Part 242

ALSO IN: _J. C. McCoan, Egypt under Ismail, chapters 8-10._

_C. Royle, The Egyptian Campaigns, volume 1, chapters 1-20._

_Khedives and Pashas._

_C. F. Goodrich, Report on British Military and Naval Operations in Egypt, 1882, part 1._

EGYPT: A. D. 1882-1883. The massacre and destruction in Alexandria. Declared rebellion of Arabi. Its suppression by the English. Banishment of Arabi. English occupation.

The city of Alexandria had become "such a scene of pillage, massacre, and wanton destruction as to make the world shudder. It was the old tale of horrors. Houses were plundered and burned; the European quarter, including the stately buildings surrounding the Great Square of Mehemet Ali, was sacked and left a heap of smoldering ruins; and more than two thousand Europeans, for the most part Levantines, were massacred with all the cruelty of oriental fanaticism. This was on the afternoon of the 12th. It was the second massacre that had occurred under the very eyes of the British fleet. The admiral's failure to prevent it has been called unfortunate by some and criminal by others. It seems to have been wholly without excuse. … The blue-jackets were landed on the 13th, and cleared the way before them with a Gatling gun. The next day, more ships having arrived, a sufficient force was landed to take possession of the entire city. The khedive was escorted back to Ras-el-Tin from Ramleh, and given a strong guard. Summary justice was dealt out to all hostile Arabs who had been captured in the city. In short, English intervention was followed by English occupation. The bombardment of Alexandria had defined clearly the respective positions of Arabi and the khedive toward Egypt and the Egyptian people. … The khedive was not only weak in the eyes of his people, but he was regarded as the tool of England. … From the moment the first shot was fired upon Alexandria, Arabi was the real ruler of the people. … The conference at Constantinople was stirred by the news of the bombardment of Alexandria. It presented a note to the Porte, July 15, requesting the dispatch of Turkish troops to restore the status quo in Egypt. But the sultan had no idea of taking the part of the Christian in what all Islam regarded as a contest between the Moslem and the unbeliever. … In Egypt, the khedive had been prevailed upon, after some demur, to proclaim Arabi a rebel and discharge him from his cabinet. Arabi had issued a counter-proclamation, on the same day, declaring Tewfik a traitor to his people and his religion. {766} Having received the news of the khedive's proclamation, Lord Dufferin, the British ambassador at Constantinople, announced to the conference that England was about to send an expedition to Egypt to suppress the rebellion and to restore the authority of the khedive. Thereupon the sultan declared that he had decided to send a Turkish expedition. Lord Dufferin feigned to accept the sultan's cooperation, but demanded that the Porte, as a preliminary step, should declare Arabi a rebel. Again the sultan was confronted with the danger of incurring the wrath of the Moslem world. He could not declare Arabi a rebel. … In his desperation, he sent a force of 3,000 men to Suda bay with orders to hold themselves in readiness to enter Egypt at a moment's notice. … In the meantime, however, the English expedition had arrived in Egypt and was proceeding to crush the rebellion, regardless of the diplomatic delays and bickerings at Constantinople. … It was not until the 15th of August that Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived with his force in Egypt. The English at that time held only two points, Alexandria and Suez, while the entire Egyptian interior, as well as Port Said and Ismailia, were held by Arabi, whose force, it was estimated, now amounted to about 70,000 men, of whom at least 50,000 were regulars. The objective point of General Wolseley's expedition to crush Arabi was, of course, the city of Cairo. There were two ways of approaching that city, one from Alexandria, through the Delta, and the other from the Suez canal. There were many objections to the former route. … The Suez canal was supposed to be neutral water. … But England felt no obligation to recognize any neutrality, … acting upon the principle, which is doubtless sound, that 'the neutrality of any canal joining the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans will be maintained, if at all, by the nation which can place and keep the strongest ships at each extremity.' In other words, General Wolseley decided to enter Cairo by way of the Suez canal and Ismailia. But he kept his plan a profound secret. Admiral Seymour alone knew his purpose. … On the 19th, the transports moved eastward from Alexandria, as if to attack Abukir; but under the cover of darkness that night, they were escorted on to Port Said, where they learned that the entire canal, owing to the preconcerted action of Admiral Seymour, was in the hands of the British. On the 21st, the troops met Sir Henry McPherson's Indian contingent at Ismailia. Two days were now consumed in rest and preparation. The Egyptians cut off the water supply, which came from the Delta by the Sweet Water Canal, by damming the canal. A sortie to secure possession of the dam was therefore deemed necessary, and was successfully made on the 24th. Further advances were made, and on the 26th, Kassassin, a station of some importance on the canal and railway, was occupied. Here the British force was obliged to delay for two weeks, while organizing a hospital and a transport service. This gave Arabi opportunity to concentrate his forces at Zagazig and Tel-el-Kebir. But he knew it was for his interest to strike at once before the British transports could come up with the advance. He therefore made two attempts, one on August 28, and the other on September 9, to regain the position lost at Kassassin. But he failed in both, though inflicting some loss upon his opponents. On the 12th of September preparations were made by General Wolseley for a decisive battle. He had become convinced from daily reconnoissance and from the view obtained in the engagement of September 9, that the fortifications at Tel-el-Kebir were both extensive and formidable. … It was therefore decided to make the approach under cover of darkness. … At 1.30 on the morning of the 13th General Wolseley gave the order for the advance, his force consisting of about 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalrymen, and sixty field-guns. They had only the stars to guide them, but so accurately was the movement conducted that the leading brigades of each division reached the enemy's outposts within two minutes of each other. 