Part 439

_T. H. Dyer, History of Modern Europe, book 1, chapter 11 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN: _C. Botta, Italy during the Consulate and Empire of Napoleon, chapters 3-4._

_Memoirs dictated by Napoleon to his Generals at St. Helena, volume 6, pages 219-225._

_J. Fouché, Memoirs, pages 260-274._

_Count Miot de Melito, Memoirs, chapters 16-17._

_W. Hazlitt, Life of Napoleon, chapters 38-34 (volume 2)._

_Madame de Rémusat, Memoirs, book 1, chapters 4-10 (volume 1)._

_P. Lanfrey, History of Napoleon, volume 2, chapters 9-10._

_M. de Bourrienne, Private Memoirs of Napoleon, volume 3, chapters 1-12._

FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (January-April). The Third European Coalition.

"In England Pitt returned to office in May, 1804, and this in itself was an evil omen for France. He enjoyed the confidence, not only of his own nation but of Europe, and he at once set to work to resume the threads of that coalition of which England had formerly directed the resources. Alexander I. of Russia had begun to see through the designs of Napoleon; he found that he had been duped in the joint mediation in Germany, he resented the occupation of Hanover and he ordered his court to put on mourning for the duke of Enghien. Before long he broke off diplomatic relations with France (September 1804), and a Russian war was now only a question of time. Austria was the power most closely affected by Napoleon's assumption of the imperial title. … While hastening to acknowledge Napoleon, Austria was busied in military preparations and began to resume its old connection with England. Prussia was the power on which France was accustomed to rely with implicit confidence. But the occupation of Hanover and the interference with the commerce of the Elbe had weakened Frederick William III.'s belief in the advantages of a neutral policy, and, though he could not make up his mind to definite action, he began to open negotiations with Russia in view of a rupture with France. The fluctuations of Prussian policy may be followed in the alternating influence of the two ministers of foreign affairs, Haugwitz and Hardenberg. Meanwhile Napoleon, ignorant or reckless of the growing hostility of the great powers, continued his aggressions at the expense of the lesser states. … These acts gave the final impulse to the hostile powers, and before Napoleon quitted Italy the Coalition had been formed. On the 11th of April, 1805, a final treaty was signed between Russia and England. The two powers pledged themselves to form an European league against France, to conclude no peace without mutual consent, to settle disputed points in a congress at the end of the war, and to form a federal tribunal for the maintenance of the system which should, then be established. The immediate objects of the allies were the abolition of French rule in Italy, Holland, Switzerland, and Hanover; the restoration of Piedmont to the king of Sardinia; the protection of Naples; and the erection of a permanent barrier against France by the union of Holland and Belgium under the House of Orange. The coalition was at once joined by Gustavus IV. of Sweden, who inherited his father's devotion to the cause of legitimate monarchy, and who hoped to recover power in Pomerania. Austria, terrified for its Italian possessions by Bonaparte's evident intention to subdue the whole peninsula, was driven into the league. Prussia, in spite of the attraction of recovering honour and independence, refused to listen to the solicitations of England and Russia, and adhered to its feeble neutrality. Of the other German states Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg were allies of France. As far as effective operations were concerned, the coalition consisted only of Austria and Russia. Sweden and Naples, which had joined secretly, could not make efforts on a great scale, and England was as yet content with providing subsidies and the invaluable services of its fleet. It was arranged that, one Austrian army under the archduke Charles should invade Lombardy, while Mack, with a second army and the aid of Russia, should occupy Bavaria and advance upon the Rhine."

_R. Lodge, History of Modern Europe, chapter 24, sections 13-15._

ALSO IN: _Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 39 (volume 9)._

FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (March-December). Napoleon's plans and preparations for the invasion of England. Nelson's long pursuit of the French fleets. His victory and death at Trafalgar. Napoleon's rapid march to the Danube. Capitulation of Mack at Ulm. The French in Vienna. The great battle of Austerlitz.

