Part 639

"The plain of Latium must have been in primeval times the scene of the grandest conflicts of nature, while the slowly formative agency of water deposited, and the eruptions of mighty volcanoes upheaved, the successive strata of that soil on which was to be decided the question to what people the sovereignty of the world should belong. Latium is bounded on the east by the mountains of the Sabines and Aequi, which form part of the Apennines; and on the south by the Volscian range rising to the height of 4,000 feet, which is separated from the main chain of the Apennines by the ancient territory of the Hernici, the table-land of the Sacco (Trerus, a tributary of the Liris), and stretching in a westerly direction terminates in the promontory of Terracina. On the west its boundary is the sea, which on this part of the coast forms but few and indifferent harbours. On the north it imperceptibly merges into the broad highlands of Etruria. The region thus enclosed forms a magnificent plain traversed by the Tiber, the 'mountain-stream' which issues from the Umbrian, and by the Anio, which rises in the Sabine mountains. Hills here and there emerge, like islands, from the plain; some of them steep limestone cliffs, such as that of Soracte in the north-east, and that of the Circeian promontory on the south-west, as well as the similar though lower height of the Janiculum near Rome; others volcanic elevations, whose extinct craters had become converted into lakes which in some cases still exist; the most important of these is the Alban range, which, free on every side, stands forth from the plain between the Volscian chain and the river Tiber. Here settled the stock which is known to history under the name of the Latins, or, as they were subsequently called by way of distinction from the Latin communities beyond the bounds of Latium, the 'Old Latins' ('prisci Latini'). But the territory occupied by them, the district of Latium, was only a small portion of the central plain of Italy. All the country north of the Tiber was to the Latins a foreign and even hostile domain, with whose inhabitants no lasting alliance, no public peace, was possible, and such armistices as were concluded appear always to have been for a limited period. The Tiber formed the northern boundary from early times. … We find, at the time when our history begins, the flat and marshy tracts to the south of the Alban range in the hands of Umbro-Sabellian stocks, the Rutuli and Volsci; Ardea and Velitrae are no longer in the number of originally Latin towns. Only the central portion of that region between the Tiber, the spurs of the Apennines, the Alban Mount, and the sea—a district of about 700 square miles, not much larger than the present canton of Zurich—was Latium proper, the 'plain,' as it appears to the eye of the observer from the heights of Monte Cavo. Though the country is a plain, it is not monotonously flat. With the exception of the sea-beach which is sandy and formed in part by the accumulations of the Tiber, the level is everywhere broken by hills of tufa moderate in height, though often somewhat steep, and by deep fissures of the ground. These alternating elevations and depressions of the surface lead to the formation of lakes in winter; and the exhalations proceeding in the heat of summer from the putrescent organic substances which they contain engender that noxious fever-laden atmosphere, which in ancient times tainted the district as it taints it at the present day."

_T. Mommsen, History of Rome, book 1, chapter 3._

See, also, ITALY, ANCIENT.

LATT, OR LIDUS, The.

See SLAVERY: MEDIÆVAL: GERMANY.

LATTER DAY SAINTS, Church of.

See MORMONISM: A. D. 1805-1830.

LAUD, Archbishop, Church tyranny of.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1633-1640.

LAUDER BRIDGE.

See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1482-1488.

LAUDERDALE, Duke of. His oppression in Scotland.

See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1669-1679.

LAUFFENBURG, Captured by Duke Bernhard (1637).

See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.

LAURAS.

"The institution of Lauras was the connecting link between the hermitage and the monastery, in the later and more ordinary use of that word. … A Laura was an aggregation of separate cells, under the not very strongly defined control of a superior, the inmates meeting together only on the first and last days, the old and new Sabbaths, of each week, for their common meal in the refectory and for common worship. … The origin of the word 'Laura' is uncertain. … Probably it is another form of 'labra,' the popular term in Alexandria for an alley or narrow court."

_I. G. Smith, Christian Monasticism, pages 38-39._

{1955}

LAUREATE, English Poets.

"From the appointment of Chaucer about five hundred years have elapsed, and during that period a long line of poets have held the title of Laureate. For the first two hundred years they were somewhat irregularly appointed, but from the creation of Richard Edwards in 1561, they come down to the present time without interruption. The selection of the Laureate has not always been a wise one, but the list contains the names of a few of our greatest authors, and the honour was certainly worthily bestowed upon Edmund Spenser, Ben Jonson, John Dryden, Robert Southey, William Wordsworth, and Alfred Tennyson. As the custom of crowning successful poets appears to have been in use since the origin of poetry itself, the office of Poet Laureate can certainly boast of considerable antiquity, and the laurel wreath of the Greeks and Romans was an envied trophy long before our Druidical forefathers held aloft the mistletoe bough in their mystic rites. From what foreign nation we first borrowed the idea of a King of the Poets is doubtful."

