Part 1129

"The defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville was the turning-point of the war, and for the first time there was apparently a possibility of inducing the Federal Government to relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a separate authority in the South. The idea of the formation of a Southern Confederacy, distinct from the old Union, had, up to this time, been repudiated by the authorities at Washington as a thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the Federal arms in the two great battles of the Rappahannock had caused the most determined opponents of separation to doubt whether the South could be coerced to return to the Union; and, what was equally or more important, the proclamations of President Lincoln, declaring the slaves of the South free, and placing the United States virtually under martial law, aroused a violent clamor from the great Democratic party of the North, who loudly asserted that all constitutional liberty was disappearing. This combination of non-success in military affairs and usurpation by the Government emboldened the advocates of peace to speak out plainly, and utter their protest against the continuance of the struggle, which they declared had only resulted in the prostration of all the liberties of the country. Journals and periodicals, violently denunciatory of the course pursued by the Government, all at once made their appearance in New York and elsewhere. A peace convention was called to meet in Philadelphia. … On all sides the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard raising their importunate voices. … The plan of moving the Southern army northward, with the view of invading the Federal territory, seems to have been the result of many circumstances. The country [Southern] was elated with the two great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and the people were clamorous for active operations against an enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of Southern steel. The army, which had been largely augmented by the return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall of Longstreet's two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear upon the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal victory and a treaty of peace. Lee yielded to this view of things rather than urged it. … Another important consideration was the question of supplies. … More than ever before, these supplies were now needed; and when General Lee sent, in May or June, a requisition for rations to Richmond, the commissary-general is said to have endorsed upon the paper, 'If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in Pennsylvania.' {3500} The considerations here stated were the main inducements for that great movement northward which followed the battle of Chancellorsville. … Throughout the month of May, Lee was busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the decisive advance. Experience had now dictated many alterations and improvements in the army. It was divided into three 'corps d'armée,' each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general. Longstreet remained at the head of his former corps. Ewell succeeded Jackson in command of 'Jackson's old corps', and A. P. Hill was assigned to a third corps made up of portions of the two others. … On the last day of May, General Lee had the satisfaction of finding himself in command of a well-equipped and admirably-officered army of 68,352 bayonets, and nearly 10,000 cavalry and artillery—in all, about 80,000 men. … Lee began his movement northward on the 3d day of June, just one month after the battle of Chancellorsville. … Pursuing his design of manœuvring the Federal army out of Virginia, without coming to action, Lee first sent forward one division of Longstreet's corps in the direction of Culpepper, another then followed, and, on the 4th and 5th of June, Ewell's entire corps was sent in the same direction—A. P. Hill remaining behind on the south bank of the Rappahannock, near Fredericksburg, to watch the enemy there, and bar the road to Richmond. These movements became speedily known to General Hooker, whose army lay north of the river near that point, and on the 5th he laid a pontoon just below Fredericksburg, and crossed about a corps to the south bank, opposite Hill. This threatening demonstration, however, was not suffered by Lee to arrest his own movements. … He continued the withdrawal of his troops, by way of Culpepper, in the direction of the Shenandoah Valley." On the morning of the 9th of June, "two divisions of Federal cavalry, supported by two brigades of 'picked infantry,' were sent across the river at Kelly's and Beverley's Fords, east of the court-house, to beat up the quarters of Stuart and find what was going on in the Southern camps. The most extensive cavalry fight [known as the battle of Brandy Station, or the battle of Fleetwood], probably, of the whole war, followed. … This reconnoisance in force … had no other result than the discovery of the fact that Lee had infantry in Culpepper. … This attempt of the enemy to penetrate his designs had not induced General Lee to interrupt the movement of his infantry toward the Shenandoah Valley. The Federal corps sent across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, still remained facing General Hill, and, two days after the Fleetwood fight, General Hooker moved up the river with his main body, advancing the Third Corps to a point near Beverley's Ford. But these movements were disregarded by Lee. On the same day Ewell's corps moved rapidly toward Chester Gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by way of Front Royal, and reached Winchester on the evening of the 13th, having in three days marched 70 miles. The position of the Southern army now exposed it to very serious danger, and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of soldiership in the general commanding it. In face of an enemy whose force was at least equal to his own, Lee had extended his line until it stretched over a distance of about 100 miles. … When intelligence now reached Washington that the head of Lee's column was approaching the Upper Potomac, while the rear was south of the Rappahannock, the President wrote to General Hooker: 'If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road, between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere—could you not break him?' … It would seem that nothing could have been plainer than the good policy of an attack upon Hill at Fredericksburg, which would certainly have checked Lee's movement by recalling Longstreet from Culpepper, and Ewell from the Valley. But … instead of reënforcing the corps sent across at Fredericksburg and attacking Hill, General Hooker withdrew the corps, on the 13th, to the north bank of the river, got his forces together, and began to fall back toward Manassas."

