Part 86

"The ancient alliance of the crown of France with the Ottoman Porte, always unpopular, and less necessary since France had become so strong, was at this moment [early in the reign of Louis XIV.] well-nigh broken, to the great satisfaction both of the Christian nations of the South and of the Austrian empire. … Divers plans were proposed in the King's council for attacking the Ottoman power on the Moorish coasts, and for repressing the pirates, who were the terror of the merchant-shipping and maritime provinces. Colbert induced the king to attempt a military settlement among the Moors as the best means of holding them in check. A squadron commanded by the Duke de Beaufort … landed 5,000 picked soldiers before Jijeli (or Djigelli), a small Algerine port between Bougiah and Bona. They took possession of Jijeli without difficulty (July 22, 1664); but discord arose between Beaufort and his officers; they did not work actively enough to fortify themselves," and before the end of September they were obliged to evacuate the place precipitately. "The success of Beaufort's squadron, commanded under the duke by the celebrated Chevalier Paul, ere long effaced the impression of this reverse: two Algerine flotillas were destroyed in the course of 1665." The Dey of Algiers sent one of his French captives, an officer named Du Babinais, to France with proposals of peace, making him swear to return if his mission failed. The proposals were rejected; Du Babinais was loyal to his oath and returned—to suffer death, as he expected, at the hands of the furious barbarian. "The devotion of this Breton Regulus was not lost: despondency soon took the place of anger in the heart of the Moorish chiefs. Tunis yielded first to the guns of the French squadron, brought to bear on it from the Bay of Goletta. The Pacha and the Divan of Tunis obligated themselves to restore all the French slaves they possessed, to respect French ships, and thenceforth to release all Frenchmen whom they should capture on foreign ships. …. Rights of aubaine, and of admiralty and shipwreck, were suppressed as regarded Frenchmen (November 25, 1665). The station at Cape Negro was restored to France. … Algiers submitted, six' months after, to nearly the same conditions imposed on it by Louis XIV.: one of the articles stipulated that French merchants should be treated as favorably as any foreign nation, and even more so (May 17, 1666). More than 3,000 French slaves were set at liberty." Between 1669 and 1672, Louis XIV. was seriously meditating a great war of conquest with the Turks and their dependencies, but preferred, finally, to enter upon his war with Holland, which brought the other project to naught. France and the Ottoman empire then remained on tolerably good terms until 1681, when a "squadron of Tripolitan corsairs having carried off a French ship on the coast of Provence, Duquesne, at the head of seven vessels, pursued the pirates into the waters of Greece. They took refuge in the harbor of Scio. Duquesne summoned the Pacha of Scio to expel them. The Pacha refused, and fired on the French squadron, when Duquesne cannonaded both the pirates and the town with such violence that the Pacha, terrified, asked for a truce, in order to refer the matter to the Sultan (July 23, 1681). Duquesne converted the attack into a blockade. At the news of this violation of the Ottoman territory, the Sultan, Mahomet IV., fell into a rage … and dispatched the Captain-Pacha to Scio with 32 galleys. Duquesne allowed the Turkish galleys to enter the harbor, then blockaded them with the pirates, and declared that he would burn the whole if satisfaction were not had of the Tripolitans. The Divan hesitated. War was about to recommence with the Emperor; it was not the moment to kindle it against France." In the end there was a compromise, and the Tripolitans gave up the French vessel and the slaves they had captured, promising, also, to receive a French consul at Tripoli. "During this time another squadron, commanded by Château-Renault, blockaded the coasts of Morocco, the men of Maghreb having rivalled in depredations the vassals of Turkey. The powerful Emperor of Morocco, Muley Ismael, sent the governor of Tetuan to France to solicit peace of Louis XIV. The treaty was signed at Saint-Germain, January 29, 1682, on advantageous conditions," including restitution of French slaves. "Affairs did not terminate so amicably with Algiers. From this piratical centre had proceeded the gravest offenses. A captain of the royal navy was held in slavery there, with many other Frenchmen. It was resolved to inflict a terrible punishment on the Algerines. The thought of conquering Algeria had more than once presented itself to the king and Colbert, and they appreciated the value of this conquest; the Jijeli expedition had been formerly a first attempt. They did not, however, deem it incumbent on them to embark in such an enterprise; a descent, a siege, would have required too great preparations; they had recourse· to another means of attack. The regenerator of the art of naval construction, Petit-Renau, invented bomb-ketches expressly for the purpose. … July 23, 1682, Duquesne anchored before Algiers, with 11 ships, 15 galleys, 5 bomb-ketches, and Petit-Renau to guide them. After five weeks' delay caused by bad weather, then by a fire on one of the bomb-ketches, the thorough trial took place during the night of August 30. The effect was terrible: a part of the great mosque fell on the crowd that had taken refuge there. During the night of September 3-4, the Algerines attempted to capture the bomb-ketches moored at the entrance of their harbor; they were repulsed, and the bombardment continued. The Dey wished to negotiate; the people, exasperated, prevented him. The wind shifting to the northwest presaged the equinoctial storm; Duquesne set sail again, September 12. The expedition had not been decisive. It was begun anew. June 18, 1683, Duquesne reappeared in the road of Algiers; he had, this time, seven bomb-ketches instead of five. These instruments of extermination had been perfected in the interval. The nights of June 26-27 witnessed the overthrow of a great number of houses, several mosques, and the palace of the Dey. A thousand men perished in the harbor and the town." The Dey opened negotiations, giving up 700 French slaves, but was killed by his Janizaries, and one Hadgi-Hussein proclaimed in his stead. {263} "The bombardment was resumed with increasing violence. … The Algerines avenged themselves by binding to the muzzles of their guns a number of Frenchmen who remained in their hands. … The fury of the Algerines drew upon them redoubled calamities. … The bombs rained almost without intermission. The harbor was strewn with the wrecks of vessels. The city was … a heap of bloody ruins." But "the bomb-ketches had exhausted their ammunition. September was approaching. Duquesne again departed; but a strong blockading force was kept up, during the whole winter, as a standing threat of the return of the 'infernal vessels.' The Algerines finally bowed their head, and, April 25, 1684, peace was accorded by Tourville, the commander of the blockade, to the Pacha, Dey, Divan, and troops of Algiers. The Algerines restored 320 French slaves remaining in their power, and 180 other Christians claimed by the King; the janizaries only which had been taken from them were restored; they engaged to make no prizes within ten leagues of the coast of France, nor to assist the other Moorish corsairs at war with France; to recognize the precedence of the flag of France over all other flags, &c., &c.; lastly, they sent an embassy to carry their submission to Louis XIV.; they did not, however, pay the damages which Duquesne had wished to exact of them."