_W. Hamilton, Origin of the Office of Poet Laureate (Royal Historical Society, Transactions, volume 8)._

The following is a list of the Poets Laureate of England, with the dates of their appointment:

Geoffrey Chaucer, 1368; Sir John Gower, 1400; Henry Scogan; John Kay; Andrew Bernard, 1486; John Skelton, 1489; Robert Whittington, 1512; Richard Edwards, 1561; Edmund Spenser, 1590; Samuel Daniel, 1598; Ben Jonson, 1616; Sir William Davenant, 1638; John Dryden, 1670; Thomas Shadwell, 1688; Nahum Tate, 1692; Nicholas Rowe, 1715; Rev. Laurence Eusden, 1718; Colley Cibber, 1730; William Whitehead, 1757; Thomas Warton, 1785; Henry James Pye, 1790; Robert Southey, 1813; William Wordsworth, 1843; Alfred Tennyson, 1850.

_W. Hamilton, The Poets Laureate of England._

LAURIUM, Silver Mines of.

These mines, in Attica, were owned and worked at an early time by the Athenian state, and seem to have yielded a large revenue, more or less of which was divided among the citizens. It was by persuading the Athenians to forego that division that Themistocles secured money to build the fleet which made Athens a great naval power. The mines were situated in the southern part of Attica, in a district of low hills, not far from the promontory of Sunium.

_G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 39._

LAUSITZ.

See BRANDENBURG.

LAUTULÆ, Battle of.

See ROME: B. C. 343-290.

LAW, John, and his Mississippi Scheme.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1717-1720; and LOUISIANA: A. D. 1717-1718.

LAW: Start----------

LAW. [Prepared for this work by Austin Abbott, Dean of the New York University Law School.]

The subject is here treated with reference to the history of the rights of persons and property, and that of procedure, rather than in its political and economic aspects, which are discussed under other heads. And those parts of the history of law thus considered which enter into our present systems are given the preference in space,—purely historical matters, such as the Roman Law, being treated elsewhere, as indicated in the references placed at the end of this article:

ADMIRALTY LAW: Start----------

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1183. Law as to Shipwrecks.

"The Emperor Constantine, or Antonine (for there is some doubt as to which it was), had the honour of being the first to renounce the claim to shipwrecked property in favor of the rightful owner. But the inhuman customs on this subject were too deeply rooted to be eradicated by the wisdom and vigilance of the Roman law givers. The legislation in favor of the unfortunate was disregarded by succeeding emperors, and when the empire itself was overturned by the northern barbarians, the laws of humanity were swept away in the tempest, and the continual depredations of the Saxons and Normans induced the inhabitants of the western coasts of Europe to treat all navigators who were thrown by the perils of the sea upon their shores as pirates, and to punish them as such, without inquiry or discrimination. The Emperor Andronicus Comnenus, who reigned at Constantinople in 1183, made great efforts to repress this inhuman practice. His edict was worthy of the highest praise, but it ceased to be put in execution after his death. … Valin says, it was reserved to the ordinances of Lewis XIV. to put the finishing stroke towards the extinction of this species of piracy, by declaring that shipwrecked persons and property were placed under the special protection and safe guard of the crown, and the punishment of death without hope of pardon, was pronounced against the guilty."

_James Kent, International Law, edited by J. T. Abdy, page 31._

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1537. Jurisdiction.

The Act of 28 Henry VIII., c. 15, granted jurisdiction to the Lord High Admiral of England.

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1575. Jurisdiction.

"The Request of the Judge of the Admiralty, to the Lord Chief Justice of her Majesty's Bench, and his Colleagues, and the Judges' Agreement 7th May 1575,"—by which the long controversy between these Courts as to their relative jurisdiction was terminated, will be found in full in

_Benedict's American Admiralty, 3d edition, page 41._

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1664. Tide-mark.

The space between high and low water mark is to be taken as part of the sea, when the tide is in.

_Erastus C. Benedict, American Admiralty, 3d edition, by Robert D. Benedict, page 35, citing Sir John Constable's Case, Anderson's Rep. 89._

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1789. United States Judiciary Act.

The Act of 1789 declared admiralty jurisdiction to extend to all cases "where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen."

_Judiciary Act, United States Stat. at Large, volume 1, page 76._

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1798. Lord Stowell and Admiralty Law.