'The enemy (says General Wolseley) were completely surprised, and it was not until one or two of their advanced sentries fired their rifles that they realized our close proximity to their works.' … The intrenchments were not carried without a severe struggle. The Egyptians fought with a desperate courage and hundreds of them were bayoneted at their posts. … But what could the rank and file accomplish when 'each officer knew that he would run, but hoped his neighbor would stay.' At the first shot Arabi and his second in command took horse and galloped to Belbeis, where they caught a train for Cairo. Most of the other officers, as the reports of killed and wounded show, did the same. The Egyptians fired their first shot at 4.55 A. M., and at 6.45 the English had possession of Arabi's headquarters and the canal bridge. The British loss was 57 killed, 380 wounded, and 22 missing. The Egyptian army left about 2,000 dead in the fortifications. … A proof of the completeness of the success was the entire dissipation of Arabi's army. Groups of soldiers, it is true, were scattered to different parts of Egypt; but the army organization was completely broken up with the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. … 'Major-General Lowe was ordered to push on with all possible speed to Cairo. … General Lowe [reached] the great barracks of Abbassieh, just outside of Cairo, at 4.45 P. M., on the 14th instant. The cavalry marched sixty-five miles in these two days. … A message was sent to Arabi Pasha through the prefect of the city, calling upon him to surrender forthwith, which he did unconditionally.' … Before leaving England, Wolseley had predicted that he would enter Cairo on the 16th of September; but with still a day to spare the feat was accomplished, and Arabi's rebellion was completely crushed. England now stood alone. Victory had been won without the aid of France or the intervention of Turkey. In Constantinople negotiations regarding Turkish expeditions were still pending when Lord Dufferin received the news of Wolseley's success, and announced to the Porte that there was now no need of a Turkish force in Egypt, as the war was ended. France at once prepared to resume her share in the control; but England, having borne the sole burden of the war, did not propose now to share the influence her success had given her. And it was for the interest of Egypt that she should not. … England's first duty, after quiet was assured, was to send away all the British troops except a force of about 11,000 men, which it was deemed advisable to retain in Egypt until the khedive's authority was placed on a safe footing throughout the land. … {767} What should be done with Arabi was the question of paramount interest, when once the khedive's authority was re-established and recognized. Tewfik and his ministers, if left to themselves, would unquestionably have taken his life. … But England was determined that Arabi should have a fair trial. … It was decided that the rebel leaders should appear before a military tribunal, and they were given English counsel to plead their cause. … The trial was a farce. Everything was 'cut and dried' beforehand. It was arranged that Arabi was to plead guilty to rebellion, that he was forthwith to be condemned to death by the court, and that the khedive was immediately to commute the sentence to perpetual exile. In fact, the necessary papers were drawn up and signed before the court met for Arabi's trial on December 3. … On the 26th of December Arabi and his six companions … upon whom the same sentence had been passed, left Cairo for the Island of Ceylon, there to spend their life of perpetual exile. … Lord Dufferin … had been sent from Constantinople to Cairo, early in November, with the special mission of bringing order out of governmental chaos. In two months he had prepared a scheme of legislative reorganization. This was, however, somewhat altered; so that it was not until May, 1883, that the plan in its improved form was accepted by the decree of the khedive. The new constitution provided for three classes of assemblies: the 'Legislative' Council,' the 'General Assembly,' and the 'Provincial Councils,' of which there were to be fourteen, one for each province. … Every Egyptian man, over twenty years of age, was to vote (by ballot) for an 'elector-delegate' from the village in the neighborhood of which he lived, and the 'electors-delegate' from all the villages in a province were to form the constituency that should elect the provincial council. … The scheme for reorganization was carried forward to the extent of electing the 'electors-delegate' in September; but by that time Egypt was again in a state of such disquietude that the British advisers of the khedive considered it unwise to put the new institutions into operation. In place of legislative council and general assembly, the khedive appointed a council of state, consisting of eleven Egyptians, two Armenians, and ten Europeans. The reforms were set aside for the time being in view of impending troubles and dangers in the Sudan."

