Part 1216

1. The royal government is requested to lay the estimates for 1863 before the House as speedily as possible for their constitutional consideration, so that the amount of the same may be constitutionally fixed before January 1st 1863.

2. It is unconstitutional for the royal government to direct expenditures which were by resolution of the House of Representatives definitely and expressly rejected."

The Minister of State, Herr von Bismarck, spoke on these resolutions as follows: "I would willingly accept the estimates for 1862, if I could do so without entering upon explanations which might prove prejudicial. Either side might abuse its constitutional rights and be met by a reaction in kind from the opposite side. The crown, for instance, might decree dissolution twelve times in succession without violating the letter of the constitution, yet would it be an abuse of power. It may refuse to accept a striking out of estimates without measure. Where will you draw the line? At 6 millions? at 16? or at 60? There are members of the National Verein [National Union]—an organization highly respected for the well known fairness of its demands,—very estimable members—who declare all standing armies as superfluous. Well then, if the House of Representatives should hold such view must not the government repudiate it? The 'cool headedness' of the Prussian people has been referred to. Well, it is a fact, the great self-assertion of individuality among us makes constitutional government very hard in Prussia; in France, where this individual self-assertion is wanting, it is otherwise. There a constitutional conflict was no disgrace, but all honor. We are perhaps too 'cultured' to tolerate a constitution; we are too critical; the ability to pass judgment on measures of the government or acts of the legislature is too universal; there is a large number of 'Catilinarian Characters' [existences in the original] in the land whose chief interest is in revolutions. All this may sound paradoxical; yet it proves how hard constitutional life is in Prussia. {3777} The people are too sensitive about the faults of the government; as if the whole did not suffer when this or that individual minister blunders. Public opinion is changeable, the press is not public opinion; everyone knows how the press originates; the representatives have the higher task of directing opinion, of being above it. To return once more to our people: our blood is too hot, we are fond of bearing an armor too large for our small body; now let us utilize it. Germany does not look at Prussia's liberalism but at its power. Let Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden indulge in liberalism, yet no one will assign to them the rule of Prussia; Prussia must consolidate its might and hold it together for the favorable moment, which has been allowed to pass unheeded several times. Prussia's boundaries, as determined by the Congress of Vienna, are not conducive to its wholesome existence as a sovereign state. Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities the mighty problems of the age are solved—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by Blood and Iron. Last year's grants have been made, no matter on what grounds; I am seeking sincerely for a road to harmony: the finding of it does not depend on me alone. It were better, the House of Representatives had not made an accomplished fact. When the appropriations are not passed, then the way is clear. The constitution affords no relief, for interpretation is opposed to interpretation, 'summum ius, summa iniuria' [the highest law, greatest injustice], 'the letter killeth.' I am glad that the chairman by certain turns of speech admits the possibility of an understanding, of a different vote of the house on a new proposition of the government; I am searching for the same bridge; when it will be found is uncertain. The establishment of a budget for this year is barely possible; the time is too short; our conditions are exceptional. The government concedes the principle of the earliest possible handing down of the estimates. But you say, this has been promised so often and has not been done. Well 'You must trust us for honest people.' I do not share in the interpretation that it was unconstitutional to make expenditures that have been denied, all three factors [i. e. Commons, Upper House and Crown] must agree upon an interpretation, before it stands."

_Die Politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck (translated from the German), volume 2, pages 20, 28-30._