"Lord Mansfield, at a very early period of his judicial life, introduced to the notice of the English bar the Rhodian laws, the Consolato del mare, the laws of Oleron, the treatises of Roccus, the laws of Wisbuy, and, above all, the marine ordinances of Louis XIV., and the commentary of Valin. These authorities were cited by him in Luke v. Lyde [2 Burr. 882], and from that time a new direction was given to English studies, and new vigor, and more liberal and enlarged views, communicated to forensic investigations. {1956} Since the year 1798, the decisions of Sir William Scott (now Lord Stowell) on the admiralty side of Westminster Hall, have been read and admired in every region of the republic of letters, as models of the most cultivated and the most enlightened human reason. … The doctrines are there reasoned out at large, and practically applied. The arguments at the bar, and the opinions from the bench, are intermingled with the greatest reflections, … the soundest policy, and a thorough acquaintance with all the various topics which concern the great social interests of mankind."

_James Kent, Commentaries, part 5, lecture 42._

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1841-1842. Jurisdiction.

The act 3 and 4 Vic., c. 65, restored to the English Admiralty some jurisdiction of which it had been deprived by the Common Law Courts.

_Benedict's Am. Admiralty, page 56._

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1845. Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction.

"It took the Supreme Court of the United States more than fifty years to reject the antiquated doctrine of the English courts, that admiralty jurisdiction was confined to salt water, or water where the tide ebbed and flowed. Congress in 1845 passed an act extending the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts to certain cases upon the great lakes, and the navigable waters connecting the same. The constitutionality of this act was seriously questioned, and it was not till 1851 that the Supreme Court, by a divided court, in the case of the Genesee Chief, which collided with another vessel on Lake Ontario, sustained the constitutionality of the act, and repudiated the absurd doctrine that tides had anything to do with the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the constitution upon Federal courts."

_Lyman Trumbull, Precedent versus Justice, American Law Review, volume 27, page 324._

See, also _Act of 1845, 5 U. S. Stat. at L. 726._

ADMIRALTY LAW: A. D. 1873. Division of Loss in case of Collision settled by Judicature Act.

"The rule that where both ships are at fault for a collision each shall recover half his loss from the other, contradicts the old rule of the common law that a plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence can recover nothing. This conflict between the common law and the law of the Admiralty was put an end to in 1873 by the Judicature Act of that year, which (s. 25, subs. 9) provides that 'if both ships shall be found to have been in fault' the Admiralty rule shall prevail. … There can be no doubt that in some instances it works positive injustice; as where it prevents the innocent cargo-owner from recovering more than half his loss from one of the two wrong-doing shipowners. And recent cases show that it works in an arbitrary and uncertain manner when combined with the enactments limiting the shipowner's liability for damage done by his ship. The fact, however, remains, that it has been in operation with the approval of the shipping community for at least two centuries, and probably for a much longer period; and an attempt to abolish it at the time of the passing of the Judicature Acts met with no success. The true reason of its very general acceptance is probably this—that it gives effect to the principle of distributing losses at sea, which is widely prevalent in maritime affairs. Insurance, limitation of shipowner's liability, and general average contribution are all connected, more or less directly, with this principle."

_R. G. Marsden, Two Points of Admiralty Law, Law Quarterly Review, volume 2, pages 357-362._

For an enumeration of the various Maritime codes with their dates,

See _Benedict's Am. Admiralty, pages 91-97,_ and _Davis' Outlines of International Law, pages 5, 6, &c._

ADMIRALTY LAW: End----------

COMMON LAW: Start----------

Common Law. [Including legislation in modification of It.]

COMMON LAW: A. D. 449-1066. Trial by Jury unknown to Anglo-Saxons.

"It may be confidently asserted that trial by jury was unknown to our Anglo-Saxon ancestors; and the idea of its existence in their legal system has arisen from a want of attention to the radical distinction between the members or judges composing a court, and a body of men apart from that court, but summoned to attend it in order to determine conclusively the facts of the case in dispute. This is the principle on which is founded the intervention of a jury; and no trace whatever can be found of such an institution in Anglo-Saxon times."

_W. Forsyth, Trial by Jury, page 45._

COMMON LAW: A. D. 630. The first Written Body of English Law.

"The first written body of English Law is said to have been promulgated in the Heptarchy by Ethelbert, about the year 630, and enacted with the consent of the states of his kingdom."

_Joseph Parke, History of Chancery, page 14._

COMMON LAW: A. D. 871-1066. The King's Peace.

