Part 445

"The peace of Paris did not endure a year. Ten months of Bourbon rule, vengeful, implacable, stupid; alike violent in act and in language; sufficed to bring France once more to the brink of revolution. Two acts alone are sufficient to demonstrate the folly of the royalists—the resumption of the white flag, and the changing of the numbers of the regiments. A prudent king would have adopted the tricolour when he agreed to a constitutional charter, and would have refrained from wounding military sensibility by destroying the numbers of the regiments. But more stupid than these acts was the political policy pursued, a policy which aroused on all sides suspicions of what was worse than the grinding but gilded despotism of Napoleon—namely, that the Government favoured a forcible resumption of the confiscated lands, the restoration of tithes, and of the abolished exactions and imposts of feudalism. It has been surmised, and with much reason, that had Napoleon not reappeared a popular movement would have extorted from the king a really constitutional government. In that case France might have taken some real steps towards a free government, and the bases of liberty rather than of equality might have been laid. But while the Powers were wrangling at Vienna, and the Bourbons were irritating France, Napoleon was watching from Elba for the opportunity of resuming empire. It was not in the nature of the man to yield passively to anything, even to the inevitable. So long as a chance remained he looked out keenly for the propitious hour. He selected Elba as a residence because thence 'he could keep an eye upon France and upon the Bourbons.' It was his duty, he said, to guard the throne of France for his family and for his son. Thus, in making peace at Fontainebleau, he only bowed to a storm he could not then resist, and cherished in his mind the project of an imperial restoration. The hour for which he waited came at length. February, 1815, he had arrived at the conclusion that with the aid of the army he could overthrow the Bourbons, whose government, he said, was good for priests, nobles, and countesses of the old time, but worth nothing to the living generation. The army, he knew, was still, and would be always, devoted to him. … He had weighed all the chances for and against the success of his enterprise, and he had arrived at the conclusion that he should succeed; for, 'Fortune had never deserted him on great occasions.' It has been said that his departure was precipitated by a report of the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna. … It is possible, indeed, that the rumour of an intention to confine him upon an island in the Atlantic may have exercised some influence over him; but the real reasons for the selection of the 26th of February were that he was tired of inactivity, and convinced that the favourable moment had arrived. Therefore, instructing Murat to second him by assuming a strong position in front of Ancona, he embarked his faithful Thousand, and set sail for France. On the 1st of March he landed on the shores of the Gulf of Juan, and on the 20th he entered the Tuileries. As he had predicted, the army rallied to the tricolour; the generals could neither restrain nor guide their soldiers; the Bourbon dukes and princes, and the brave Duchess of Angoulême—'the only man of the family'—were utterly powerless before the universal military disaffection; and one after the other they were chased out of France. The army had restored Napoleon. Louis XVIII. drove out of Paris by the road to St. Denis on the 19th, a few hours before Napoleon, on the 20th, drove in by the Barrier of Italy; and on the 23rd, after a short stay at Lille, the King was safe in Ghent. 'The great question is,' wrote Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington three days afterwards, while yet in ignorance of the event, 'can the Bourbons get Frenchmen to fight for them against Frenchmen?' The result showed that they could not. In the then state of France the army was master of France. Louis and his ministers had done nothing to conciliate, and almost everything to irritate, the people; and even so early as November, 1814, Wellington did not see what means the King had of resisting the attack of a few hundred officers determined to risk everything. During the period occupied by Napoleon in passing from Elba to Paris, the conduct of' the sovereigns and diplomatists assembled at Vienna offered a striking contrast to the weakness and inaptitude of the Bourbons. … That there was fear in Vienna is manifest, but the acts of the Allied Powers show that fear speedily gave place to resolution. For, as early as the 12th of' March, before the Allies knew where Napoleon was, or anything about him, except that he was somewhere at large in France, they drew up that famous declaration, and signed it the next day, in which they declared that he had broken the sole legal tie to which his existence was attached, and that it was possible to keep with him 'neither peace nor truce.' 