Part 1132

"Trenches were dug, and by the middle of August the batteries were within a quarter-mile of Wagner and within two and a half miles of Sumter. The work on these batteries had to be done mostly by night, for the forts kept up a heavy fire. Another battery was also begun in the marsh on the west side of Morris Island. The black mud there was so soft that it would not bear the weight of a man, and was at least 16 feet deep. After the site was chosen, a lieutenant was ordered to superintend the work, and told to call for whatever materials he wanted. Being something of a wag, he sent to the quartermaster for 100 men 18 feet high, to work in mud 16 feet deep; but as men of that height could not be had, he had to be satisfied with workmen of common stature. {3510} All the work had to be done in the dark, for it was within range of the guns of the forts. During fourteen nights piles were driven through the mud into the solid ground beneath, and on them were piled 15,000 bags of sand to form a parapet. After breaking down several trucks, a monster eight-inch Parrott gun, a 200-pounder, was dragged across the swamp and mounted, and about the middle of August the Swamp Angel, as the soldiers named it, was ready to throw shells into Charleston, nearly five miles away. On the 17th of August twelve land-batteries and the monitors opened fire on Sumter, Wagner, and Gregg. The heaviest of the fire was aimed at Sumter, as General Gillmore wished to silence it before he made another assault on Wagner. The bombardment was kept up for seven days, when Gillmore sent a dispatch to General Halleck, saying: 'Fort Sumter is to-day (August 24) a shapeless and harmless mass of ruins.' On the 21st of August, General Gillmore wrote to General Beauregard, who was in command in Charleston, demanding the evacuation of Fort Sumter and of Morris Island, threatening, in case of refusal, to bombard Charleston. Not hearing from him, he ordered a few shells to be thrown into the city from the Swamp Angel. Some of them fell in the streets and frightened the people, but did little damage. Beauregard then wrote him a letter in which he accused him of barbarity in 'turning his guns against the old men, the women and children, and the hospitals of a sleeping city,' and called the act 'unworthy of any soldier. General Gillmore replied that it was the duty of the commander of an attacked place to 'see to it that the non-combatants were removed,' and that he (Beauregard) had had forty days' time in which to do it. But the Swamp Angel was fired only a few times. At the thirty-sixth shot it burst and blew out the whole of its breech, and no other gun was mounted in its place. Gillmore then turned his attention once more to Fort Wagner, which he determined to assault again. To do this it was necessary to silence its guns and drive its defenders into the bomb-proofs; so a heavy fire was opened on it by the batteries, while the armored frigate New Ironsides poured eleven-inch shells into it from the sea side. The bombardment was kept up day and night, strong calcium lights being used by night to blind the Confederates and to show all parts of their works. The Confederates, driven from their guns, were obliged to fly for safety to their bomb-proofs. In the morning of September 7, the troops, under General Terry, were about ready to make the assault, when it was reported that the fort was empty. The garrisons of both Wagner and Gregg had fled during the night, and the whole of Morris Island was at last in possession of the Union troops. The next night an attack was made on Sumter by thirty boat-loads of men from the fleet. They reached the base of the walls and began to go up, thinking that the garrison was asleep; but before they reached the top a fire of musketry and hand-grenades was opened on them by the Confederates within, aided by some gun boats outside, and the assailants were driven off with a loss of about 200. But little more was done against Charleston during the rest of the year. General Gillmore thought that, as Sumter's guns were silenced, the fleet might easily pass into the harbor and capture Charleston. But Admiral Dahlgren did not care to run the risk of the torpedoes and powder-mines over which he knew he would have to pass. Besides, General Beauregard had taken advantage of the long delay in taking Wagner to strengthen the inner forts. Fort Johnson had been made into a powerful earthwork, and the fleet, even if Sumter were passed, would meet with as hot a fire as had been experienced outside. General Gillmore therefore contented himself with repairing Wagner and Gregg and turning their guns on Charles·ton and the forts defending it. As they were a mile nearer the city than the Swamp Angel battery, a slow bombardment was kept up until near the end of the year. About half of Charleston was reached by the shells, and many buildings were greatly injured. As the wharfs and most of the harbor were under fire, blockade-runners could no longer run in, and the business of the city was thus wholly destroyed."

_J. D. Champlin, Jr., Young Folk's History of the War for the Union, chapter 32._

ALSO IN: _Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 4, book 3, chapter 2._

_A. Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, volume 2, chapters 32-34._

_C. B. Boynton, History of the Navy during the Rebellion, volume 2, chapter 35._

_L. F. Emilio, History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers., chapters 6-7._

[Image: Map of the Battlefield of Chattanooga. 1863.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (October-November: Tennessee). The raising of the siege of Chattanooga. "Battle above the Clouds," on Lookout Mountain. Assault of Missionary Ridge. The Rout of Bragg's army.

