snatch from the devouring element. {2771} This fresh accident was again attributed to natural causes, and considered as easily explicable in the tumult of an evacuation. During the night of the 15th of September, however, a sudden change came over the scene; for then as though every species of misfortune were to fall at the same moment on the ancient Muscovite capital, the equinoctial gales suddenly arose with the extreme violence usual to the season and in countries where widespread plains offer no resistance to the storm. This wind, blowing first from the east, carried the fire to the west into the streets comprised between the Iwer and Smolensk routes, which were the most beautiful and the richest in all Moscow. Within some hours the fire, spreading with frightful rapidity, and throwing out long arrows of flame, spread to the other westward quarters. And soon rockets were observed in the air, and wretches were seized in the act of spreading the conflagration. Interrogated under threat of instant death, they revealed the frightful secret,—the order given by Count Rostopschin for the burning of the city of Moscow as though it had been a simple village on the Moscow route. This information filled the whole army with consternation. Napoleon ordered that military commissions should be formed in each quarter of the city for the purpose of judging, shooting, and hanging incendiaries taken in the act, and that all the available troops should be employed in extinguishing the flames. Immediate recourse was had to the pumps, but it was found they had been removed; and this latter circumstance would have proved, if indeed any doubt on the matter had remained, the terrible determination with which Moscow had been given to the flames. In the mean time, the wind, increasing in violence every moment, rendered the efforts of the whole army ineffectual, and, suddenly changing, with the abruptness peculiar to equinoctial gales, from the east to the northwest, it carried the torrent of flame into quarters which the hands of the incendiaries had not yet been able to fire. After having blown during some hours from the northwest, the wind once more changed its direction, and blew from the southwest, as though it had a cruel pleasure in spreading ruin and death over the unhappy city, or, rather, over our army. By this change of the wind to the southwest the Kremlin was placed in extreme peril. More than 400 ammunition wagons were in the court of the Kremlin, and the arsenal contained some 400,000 pounds of powder. There was imminent danger, therefore, that Napoleon with his Guard, and the palace of the Czars, might be blown up into the air. … Napoleon, therefore, followed by some of his lieutenants, descended from the Kremlin to the quay of the Moskowa, where he found his horses ready for him, and had much difficulty in threading the streets, which, towards the northwest (in which direction he proceeded), were already in flames. The terrified army set out from Moscow. The divisions of Prince Eugene and Marshal Ney fell back upon the Zwenigarod and St. Petersburg roads, those of Marshal Davout fell back upon the Smolensk route, and, with the exception of the Guard, which was left around the Kremlin to dispute its possession with the flames, our troops drew back in horror from before the fire, which, after flaming up to heaven, darted back towards them as though it wished to devour them. The few inhabitants who had remained in Moscow, and had hitherto lain concealed in their dwellings, now fled, carrying away such of their possessions as they valued most highly, uttering lamentable cries of distress, and, in many instances, falling victims to the brigands whom Rostopochin had let loose, and who now exulted in the midst of the conflagration, as the genius of evil in the midst of chaos. Napoleon took up his quarters at the Château of Petrowskoié, a league's distance from Moscow on the St. Petersburg route, in the centre of the cantonments of the troops under Prince Eugene, awaiting there the subsidence of the conflagration, which had now reached such a height that it was beyond human power either to increase or extinguish it. As a final misfortune the wind changed on the following day from southwest to direct west, and then the torrents of flame were carried towards the eastern quarters of the city, the streets Messnitskaia and Bassmanaia, and the summer palace. As the conflagration reached its terrible height, frightful crashes were heard every moment,—roofs crushing inward, and stately façades crumbling headlong into the streets as their supports became consumed in the flames. The sky was scarcely visible through the thick cloud of smoke which overshadowed it, and the sun was only apparent as a blood-red globe. For three successive days—the 16th, the 17th, and the 18th of September—this terrific scene continued, and in unabated intensity. At length, after having devoured four-fifths of the city, the fire ceased, gradually quenched by the rain, which, as is usually the case, succeeded the violence of the equinoctial gales. As the flames subsided, only the spectre, as it were, of what had once been a magnificent city was visible; and, indeed, the Kremlin, and about a fifth part of the city, were alone saved,—their preservation being chiefly due to the exertions of the Imperial Guard. As the inhabitants of Moscow themselves entered the ruins, seeking what property still remained in them undestroyed, it was scarcely possible to prevent our soldiers from acting in the same manner. … Of this horrible scene the chiefest horror of all remains to be told: the Russians had left 15,000 wounded in Moscow, and, incapable of escaping, they had perished, victims of Rostopschin's barbarous patriotism."

_A. Thiers, History of the] Consulate and the Empire, book 44 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN: _General Count M. Dumas, Memoirs, chapter 15 (volume 2)._

_J. Philippart, Northern Campaigns, 1812-1813, volume 1, pages 81-115._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (October-December). The retreat from Moscow. Its horrors.