Part 864

"The first battle was fought (218) on the river Ticinus, which runs into the Padus from the north. The Romans were driven back, and Hannibal passed the Padus. Meanwhile another Roman army had come up, and its general, the consul, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, wanted to fight at once. The little river of the Trebbia lay between the two armies, and on a cold morning the Roman general marched his soldiers through the water against Hannibal. The Romans were entirely beaten, and driven out of Gaul. All northern Italy had thus passed under Hannibal's power, and its people were his friends; so next year, 217, Hannibal went into Etruria, and marched south towards Rome itself, plundering as he went. The Roman consul, Caius Flaminius Nepos, went to meet him, and a battle was fought on the shores of the Lake Trasimenus. It was a misty day, and the Romans, who were marching after Hannibal, were surrounded by him and taken by surprise: they were entirely beaten, and the consul was killed in battle. Then the Romans were in great distress, and elected a dictator, Quintus Fabius Maximus. He saw that it was no use to fight battles with Hannibal, so he followed him about, and watched him, and did little things against him when he could; so he was called 'Cunctator,' or 'the Delayer.' But, although this plan of waiting was very useful, the Romans did not like it, for Hannibal was left to plunder as he thought fit, and there was always danger that the other Italians would join him against Rome. So next year, 216, the Romans made a great attempt to get rid of him. They sent both the consuls with an army twice as large as Hannibal's, but again they were defeated at Cannæ. They lost 70,000 men, while Hannibal only lost 6,000; all their best soldiers were killed, and it seemed as though they had no hope left. But nations are not conquered only by the loss of battles. Hannibal hoped, after the battle of Cannæ, that the Italians would all come to his side, and leave Rome. Some did so, but all the Latin cities, and all the Roman colonies held by Rome. So long as this was the case, Rome was not yet conquered. Hannibal could win battles very quickly, but it would take him a long time to besiege all the cities that still held to Rome, and for that he must have a larger army. But he could not get more soldiers,—the Romans had sent an army into Spain, and Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, was busy fighting the Romans there, and could not send any troops to Italy. The Carthaginians also would not send any, for they were becoming afraid of Hannibal, and they did not know anything about Italy. So they answered his letters, asking for more men, by saying, that if he had won such great battles, he ought not to want any more troops. {2677} At Cannæ, then, Hannibal had struck his greatest blow: he could do no more. The Romans had learned to wait, and be careful: so they fought no more great battles, but every year they grew stronger and Hannibal grew weaker. The chief town that had gone over to Hannibal's side was Capua, but in 211 the Romans took it again, and Hannibal was not strong enough to prevent them. The chief men of Capua were so afraid of falling into the hands of the Romans that they all poisoned themselves. After this all the Italian cities that had joined Hannibal began to leave him again."

_M. Creighton, History of Rome, chapter 3._

ALSO IN: _T. A. Dodge, Hannibal, chapters 11-39._

_T. Arnold, History of Rome, chapters 43-47._

See, also, PUNIC WAR, THE SECOND.

ROME: B. C. 214-146. The Macedonian Wars. Conquest of Greece.

See GREECE: B. C. 214-146; also 280-146.

ROME: B. C. 211. The Second Punic War: Hannibal at the gates.