_H. Martin, History of France: Age of Louis XIV., volume 1, chapters 4 and 7._

BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1785-1801. Piratical depredations upon American commerce. Humiliating treaties and tribute. The example of resistance given by the United States.

"It is difficult for us to realize that only 70 years ago the Mediterranean was so unsafe that the merchant ships of every nation stood in danger of being captured by pirates, unless they were protected either by an armed convoy or by tribute paid to the petty Barbary powers. Yet we can scarcely open a book of travels during the last century without mention being made of the immense risks to which everyone was exposed who ventured by sea from Marseilles to Naples. … The European states, in order to protect their commerce, had the choice either of paying certain sums per head for each captive, which in reality was a premium on capture, or of buying entire freedom for their commerce by the expenditure of large sums yearly. The treaty renewed by France, in 1788, with Algiers, was for fifty years, and it was agreed to pay $200,000 annually, besides large presents distributed according to custom every ten years, and a great sum given down. The peace of Spain with Algiers is said to have cost from three to five millions of dollars. There is reason to believe that at the same time England was paying an annual tribute of about $280,000. England was the only power sufficiently strong on the sea to put down these pirates; but in order to keep her own position as mistress of the seas she preferred to leave them in existence in order to be a scourge to the commerce of other European powers, and even to support them by paying a sum so great that other states might find it difficult to make peace with them. When the Revolution broke out, we [of the United States of America] no longer had the safeguards for our commerce that had been given to us by England, and it was therefore that in our very first negotiations for a treaty with France we desired to have an article inserted into the treaty, that the king of France should secure the inhabitants of the United States, and their vessels and effects, against all attacks or depredations from any of the Barbary powers. It was found impossible to insert this article in the treaty of 1778, and instead of that the king agreed to 'employ his good offices and interposition in order to provide as fully and efficaciously as possible for the benefit, conveniency and safety of the United States against the princes and the states of Barbary or their subjects.'"

