Part 73

Since the conquest of Silesia by Frederick the Great of Prussia, "he had cast off all reserve. In his extraordinary Court at Potsdam this man of wit and war laughed at God, and at his brother philosophers and sovereigns; he ill-treated Voltaire, the chief organ of the new opinions; he wounded kings and queens with his epigrams; he believed neither in the beauty of Madam de Pompadour nor in the poetical genius of the Abbé Bernis, Prime Minister of France. The Empress thought the moment favourable for the recovery of Silesia; she stirred up Europe, especially the queens; she persuaded the Queen of Poland and the Empress of Russia; she paid court to the mistress of Louis XV. The monstrous alliance of France with the ancient state of Austria against a sovereign who maintained the equilibrium of Germany united all Europe against him. England alone supported him and gave him subsidies. She was governed at that time by a gouty lawyer, the famous William Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham, who raised himself by his eloquence and by his hatred of the French. England wanted two things; the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, and the destruction of the French and Spanish colonies. {221} Her griefs were serious; the Spaniards had ill-treated her smugglers and the French wanted to prevent her from settling on their territory in Canada. In India, La Bourdonnaie and his successor Dupleix threatened to found a great empire in the face of the English. As a declaration of war the English confiscated 300 French ships (1756). The marvel of the war was to see this little kingdom of Prussia, interposed between the huge powers of Austria, France, and Russia, run from one to the other, and defy them all. This was the second period of the art of war. The unskillful adversaries of Frederick thought that he owed all his success to the precision of the manœuvres of the Prussian soldiers, to their excellent drill and rapid firing. Frederick had certainly carried the soldier machine to perfection. This was capable of imitation: the Czar Peter III. and the Count of St. Germin created military automatons by means of the lash. But they could not imitate the quickness of his manœuvres; the happy arrangement of his marches, which gave him great facility for moving and concentrating large masses, and directing them on the weak points of the enemy. In this terrible chase given by the large unwieldy armies of the allies to the agile Prussians, one cannot help noticing the amusing circumspection of the Austrian tacticians and the stupid folly of the fine gentlemen who led the armies of France. The Fabius of Austria, the sage and heavy Daun, was satisfied with a war of positions; he could not find encampments strong enough or mountains sufficiently inaccessible; his stationary troops were always beaten by Frederick. To begin with, he freed himself from the enmity of Saxony. He did not hurt, he only disarmed her. He struck his next blow in Bohemia. Repulsed by the Austrians, and abandoned by the English army, which determined at Kloster-seven to fight no more, threatened by the Russians, who were victorious at Joegerndorf, he passed into Saxony and found the French and Imperialists combined there. Prussia was surrounded by four armies. Frederick fancied himself lost and determined on suicide. He wrote to his sister and to d'Argens announcing his intention. There was only one thing which frightened him: it was, that when once he was dead the great distributor of glory—Voltaire—might make free with his name: he wrote an epistle to disarm him. … Having written this epistle he defeated the enemy at Rosbach. The Prince of Soubise, who thought that he fled, set off rashly in pursuit; then the Prussians unmasked their batteries, killed 3,000 men, and took 7,000 prisoners. In the French camp were found an army of cooks, actors, hair-dressers; a number of parrots, parasols, and huge cases of lavender-water, &c. (1757). None but a tactician could follow the King of Prussia in this series of brilliant and skillful battles. The Seven Years' War, however varied its incidents, was a political and strategical war: it has not the interest of the wars for ideas, the struggles for religion and for freedom of the 16th century and of our own time. The defeat of Rosbach was followed by another at Crevelt, and by great reverses balanced by small advantages; the total ruin of the French navy and colonies; the English masters of the ocean and conquerors of India; the exhaustion and humiliation of old Europe in the presence of young Prussia. This is the history of the Seven Years War. It was terminated under the ministry of the Duke of Choiseul," by the Peace of Hubertsburg and the Peace of Paris.

_J. Michelet, A Summary of Modern History, pages 300-302._

See GERMANY: A. D. 1755-1756, to 1763; and, also, SEVEN YEARS' WAR.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1772-1773. The First Partition of Poland.

See POLAND: A. D. 1763-1773.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1777-1779. The question of the Bavarian Succession.

See BAVARIA: A. D. 1777-1779.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1782-1811. Abolition of Serfdom.

See SLAVERY, MEDIÆVAL: GERMANY.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1787-1791. War with the Turks. Treaty of Sistova. Slight Acquisitions of Territory.