"Otto von Bismarck-Schoenhausen, born April 1, 1815, was a Junker [squire, aristocrat] from top to toe, but from the very first, as was the case with all the Junkers of Prussia, Pomerania and the Mark, his life had been thoroughly merged in that of the Prussian state. He had first called attention to himself in 1847 at the general diet (Vereinigter Landtag]. In 1849 he came forward in the chamber of deputies, in 1850 in the Union Parliament at Frankfort—always as the goad of the extreme right, and each time his appearance gave the signal for a violent conflict. Perfectly unsparing of all his opponents, very anti-liberal but very Prussian, very national-minded, in spite of being such a Junker, Bismarck flared up with especial violence against the democratic attacks on the army and the monarchy. … To Frankfort Bismarck came as the sworn defender of the policy of reaction. The Austrian party, thinking him to be a man of no consequence, greeted his coming with joy. He soon made himself unpleasant enough, especially to the Austrian presidents of the federal diet. … He refused to accept the servile role which Austria had apportioned to him; his objections in matters of form and on unimportant occasions prepared the great fundamental anti-Austrian uprising. A feeling of pain came over him at the sight of the Prussian submission to Austria, but at the same time he was seized with a thirst for vengeance. … In Frankfort, too, he learned thoroughly to know German affairs: the utter weakness of the Confederation and the misery of having so many petty states. … To his mind the goal of Prussian policy was to drive Austria out of Germany and then to bring about a subordination of the other German states to Prussia. … Nor did he make the least secret of his warlike attitude towards Austria. When an Austrian arch-duke, who was passing through, once asked him maliciously whether all the many decorations which he wore on his breast had been won by bravery in battle: 'All gained before the enemy, all gained here in Frankfort,' was the ready answer. In the year 1859 came the complications between Austria and Italy, the latter being joined by France. This Italian war between Austria and France thoroughly roused the German nation. … Many wanted to protect Austria, others showed a disinclination to enter the lists for Austria's rule over Italy. … Bismarck's advice at this time was that Prussia should side against Austria and should join Italy. In the spring of 1859, however, he was transferred from Frankfort on the Main to St. Petersburg: 'put on ice on the Neva,' as he said himself, 'like champagne for future use.' … In June 1859, in view of the Italian war, it had been decreed in Prussia that the army should be mobilized and kept in readiness to fight. … When, later, in the summer of this year, the probability of war had gone by, the Landwehr was not dismissed but, on the contrary, a beginning was made with a new formation of regiments which had already been planned and talked over. … On February 10, 1860, the question of the military reorganization was laid before the diet, where doubts and objections were raised against it. … On the 4th of May, at the same time when the law about civil marriages was rejected, the land-tax, by which the cost of the army-reorganization was to have been covered, was refused by the Upper House. The liberals were disappointed and angered. The ministry was soon in a bad dilemma: should it give way to the liberal opposition and dissolve the newly formed regiments? The expedient that was thought of seemed clever enough but it led in reality to a blind alley and was productive of the most baneful consequences. The ministry moved a single grant of 9,000,000 thalers for the purpose of completing the army and maintaining its efficiency on the former footing. The motion was carried on May 15, 1860, by a vote of 315 against two. … The new elections for the house of deputies in December 1861 produced a diet of an entirely different stamp from that of 1858. … The moderate majority was now to atone for the sin of not having come to any real arrangement with the ministry on the army question; for the new majority came to Berlin with the full intention of crushing the army-reform. … The chief task of the newly formed ministry of 1862 was to solve the military question, for the longer it had remained in abeyance the more complicated had the matter become. {3778} The newly-elected diet had been in session since the 19th of May. The majority was determined to draw the conclusion from the provisional nature of the army-reorganization grants that no such grants were any longer to be made. The battle cry of the majority of the diet was that all further demands of the government for the military reform were to be refused. … But how would this result? … The new officers had an actionable, legal claim to their salaries; who was to pay them? The budget for 1862 was already in great part expended. … Were the ministers themselves to pay the damages? Such seems to have been the idea of the fanatics in the parliament. … By September 1862 the belligerent and uncompromising attitude of the liberal majority had induced King William to lay aside his earlier distrust of Bismarck. He allowed him to be summoned and placed him at the head of the ministry. Most stirring was the first audience which Bismarck had with his king in the Park of Babelsberg on September 23. The king first of all laid before Bismarck the declaration of his abdication. Very much startled, Bismarck said: 'To that it should never be allowed to come!' The king replied that he had tried everything and knew no other alternative. His convictions, contrary to which he could not act, contrary to which he could not reign, forbade him to relinquish the army-reorganization. Thereupon Bismarck explained to the king his own different view of the matter and closed with the