'The Powers, in consequence,' so runs this document, 'declare that Napoleon Buonaparte is placed beyond the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as a common enemy and disturber of the peace of the world, he has delivered himself over to public justice.' This declaration, which has been the subject of vehement criticism, was the natural consequence of the prevailing and correct appreciation of Napoleon's character. There was not a nation in Europe which felt the slightest particle of confidence or trust in him. Hence this declaration, made so promptly, was drawn up in ignorance of any professions he might make, because, beforehand, Europe felt that no professions of his could be relied on. The news of his success was followed by a treaty, adopted on the 25th of March, renewing the alliance of Chaumont, whereby Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia bound themselves to provide each 150,000 men; to employ, in addition, all their resources, and to work together for the common end—the maintenance of the Treaty of Paris, and of the stipulations determined on and signed at the Congress of Vienna. Further, they engaged not to lay down their arms but by common consent; nor before the object of the war should have been attained; nor, continues the document, 'until Buonaparte shall have been rendered absolutely unable to create disturbance, and to renew attempts for possessing himself of supreme power in France.' All the Powers of Europe generally, and Louis XVIII. specially, were invited to accede to the treaty; but, at the instance of Lord Castlereagh, the Four Great Powers declared in the most solemn manner that, although they desired to see his Most Christian Majesty restored to the throne, and also to contribute to that 'auspicious result,' yet that their 'principles' would not permit them to prosecute the war 'with a view of imposing any particular Government on France.' With Napoleon they refused to hold any communication whatever; and when he sent couriers to announce that he intended to observe existing treaties, they were stopped on the frontiers. … {1361} Wellington, on his own responsibility, acted for England, signed treaties, undertook heavy engagements in her name, and agreed to command an army to be assembled in Belgium; and having satisfied, as well as he could, the clamour of 'all' for subsidies from England, he took his departure from Vienna on the 29th of March, and arrived in Brussels on the 4th of April. The British Parliament and nation confirmed readily the proceedings of the Government and of the Duke of Wellington at Vienna. … Napoleon had formed a Ministry on the very evening of his return to the Tuileries. … He felt certain that war would ensue. Knowing that at the moment when he returned from Elba a large part of the best troops of England were in America, that the German force on the Rhine was weak, and that the Russian armies were in Poland, he calculated that the Allied Powers would not be in a position to open the campaign, at the earliest, until the middle of July; and, for a moment, he hoped that, by working on the feelings of his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, and by rousing the anger of the Emperor Alexander against his allies, he would be able, if not to reduce his enemies to two, England and Prussia, at least to defer the period of hostilities until the autumn. … Before his great schemes of military preparation were half complete he found himself compelled by events to begin the war. What he actually did accomplish between March and June has been the subject of fierce controversy. His friends exaggerate, his enemies undervalue, his exertions and their results. But no candid inquirer can fail to see, that if his energetic activity during this period is far below that of the Convention when threatened by Europe, it is far above the standard fixed by his passionate crimes. The real reason why he failed to raise a larger military force during the hundred days was that his genius worked upon exhausted materials. The nation, to use an expressive vulgarism, was 'used up.' … The proper conscription for 1815 had been levied in the autumn of 1813. The drafts on the rising generation had been anticipated, and hence there remained little available except the old soldiers. … The result of Napoleon's prodigious exertions to augment the military force of France appears to be this: Napoleon found ready to his hand a force of 228,972 men of all arms, officers included, giving a disposable effective of 155,000 men ready to take the field. By the 18th of June he had raised this force to 276,982 men, officers included: that is 247,609 of the line, and 29,373 of the Imperial Guard. The number disposable for war was 198,180; and it therefore follows that Napoleon had increased the general effective by 53,010 men, and that part of it disposable for war by 48, 180."