In the eighth year of the Second Punic War (B. C. 211), when fortune had begun to desert the arms of Hannibal—when Capua, his ally and mainstay in Italy was under siege by the Romans and he was powerless to relieve the doomed senators and citizens—the Carthaginian commander made a sudden march upon Rome. He moved his army to the gates of his great enemy, "not with any hope of taking the city, but with the hope that the Romans, panic-stricken at the realization of a fear they had felt for five years past, would summon the consuls from the walls of Capua. But the cool head of Fabius, who was in Rome, guessed the meaning of that manœuvre, and would only permit one of the consuls, Flaccus, to be recalled. Thus the leaguer of the rebel city was not broken. Hannibal failed in his purpose, but he left an indelible impression of his terrible presence upon the Roman mind. Looming through a mist of romantic fable, unconquerable, pitiless, he was actually seen touching the walls of Rome, hurling with his own hand a spear into the sacred Pomoerium. He had marched along the Via Latina, driving crowds of fugitives before him, who sought refuge in the city. … He had fixed his camp on the Anio, within three miles of the Esquiline. To realize the state of feeling in Rome during those days of panic would be to get at the very heart of the Hannibalic war. The Senate left the Curia and sat in the Forum, to reassure, by their calm composure, the excited crowds. Fabius noticed from the battlements that the ravagers spared his property. It was a cunning attempt on the part of Hannibal to bring suspicion on him; but he forthwith offered the property for sale; and such was the effect of his quiet confidence that the market price even of the land on which the camp of the enemy was drawn never fell an 'as.' … Hannibal marched away into the Sabine country, and made his way back to Tarentum, Rome unsacked, Capua unrelieved."

_R. F. Horton, History of the Romans, chapter 12._

ALSO IN: _T. Arnold, History of Rome, chapter 44._

_T. A. Dodge, Hannibal, chapter 34._

ROME: B. C. 211-202. The Second Punic War: Defeat of Hasdrubal at the Metaurus. The war in Africa. The end at Zama. Acquisition of Spain.