See TURKS: A. D. 1776-1792.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1790-1797. Death of Joseph II. and Leopold II. Accession of Francis II. The Coalition against and war with revolutionary France, to the Peace of Campo Formio.

"It is a mistake to imagine that the European Powers attacked the Revolution in France. It was the Revolution which attacked them. The diplomatists of the 18th century viewed at first with cynical indifference the meeting of the States-General at Versailles. … The two points which occupied the attention of Europe in 1789 were the condition of Poland and the troubles in the East. The ambitious designs of Catherine and the assistance lent to them by Joseph threatened the existence of the Turkish Empire, irritated the Prussian Court, and awakened English apprehensions, always sensitive about the safety of Stamboul. Poland, the battle-field of cynical diplomacy, torn by long dissensions and mined by a miserable constitution, was vainly endeavouring, under the jealous eyes of her great neighbours, to avert the doom impending, and to reassert her ancient claim to a place among the nations of the world. But Russia had long since determined that Poland must be a vassal State to her or cease to be a State at all, while Prussia, driven to face a hard necessity, realised that a strong Poland and a strong Prussia could not exist together, and that if Poland ever rose again to power, Prussia must bid good-bye to unity and greatness. These two questions to the States involved seemed to be of far more moment than any political reform in France, and engrossed the diplomatists of Europe until the summer of 1791. In February, 1790, a new influence was introduced into European politics by the death of the Emperor Joseph and the accession of his brother, Leopold II. Leopold was a man of remarkable ability, no enthusiast and no dreamer, thoroughly versed in the selfish traditions of Austrian policy and in some of the subtleties of Italian statecraft, discerning, temperate, resolute and clear-headed, quietly determined to have his own way, and generally skilful enough to secure it. Leopold found his new dominions in a state of the utmost confusion, with war and rebellion threatening him on every side. He speedily set about restoring order. He repealed the unpopular decrees of Joseph. He conciliated or repressed his discontented subjects. He gradually re-established the authority of the Crown. … Accordingly, the first eighteen months of Leopold's reign were occupied with his own immediate interests, and at the end of that time his success was marked. {222} Catherine's vast schemes in Turkey had been checked. War had been averted. Poland had been strengthened by internal changes. Prussia had been conciliated and outmanœuvred, and her influence had been impaired. At last, at the end of August, 1791, the Emperor was free to face the French problem, and he set out for the Castle of Pillnitz to meet the King of Prussia and the Emigrant leaders at the Saxon Elector's Court. For some time past the restlessness of the French Emigrants had been causing great perplexity in Europe. Received with open arms by the ecclesiastical princes of the Rhine, by the Electors of Mayence and Trèves, they proceeded to agitate busily for their own restoration. … The object of the Emigrants was to bring pressure to bear at the European Courts, with the view of inducing the Powers to intervene actively in their behalf. … After his escape from France, in June, 1790, the Comte de Provence established his Court at Coblentz, where he was joined by his brother the Comte d'Artois, and where, on the plea that Louis was a prisoner, he claimed the title of Regent, and assumed the authority of King. The Court of the two French princes at Coblentz represented faithfully the faults and follies of the Emigrant party. But a more satisfactory spectacle was offered by the camp at Worms, where Condé was bravely trying to organise an army to fight against the Revolution in France. To Condé's standard flocked the more patriotic Emigrants. … But the German Princes in the neighbourhood looked with disfavour on the Emigrant army. It caused confusion in their dominions, and it drew down on them the hostility of the French Government. The Emperor joined them in protesting against it. In February, 1792, Condé's army was compelled to abandon its camp at Worms, and to retire further into Germany. The Emperor was well aware of the reckless selfishness of the Emigrant princes. He had as little sympathy with them as his sister. He did not intend to listen to their demands. If he interfered in France at all, it would only be in a cautious and tentative manner, and in order to save Marie Antoinette and her husband. Certainly he would not undertake a war for the restoration of the Ancien Régime. … Accordingly, the interviews at Pillnitz came to nothing. … Early in March, 1792, Leopold suddenly died. His heir Francis, unrestrained by his father's tact and moderation, assumed a different tone and showed less patience. The chances of any effective pressure from the Powers declined, as the prospect of war rose on the horizon. Francis' language was sufficiently sharp to give the Assembly the pretext which it longed for, and on the 20th April, Louis, amid general enthusiasm, came down to the Assembly and declared war against Austria. The effects of that momentous step no comment can exaggerate. It ruined the best hopes of the Revolution, and prepared the way for a military despotism in the future."

