Part 1075

By the terms of the Constitution, Congress was deprived of power to interfere with the importation of slaves before the year 1808, but no longer. The time now approached when that restraint would cease, and the President in his annual message brought the subject to notice. {3336} "It was referred to a committee of which Mr. Early of Georgia was the chairman. There was no difference of opinion as to the prohibition of the traffic, or at least no expression of any; but the practical details of the law, the penalties by which it was to be enforced, and, above all, the disposition to be made of such negroes as might be brought into the country in violation of it, gave rise to violent and excited debates. The committee reported a law prohibiting the slave-trade after the 31st of December, 1807, imposing certain penalties for its breach, and providing that all negroes imported after that date should be forfeited. The object of this provision undoubtedly was to obtain directly what the Constitution only gave indirectly and by implication,—the sanction of the government of the United States to the principle of slave-holding, by making it hold and sell men as property. The astuteness of the slave-holding mind on all points touching slavery was shown in this proposition, and all the tactics of bullying and bluster with which later Congressional campaigns have made us familiar, were employed in the debate to which it gave rise. It having been moved that the words 'shall be entitled to his or her freedom' should be inserted after the word 'forfeited,' a furious fight ensued over this amendment. The Southern members resisted it, on the ground that the emancipation of the imported Africans would increase the number of free negroes, who, as Mr. Early affirmed, 'were considered in the States where they are found in considerable numbers as instruments of murder, theft, and conflagration.' And so craftily was this proposition of forfeiture to the government qualified, that its drift was not at first discerned by the Northern members. For, strong as was their disapprobation of slavery in the abstract, they felt no disposition to expose their Southern brethren to all the horrors of insurrection which it was assumed would follow the multiplication of free negroes. Indeed, Mr. Early candidly said, that, if these negroes were left free in the Southern States, not one of them would be alive in a year. And although the Federalists as a party, and Mr. Quincy eminently among them, regarded the political element of slavery as full of dangers to the future of the nation, these opinions had worked no personal and social alienation between Northern and Southern men, such as has since taken place. … There was, therefore, quite disposition enough to arrange this matter in the way the most satisfactory to the masters, without so rigid a regard to the rights of the negroes as, it is to be hoped, would have been had in later times. Mr. Quincy at first opposed striking out the forfeiture clause, on the ground that this was the only way in which the United States could get the control of the Africans, so as to dispose of them in the manner most for their own interest. … These views influenced a majority of the Northern members until the question of the final passage of the bill approached. At last they came to a sense of the disgrace which the forfeiture of the negroes to the government, and the permission to it to sell them as slaves if it so pleased, would bring upon the nation, and the whole matter was recommitted to a committee of one from each State. … This committee reported a bill providing that such imported negroes should be sent to such States as had abolished slavery, there to be bound out as apprentices for a term of years, at the expiration of which they should be free. This bill produced a scene of great and violent excitement on the part of the slaveholders. Mr. Early declared that the people of the South would resist this provision with their lives! This resistance to a measure which proposed doing all the slaveholders had demanded for their own safety, to wit, removing the imported negroes from the slaveholding domain and providing for them in the Free States, showed that their purpose was, at least in part, to have the negroes sold as slaves to themselves. This object they did virtually gain at last, as the final settlement was by a bill originating in the Senate, providing that, though neither importer nor purchaser should have a title to such negroes, still the negroes should be subject to any regulation for their disposal that should be made by the States into which they might be brought. The design of the slaveholding party to make the United States recognize the rightfulness of property in man was thus avoided, but it was at the cost of leaving the imported Africans to the tender mercies of the Slave States. The fact that the slaveholders were greatly incensed at the result, and regarded it as an injury and an affront, does not make this disposition of these unfortunates any the less discreditable to Congress or the nation."

_E. Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy, chapter 5._

See, also, SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1792-1807.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1808. The effects of the Embargo.

