Part 1122

"By contradictory orders and the useless marches and counter-marches they involved, Pope's opportunity was thrown away, and instead of fighting Jackson's corps alone, it was the entire army of Lee with which he had to deal,—this, too, with his forces very much out of position, and he himself ignorant both of his own situation and that of the enemy. When, towards noon [August 29], Pope, coming from Centreville, reached the field near Groveton, he found the situation as follows: Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker and Kearney, on the right, in front and west of the Sudley Springs road; Reno and Sigel holding the centre,—Sigel's line being extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike; Reynolds with his division on the left. But the commander was ignorant of the whereabouts of both Porter and McDowell, and he knew not that Longstreet had joined Jackson! The troops had been considerably cut up by the brisk skirmishing that had been going on all morning. An artillery contest had also been waged all forenoon between the opposing lines; but it was at long range and of no effect. The position of the troops in front of Jackson's intrenched line was one that promised very little success for a direct attack, and especially for a partial attack. Nevertheless, at three o'clock, Pope ordered Hooker to assault. The attempt was so unpromising that that officer remonstrated against it; but the order being imperative, he made a very determined attack with his division," and was driven back. {3478} "Too late for united action, Kearney was sent to Hooker's assistance, and he also suffered repulse. Meanwhile, Pope had learnt the position of Porter's command, and, at half-past four in the afternoon, sent orders to that officer to assail the enemy's right flank and rear,—Pope erroneously believing the right flank of Jackson, near Groveton, to be the right of the Confederate line. Towards six, when he thought Porter should be coming into action, he directed Heintzelman and Reno to assault the enemy's left. The attack was made with vigor, especially by Kearney," but the enemy brought up heavy reserves and repelled the assault. "Turning now to the left, where Porter was to have assailed the Confederate left [right], it appears that the order which Pope sent at half-past four did not reach Porter till about dusk. He then made dispositions for attack, but it was too late. It is, however, more than doubtful that, even had the order been received in time, any thing but repulse would have resulted from its execution. … Contrary to Pope's opinion, he [Porter] had then, and had had since noon, Longstreet's entire corps before him. So, as firing now died away in the darkling woods on the right, a pause was put for the day to the chaos and confusion of this mismanaged battle [known as the battle of Groveton], in which many thousand men had fallen on the Union side. It would have been judicious for General Pope, in the then condition of his army, to have that night withdrawn across Bull Run and taken position at Centreville, or even within the fortifications of Washington. By doing so he would have united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, then between Washington and Centreville. … With untimely obstinacy, Pope determined to remain and again try the issue of battle. To utilize Porter's corps, he drew it over from the isolated position it had held the previous day to the Warrenton road. … Now, by one of those curious conjunctures which sometimes occur in battle, it so was that the opposing commanders had that day formed each the same resolution: Pope had determined to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined to attack Pope's left flank. And thus it came about that when Heintzelman pushed forward to feel the enemy's left, the refusal of that flank by Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to his right for the purpose of making his contemplated attack on Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confederates were retreating up the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. … Pope … telegraphed to Washington that the enemy was 'retreating to the mountains,'—a dispatch which, flashed throughout the land, gave the people a few hours, at least, of unmixed pleasure. To take advantage of the supposed 'retreat' of Lee, Pope ordered McDowell with three corps—Porter's in the advance—to follow up rapidly on the Warrenton turnpike, and 'press the enemy vigorously during the whole day.' But no sooner were the troops put in motion to make this pursuit of a supposed flying foe, than the Confederates, hitherto concealed in the forest in front of Porter, uncovered themselves." The result of this misdirected movement was a fatal check, Porter's troops being fearfully cut up and driven back. "Jackson immediately took up the pursuit, and was joined by a general advance of the whole Confederate line—Longstreet extending his right so as, if possible, to cut off the retreat of the Union forces." In this attempt, however, he was foiled, and "under cover of the darkness the wearied troops retired across Bull Run, by the stone bridge, and took position on the heights of Centreville. Owing to the obscurity of the night, and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run, Lee attempted no pursuit." The engagement of this day is called the Second Battle of Bull Run, or the Second Battle of Manassas, as it was named by the Confederate victors. "At Centreville, Pope united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and he remained there during the whole of the 31st. But Lee had now yet given up the pursuit. Leaving Longstreet on the battle-field, he sent Jackson by a detour on Pope's right, to strike the Little River turnpike, and by that route to Fairfax Courthouse; to intercept, if possible, Pope's retreat to Washington. Jackson's march was much retarded by a heavy storm that commenced the day before and still continued. Pope, meantime, fell back to positions covering Fairfax Courthouse and Germantown; and on the evening of the 1st of September, Jackson struck his right, posted at Ox Hill." The short but severe action which then occurred (called the battle of Chantilly) was indecisive. Jackson's attack was repelled, but the repulse cost the lives of two excellent officers of high rank and reputation, Generals Kearney and Stevens, besides many men. "On the following day, September 2d, the army was, by order of General Halleck, drawn back within the lines of Washington."