_G. Hooper, Waterloo, book 1, chapter 1._

ALSO IN: _Imbert de Saint-Amand, The Duchess of Angouléme and the two Restorations, part 1._

_F. P. Guizot, Memoirs of My Time, volume 1, chapter 3._

_J. C. Ropes, The First Napoleon, lecture 6._

_E. E. Crowe, History of the Reigns of Louis XVIII. and Charles X., volume 1, chapters 4-6._

_R. H. Horne, Life of Napoleon, chapters 41-42._

_General Sir N. Campbell, Napoleon at Fontainebleau and Elba._

FRANCE: A. D. 1814-1815. The Congress of Vienna and the fruits of its labors.

See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (June). Napoleon's last campaign. His final defeat and overthrow at Waterloo.

"The nearest troops of the allies were the Prussian army in the Rhenish provinces, and the army of British, Dutch, Belgians, Bunswickers, and Hanoverians, occupying Belgium. Napoleon's scheme, the best in his desperate circumstances, was to expel the British and Prussians, who were moving west, from Belgium, win the Rhine frontier—to arouse the enthusiasm of all France—before the Austrians were ready, and carry the war out of France. The Duke of Wellington proceeded to Belgium, for the first and last time to measure his skill with Napoleon's, and Marshal Blücher took over from Kleist the command of the Prussians. The two armies, the Prussian and the British, took up a line extending from Liege to the sea. The country on this line was open along the west, affording by nature little means of resisting an invasion, but most of the fortresses commanding the roads had been put in a state of moderate repair. The Prussians held the line of the Meuse and Sambre to beyond Charleroi, the head-quarters being at Namur. They numbered about 117,000 men … with 312 guns. … The motley mass of the British and their allies numbered 106,000 men … with 196 guns. … So entirely ignorant were the allies of Napoleon's movements, that on the very day on which he burst across the frontier, Wellington wrote to the Czar, who was at Vienna, respecting the general invasion of France. At that time the frontier of France approached within six miles of Charleroi (which is itself but 34 miles by the main road from Brussels). The Charleroi road was not only the most direct to Brussels, but was unprotected by fortresses; and the line of the allied armies was weakest here at the point of junction between them. … It was against the central weak point that Napoleon resolved to move, down the basins of the Sambre and the Meuse. … The mass of the troops was being assembled within a league of the frontier, but behind some small hills which completely screened them from the enemy's outposts. To conceal his designs to the last moment, the line of sentries along the frontier was tripled, and any attempt to pass the line was forbidden under pain of death. The arrangements were being carried out by Soult, who on the 2nd June had been appointed chief of the staff. … The army concentrated on the frontier consisted (according to Colonel Chesney) of 90,000 infantry and 22,000 cavalry—in all 112,000 men—344 guns. … Napoleon, accompanied by his brother Jerome, arrived in the camp, and in the evening of the 14th his soldiers, already elated by his presence, were excited to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by an address from Napoleon. … A general order fixed the attack upon the allies' position for three o'clock in the following morning (15th)." At the appointed time "the French left was in motion, Reille proceeding from Solre down the right bank of the Sambre. He was soon brought into collision with the Prussian outposts near Thuin: he drove them back and secured at ten o'clock the bridge of Marchiennes." The movements of other corps were delayed by various causes. Nevertheless, "of the Prussians only Ziethen's corps, and of Wellington's army only Perponcher's Dutch-Belgians, were as yet near the menaced position; while 40,000 French had passed the Sambre at Marchiennes and 70,000 more were entering Charleroi. When Reille deployed in front of Gosselies, the Prussians called in their detachments and retired from it, upon Fleurus, … leaving open the road through Quatre Bras to Brussels. {1362} Ney, who had just come up, then took command of the left, … which was now directed upon Quatre Bras; and Napoleon galloped off to the road between Charleroi and Fleurus, where the retiring Prussians were concentrating. … At dark Ziethen [with the First Prussian corps] still held Fleurus with his advanced guard, and the wood on its south, the bulk of his troops lay for the night upon the hill of Ligny, above the village of Bry. His loss during the day's manœuvring has been estimated at 2,000. On the French left, Ney… had come in contact with the advance guard of Wellington's army, a battalion of Nassauers and a light battery, in front of the village of Frasnes, two miles from Quatre Bras, the name applied to the farm-buildings at the intersection of the four main roads,—Brussels, Nivelles, Charleroi, Namur. … After a few cannon-shots the outpost fell back from Frasnes to Quatre Bras." Ney, after a reconnoissance, postponed attack until morning. "It had been intended by Napoleon that the whole army should have crossed the Sambre before noon; but from the several delays … when night fell on the 15th, half of the cavalry of the guard, two of Grouchy's reserve divisions, Lobau's corps, and one-half of Gérard's corps were still on the south of the river. Apparently relying on secret information from Paris—which contradicted the rumours that Napoleon was about to