"The conquest of Capua was the turning point in the war. Hannibal lost his stronghold in Campania and was obliged to retire to the southern part of Italy. Rome was gaining everywhere. The Italians who had joined Hannibal began to lose confidence. Salapia and many towns in Samnium were betrayed to the Romans. But when Fulvius, the proconsul who commanded in Apulia, appeared before Herdonea, which he hoped to gain possession of by treachery, Hannibal marched from Bruttium, attacked the Roman army, and gained a brilliant victory. In the following year the Romans recovered several places in Lucania and Bruttium, and Fabius Maximus crowned his long military career with the recapture of Tarentum (B. C. 209). The inhabitants were sold as slaves; the town was plundered and the works of art were sent to Rome. The next year Marcellus, for the fifth time elected to the consulship, was surprised near Venusia and killed. … The war had lasted ten years, yet its favorable conclusion seemed far off. There were increasing symptoms of discontent among the allies, while the news from Spain left little doubt that the long prepared expedition of Hasdrubal over the Alps to join his brother in Italy was at last to be realized. Rome strained every nerve to meet the impending danger. The number of legions was increased from twenty-one to twenty-three. The preparations were incomplete, when the news came that Hasdrubal was crossing the Alps by the same route which his brother had taken eleven years before. The consuls for the new year were M. Livius Salinator and G. Claudius Nero. Hannibal, at the beginning of spring, after reorganizing his force in Bruttium, advanced northward, encountered the consul Nero at Grumentum, whence, after a bloody but indecisive battle, he continued his march to Canusium. Here he waited for news from his brother. The expected despatch was intercepted by Nero, who formed the bold resolution of joining his colleague in the north, and with their united armies crushing Hasdrubal while Hannibal was waiting for the expected despatch. Hasdrubal had appointed a rendezvous with his brother in Umbria, whence with their united armies they were both to advance on Narnia and Rome. Nero, selecting from his army 7,000 of the best soldiers and 1,000 cavalry, left his camp so quietly that Hannibal knew nothing of his departure. Near Sena he found his colleague Livius, and in the night entered his camp that his arrival might not be known to the Carthaginians. Hasdrubal, when he heard the trumpet sound twice from the Roman camp and saw the increased numbers, was no longer ignorant that both consuls were in front of him. Thinking that his brother had been defeated, he resolved to retire across the Metaurus and wait for accurate information. Missing his way, wandering up and down the river to find a ford, pursued and attacked by the Romans, he was compelled to accept battle. Although in an unfavorable position, a deep river in his rear, his troops exhausted by marching all night, still the victory long hung in suspense. Hasdrubal displayed all the qualities of a great general, and when he saw that all was lost, he plunged into the thickest of the battle and was slain. The consul returned to Apulia with the same rapidity with which he had come. He announced to Hannibal the defeat and death of his brother by casting Hasdrubal's head within the outposts and by sending two Carthaginian captives to give him an account of the disastrous battle. {2678} 'I foresee the doom of Carthage,' said Hannibal sadly, when he recognized the bloody head of his brother. This battle decided the war in Italy. Hannibal withdrew his garrisons from the towns in southern Italy, retired to the peninsula of Bruttium, where for four long years, in that wild and mountainous country, with unabated courage and astounding tenacity, the dying lion clung to the land that had been so long the theatre of his glory. … The time had come to carry into execution that expedition to Africa which Sempronius had attempted in the beginning of the war. Publius Scipio, on his return from Spain, offered himself for the consulship and was unanimously elected. His design was to carry the war into Africa and in this way compel Carthage to recall Hannibal. … The senate finally consented that he should cross from his province of Sicily to Africa, but they voted no adequate means for such an expedition. Scipio called for volunteers. The whole of the year B. C. 205 passed away before he completed his preparations. Meanwhile the Carthaginians made one last effort to help Hannibal. Mago, Hannibal's youngest brother, was sent to Liguria with 14,000 men to rouse the Ligurians and Gauls to renew the war on Rome; but having met a Roman army under Quintilius Varus, and being wounded in the engagement which followed, his movements were so crippled that nothing of importance was accomplished. In the spring of B. C. 204 Scipio had completed his preparations. He embarked his army from Lilybæum, and after three days landed at the Fair Promontory near Utica. After laying siege to Utica all summer, he was compelled to fall back and entrench himself on the promontory. Masinissa had joined him immediately on his arrival. By his advice Scipio planned a night attack on Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, and Syphax, who were encamped near Utica. This enterprise was completely successful. A short time afterwards Hasdrubal and Syphax were again defeated. Syphax fled to Numidia, where he was followed by Lælius and Masinissa and compelled to surrender. These successes convinced the Carthaginians that with the existing forces the Roman invasion could not long be resisted. Therefore they opened negotiations for peace with Scipio, in order probably to gain time to recall their generals from Italy. The desire of Scipio to bring the war to a conclusion induced him to agree upon preliminaries of peace, subject to the approval of the Roman senate and people. … Meanwhile the arrival of Hannibal at Hadrumetum had so encouraged the Carthaginians that the armistice had been broken before the return of the ambassadors from Rome. All hopes of peace by negotiation vanished, and Scipio prepared to renew the war, which, since the arrival of Hannibal, had assumed a more serious character. The details of the operations which ended in the battle of Zama are but imperfectly known. The decisive battle was fought on the river Bagradas, near Zama, on the 19th of October, B. C. 202. Hannibal managed the battle with his usual skill. His veterans fought like the men who had so often conquered in Italy, but his army was annihilated. The elephants were rendered unavailing by Scipio's skillful management. Instead of the three lines of battle, with the usual intervals, Scipio arranged his companies behind each other like the rounds of a ladder. Through these openings the elephants could pass without breaking the line. This battle terminated the long struggle. … Hannibal himself advised peace."

_R. F. Leighton, History of Rome, chapters 23-24._

"Scipio prepared as though he would besiege the city, but his heart also inclined to peace. … The terms which he offered were severe enough, and had the Carthaginians only realised what they involved, they would surely have asked to be allowed to meet their fate at once. They were to retain indeed their own laws and their home domain in Africa; but they were to give up all the deserters and prisoners of war, all their elephants, and all their ships of the line but ten. They were not to wage war, either in Africa or outside of it, without the sanction of the Roman Senate. They were to recognise Massinissa as the king of Numidia, and, with it, the prescriptive right which he would enjoy of plundering and annoying them at his pleasure, while they looked on with their hands tied, not daring to make reprisals. Finally, they were to give up all claim to the rich islands of the Mediterranean and to the Spanish kingdom, the creation of the Barcides, of which the fortune of war had already robbed them; and thus shorn of the sources of their wealth, they were to pay within a given term of seven years a crushing war contribution! Henceforward, in fact, they would exist on sufferance only, and that the sufferance of the Romans. … The conclusion of the peace was celebrated at Carthage by a cruel sight, the most cruel which the citizens could have beheld, except the destruction of the city itself—the destruction of their fleet. Five hundred vessels, the pride and glory of the Phœnician race, the symbol and the seal of the commerce, the colonisation, and the conquests of this most imperial of Phœnician cities, were towed out of the harbour and were deliberately burned in the sight of the citizens."