_J. E. Bowen, The Conflict of East and West in Egypt, chapter 5-6._

ALSO IN: _Colonel J. F. Maurice, Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt._

_C. Royle, The Egyptian Campaigns, volume 1, chapters 22-44._

EGYPT: A. D. 1884-1885. General Gordon's Mission to Khartoum. The town beleaguered by the Mahdists. English rescue expedition. The energy that was too late.

"The abandonment of the Soudan being decided upon, the British Government confided to General Gordon the task of extricating the Egyptian garrisons scattered throughout the country. … Gordon's original instructions were dated the 18th January, 1884. He was to proceed at once to Egypt, to report on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it might be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum. … He was to be accompanied by Colonel Stewart. … Gordon's final instructions were given him by the Egyptian Government in a firman appointing him Governor-General. … Gordon arrived at Khartoum on the 18th February. … While Gordon was sending almost daily expressions of his view as to the only way of carrying out the policy of eventual evacuation, it was also becoming clear to him that he would very soon be cut off from the rest of Egypt. His first remark on this subject was to express 'the conviction that I shall be caught in Khartoum'; and he wrote,—'Even if I was mean enough to escape I have no power to do so.' The accuracy of this forecast was speedily demonstrated. Within a few days communications with Khartoum were interrupted, and although subsequently restored for a time, the rising of the riparian tribes rendered the receipt and despatch of messages exceedingly uncertain. … Long before the summer of 1884, it was evident that the position of Gordon at Khartoum had become so critical, that if he were to be rescued at all, it could only be by the despatch of a British force. … Early in May, war preparations were commenced in England, and on the 10th of the month the military authorities in Cairo received instructions to prepare for the despatch in October of an expedition for the relief of the Soudanese capital. 12,000 camels were ordered to be purchased and held in readiness for a forward march in the autumn. On the 16th May a half-battalion of English troops was moved up the Nile to Wady Halfa. A few weeks later some other positions on the Nile were occupied by portions of the Army of Occupation. Naval officers were also sent up the river to examine and report upon the cataracts and other impediments to navigation. Still it was not till the 5th August that Mr. Gladstone rose in the House of Commons to move a vote of credit of £300,000 to enable the Government to undertake operations for the relief of Gordon. … It was agreed that there were but two routes by which Khartoum could be approached by an expedition. One by way of the Nile, and the other via Souakim and Berber. … The Nile route having been decided on, preparations on a large scale were begun. … It was at first arranged that not more than 5,000 men should form the Expedition, but later on the number was raised to 7,000. … The instructions given to Lord Wolseley stated that the primary object of the Expedition was to bring away Gordon and Stewart from Khartoum; and when that purpose should be effected, no further offensive operations of any kind were to be undertaken."