1. The technical use of "the king's peace" is, I suspect, connected with the very ancient rule that a breach of the peace in a house must be atoned for in proportion to the householder's rank. If it was in the king's dwelling, the offender's life was in the king's hand. This peculiar sanctity of the king's house was gradually extended to all persons who were about his business, or specially under his protection; but when the Crown undertook to keep the peace everywhere, the king's peace became coincident with the general peace of the kingdom, and his especial protection was deemed to be extended to all peaceable subjects. In substance, the term marks the establishment of the conception of public justice, exercised on behalf of the whole commonwealth, as something apart from and above the right of private vengeance,—a right which the party offended might pursue or not, or accept composition for, as he thought fit. The private blood feud, it is true, formally and finally disappeared from English jurisprudence only in the present century; but in its legalized historical shape of the wager of battle it was not a native English institution.

_Sir Frederick Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, page 205._

See, also, KING'S PEACE.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1066. Inquisition, parent of Modern Jury.

"When the Normans came into England they brought with them, not only a far more vigorous and searching kingly power than had been known there, but also a certain product of the exercise of this power by the Frankish kings and the Norman dukes; namely, the use of the inquisition in public administration, i. e., the practice of ascertaining facts by summoning together by public authority a number of people most likely, as being neighbors, to know and tell the truth, and calling for their answer under oath. This was the parent of the modern jury. … {1957} With the Normans came also another novelty, the judicial duel—one of the chief methods for determining controversies in the royal courts; and it was largely the cost, danger, and unpopularity of the last of these institutions which fed the wonderful growth of the other."

_J. B. Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial (Harvard Law Review, volume 5, page 45)._

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1066-1154. Trial by Jury unknown to Anglo-Normans.

"The same remark which has already been made, with reference to the absence of all mention of the form of jury trial in the Anglo-Saxon Laws, applies equally to the first hundred years after the Conquest. It is incredible that so important a feature of our jurisprudence, if it had been known, would not have been alluded to in the various compilations of law which were made in the reigns of the early Norman kings. … Although the form of the jury did not then exist, the rudiments of that mode of trial may be distinctly traced, in the selection from the neighborhood where the dispute arose, of a certain number of persons, who after being duly sworn testified to the truth of the facts within their own knowledge. This is what distinguishes the proceeding from what took place among the Anglo-Saxons—namely, the choosing a limited number of probi homines to represent the community, and give testimony for them."

_W. Forsyth, Trial by Jury, pages 82-90._

See, also, JURY: TRIAL BY.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1066-1154. The Curia Regis.

"As a legal tribunal the jurisdiction of the Curia was both civil and criminal, original and appellate. As a primary court it heard all causes in which the king's interests were concerned, as well as all causes between the tenants-in-chief of the crown, who were too great to submit to the local tribunals of the shire and the hundred. As an appellate court it was resorted to in those cases in which the powers of the local courts had been exhausted or had failed to do justice. By virtue of special writs, and as a special favor, the king could at his pleasure call up causes from the local courts to be heard in his own court according to such new methods as his advisers might invent. Through the issuance of these special writs the king became practically the fountain of justice, and through their agency the new system of royal law, which finds its source in the person of the king, was brought in to remedy the defects of the old, unelastic system of customary law which prevailed in the provincial courts of the people. The curia followed the person of the king, or the justiciar in the king's absence."

_Hannis Taylor, Origin and Growth of the English Constitution, part 1, pages 245-246._

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1066-1215. Purchasing Writs.

"The course of application to the curia regis was of this nature. The party suing paid, or undertook to pay, to the king a fine to have justitiam et rectam in his court: and thereupon he obtained a writ or precept, by means of which he commenced his suit; and the justices were authorized to hear and determine his claim."

_Reeves' (Finlason's) History English Law, volume 1, page 267._

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1077. Trial by Battle.

"The earliest reference to the battle, I believe, in any account of a trial in England, is at the end of the case of Bishop Wulfstan v. Abbot Walter, in 1077. The controversy was settled, and we read: 'Thereof there are lawful witnesses … who said and heard this, ready to prove it by oath and battle.' This is an allusion to a common practice in the Middle Ages, that of challenging an adversary's witness, or perhaps to one method of disposing of cases where witnesses were allowed on opposite sides and contradicted each other. … Thus, as among nations still, so then in the popular courts and between contending private parties, the battle was often the ultima ratio, in cases where their rude and unrational methods of trial yielded no results. It was mainly in order to displace this dangerous … mode of proof that the recognitions—that is to say, the first organized form of the jury—were introduced. These were regarded as a special boon to the poor man, who was oppressed in many ways by the duel. It was by enactment of Henry II. that this reform was brought about, first in his Norman dominions (in 1150-52), before reaching the English throne, and afterwards in England, sometime after he became king, in 1154."

_J. B. Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial (Harvard Law Review, volume 5, pages 66-67)._

See, also: WAGER OF BATTLE.

COMMON LAW: A. D. 1100 (circa). Origin of Statutes of Limitation.