"While the coalition was forming, and Napoleon seemed wantonly to be insulting Europe and ignoring the danger of exciting fresh enemies, he was in fact urging on with all rapidity his schemes for the invasion of England, which he probably hoped might be so successful as to paralyse all action on the part of the European powers. The constantly repeated representations of his naval officers had forced him, much against his will, to believe that his descent upon England would be impracticable unless secured by the presence of his fleet. In spite of the general voice of those who knew the condition of the French navy, he determined to act with his fleet on the same principles as he would have acted with his army; a gigantic combination of various squadrons was to be effected, and a fleet great enough to destroy all hope of opposition to sweep the Channel. For this purpose the 18 ships of the line at Brest under Admiral Gantheaume, the squadron at Rochefort under Villeneuve, and the Toulon fleet under Latouche-Tréville, were to unite. The last mentioned admiral was intrusted with the chief command. Sailing up the coast of France, he was to liberate from their blockade the squadrons of Rochefort and Brest, and with their combined fleets appear before Boulogne. But Latouche-Tréville died, and Napoleon intrusted his plans to Villeneuve. {1343} Those plans, all of them arranged without regard to the bad condition of the French ships, or to the uncertainty of the weather, were frequently changed; at one time Villeneuve from Toulon, and Missiessy, his successor, at Rochefort, were to proceed to the West Indies, drawing the English fleet thither; then Gantheaume was to appear from Brest, throw troops into Ireland, and thus cover the flotilla. At another time, all the fleets were to assemble at the West Indies, and, joining with the Spanish fleet at Ferrol, appear in the Straits of Calais. To complete this last measure Villeneuve set sail from Toulon on the 30th of March 1805, joined Gravina at Cadiz, and reached Martinique on the 13th of May with 20 ships of the line, and 7 frigates. His voyage was so slow that Missiessy had returned from the West Indies to France, and the junction failed. In hot pursuit of Villeneuve, Nelson, who had at length found out his destination, had hurried. At Martinique Gantheaume, with the Brest fleet, should have joined Villeneuve; unfortunately for him, Admiral Cornwallis blockaded his fleet. Villeneuve therefore had to return to Europe alone, sailing for Ferrol to pick up a squadron of 15 ships. He was then, at the head of 35 ships, ordered to appear before Brest, liberate Gantheaume, and appear in the Channel. Back again in pursuit of him Nelson sailed, but supposed that he would return to the Mediterranean and not to Ferrol; he therefore again missed him; but as he had found means to inform the English Government that Villeneuve was returning to Europe, Calder, with a fleet of 15 ships, was sent to intercept him. The fleets encountered off Cape Finisterre [Northwest corner of Spain]. The French had 27 vessels, Calder but 18, and after an indecisive battle, in which two Spanish ships were taken, he was afraid to renew the engagement; and Villeneuve was thus enabled to reach Ferrol in safety. However, all the operations towards concentration had led to absolutely nothing, and the English fleets, which the movements towards the West Indies were to have decoyed from the Channel, were either still off the coast of France or in immediate pursuit of the fleet of Villeneuve. Nelson returned to Gibralter, and as soon as he found out where Villeneuve was, he joined his fleet to that of Cornwallis before Brest, and himself returned to England. … Meanwhile Villeneuve had not been able to get ready for sea till the 11th of August. … He was afraid to venture northwards, and with the full approbation of his Spanish colleague Gravina, determined to avail himself of a last alternative which Napoleon had suggested, and sailed to Cadiz. This was a fatal blow to the gigantic schemes of Napoleon. Up till the 22nd of August he still believed that Villeneuve would make his appearance, and in fact wrote to him that day at Brest, closing his letter with the words, 'England is ours.' As the time for his great stroke drew near he grew nervously anxious, constantly watching the Channel for the approach of the fleet, and at last, when his Minister of Marine, Decrès, told him that the fleet had gone to Cadiz, he broke forth in bitter wrath against both his Minister and Villeneuve, whom he accused of the most shameful weakness. But Napoleon was not a man who let his success be staked upon one plan alone. Though studiously hiding from his people the existence of the coalition, and not scrupling to have recourse to forged letters and fabricated news for the purpose, he was fully aware of its existence. … Without much difficulty, therefore, he at once resigned his great plans upon England, and directed his army towards the eastern frontier."