"The dread of war, radical in the Republican theory, sprang not so much from the supposed waste of life or resources as from the retroactive effects which war must exert upon the form of government; but the experience of a few months showed that the embargo as a system was rapidly leading to the same effects. … Personal liberties and rights of property were more directly curtailed in the United States by embargo than in Great Britain by centuries of almost continuous foreign war. … While the constitutional cost of the two systems was not altogether unlike, the economical cost was a point not easily settled. No one could say what might be the financial expense of embargo as compared with war. Yet Jefferson himself in the end admitted that the embargo had no claim to respect as an economical measure. … As the order was carried along the seacoast, every artisan dropped his tools, every merchant closed his doors, every ship was dismantled. American produce—wheat, timber, cotton, tobacco, rice—dropped in value or became unsalable; every imported article rose in price; wages stopped; swarms of debtors became bankrupt; thousands of sailors hung idle round the wharves trying to find employment on coasters, and escape to the West Indies or Nova Scotia. A reign of idleness began; and the men who were not already ruined felt that their ruin was only a matter of time. The British traveller, Lambert, who visited New York in 1808, described it as resembling a place ravaged by pestilence:—'The port indeed was full of shipping, but they were dismantled and laid up; their decks were cleared, their hatches fastened down, and scarcely a sailor was to be found on board. Not a box, bale, cask, barrel, or package was to be seen upon the wharves.' … In New England, where the struggle of existence was keenest, the embargo struck like a thunderbolt, and society for a moment thought itself at an end. {3337} Foreign commerce and shipping were the life of the people, —the ocean, as Pickering said, was their farm. The outcry of suffering interests became every day more violent, as the public learned that this paralysis was not a matter of weeks, but of months or years. … The belief that Jefferson, sold to France, wished to destroy American commerce and to strike a deadly blow at New and Old England at once, maddened the sensitive temper of the people. Immense losses, sweeping away their savings and spreading bankruptcy through every village, gave ample cause for their complaints. Yet in truth, New England was better able to defy the embargo than she was willing to suppose. She lost nothing except profits which the belligerents had in any case confiscated; her timber would not harm for keeping, and her fish were safe in the ocean. The embargo gave her almost a monopoly of the American market for domestic manufactures; no part of the country was so well situated or so well equipped for smuggling. … The growers of wheat and live stock in the Middle States were more hardly treated. Their wheat, reduced in value from two dollars to seventy-five cents a bushel, became practically unsalable. … The manufacturers of Pennsylvania could not but feel the stimulus of the new demand; so violent a system of protection was never applied to them before or since. Probably for that reason the embargo was not so unpopular in Pennsylvania as elsewhere, and Jefferson had nothing to fear from political revolution in this calm and plodding community. The true burden of the embargo fell on the Southern States, but most severely upon the great State of Virginia. Slowly decaying, but still half patriarchal, Virginia society could neither economize nor liquidate. Tobacco was worthless; but 400,000 negro slaves must be clothed and fed, great establishments must be kept up, the social scale of living could not be reduced, and even could not clear a large landed estate without creating new encumbrances in a country bankruptcy where land and negroes were the only forms of property on which money could be raised. Stay-laws were tried, but served only to prolong the agony. With astonishing rapidity Virginia succumbed to ruin, while continuing to support the system that was draining her strength."

_H. Adams, History of the United States: Second Administration of Jefferson, volume 2, chapter 12._

"'Our passion,' said Jefferson, 'is peace.' He not only recoiled as a philanthropist from bloodshed, but as a politician he with reason dreaded military propensities and sabre sway. Such preparations for war as he could be induced to make were scrupulously defensive, and his fleet of gun-boats for the protection of the coast to be launched when the invader should appear excited a smile. Alone among all statesmen he tried to make war without bloodshed by means of an embargo on trade. … It is not the highest of his titles to fame in the eyes of his countrymen, but it may be not the lowest in the court of humanity, that he sacrificed his popularity in the attempt to find a bloodless substitute for war. His memory recovered from the shock and his reign over American opinion endured."

_Goldwin Smith, The United States: An outline of Political History, 1492-1871, chapter 3._

ALSO IN: _H. A. Hill, Trade and Commerce of Boston, 1780-1880 (Memorial History of Boston, volume 4, part 2, chapter 8)._

_E. Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy, chapters 6-7._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1808. Sixth Presidential Election. Jefferson succeeded by Madison.

"In anticipation of Jefferson's retirement there had been … no little dispute and lively canvassing as to the next incumbency of the presidential chair. … Upon Madison, it was generally considered that Jefferson had fixed his personal preference. … But Madison had many political enemies in the Republican ranks among Virginians themselves. … Monroe was the growing favorite. Republicans in Congress, who, from one cause or another, had become disaffected to the Secretary of State, made their new choice manifest. The Quids [see QUIDS], having courted Monroe by letter when he was abroad, crowded about him when he passed through Washington on his way home, just as the Embargo became a law. … Monroe hesitated, unwilling to make a breach; and rather than hazard the Republican cause, or the future prospects of their favorite, his more temperate friends took him off the list of candidates, so that at the usual Congressional caucus, held at the capital, Madison was nominated almost unanimously for President, and George Clinton for Vice-President. But out of 139 Republican Senators and Representatives only 89 were present at this caucus, some being sick or absent from the city, and others keeping away because dissatisfied. Clinton had been a disappointed candidate, as well as Monroe, for the highest honors. … His ambition was pursued beyond the caucus, notwithstanding his renomination as Vice-President, until the friends of Madison, who had profited by the diversion among competitors, threatened to drop Clinton from the regular ticket unless he relinquished his pretensions to a higher place than that already assigned him. Meantime the schismatic Republicans had united in protesting to the country against Congressional dictation, at the same time pronouncing that the caucus which had nominated Madison was irregularly held. This open letter was signed by 17 Republican members of Congress. … Unfortunately for their influence in the canvass, however, they could not agree as to whether Monroe or Clinton should head the ticket. Objectionable, moreover, as the Congressional caucus might be, many more Presidential terms elapsed before other nominating machinery superseded it. National delegates, the national congress or convention of a party, was an idea too huge as yet for American politics to grasp in these days of plain frugality. … Harassed with foes within and without, with dissensions among the friends of rival candidates for the succession, with an odious and profitless measure to execute, against which citizens employed both cunning and force, it seemed, at one time, as if the administration party would go down in the fall elections. But Jefferson's wonderful popularity and the buoyancy of Republican principles carried the day. The regular Presidential ticket prevailed, not without a diminished majority."