_C. Royle, The Egyptian Campaigns, 1882-1885, volume 2, chapters 12-18._

"First, it was said that our troops would be before the gates of Khartoum on January 14th; next it was the middle of February; and then the time stretched out to the middle of March. … Lord Wolseley offered a hundred pounds to the regiment covering the distance from Sarras to Debbeh most expeditiously and with least damage to boats. … He also dispatched Sir Herbert Stewart on the immortal march to Gakdul. Stewart's force, composed principally of the Mounted Infantry and Camel Corps, and led by a troop of the 19th Hussars, acting as scouts—numbering about 1,100 in all—set out from Korti on December 30th. Its destination was about 100 miles from headquarters, and about 80 from the Nile at Shendy. {768} The enterprise, difficult and desperate as it was, was achieved with perfect success. … On the 17th January Sir Herbert Stewart engaged the enemy on the road to Metemneh, and after defeating some 10,000 Arabs—collected from Berber, Metemneh, and Omdurman—pushed forward to the Abu Klea Wells. His tactics were much the same as those of General Graham at Elteb, and those of the Mahdi's men—of attacking when thirst and fatigue had well-nigh prostrated the force—were at all points similar to those adopted against Hicks. Our losses were 65 non-commissioned officers and men killed and 85 wounded, with 9 officers killed—among them Colonel Burnaby—and 9 wounded. Stewart at once pushed on for Metemneh and the Nile. He left the Wells on the 18th January to occupy Metemneh, if possible, but, failing that, to make for the Nile and entrench himself. After a night's march, some five miles south of Metemneh, the column found itself in presence of an enemy said to have been about 18,000 strong. Stewart halted and formed a zareba under a deadly fire. He himself was mortally hurt in the groin, and Mr. Cameron, of the Standard, and Mr. Herbert, of the Morning Post, were killed. The zareba completed, the column advanced in square, and the Arabs, profiting by Abu Klea, moved forward in echelon, apparently with the purpose of charging. At thirty yards or so they were brought to bay, so terrific was the fire from the square, and so splendidly served was Norton's artillery. For two hours the battle raged; and then the Arabs, 'mown down in heaps,' gave way. Meantime Sir Charles Wilson had made a dash for the Nile, where he found steamers and reinforcements from Gordon, and the laconic message, 'An right at Khartoum. Can hold out for years.' … In the joy at the good news, none had stopped to consider the true meaning of the message, 'All right. Can hold out for years,' for none was aware that nearly two months before Gordon had said he had just provisions enough for 40 days, and that what he really meant was that he had come to his last biscuit. The message—which was written for the enemy—was dated December 20, and Sir Charles Wilson would reach Khartoum on January 28, just a month after its despatch. … The public, carefully kept in ignorance … and hopeful beyond their wont, were simply stupefied to hear, on February 5, that Khartoum was in the hands of the Mahdi and Gordon captured or dead."

_A. E. Hake, The Story of Chinese Gordon, volume 2, chapter 10._

ALSO IN: _H. M. Stanley, In Darkest Africa, chapter 1._

_Colonel H. E. Colvile, History of the Soudan Campaign._

_Colonel C. W. Wilson, From Korti to Khartoum._

_Colonel Sir W. F. Butler, The Campaign of the Cataracts._

_W. M. Pimblett, The Story of the Soudan War._

_General C. G. Gordon, Journals at Khartoum._

_H. W. Gordon, Events in the Life of Charles George Gordon, chapters 14-20._

EGYPT: A. D. 1893. The reigning khedive.