_J. F. Bright, History of England, period 3, pages 1261-1264._

"In the first days of September, 1805, Napoleon's great army was in full march across France and Germany, to attain the Danube. … The Allies … had projected four separate and ill-combined attacks; the first on Hanover and Holland by a Russian and British force; the second, on Lower Italy by a similar body; the third, by a great Austrian army on Upper Italy; and the fourth, by a United Austrian and Russian army, moving across Southern Germany to the Rhine. … By this time, the Austrian Mack had drawn close to the Inn, in order to compel Bavaria to join the Allies, and was even making his way to the Iller, but his army was far distant from that of the Russian chief, Kutusoff, and still further from that of Buxhöwden, the one in Galicia, the other in Poland. … Napoleon had seized this position of affairs, with the comprehensive knowledge of the theatre of war, and the skill of arranging armies upon it, in which he has no equals among modern captains. He opposed Masséna to the Archdukes, with a much weaker force, confident that his great lieutenant could hold them in check. He neglected the attacks from the North Sea, and the South; but he resolved to strike down Mack, in overwhelming strength, should he advance without his Russian supports. … The great mass of the Grand Army had reached the Main and Rhine by the last week of September. The left wing, joined by the Bavarian forces, and commanded by Bernadotte and Marmont, had marched from Hanover and Holland, and was around Würtzburg; the centre, the corps of Soult, and Davoust, moved from the channel, was at Spire and Mannheim, and the right wing, formed of the corps of Ney and Lannes, with the Imperial Guard, and the horse of Murat, filled the region between Carlsruhe and Strasburg, the extreme right under Augereau, which had advanced from Brittany, being still behind but drawing towards Huningen. By this time Mack was upon the Iller, holding the fortress of Ulm on the upper Danube, and extending his forces thence to Memmingen. … By the first days of October the great French masses … were in full march from the Rhine to the Main, across Würtemberg and the Franconian plains; and cavalry filled the approaches to the Black Forest, in order to deceive and perplex Mack. … The Danube ere long was reached and crossed, at Donauwörth, Ingolstadt, and other points; and Napoleon already stood on the rear of his enemy, interposing between him and Vienna, and cut him off from the Russians, even now distant. The net was quickly drawn round the ill-fated Mack. … By the third week of October, the Grand Army had encompassed the Austrians on every side, and Napoleon held his quarry in his grasp. Mack … had not the heart to strike a desperate stroke, and to risk a battle; and he capitulated at Ulm on the 19th of October. Two divisions of his army had contrived to break out; but one was pursued and nearly destroyed by Murat, and the other was compelled by Augereau to lay down its arms, as it was on its way to the hills of the Tyrol. An army of 85,000 men had thus, so to speak, been well-nigh effaced; and not 20,000 had effected their escape. France meanwhile had met a crushing disaster on the element which England had made her own. {1344} We have seen how Villeneuve had put into Cadiz, afraid to face the hostile fleets off Brest; and how this had baffled the project of the descent. Napoleon was indignant with his ill-fated admiral. … At a hint of disgrace the susceptible Frenchman made up his mind, at any risk, to fight. By this time Nelson had left England, and was off Cadiz with a powerful fleet; and he actually weakened his force by four sail-of-the-line, in order to lure his adversary out. On the 20th of October, 1805, the allied fleet was in the open sea; it had been declared at a council of war, that a lost battle was almost certain, so bad was the condition of many of the crews; but Villeneuve was bent on challenging Fate; and almost courted defeat, in his despair. … On the morning of the 21st, the allied fleet, 33 war ships, and a number of frigates, was off Cape Trafalgar [25 miles west of Gibraltar on the coast of Spain], making for the Straits. … Nelson advanced slowly against his doomed enemy, with 27 ships and their attendant frigates; the famous signal floated from his mast, 'England expects every man to do his duty'; and, at about noon, Collingwood pierced Villeneuve's centre; nearly destroying the Santa Anna with a single broadside. Ere long Nelson had, broken Villeneuve's line, with the Victory, causing frightful destruction; and as other British ships came up by degrees they relieved the leading ships from the pressure of their foes, and completed the ruin already begun. At about one, Nelson met his death wound, struck by a shot from the tops of the Redoutable. … Pierced through and through, the shattered allied centre was soon a collection of captured wrecks. … Only 11 ships out of 33 escaped; and the burning Achille, like the Orient at the Nile, added to the grandeur and horrors of an appalling scene. Villeneuve, who had fought most honourably in the Bucentaure, was compelled to strike his flag before the death of Nelson. The van of the allies that had fled at Trafalgar, was soon afterwards captured by a British squadron. Though dearly bought by the death of Nelson, the victory may be compared to Lepanto; and