_J. E. Cooke, Life of General Robert E. Lee, part 6, chapters 9-12._

ALSO IN: _H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 21._

_W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 9._

[Image: Map of the Battlefield of Gettysburg. July 1-3, 1863.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Pennsylvania). Lee's Invasion. The Battle of Gettysburg.

"Hooker started toward Washington. Ewell gained possession of Winchester and Martinsburg, but not of Harper's Ferry. There is a rocky and thickly wooded range of heights called the Bull Run Mountains, running from Leesburg south. As Hooker had not occupied them but was farther to the East, Lee desired to do so, for it would give him a strong position on Hooker's flank and bring him (Lee) very near to Washington. He therefore directed his cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction. Stuart's reconnoitering party met the Union cavalry at Aldie, and after a hard battle retreated. A series of cavalry combats ensued, ending in the retreat of Stuart's cavalry behind the Blue Ridge. Hooker was strongly posted east of the Bull Run range and could not be attacked with much chance of success. As Lee could not well remain inactive or retreat, he resolved to invade Pennsylvania. This was a hazardous enterprise, for Hooker might intervene between him and Richmond. Stuart's cavalry was left to prevent this catastrophe by guarding the passes in the Blue Ridge. Stuart was also directed to harass Hooker and attack his rear should he attempt to cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Lee reached Chambersburg with Longstreet's and Hill's corps. Ewell's corps was in advance at Carlisle [June 27] and York," and advance bodies of cavalry were threatening Harrisburg. The militia of Pennsylvania, New York and Maryland were called out in force, but arms and ammunition for them were inadequate. "On June 28th, Hooker determined to send Slocum's corps and the garrison of Harper's Ferry—the latter about 10,000 strong—to operate against Lee's rear. This was an excellent plan, but Hooker's superior, General Halleck, refused to allow him to remove the troops from Harper's Ferry; and Hooker said if he could not manage the campaign in his own way, he preferred to give up the command of the army." {3502} He was accordingly relieved and the command was given to Major-General George G. Meade, of the Fifth Corps. Meantime (June 25-27) the Union army had crossed the Potomac and advanced to Frederick, Maryland. "On June 28th, Lee learned from a scout that the Union army was in his rear and that his communication with Richmond was seriously endangered. … In this emergency he concluded to threaten Baltimore. As a preliminary measure, he directed his entire army to move on Gettysburg. This he hoped would induce Meade to concentrate in his front and leave his rear free; which was precisely what Meade did do. … Under the impression that Lee's army was spread out along the Susquehanna from Carlisle to York, Meade threw out his own forces fan-shaped to march in that direction. … The Union corps were marching on and getting farther apart, while the enemy were concentrating. The advance of Hill's corps, on the morning of July 1st, struck Buford's division of Union cavalry a short distance to the west of Gettysburg, and in spite of a stout resistance forced it slowly back towards the town. The First Corps at this time was five miles south of Gettysburg. General Reynolds went to the support of Buford with the nearest division of the First Corps—Wadsworth's—and directed that the others follow. While forming his line of battle he was killed. General Howard succeeded to the command of the field, but did not issue any orders to the First Corps until the afternoon. In the meantime General Doubleday continued the contest, captured a great part of the forces that had assailed him, and cleared his immediate front of all enemies. Before the Eleventh Corps came up the enemy could have walked right over the small force opposed to them, but owing to the absence of Stuart's cavalry [which, not crossing the Potomac to follow Lee until the 27th, had undertaken a long raid around the Union forces, and did not succeed in joining the main body of the Confederates until July 2d] they had not been kept informed as to the movements Meade was making, and fearing that the whole Union army was concentrated in their front they were overcautious. There was now a lull in the battle for about an hour. The remainder of the First Corps came up and was followed soon after by the Eleventh Corps under General Schurz. About the same time the Confederate corps of General Ewell arrived and made a junction with that of Hill. General Howard assumed command of the Union forces. Repeated attacks were now made against the First Corps by Ewell from the north and Hill from the west; but the Confederate charges were successfully repulsed. … Ewell's attack also struck the Eleventh Corps on the right and front with great force. … General Meade, when he heard of Reynold's death, was 14 miles from Gettysburg at Taneytown, preparing to form line of battle along Pipe Creek. He at once sent General Hancock forward with orders to assume command of the field. Hancock, perceiving that Cemetery Ridge [about half a mile south of Gettysburg] was an admirable position for a defensive battle, determined to hold it if possible. This was not an easy thing to do, for the enemy were in overwhelming force, and the feeble remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps were not in a condition to make a prolonged resistance. … Hancock directed Doubleday to send a force to Culp's Hill on the right, while he instructed Buford to parade up and down on the extreme left with his cavalry. The enemy were thus led to suppose that the Union line was a long one and had been heavily reënforced. As the losses on both sides had been tremendous, probably not exceeded for the same number of troops during the war, the enemy hesitated to advance, particularly as some movements of Kilpatrick's cavalry seemed to threaten their rear. They therefore deferred action until Meade concentrated the next day. On General Hancock's recommendation General Meade ordered his entire army to Gettysburg. By dusk part of the Third Corps had arrived, and soon after the Twelfth Corps and the Second Corps were close at hand. … Most of the troops, though worn out with hard marching, arrived by midday of July 2d. The Sixth Corps had 34 miles to march and came later in the afternoon. … The attack as ordered by General Lee was to begin with Longstreet on the right and be made 'en échelon.' That is, as soon as Longstreet was fairly engaged, Hill's corps was to take up the fight and go in, and as soon as Hill was fairly engaged, Ewell's corps on the right was to attack. The object was to keep the whole Union line in a turmoil at once, and prevent reënforcements going from any corps not engaged to another that was fighting; but Hill did not act until Longstreet's fight was over, and Ewell did not act until Hill had been repulsed. … The enemy … failed in every attack against Meade's main line, with the exception of that portion south of Culp's Hill. Elated by the fact that he had made a lodgement there, Ewell determined to hold on at all hazards and sent heavy reënforcements during the night to aid Johnson to make an attack in the morning. … So ended the battle of the second day. At day dawn [July 3] General Warren, acting for General Meade, established a cordon of troops and batteries which drove Johnson out of his position on the right. … Lee having failed in his attacks both on Meade's left and right had to decide at once whether he would give up the contest and retreat, or make another attempt to force the Union line. As he had been reënforced by Stuart's cavalry, and as a fresh division under Pickett was available, he determined to try to pierce the left center of the Union army and disperse the force opposed to him. To this end he directed Longstreet to form a strong column of attack to be composed of Pickett's division and Pettigrew's division and two brigades of Pender's division, under Trimble, of Hill's corps. To create confusion and prevent General Meade from sending reënforcements to the menaced point, Stuart was ordered to ride around the right of the Union army and make an attack in rear. And still more to facilitate the attack 135 guns were to concentrate their fire against the Union center and disperse the forces assembled there. About 1 P. M. the terrific cannonade began and lasted for two hours, by which time the Confederate ammunition was nearly exhausted. … Stuart's cavalry attack proved abortive, for it was met and frustrated by two brigades of Gregg's cavalry aided by Custer's brigade, after a severe battle, which was hotly contested on both sides. Stuart's further progress was checked and he was forced to retreat. … Pickett formed his great column of attack and came forward as soon as the fire from the Union batteries slackened." {3503} Fresh guns had, however, been brought into position and swept the ground over which Pickett moved. His charge, one of the most desperately determined of the whole war, was heroically met by Gibbon's division of the Second Corps and by part of the First Corps, under the personal direction of General Hancock, who was severely wounded in the terrible conflict. Pickett was forced to retreat with the survivors of his onslaught, and "the whole plain was soon covered with fugitives; but, as no pursuit was ordered, General Lee in person succeeded in rallying them and in re-forming the line of battle. The next day, July 4th, General Lee drew back his flanks and at evening began his retreat by two routes—the main body on the direct road to Williamsport through the mountains, the other via Chambersburg, the latter including the immense train of the wounded. Gregg's division (except Huey's brigade) was sent in pursuit by way of Chambersburg, but the enemy had too much the start to render the chase effective. Kilpatrick, however, got in front of the main body on the direct route and, after a midnight battle at Monterey, fought during a terrific thunder storm, succeeded in making sad havoc of Ewell's trains. … Lee concentrated his army in the vicinity of Williamsport, but as French had destroyed his pontoon bridge, and as the Potomac had risen, he was unable to cross. He therefore fortified his position. Meade did not follow Lee directly, but went around by way of Frederick. After considerable delay the Union army again confronted that of Lee and were about—under orders from President Lincoln-to make an attack, when Lee slipped away on the night of July 14th to the Virginia side of the Potomac. This ended the campaign of Gettysburg. The Union loss was 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded, 5,434 missing=Total, 23,003. The Confederate loss was 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded, 5,150 missing=Total, 20,451."