request that his Majesty might abandon all thoughts of abdication. The king then asked the minister if he would undertake to carry on the government without a majority and without a budget. Bismarck answered both questions in the affirmative and with the utmost decision. … The alliance between the king and his minister was closed and cemented on that 23rd of September in Babelsberg to endure for all time. … To this bond of allegiance which joined king and minister, Prussia and Germany owe all the glory that has fallen to their share. … In the summer of 1863 was originated the famous Austrian project of reform. … The proposals of Prussia that there should be one central head of Germany with popular representation from the whole nation was entirely thrust aside and, on the contrary, a federal directory was recommended with a parliament of delegates from the separate diets. … In spite of Prussia's absence the assembly of princes took place at Frankfort. King John of Saxony again travelled to Baden to urge King William to attend but the latter again declined. Not but that this refusal cost him a great struggle. … Bismarck had to threaten with his resignation before he could make the king remain firm; … he did not breathe freely again until the Saxon king had taken his leave. Then with his powerful hand he demolished a plate of glasses that stood before him; that cooled his anger and his excitement and he was once more the polished courtier. … Bismarck's policy now met with a great piece of good fortune. Through the death of the king of Denmark, namely, the Schleswig-Holstein question was forced to a final solution and this offered Bismarck an opportunity of trying his diplomatic skill, while at the same time it gave the Prussian army a brilliant occasion for showing what it could accomplish. In a series of bold moves Bismarck steered through the complications of the Schleswig-Holstein question; it is the first stage in his great career of victory. … But in spite of all the successes of the Danish war the diet continued in its opposition. A loan for the war was refused; any loan made without the consent of the diet was declared unconstitutional and not binding. … The subsequent grant for the costs of the war was refused. … Naturally the Prussian war-budget could not be made up, and the land continued to be governed without a budget. The details of the debates on these subjects are today only of minor interest. Much time was lost in mutual insults between Bismarck on the one hand and Virchow and Gneist on the other. Bismarck challenged Virchow to a duel, Virchow refused the challenge. … By April 1866 Bismarck had cleared the political field for his war against Austria; the necessity for that war had long been apparent to him. … That the German question could only be settled by the separation of Austria from Germany and that this separation could only be brought about by a war between Prussia and Austria had, in the course of years, become clear to all patriots who knew anything of history. With incomparable perspicuity the statesman who had led Prussia's policy since the autumn of 1862 had grasped the idea and had seen to carrying it out with the whole force of his iron will. Already in the autumn of 1863 he had drawn up the program of what he intended that the German Confederation should be. … The history of the world had not for centuries seen such a war as 1866. … It was then that King William and his minister, crowned with victories, asked the Prussian diet for indemnity: i. e. for an acknowledgment of their good purposes in spite of their illegal acts. … In point of fact the diet had been wrong and the king and his minister had acted wisely and well; in point of form they had broken the letter of the law. … In the years 1862-1866 Bismarck had held off Napoleon with incomparable political skill. He had always refused the French demands, but so that Napoleon in each case could cherish some hope and could venture again and again to approach Prussia with some new lure. Not until August 1866 did Napoleon receive a thorough and open repulse. Bismarck then answered every threat of the French with the counter-threat of a German war. The refusal of Bismarck and his king brought Napoleon into a very bad position as regarded the French people. In the minds of the latter a war against Germany was a foregone conclusion since 1866. … On the 8th of July (1870) the French envoy came to King William in Ems and demanded that he should forbid Prince Leopold to accept the crown of Spain. … It is a popular fiction that the king turned his back on Benedetti, or that he answered that he 'had nothing more to say to him,' or that he out and out refused him an audience. An extra of the German papers of July 14th did indeed read to that effect: Bismarck himself had drawn up the notice for the papers. He had made no false additions, but here and there he had erased and omitted some of the words spoken at Ems, thus rendering possible at least the whole false conception of the matter. Bismarck ventured on such a step, having clearly counted the costs; the result showed how closely he had made his calculations. … {3779} It was the war of 1870 that fundamentally changed the relations of the chancellor to the mass of the people. After 1871 he was immensely popular. … People believed that he could do anything, that he could make possible what was impossible for other men. … Bismarck was very soon surrounded with an almost mythical halo."

_W. Maurenbrecher, Gründung des Deutschen Reichs (translated from the German), pages 13-258._

See, also, GERMANY: A. D. 1861-1866, and after (pages 1537-1548).

GERMANY: A. D. 1863. Formation of the first Socialist party by Lassalle.

See SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A. D. 1862-1864 (page 2949).

GERMANY: A. D. 1870-1874. The "Kulturkampf" in its first stages. Speeches of Bismarck.