it blotted France out as a great Power on the ocean; Napoleon … never tried afterwards to meet England at sea. … His success, at this moment, had been so wonderful, that what he called 'the loss of a few ships at sea,' seemed a trifling and passing rebuff of fortune. … He had discomfitted the whole plan of the Allies; and the failure of the attack on the main scene of the theatre had caused all the secondary attacks to fail. … Napoleon, throwing out detachments to protect his flanks, had entered Vienna on the 14th of November. … The House of Hapsburg and its chief had fled. … Extraordinary as his success had been, the position of the Emperor had, in a few days, become grave. … Napoleon had not one hundred thousand men in hand—apart from the bodies that covered his flanks—to make head against his converging enemies. Always daring, however, he resolved to attack the Allies before they could receive aid from Prussia; and he marched from Vienna towards the close of November; having taken careful precautions to guard his rear. … By this time the Allies were around Olmütz, the Archdukes were not many marches away, and a Prussian army was nearly ready to move. Had the Russians and Austrians fallen back from Olmütz and effected their junction with the Archdukes, they could, therefore, have. opposed the French with a force more than two-fold in numbers. … But the folly and presumption which reigned among the young nobles surrounding the Czar—Alexander was now at the head of his army—brought on the Coalition deserved punishment, and pedantry had its part in an immense disaster. The force of Napoleon appeared small, his natural line of retreat was exposed, and a theorist in the Austrian camp persuaded the Czar and the Austrian Emperor, who was at the head of his troops at Olmütz, to consent to a magnificent plan of assailing Napoleon by the well-known method of Frederick the Great, in the Seven Years' War, of turning his right wing, by an attack made, in the oblique order, in great force, and of cutting him off from his base at Vienna, and driving him, routed, into, Bohemia. This grand project on paper, which involved a march across the front of the hostile army within reach of the greatest of masters of war, was hailed with exultation. … The Allies were soon in full march from Olmütz, and preparations were made for the decisive movement in the night of the 1st December, 1805. Napoleon had watched the reckless false step being made by his foes with unfeigned delight; 'that army is mine,' he proudly exclaimed. … The sun of Austerlitz rose on the 2nd, the light of victory often invoked by Napoleon. … The dawn of the winter's day revealed three large columns, succeeded by a fourth at no great distance, toiling through a tract of marshes and frozen lakes, to outflank Napoleon's right on the Goldbach, the allied centre, on the tableland of Prätzen, immediately before the French front, having been dangerously weakened by this great turning movement. The assailants were opposed by a small force only, under Davoust, one of the best of the marshals. … Ere long Napoleon, who, like a beast of prey, had reserved his strength until it was time to spring, launched Soult in force against the Russian and Austrian centre, enfeebled by the detachment against the French right and exposed to the whole weight of Napoleon's attacks; and Prätzen was stormed after a fierce struggle, in which Bernadotte gave the required aid to Soult. The allied centre was thus rent asunder. Lannes meanwhile had defeated the allied right. … Napoleon now turned with terrible energy and in overwhelming strength against the four columns, that had assailed his right, but had begun to retreat. His victorious centre was aided by his right, now set free; the Russians and Austrians were struck with panic, a horrible scene of destruction followed, the flying troops were slain or captured in thousands; and multitudes perished, engulfed in the lakes, the French artillery shattering their icy surface. The rout was decisive, complete, and appalling; about 80,000 of the Allies were engaged; they lost all their guns and nearly half their numbers, and the remains of their army were a worthless wreck. Napoleon had only 60,000 men in the fight. … The memorable campaign of 1805 is, perhaps, the grandest of Napoleon's exploits in war."

_W. O'C. Morris, Napoleon, chapter 7._

ALSO IN: _A. Thiers, History of the Consulate and Empire, book 22 (volume 2)._

_R. Southey, Life of Nelson, chapters 8-9 (volume 2)._

_W. C. Russell, Nelson and the Naval Supremacy of England, chapters 17-20._

_Lord Nelson, Dispatches and Letters, volumes 6-7._

_Capt. E. J. de la Gravière, Sketches of the last Naval War, part 6 (volume 2)._

_C. Adams, Great Campaigns in Europe, from 1796 to 1870, chapter 3._

_Baron de Marbot, Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 20-23._

_A. T. Mahan, Influences of Sea Power upon the French Revolution, chapters 15-16 (volume 2)._

{1345}

FRANCE: A. D. 1805-1806 (December-August). The Peace of Presburg. Humiliation of Austria. Formation of the Confederation of the Rhine. Extinction of the Holy Roman Empire. The goading of Prussia to war.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1805-1806; and 1806 (JANUARY-AUGUST).

FRANCE: A. D. 1805-1806 (December-September). Dethronement of the dynasty of Naples. Bestowal of the crown upon Joseph Bonaparte.