Mohamed Tewfik died in January, 1802 and was succeeded by his son Abbas, born in 1874.

_Statesman's Year-book, 1893._

EGYPT: End----------

EGYPTIAN EDUCATION.

See EDUCATION, ANCIENT.

EGYPTIAN TALENT.

See TALENT.

EIDGENOSSEN.

The German word Eidgenossen, signifying "confederates," is often used in a special sense, historically, as applied to the members of the Swiss Confederation/

See SWITZERLAND: THE THREE FOREST CANTONS.

The name of the Huguenots is believed by some writers to be a corruption of the same term.

EIGHT SAINTS OF WAR, The.

See FLORENCE: A. D. 1375-1378.

EIKON BASILIKE, The.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1649 (FEBRUARY).

EION, Siege and capture of (B. C. 470).

See ATHENS: B. C. 470-466.

EIRE.

See IRELAND: THE NAME.

EKKLESIA.

See ECCLESIA.

EKOWE, Defence of (1879).

See SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1877-1870.

ELAGABALUS, Roman Emperor, A. D. 218-222.

ELAM.

"Genesis calls a tribe dwelling on the Lower Tigris, between the river and the mountains of Iran, the Elamites, the oldest son of Shem. Among the Greeks the land of the Elamites was known as Kissia [Cissia], and afterwards as Susiana, from the name of the capital. It was also called Elymais."

_M. Duncker, History of Antiquity, book 2, chapter 1._

About 2300 B. C. Chaldea, or Babylonia, was overwhelmed by an Elamite invasion—an invasion recorded by king Asshurbanipal, and which is stated to have laid waste the land of Accad and desecrated its temples. "Nor was this a passing inroad or raid of booty-seeking mountaineers. It was a real conquest. Khudur-Nankhundi and his successors remained in Southern Chaldea. … This is the first time we meet authentic monumental records of a country which was destined through the next sixteen centuries to be in continual contact, mostly hostile, with both Babylonia and her northern rival, Assyria, until its final annihilation by the latter [B. C. 649, under Asshurbanipal, the Sardanapulus of the Greeks, who reduced the whole country to a wilderness]. Its capital was Shushan (afterwards pronounced by foreigners Susa), and its own original name Shushinak. Its people were of Turanian stock, its language was nearly akin to that of Shumir and Accad. … Elam, the name under which the country is best known, both from the Bible and later monuments, is a Turanian word, which means, like 'Accad,' 'Highlands.' … One of Khudur-Nankhundi's next successors, Khudur-Lagamar, was not content with the addition of Chaldea to his kingdom of Elam. He had the ambition of a born conqueror, and the generalship of one. The Chapter xiv, of Genesis—which calls him Chedorlaomer—is the only document we have descriptive of this king's warlike career, and a very striking picture it gives of it, … Khudur-Lagamar … lived, according to the most probable calculations, about 2200 B. C."

_Z. A. Ragozin, Story of Chaldea, chapter 4._

It is among the discoveries of recent times, derived from the records in clay unearthed in Babylonia, that Cyrus the Great was originally king of Elam, and acquired Persia, as he acquired his later dominions, by conquest.

See PERSIA, B. C. 549-521.

See, also, BABYLONIA.

EL ARISH, Treaty of.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1800 (JANUARY-JUNE).

ELBA: A. D. 1735. Ceded to Spain by Austria.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735.

ELBA: A. D. 1802. Annexation to France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1802 (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER).

ELBA: A. D. 1814. Napoleon in exile.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (MARCH-APRIL), and (APRIL-JUNE).

{i}

APPENDIX A.

NOTES TO ETHNOGRAPHICAL MAP, PLACED AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS VOLUME.

To the eye of modern scholarship "language" forms the basis of every ethnic distinction. Physical and exterior features like the stature, the color of the skin, the diversity of habits and customs, the distinctions which once formed in great part the basis of ethnic research have all in our own day been relegated to a subordinate place.