After its defeat at Chickamauga the National Army was practically besieged on Chattanooga. Bragg acquired strong positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and was able to cut off all of Rosecrans's routes of supply, except one long and difficult wagon-road. On the 17th of October an important reorganization of the Union armies in the West was effected. "The departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, were united under the title of Military Division of the Mississippi, of which General Grant was made commander, and Thomas superseded Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland. General Hooker, with two corps, was sent to Tennessee. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 23d of October, and found affairs in a deplorable condition. It was impossible to supply the troops properly by the one wagon-road, and they had been on short rations for some time, while large numbers of the mules and horses were dead. Grant's first care was to open a new and better line of supply. Steamers could come up the river as far as Bridgeport, and he ordered the immediate construction of a road and bridge to reach that point by way of Brown's Ferry, which was done within five days, the 'cracker line,' as the soldiers called it, was opened, and thenceforth they had full rations and abundance of everything. The enemy attempted to interrupt the work on the road; but Hooker met them at Wauhatchie, west of Lookout Mountain, and after a three-hours' action drove them off [with It loss of 416 killed and wounded, the Confederate loss being unknown]. Chattanooga was now no longer in a state of siege; but it was still seriously menaced by Bragg's army, which held a most singular position. {3512} Its flanks were on the northern ends of Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, the crests of which were occupied for some distance, and its centre stretched across Chattanooga valley. This line was twelve miles long, and most of it was well intrenched. Grant ordered Sherman [coming from Memphis] to join him with one corps, and Sherman promptly obeyed, but as he did considerable railroad repairing on the way, he did not reach Chattanooga till the 15th of November. Meanwhile Longstreet with 20,000 troops had been detached from Bragg's army and sent against Burnside at Knoxville. After Sherman's arrival, Grant had about 80,000 men."

_R. Johnson, Short History of the War of Secession, chapter 20._

"My orders for battle," writes General Grant, "were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival, except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into Chattanooga Valley. The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross at Brown's Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge." Remaining in this concealed position until the time of attack, Sherman's army was then, under cover of night, to be rapidly brought back to the south side of the Tennessee, at a point where Missionary Ridge prolonged would touch the river, this being done by pontoons ready provided at a spot also concealed. The execution of the plan was delayed by heavy rains until November 23, when Burnside's distress at Knoxville forced Grant to begin his attack on Bragg by an advance of Thomas's army, at the center, before the flanking preparations were completed. "This movement [General Grant's narrative continues] secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this preliminary action about 1,100 killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. … By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move," and by daylight two divisions of his command were on the south side of the river, "well covered by the works they had built. The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. … By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chickamauga … and all the infantry and artillery were on the south side of the Tennessee. Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. … By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. … Artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand, The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. … While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west. He had three divisions … all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and entrenched. … The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms. … Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. … This attracted the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over 40 men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. … By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. … The day was hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at the moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. {3513} By a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. … The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view. … Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base … and Corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured." The fighting was severe for hours, and Bragg moved heavy masses of troops to resist Sherman's advance, while a division from Thomas was sent to reinforce the latter. "It had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also. The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces. … But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once." In this splendid charge the Union troops drove the Confederates from the first line of their works and then pushed on, with no further orders, to the second line, with the same success. "The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. … To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small arms that day. … The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. … Hooker [pushing on to Rossville as soon as he had succeeded in getting across Chattanooga Creek] … came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. … The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position."

_U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapters 42-44 (volume 2)._

"Grant's losses in these battles were 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 330 missing; total 5,616. The enemy's losses were fewer in killed and wounded, owing to the fact that he was protected by intrenchments, while the national' soldiers were without cover. Grant captured 6,142 prisoners, 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 7,000 stand of small arms; by far the greatest capture, in the open field, which had then been made during the war. The battle of Chattanooga was the grandest ever fought west of the Alleghanies. It covered an extent of 13 miles, and Grant had over 60,000 men engaged. The rebels numbered only 45,000 men, but they enjoyed immense advantages of position in every part of the field." Pursuit of the retreating Confederates began early in the morning of the 26th, and considerable fighting occurred on that day and the next. At Ringgold, Hooker was checked by Cleburne's division, which held an easily defended gap while the main column with its trains were moved beyond reach. In this battle at Ringgold Hooker lost 65 killed and 377 wounded. He took three pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners.

_A. Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, chapters 11-12 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN: J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 8, chapter 5.

_H. M. Cist, The Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7), chapters 13-14._

_Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 4, book 2._

_W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 13 (volume 1)._

_P. H. Sheridan, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 16._

_T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapters 21-22 (volume 1)._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 31._

_B. F. Taylor, Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (October-December: Tennessee). The Siege of Knoxville.