_J. Schouler, History of the United States, chapter 6, section 2 (volume 2)._

James Madison, Democratic Republican, was elected, receiving 122 votes in the Electoral College; George Clinton, of the same party, receiving 6, and Charles C. Pinckney, Federalist, 47. George Clinton was chosen Vice President.

{3338}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1808-1810. Substitution of Non-intercourse for Embargo. Delusive conduct of Napoleon.

"All through the year 1808 and the first two months of 1809, the heavy hand of the embargo was laid on American commerce. The close of Jefferson's administration was signalized by an important change in the policy of the American Government. Almost the last act which Jefferson performed as President was to sign the new law which repealed the embargo, and substituted non-intercourse—a law which instead of universal prohibition of trade, merely prohibited commerce with Great Britain and with the countries under French control. The statute further authorized the President to suspend this prohibition as to either Great Britain or France as soon as one or the other should desist from violating neutral rights. An excuse for renewing commercial relations was not long delayed. On April 21, 1809, immediately upon the rather unexpected conclusion of a liberal and satisfactory diplomatic arrangement with Erskine, the British minister in Washington, the non-intercourse act was suspended as to Great Britain; and foreign trade, long dormant, suddenly sprang into excessive activity. This happy truce was short-lived. Erskine had effected his arrangement by a deliberate and almost defiant disregard of Canning's instructions; and his acts were promptly disavowed by his government. His recall was followed by a renewal of non-intercourse under a presidential proclamation of August 9, 1809. But notwithstanding the disavowal of Erskine, the British Government had made an apparent concession to the United States by the adoption of new orders in council which revoked the stringent prohibitions of the orders of 1807, and substituted a paper blockade of all ports and places under the government of France—a distinction which, on the whole, was perhaps without any important difference. France, on the other hand, entered upon a course of further aggressions. Louis Bonaparte was driven from his kingdom of Holland because he refused to attack neutral commerce, and all American ships found lying at Amsterdam were seized. Finally, by the decree of Rambouillet, every American ship found in any French port was confiscated and ordered sold. England and the United States thus seemed for the moment to be slowly drawing together in the presence of a common enemy, when suddenly the whole situation of affairs was changed by the formal announcement on August 5, 1810, of the Emperor's intended revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, such revocation to take place on the first day of the following November, provided the British Government revoked their orders in council, or (and this was the important provision) the United States caused their rights to be respected. This promise, as Napoleon had privately pointed out a few days before, committed him to nothing; but it was accepted with all seriousness on the part of the United States. In reliance upon the imperial word, commercial intercourse with Great Britain—which had been once more resumed in May, 1810—was for the third time suspended. This, it was thought, was 'causing American rights to be respected'; and although the condemnation of American ships went on without a pause in every continental port, the Government of the United States clung with the strongest pertinacity to the belief that Napoleon's declarations were sincere. The practical effect of all this was to bar the door against any possible settlement with Great Britain. Commerce was now permanently suspended; there was a long list of grievances to be redressed, and negotiation was exhausted."

_G. L. Rives, editor, Selections from the Correspondence of Thomas Barclay, chapter 6._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1810. The Third Census.

Total population, 7,215,791 (being an increase of nearly 36½ per cent. over the population shown in 1800), classed and distributed as follows:

North.

White. Free black. Slave. Connecticut. 255,279 6,453 310 Illinois. 11,501 613 168 Indiana. 23,890 393 237 Maine. 227,736 969 0 Massachusetts. 465,303 6,737 0 Michigan. 4,618 120 24 New Hampshire. 213,390 970 0 New Jersey. 226,861 7,843 10,851 New York. 918,699 25,333 15,017 Ohio. 228,861 1,899 0 Pennsylvania. 786,804 22,492 795 Rhode Island. 73,314 3,609 108 Vermont. 216,963 750 0 ------- ------ ------ Total 3,653,219 78,181 27,510

South.

White. Free black. Slave. Delaware. 55,361 13,136 4,177 District of Columbia. 16,079 2,549 5,395 Georgia. 145,414 1,801 105,218 Kentucky. 324,237 1,713 80,561 Louisiana. 34,311 7,585 34,660 Maryland. 235,117 33,927 111,502 Mississippi. 23,024 240 17,088 Missouri. 17,227 607 3,011 North Carolina. 376,410 10,266 168,824 South Carolina. 214,196 4,554 196,365 Tennessee. 215,875 1,317 44,535 Virginia. 551,534 30,570 392,518 ------- ------- ------- 2,208,785 108,265 1,163,854

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1810-1812. Continued provocation from England and France. The "War of 1812" against Great Britain declared.