Direct negotiations between the United States and the piratical powers were opened in 1785, by a call which Mr. Adams made upon the Tripolitan ambassador. The latter announced to Mr. Adams that "'Turkey, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco were the sovereigns of the Mediterranean; and that no nation could navigate that sea without a treaty of peace with them.' … The ambassador demanded as the lowest price for a perpetual peace 30,000 guineas for his employers and £3,000 for himself; that Tunis would probably treat on the same terms; but he could not answer for Algiers or Morocco. Peace with all four powers would cost at least $1,000,000, and Congress had appropriated only $80,000. … Mr. Adams was strongly opposed to war, on account of the expense, and preferred the payment of tribute. … Mr. Jefferson quite as decidedly preferred war." The opinion in favor of a trial of pacific negotiations prevailed, and a treaty with the Emperor of Morocco was concluded in 1787. An attempt at the same time to make terms with the Del of Algiers and to redeem a number of American captives in his hands, came to nothing. "For the sake of saving a few thousand dollars, fourteen men were allowed to remain in imprisonment for ten years. … In November, 1793, the number of [American] prisoners at Algiers amounted to 115 men, among whom there remained only ten of the original captives of 1785." At last, the nation began to realize the intolerable shame of the matter, and, "on January 2, 1794, the House of Representatives resolved that a 'naval force adequate for the protection of the commerce of the United States against the AIgerine forces ought to be provided.' In the same year authority was given to build six frigates, and to procure ten smaller vessels to be equipped as galleys. Negotiations, however, continued to go on," and in September, 1795, a treaty with the Dey was concluded. "In making this treaty, however, we had been obliged to follow the usage of European powers—not only pay a large sum for the purpose of obtaining peace, but an annual tribute, in order to keep our vessels from being captured in the future. The total cost of fulfilling the treaty was estimated at $992,463. 25."

_E. Schuyler, American Diplomacy, part 4._

"The first treaty of 1795, with Algiers, which was negotiated during Washington's administration, cost the United States, for the ransom of American captives, and the Dey's forbearance, a round $1,000,000, in addition to which an annuity was promised. Treaties with other Barbary States followed, one of which purchased peace from Tripoli by the payment of a gross sum. Nearly $2,000,000 had been squandered thus far in bribing these powers to respect our flag, and President Adams complained in 1800 that the United States had to pay three times the tribute imposed upon Sweden and Denmark. {264} But this temporizing policy only made matters worse. Captain Bainbridge arrived at Algiers in 1800, bearing the annual tribute money for the Dey in a national frigate, and the Dey ordered him to proceed to Constantinople to deliver Algerine dispatches. 'English, French, and Spanish ships of war have done the same,' said the Dey, insolently, when Bainbridge and the American consul remonstrated. 'You pay me tribute because you are my slaves.' Bainbridge had to obey. … The lesser Barbary States were still more exasperating. The Bashaw of Tripoli had threatened to seize American vessels unless President Adams sent him a present like that bestowed upon Algiers. The Bashaw of Tunis made a similar demand upon the new President [Jefferson]. … Jefferson had, while in Washington's cabinet, expressed his detestation of the method hitherto favored for pacifying these pests of commerce; and, availing himself of the present favorable opportunity, he sent out Commodore Dale with a squadron of three frigates and a sloop of war, to make a naval demonstration on the coast of Barbary. … Commodore Dale, upon arriving at Gibraltar [July, 1801], found two Tripolitan cruisers watching for American vessels; for, as had been suspected, Tripoli already meditated war. The frigate Philadelphia blockaded these vessels, while Bainbridge, with the frigate Essex, convoyed American vessels in the Mediterranean. Dale, in the frigate President, proceeded to cruise off Tripoli, followed by the schooner Experiment, which presently captured a Tripolitan cruiser of 14 guns after a spirited action. The Barbary powers were for a time overawed, and the United States thus set the first example among Christian nations of making reprisals instead of ransom the rule of security against these commercial marauders. In this respect Jefferson's conduct was applauded at home by men of all parties."

_J. Schouler, History of the United States, chapter 5, section 1 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN: _R. L. Playfair, The Scourge of Christendom, chapter 16._

BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1803-1805. American War with the pirates of Tripoli.