_W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, pages 184-193._

"The Second Battle of Bull Hun … was a severe defeat for General Pope; but it was nothing else. It was not a rout, nor anything like a rout. … Lee claims to have captured in these engagements 30 pieces of artillery and 7,000 unwounded prisoners."

_J. C. Ropes, The Army under Pope (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 4), chapters 8-11._

ALSO IN: _G. H. Gordon, History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia, chapters 11-13._

_The Virginia Campaign of General Pope (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 2)._

_J. Pope, The Second Battle of Bull Run (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 449-494)._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 12, part 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland). Lee's first invasion: His cold reception and disappointment.

"The defeat of General Pope opened the way for movements not contemplated, probably, by General Lee, when he marched from Richmond. … He accordingly determined to advance into Maryland—the fortifications in front of Washington, and the interposition of the Potomac, a broad stream easily defended, rendering a movement in that direction unpromising. On the 3d of September, therefore, and without waiting to rest his army, which was greatly fatigued with the nearly continuous marching and fighting since it had left the Rapidan, General Lee moved toward Leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to the music of the bands playing the popular air, 'Maryland, my Maryland,' advanced to Frederick City, which he occupied on the 7th of September. Lee's object in invading Maryland has been the subject of much discussion. … It can only be said that General Lee, doubtless, left the future to decide his ultimate movements; meanwhile he had a distinct and clearly-defined aim, which he states in plain words. {3479} His object was to draw the Federal forces out of Virginia. … The condition of affairs in Maryland, General Lee says, 'encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide for contingencies which its course toward the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend,' and to cross the Potomac 'might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty.' It may be said, in summing up on this point, that Lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the yoke of the Federal Government, and the army certainly shared this expectation. The identity of sentiment generally between the people of the States of Maryland and Virginia, and their strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result afterward was extremely bitter. Such were the first designs of Lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear. By advancing into Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington, he knew that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the Confederate communications with Richmond; when this was accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross the Maryland extension of the Blue Ridge, called there the South Mountain, advance by way of Hagerstown into the Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies, while his own communications would remain open by way of the Shenandoah Valley. … The Southern army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Frederick City by the 7th of September, and on the next day General Lee Issued an address to the people of Maryland. … This address, couched in terms of such dignity, had little effect upon the people. Either their sentiment in favor of the Union was too strong, or they found nothing in the condition Of affairs to encourage their Southern feelings. A large Federal force was known to be advancing; Lee's army, in tatters, and almost without supplies, presented a very uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his standard, the population in general remaining hostile or neutral. … Lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his own men for success in his future movements. He faced that conviction courageously; and, without uttering a word of comment, or indulging in any species of crimination against the people of Maryland, resolutely commenced his movements looking to the capture of Harper's Ferry and the invasion of Pennsylvania."

_J. E. Cooke, Life of Robert E. Lee, part 5, chapters 1-2._

ALSO IN: _A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 12._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland). Lee's first invasion: Harper's Ferry. South Mountain. Antietam.