_C. E. Mallet, The French Revolution, chapter 7._

See FRANCE: A. D. 1790-1791; 1791 (JULY-DECEMBER); 1791-1792; 1792 (APRIL-JULY), and (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER); 1792-1793 (DECEMBER-FEBRUARY); 1793 (FEBRUARY-APRIL), and (JULY-DECEMBER); 1794 (MARCH-JULY); 1794-1795 (OCTOBER-MAY); 1795 (JUNE-DECEMBER); 1796 (APRIL-OCTOBER); and 1796-1797 (OCTOBER-APRIL).

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1794-1796. The Third partition of Poland. Austrian share of the spoils.

See POLAND: A. D. 1793-1796.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1797 (October). Treaty of Campo-Formio with France. Cession of the Netherlands and Lombard provinces. Acquisition of Venice and Venetian territories.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY-OCTOBER).

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1798-1806. Congress of Rastadt. Second Coalition against France. Peace of Luneville. Third Coalition. Ulm and Austerlitz. Peace of Presburg. Extinction of the Holy Roman Empire. Birth of the Empire of Austria.

"When Bonaparte sailed for Egypt he had left a congress at Rastadt discussing means for the execution of certain articles in the treaty of Campo Formio which were to establish peace between France and the Empire. … Though openly undertaking to invite the Germans to a congress in order to settle a general peace on the basis of the integrity of the Empire, the Emperor agreed in secret articles to use his influence to procure for the Republic the left bank of the Rhine with the exception of the Prussian provinces, to join with France in obtaining compensation in Germany for those injured by this change, and to contribute no more than his necessary contingent if the war were prolonged. The ratification of these secret provisions had been extorted from the Congress by threats before Bonaparte had left; but the question of indemnification had progressed no farther than a decision to secularise the ecclesiastical states for the purpose, when extravagant demands from the French deputies brought negotiation to a deadlock. Meanwhile, another coalition war had been brewing. Paul I. of Russia had regarded with little pleasure the doings of the Revolution, and when his proteges, the knights of St. John of Jerusalem, had been deprived of Malta by Bonaparte on his way to Egypt, when the Directory established by force of arms a Helvetic republic in Switzerland, when it found occasion to carry off the Pope into exile and erect a Roman republic, he abandoned the cautious and self-seeking policy of Catherine, and cordially responded to Pitt's advances for an alliance. At the same time Turkey was compelled by the invitation of Egypt to ally itself for once with Russia. Austria, convinced that the French did not intend to pay a fair price for the treaty of Campo Formio, also determined to renew hostilities; and Naples, exasperated by the sacrilege of a republic at Rome, and alarmed by French aggressiveness, enrolled itself in the league. The Neapolitan king, indeed, opened the war with some success, before he could receive support from his allies; but he was soon vanquished by the French, and his dominions were converted into a Parthenopean republic. Austria, on the contrary, awaited the arrival of the Russian forces; and the general campaign began early in 1799. The French, fighting against such generals as the Archduke Charles and the Russian Suvaroff, without the supervision of Carnot or the strategy and enterprise of Bonaparte, suffered severe reverses and great privations. Towards the end the Russian army endured much hardship on account of the selfishness of the Austrian cabinet; and this caused the Tsar, who thought he had other reasons for discontent, to withdraw his troops from the field. {223} When Bonaparte was made First Consul the military position of France was, nevertheless, very precarious. … The Roman and Cisalpine republics had fallen. The very congress at Rastadt had been dispersed by the approach of the Austrians; and the French emissaries had been sabred by Austrian troopers, though how their insolence came to be thus foully punished has never been clearly explained. At this crisis France was rescued from foreign foes and domestic disorders by its most successful general. … In the campaign which followed, France obtained signal satisfaction for its chagrin. Leaving Moreau to carry the war into Germany, Bonaparte suddenly crossed the Alps, and defeated the Austrians on the plain of Marengo. The Austrians, though completely cowed, refrained from concluding a definite peace out of respect for their engagements with England; and armistices, expiring into desultory warfare, prolonged the contest till Moreau laid the way open to Vienna, by winning a splendid triumph at Hohenlinden. A treaty of peace was finally concluded at Lunéville, when Francis II. pledged the Empire to its provisions on the ground of the consents already given at Rastadt. In conformity with the treaty of Campo Formio, Austria retained the boundary of the Adige in Italy; France kept Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine; and the princes, dispossessed by the cessions, were promised compensation in Germany; while Tuscany was given to France to sell to Spain at the price of Parma, Louisiana, six ships of the line, and a sum of money. Shortly afterwards peace was extended to Naples on easy terms. … The time was now come for the Revolution to complete the ruin of the Holy Roman Empire. Pursuant to the treaty of Lunéville, the German Diet met at Regensburg to discuss a scheme of compensation for the dispossessed rulers. Virtually the meeting