"The war with Tripoli dragged tediously along, and seemed no nearer its end at the close of 1803 than 18 months before. Commodore Morris, whom the President sent to command the Mediterranean squadron, cruised from port to port between May, 1802, and August, 1803, convoying merchant vessels from Gibraltar to Leghorn and Malta, or lay in harbor and repaired his ships, but neither blockaded nor molested Tripoli; until at length, June 21, 1803, the President called him home and dismissed him from the service. His successor was Commodore Preble, who Sept. 12, 1803, reached Gibraltar with the relief-squadron which Secretary Gallatin thought unnecessarily strong. … He found Morocco taking part with Tripoli. Captain Bainbridge, who reached Gibraltar in the 'Philadelphia' August 24, some three weeks before Preble arrived, caught in the neighborhood a Moorish cruiser of 22 guns with an American brig in its clutches. Another American brig had just been seized at Mogador. Determined to stop this peril at the outset, Preble united to his own squadron the ships which he had come to relieve, and with this combined force, … sending the 'Philadelphia' to blockade Tripoli, he crossed to Tangiers October 6, and brought the Emperor of Morocco to reason. On both sides prizes and prisoners were restored, and the old treaty was renewed, This affair consumed time; and when at length Preble got the 'Constitution' under way for the Tripolitan coast, he spoke [to] a British frigate off the Island of Sardinia, which reported that the 'Philadelphia' had been captured October 21, more than three weeks before. Bainbridge, cruising off Tripoli, had chased a Tripolitan cruiser into shoal water, and was hauling off, when the frigate struck on a reef at the mouth of the harbor. Every effort was made without success to float her; but at last she was surrounded by Tripolitan gunboats, and Bainbridge struck his flag. The Tripolitans, after a few days work, floated the frigate, and brought her under the guns of the castle. The officers became prisoners of war, and the crew, in number 300 or more, were put to hard labor. The affair was in no way discreditable to the squadron. … The Tripolitans gained nothing except the prisoners; for at Bainbridge's suggestion Preble, some time afterward, ordered Stephen Decatur, a young lieutenant in command of the 'Enterprise', to take a captured Tripolitan craft renamed the 'Intrepid,' and with a crew of 75 men to sail from Syracuse, enter the harbor of Tripoli by night, board the 'Philadelphia,' and burn her under the castle guns. The order was literally obeyed. Decatur ran into the harbor at ten o'clock in the night of February 16, 1804, boarded the frigate within half gun-shot of the Pacha's castle, drove the Tripolitan crew overboard, set the ship on fire, remained alongside until the flames were beyond control, and then withdrew without losing a man."

_H. Adams, History of the United States: Administration of Jefferson, volume 2, chapter 7._

"Commodore Preble, in the meantime, hurried his preparations for more serious work, and on July 25th arrived off Tripoli with a squadron, consisting of the frigate Constitution, three brigs, three schooners, six gunboats, and two bomb vessels. Opposed to him were arrayed over a hundred guns mounted on shore batteries, nineteen gunboats, one ten-gun brig, two schooners mounting eight guns each, and twelve galleys. Between August 3rd and September 3rd five attacks were made, and though the town was never reduced, substantial damage was inflicted, and the subsequent satisfactory peace rendered possible. Preble was relieved by Barron in September, not because of any loss of confidence in his ability, but from exigencies of the service, which forbade the Government sending out an officer junior to him in the relief squadron which reinforced his own. Upon his return to the United States he was presented with a gold medal, and the thanks of Congress were tendered him, his officers, and men, for gallant and faithful services. The blockade was maintained vigorously, and in 1805 an attack was made upon the Tripolitan town of Derna, by a combined land and naval force; the former being under command of Consul-General Eaton, who had been a captain in the American army, and of Lieutenant O'Bannon of the Marines. The enemy made a spirited though disorganized defence, but the shells of the war-ships drove them from point to point, and finally their principal work was carried by the force under O'Bannon and Midshipman Mann. Eaton was eager to press forward, but he was denied reinforcements and military stores, and much of his advantage was lost. {265} All further operations were, however, discontinued in June, 1805, when, after the usual intrigues, delays, and prevarications, a treaty was signed by the Pasha, which provided that no further tribute should be exacted, and that American vessels should be forever free of his rovers. Satisfactory as was this conclusion, the uncomfortable fact remains that tribute entered into the settlement. After all the prisoners had been exchanged man for man, the Tripolitan Government demanded, and the United States paid, the handsome sum of sixty thousand dollars to close the contract. This treaty, however, awakened the conscience of Europe, and from the day it was signed the power of the Barbary Corsairs began to wane. The older countries saw their duty more clearly, and ceased to legalize robbery on the high seas."

_S. Lane-Poole, Story of the Barbary Corsairs, chapter 20._

ALSO IN: _J. F. Cooper, History of the U. S. Navy, volume 1, chapter 18 and volume 2, chapters 1-7._

_J. F. Cooper, Life of Preble._

_A. S. Mackenzie, Life of Decatur, chapter 3-7._

BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1815. Final War of Algiers with the United States. Death-blow to Algerine piracy.