"On the 2d of September the President went to General McClellan's house in Washington, asked him to take command again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had now been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The first thing that McClellan wanted was the withdrawal of Miles's force, 11,000 men, from Harper's Ferry—where, he said, it was useless and helpless—and its addition to his own force. All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and unquestionably right; but the marplot hand of Halleck intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. Halleck's principal reason appeared to be a reluctance to abandon a place where so much expense had been laid out. Miles, a worthy subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck's orders with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead of holding it by placing his force on the heights that command it. As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland, McClellan set his army in motion northward, to cover Washington and Baltimore and find an opportunity for a decisive battle. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on the 12th, and met with a reception in striking contrast to that accorded to the army that had left the town two days before. … But this flattering reception was not the best fortune that befell the Union army in Frederick. On his arrival in the town General McClellan came into possession of a copy of General Lee's order, dated three days before, in which the whole campaign was laid out. … General Lee had taken it for granted that Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry would be evacuated at his approach (as they should have been); and when he found they were not, he had so far changed or suspended the plan with which he set out as to send back a large part of his army to capture those places and not leave a hostile force in his rear." This was easily accomplished by Jackson and McLaws, the latter of whom took possession of the heights commanding the town, where Miles waited to be trapped. "A bombardment the next day compelled a surrender when Jackson was about to attack. General Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last shots. About 11,000 men were included in the capitulation, with 73 guns. … Jackson, leaving the arrangements for the sur·render to A. P. Hill, hurried with the greater part of his force to rejoin Lee, and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th. The range known as the South Mountain, which is a continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, is about 1,000 feet high. The two principal gaps are Turner's and Crampton's, each about 400 feet high, with the hills towering 600 feet above it. When McClellan learned the plans of the Confederate commander, he set his army in motion to thwart them. He ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's Gap and press on to relieve Harper's Ferry; the corps of Reno and Hooker, under command of Burnside, he moved to Turner's Gap. The movement was quick for McClellan, but not quite quick enough for the emergency. He might have passed through the Gaps on the 13th with little or no opposition, and would then have had his whole army between Lee's divided forces, and could hardly have failed to defeat them disastrously and perhaps conclusively. But he did not arrive at the passes till the morning of the 14th; and by that time Lee had learned of his movement and recalled Hill and Longstreet, from Boonsboro and beyond, to defend Turner's Gap, while he ordered McLaws to look out for Crampton's. … There was stubborn and bloody fighting all day, with the Union forces slowly but constantly gaining ground, and at dark the field was won," at both the passes. The two engagements were called the battle of South Mountain by the Federals, the Battle of Boonsboro by the Confederates. {3480} At Turner's Gap there was a loss of about 1,500 on each side, and 1,500 Confederates were made prisoners; at Crampton's Gap, the loss in killed and wounded was some 500 on each side, with 400 Confederate prisoners taken. The Union army had forced the passage of the mountains, but Lee had gained time to unite his scattered forces. "He withdrew across the Antietam, and took up a position on high ground between that stream and the village of Sharpsburg. … Lee now had his army together and strongly posted. But it had been so reduced by losses in battle and straggling that it numbered but little over 40,000 combatants. … McClellan had somewhat over 70,000 men. … The ground occupied by the Confederate army, with both flanks resting on the Potomac, and the Antietam flowing in front, was advantageous. The creek was crossed by four stone bridges and a ford, and all except the northernmost bridge were strongly guarded. The land was occupied by meadows, cornfields, and patches of forest, and was much broken by outcropping ledges. McClellan only reconnoitered the position on the 15th. On the 16th he developed his plan of attack, which was simply to throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper and unguarded bridge, assail the Confederate left, and when this had sufficiently engaged the enemy's attention and drawn his strength to that flank, to force the bridges and cross with his left and centre. … All day long an artillery duel was kept up. … It was late in the afternoon when Hooker's corps crossed by the upper bridge, advanced through the woods, and struck the left flank, which was held by two brigades of Hood's men. Scarcely more than a skirmish ensued, when darkness came on, and the lines rested for the night where they were." At sunrise, next morning, Hooker assaulted Jackson and was seriously wounded in the fighting which followed. Sumner's corps finally joined in the attack, and all the forenoon the battle was desperate in that part of the field. "But while this great struggle was in progress on McClellan's right, his centre and left, under Porter und Burnside, did not make any movement to assist. At noon Franklin arrived from Crampton's Gap, and was sent over to help Hooker and Sumner, being just in time to check a new advance by more troops brought over from the Confederate right. At eight o'clock in the morning Burnside had been ordered to carry the bridge in his front, cross the stream, and attack the Confederate right. But, though commanded and urged repeatedly, it was one o'clock before he succeeded in doing this, and two more precious hours passed away before he had carried the ridge commanding Sharpsburg and captured the Confederate battery there. Then came up the last division of Lee's forces (A. P. Hill's) from Harper's Ferry, 2,000 strong, united with the other forces on his left, and drove Burnside from the crest and re-took the battery. Here ended the battle; not because the day was closed, or any apparent victory had been achieved, but because both sides had been so severely punished that neither was inclined to resume the fight. Every man of Lee's force had been actively engaged, but not more than two thirds of McClellan's. The reason why the Confederate army was not annihilated or captured must be plain to any intelligent reader. … General McClellan reported his entire loss at 12,469, of whom 2,010 were killed. General Lee reported his total loss in the Maryland battles as 1,567 killed and 8,724 wounded, saying nothing of the missing; but the figures given by his division commanders foot up 1,842 killed, 9,399 wounded, and 2,292 missing—total 13,533. … Nothing was done on the 18th, and when McClellan determined to renew the attack on the 19th, he found that his enemy had withdrawn from the field and crossed to Virginia by the ford at Shepherdstown. The National commander reported the capture of more than 6,000 prisoners, 13 guns, and 39 battle-flags, and that he had not lost a gun or a color. As he was also in possession of the field … and had rendered Lee's invasion fruitless of anything but the prisoners carried off from Harper's Ferry, the victory was his."

_R. Johnson, Short History of the War of Secession, chapter 12._

ALSO IN: _F. W. Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5)._

_Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 2, book 3, chapter 4._

_F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapter 4._

_A. Woodbury, Burnside and the 9th. Army Corps, part 2, chapters 2-3._

_Official Records, series 1, volume 19._

_G. B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, chapters 33-38._

_D. H. Hill, J. D. Cox, J. Longstreet, and others, Lee's Invasion of Maryland (Battles and Leaders, volume 2)._

_W. Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, chapters 37-48._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September). President Lincoln's Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation, and the attitude of Northern parties on the Slavery question.