join the army—Wellington had been lulled into a false security, and the reports as to the concentration had been neglected. News of the enemy's advance across the Sambre did not reach him till three o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, when the Prince of Orange in person reported the skirmish at Thuin. As he did not yet know the point of concentration, the British general, 'never precipitate or nervous' (Hooper), merely issued orders for all the troops to be in readiness. … At night intelligence was received from Mons that the French concentration was at Charleroi, and orders were issued for the immediate movement of the troops. … Wellington and the Prince of Orange, with several of the staff' officers, went—it is said, to prevent a panic in Brussels—to the Duchess of Richmond's ball, where 'Belgium's capital had gathered then her beauty and her chivalry,' and, 'while all went merry as a marriage bell,' the staff officers stole away one by one. The Duke himself, 'throwing away golden minutes' (Hamley), as if to show his confidence in his fortunes, remained to a late hour to return thanks after supper for the health of the Prince Regent of Great Britain, which the Prince of Orange proposed. … Blücher had received, at his head-quarters at Namur, news on the morning of the 14th of the French concentration, and he had ordered forward the corps of Pirch and Thielemann. … Napoleon did not foresee Blücher's promptitude, and nothing was done in the early morning of the 16th to proceed with the execution of the intended surprise. . . …. No orders were issued by the Emperor till eight, when Napoleon's resolution was taken,—to strike at the Prussians, who would, he believed, if defeated, retire upon their natural base of communications, through Namur and Liege, and he would thus be left to deal separately with the British, who could not move from their base, the sea. The French army was to advance in two wings, the left under Ney, the right under Grouchy, with the reserve under the Emperor himself. Ney was to capture Quatre Bras, reconnoitre the Brussels road, and hold himself in readiness to march to Brussels, which Napoleon hoped to be able to enter the following morning. … Napoleon had 64,000 men to attack the position at Ligny; Ney on the left wing had 45,000 for Quatre Bras; Lobau had 10,000 to support either wing of the Grand Army; 5,000 troops were in the rear; and the victorious wing, whether Ney's or Grouchy's, was to wheel round and manœuvre in the direction of the other. Thielemann having come up before the French delivered their attack, Blücher had 85,000 men on the field. Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras (which is 20 miles from Brussels) at 11 o'clock in the forenoon. As Marshal Ney gave no sign of an imminent attack, Wellington galloped over, about seven miles, to confer with Blücher. … Wellington, after some discussion, in which he expressed his disapproval of Blücher's position, agreed to move to the rear of the Prussians, to act as a reserve, if his own position at Quatre Bras were not attacked. … He reached Quatre Bras when his own position was being assailed, and no help could be sent to Blücher. … At about three o'clock, when the heavy cannonade a few miles to the west intimated that a desperate battle was in progress at Quatre Bras, the signal for attack [on the Prussians, at Ligny] was given. The French left sped forward with impetuosity; the resistance was vigorous but futile, and the enemy streamed through the village. Blücher immediately moved forward fresh troops and re-took the village, but was unable to retain it. … Thrice the Grenadiers forced their way into and through the village, but only to be driven back again." But "Blücher gradually exhausted his reserves, and when, in the dusk, Napoleon saw the last battalion moved forward and the ground behind Ligny vacant, he exclaimed, 'they are lost!' The Guards and the Cuirassiers were immediately ordered to attack," and the wearied Prussian infantry were broken by their onset. "The fugitives led precipitately over the fields and along the roads to the east, and the order for the whole to retire was immediately given. … Blücher himself gathered a few of his squadrons to check the hot pursuit near Sombreffe, and thrice led them to the charge. His squadrons were broken, and after the last charge his horse fell dead, and the veteran marshal lay under it. His aid-de-camp, Nostitz, stood by him, and covered him with a cloak; the Cuirassiers galloped past without noticing him. … Gneisenau, who took temporary command from the accident to Blücher, ordered a retreat upon Wavre, with the view of joining Bülow's corps and keeping open the communications with Wellington. … The loss on each side has been very variously estimated. Napoleon put his own loss at 7,000 men, Charras puts it at 11,000, and the loss of the Prussians at 18,000. The retreat upon Wavre abandoned the communications with Namur and Liege, through which the Prussian supplies came from the lower Rhine, for a new line by Louvain, but it kept the Prussians on a line parallel to the road on which Wellington must retreat, and thus still enabled the two armies to aid each other. 'This noble daring at once snatched from Napoleon the hoped-for fruits of his victory, and the danger Ligny had for a few hours averted was left impending over him' (Chesney)."

_H. R. Clinton, The War in the Peninsula and Wellington's Campaigns in France and Belgium, chapter 12._

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