was a renewal of the congress of Rastadt. … At Rastadt the incoherence and disintegration of the venerable Empire had become painfully apparent. … When it was known that the head of the nation, who had guaranteed the integrity of the Empire in the preliminaries of Leoben, and had renewed the assurance when he convoked the assembly, had in truth betrayed to the stranger nearly all the left bank of the Rhine,—the German rulers greedily hastened to secure every possible trifle in the scramble of redistribution. The slow and wearisome debates were supplemented by intrigues of the most degraded nature. Conscious that the French Consul could give a casting vote on any disputed question, the princes found no indignity too shameful, no trick too base, to obtain his favour. … The First Consul, on his side, prosecuted with a duplicity and address, heretofore unequalled, the traditional policy of France in German affairs. … Feigning to take into his counsels the young Tsar, whose convenient friendship was thus easily obtained on account of his family connections with the German courts, he drew up a scheme of indemnification and presented it to the Diet for endorsement. In due time a servile assent was given to every point which concerned the two autocrats. By this settlement, Austria and Prussia were more equally balanced against one another, the former being deprived of influence in Western Germany, and the latter finding in more convenient situations a rich recompense for its cessions on the Rhine; while the middle states, Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg, received very considerable accessions of territory. But if Bonaparte dislocated yet further the political structure of Germany, he was at least instrumental in removing the worst of the anachronisms which stifled the development of improved institutions among a large division of its people. The same measure which brought German separatism to a climax, also extinguished the ecclesiastical sovereignties and nearly all the free cities. That these strongholds of priestly obscurantism and bourgeois apathy would some day be invaded by their more ambitious and active neighbours, had long been apparent. … And war was declared when thousands of British subjects visiting France had already been ensnared and imprisoned. … Pitt had taken the conduct of the war out of the hands of Addington's feeble ministry. Possessing the confidence of the powers, he rapidly concluded offensive alliances with Russia, Sweden, and Austria, though Prussia obstinately remained neutral. Thus, by 1805, Napoleon had put to hazard all his lately won power in a conflict with the greater part of Europe. The battle of Cape Trafalgar crushed for good his maritime power, and rendered England safe from direct attack. The campaign on land, however, made him master of central Europe. Bringing the Austrian army in Germany to an inglorious capitulation at Ulm, he marched through Vienna, and, with inferior forces won in his best style the battle of Austerlitz against the troops of Francis and Alexander. The action was decisive. The allies thought not of renewing the war with the relays of troops which were hurrying up from North and South. Russian and Austrian alike wished to be rid of their ill-fated connection. The Emperor Alexander silently returned home, pursued only by Napoleon's flattering tokens of esteem; the Emperor Francis accepted the peace of Presburg, which deprived his house of the ill-gotten Venetian States, Tyrol, and its more distant possessions in Western Germany; the King of Prussia, who had been on the point of joining the coalition with a large army if his mediation were unsuccessful, was committed to an alliance with the conqueror by his terrified negotiator. And well did Napoleon appear to make the fruits of victory compensate France for its exertions. The empire was not made more unwieldy in bulk, but its dependents, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, received considerable accessions of territory, and the two first were raised to the rank of kingdoms; while the Emperor's Italian principality, which he had already turned into a kingdom of Italy to the great disgust of Austria, was increased by the addition of the ceded Venetian lands. But the full depth of Europe's humiliation was not experienced till the two following years. In 1806 an Act of Federation was signed by the kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Elector of Baden, and thirteen minor princes, which united them into a league under the protection of the French Emperor. The objects of this confederacy, known as the Rheinbund were defence against foreign aggression and the exercise of complete autonomy at home. … Already the consequences of the Peace of Lunéville had induced the ruling Hapsburg to assure his equality with the sovereigns of France and Russia by taking the imperial title in his own right; and before the Confederation of the Rhine was made public he formally renounced his office of elective Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and released from allegiance to him all the states and princes of the Reich, The triumph of the German policy of the Consulate was complete."

_A. Weir, The Historical Basis of Modern Europe, chapter 4._

See, also, FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799, to 1805, and GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803, to 1805-1806.

{224}

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1809-1814. The second struggle with Napoleon and the second defeat. The Marriage alliance. The Germanic War of Liberation. The final alliance and the overthrow of the Corsican.