_A. Doubleday, Gettysburg made plain (with 29 maps)._

ALSO IN: _A. Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 6, part 2)._

_J. Longstreet, H. J. Hunt and others, Gettysburg (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapter 8._

_A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 15._

_Comte de Paris, History of the American Civil War, volume 3, book 3, chapter 4._

_D. X. Junkin and F. H. Norton, Life of General Hancock, chapters 11-13._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 27._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Tennessee). The Tullahoma campaign.

"During the first six months of the year 1863 the Army of the Cumberland remained at Murfreesboro' and was comparatively inactive. The troops were employed in the construction of elaborate fortifications and in divers minor operations with defensive or tentative objects. … Late in June the Army of the Cumberland advanced against its old enemy, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, then holding the line of Duck River. In this movement the Fourteenth Corps [General Thomas] was in the centre, its appropriate place, and drove the enemy from Hoover's Gap and from several positions in front of that gap. General McCook [Twentieth Corps] on the right had a severe combat at Liberty Gap, but finally pressed the enemy from the hills. General Crittenden [Twenty-first Corps] on the left did not meet much opposition. When Bragg's army had been driven from its defensive line on Duck River, General Rosecrans moved his army towards Manchester, and regarding this movement as indicating either an attack upon his position at Tullahoma, or the interruption of his communications, Bragg fell back from that place. He did not consider himself strong enough to meet Rosecrans in battle, and he consequently retreated first to the Cumberland Mountains, and, soon after, across the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. The Tullahoma campaign was begun on the 23d of June and terminated on the 4th of July. The enemy fought at the gaps of the mountains, but the defense on the whole was feeble. The result was the possession by the Army of the Cumberland of the region from Murfreesboro' to Bridgeport, Alabama. At the close of the campaign the army advanced to the northern base of the Cumberland Mountains, and there halted to make preparations for a campaign south of the Tennessee River."

_T. B. Van Horne, Life of General George H. Thomas, chapter 5._

ALSO IN: _T. B. Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapter 19 (volume 1)._

_H. M. Cist, The Army of the Cumberland (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7)._

_P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 14._

_D. S. Stanley, The Tullahoma Campaign (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery L. L. of the United States, volume 3)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: On the Mississippi). The Defence of Helena.

"One of the most brilliant of the minor victories of the war was gained at Helena, Arkansas, on the west bank of the Mississippi, on the 4th of July, General Holmes [Confederate] had asked and received permission to take that place, in the middle of June, and had mustered for that purpose an army of nearly 10,000 men. The garrison of Helena consisted of a division of the Thirteenth Corps and a brigade of cavalry numbering in all 4000 men, commanded by Major-General B. M. Prentiss. Holmes felt so sure of victory that he doubtless selected the 4th of July for his attack in a mere spirit of bravado. He assaulted at daylight with converging columns, two of which made considerable impression upon the outworks, but never reached the town. The defense of the Union troops was singularly skilful and energetic, and, after a few hours of fighting, Holmes, finding himself utterly defeated, retired at half-past ten. The little army of Prentiss was, of course, too small to pursue. The last Confederate attempt to hold the Mississippi River thus ended in a complete and most humiliating repulse."

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 7, chapter 11._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: Mississippi). The capture and destruction of Jackson.