_R. B. Smith, Rome and Carthage: the Punic Wars, chapter 17._

ALSO IN: _H. G. Liddell, History of Rome, chapters 31-34._

See, also. PUNIC WAR: THE SECOND.

ROME: B. C. 2d Century. Greek influences.

See HELLENIC GENIUS AND INFLUENCE.

ROME: B. C. 191. War with Antiochus the Great of Syria. First conquests in Asia Minor bestowed on the king of Pergamum and the Republic of Rhodes.

See SELEUCIDÆ: B. U. 224-187.

ROME: B. C. 189-139. Wars with the Lusitanians.

See PORTUGAL: EARLY HISTORY; and LUSITANIA.

ROME: B. C. 184-149. The Spoils of Conquest and the Corruption they wrought.

"The victories of the last half-century seemed to promise ease and wealth to Rome. She was to live on the spoils and revenue from the conquered countries. Not only did they pay a fixed tax to her exchequer, but the rich lands of Capua, the royal domain lands of the kings of Syracuse and of Macedonia, became public property, and produced a large annual rent. It was found possible in 167 to relieve citizens from the property tax or tributum, which was not collected again until the year after the death of Julius Caesar. But the sudden influx of wealth had the usual effect of raising the standard of expense; and new tastes and desires required increased means for their gratification. All manner of luxuries were finding their way into the city from the East. {2679} Splendid furniture, costly ornaments, wanton dances and music for their banquets, became the fashion among the Roman nobles; and the younger men went to lengths of debauchery and extravagance hitherto unknown. The result to many was financial embarrassment, from which relief was sought in malversation and extortion. The old standard of honour in regard to public money was distinctly lowered, and cases of misconduct and oppression were becoming more common and less reprobated. … The fashionable taste for Greek works of art, in the adornment of private houses, was another incentive to plunder, and in 149 it was for the first time found necessary to establish a permanent court or 'quaestio' for cases of malversation in the provinces. Attempts were indeed made to restrain the extravagance which was at the root of the evil. In 184 Cato, as censor, had imposed a tax on the sale of slaves under twenty above a certain price, and on personal ornaments above a certain value; and though the 'lex Oppia,' limiting the amount of women's jewelry, had been repealed in spite of him in 195, other sumptuary laws were passed. A 'lex Orchia' in 182 limited the number of guests, a 'lex Fannia' in 161 the amount to be spent on banquets; while a 'lex Didia' in 143 extended the operation of the law to all Italy. And though such laws, even if enforced, could not really remedy the evil, they perhaps had a certain effect in producing a sentiment; for long afterwards we find overcrowded dinners regarded as indecorous and vulgar. Another cause, believed by some to be unfavourably affecting Roman character, was the growing influence of Greek culture and Greek teachers. For many years the education of the young, once regarded as the special business of the parents, had been passing into the hands of Greek slaves or freedmen. … On the superiority of Greek culture there was a division of opinion. The Scipios and their party patronised Greek philosophy and literature. … This tendency, which went far beyond a mere question of literary taste, was opposed by a party of which M. Porcius Cato was the most striking member. … In Cato's view the reform needed was a return to the old ways, before Rome was infected by Greece."

_E. S. Shuckburgh, History of Rome to the Battle of Actium, chapter 32._

ROME: B. C. 159-133. Decline of the Republic. Social and economic causes. The growing system of Slavery and its effects. Monopoly of land by capitalists. Extinction of small cultivators. Rapid decrease of citizens.