Part 1060

Some "sought a refuge in Florida, then a possession of Spain, and founded settlements which their descendants have since raised to prosperous and beautiful villages, renowned for groves of orange-trees and fields of cane. Others embarked on the British ships of war, and were carried to Canada or the island of Bermuda; a few turned pirates, obtained a sloop, and scoured the waters of Chesapeake bay. Many went to England, beset the ministry with petitions for relief, wearied the public with pathetic stories of the harsh ingratitude with which their sufferings had been requited, and were accused, with much show of reason, by the Americans of urging the severe restrictions which England began to lay on American commerce. Many more … set out for Nova Scotia. … The open contempt with which, in all parts of the country, the people treated the recommendation of Congress concerning the refugees and the payment of the debts, was no more than any man of ordinary sagacity could have foretold. Indeed, the state into which Congress had fallen was most wretched. … Each of the thirteen States the Union bound together retained all the rights of sovereignty, and asserted them punctiliously against the central government. {3290} Each reserved to itself the right to put up mints, to strike money, to levy taxes, to raise armies, to say what articles should come into its ports free and what should be made to pay duty. Toward the Continental Government they acted precisely as if they were dealing with a foreign power. In truth, one of the truest patriots of New England had not been ashamed to stand up in his place in the Massachusetts House of Deputies and speak of the Congress of the States as a foreign government. Every act of that body was scrutinized with the utmost care. The transfer of the most trivial authority beyond the borders of the State was made with protestations, with trembling, and with fear. Under such circumstances, each delegate felt himself to have much the character, and to be clothed with very much of the power, of ambassadors. He was not responsible to men, he was responsible to a State. … From beginning to end the system of representation was bad. By the Articles of Confederation each of the thirteen little republics was annually to send to Congress not more than seven and not less than two delegates. No thought was taken of population. … But this absolute equality of the States was more apparent than real. Congress possessed no revenue. The burden of supporting the delegates was cast on those who sent them, and, as the charge was not light, a motive was at once created for preferring a representation of two to a representation of seven, or, indeed, for sending none at all. While the war was still raging and the enemy marching and counter-marching within the border of every State, a sense of fear kept up the number of delegates to at least two. Indeed, some of the wealthier and more populous States often had as many as four congressmen on the floor of the House. But the war was now over. The stimulus derived from the presence of a hostile army was withdrawn, and the representation and attendance fell off fast. Delaware and Georgia ceased to be represented. From the ratification of the treaty to the organization of the Government under the Constitution six years elapsed, and during those six years Congress, though entitled to 91 members, was rarely attended by 25. The House was repeatedly forced to adjourn day after day for want of a quorum. On more than one occasion these adjournments covered a period of thirteen consecutive days. … No occasion, however impressive or important, could call out a large attendance. Seven States, represented by twenty delegates, witnessed the resignation of Washington. Twenty-three members, sitting for eleven States, voted for the ratification of the treaty. … It is not surprising, therefore, that Congress speedily degenerated into a debating club, and a debating club of no very high order. Neglected by its own members, insulted and threatened by its mutinous troops, reviled by the press, and forced to wander from city to city in search of an abiding place, its acts possessed no national importance whatever. It voted monuments that never were put up, rewarded meritorious services with sums of money that never were paid, formed wise schemes for the relief of the finances that never were carried out, and planned on paper a great city that never was built. In truth, to the scoffers and malcontents of that day, nothing was more diverting than the uncertain wanderings of Congress. … In the coffee-houses and taverns no toasts were drunk with such uproarious applause as 'A hoop to the barrel' and 'Cement to the Union'; toasts which not long before had sprung up in the army and come rapidly into vogue. … The men who, in after years, came to eminence as the framers of the Constitution, who became renowned leaders of the Federalists, presidents, cabinet ministers, and constitutional statesmen, were then in private life, abroad, or in the State Assemblies. Washington was busy with his negroes and tobacco; Adams was minister to Holland; Jefferson still sat in Congress, but was soon to be sent as minister to France; Madison sat in the Virginia House of Deputies; Hamilton was wrangling with Livingston and Burr at the bar of New York; Jay was minister to Spain."

_J. B. McMaster, History of the People of the United States, volume 1, chapter 2._

Hamilton's description, in one of the papers of the Federalist, of the state of the country in 1787, is very graphic: "We may indeed, with propriety," he wrote, "be said to have reached almost the last stage of National humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character of an independent nation, which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our political existence! These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered! These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor Government. Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to National wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our Government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of National distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. {3291} To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded what indication is there of National disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? … The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation for States or Governments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money, but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that, though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option. … There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations, for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty; regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. … If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general discretionary superintendence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all views towards a Confederate Government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a National Government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common Council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a Government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,—the only proper objects of Government."

_Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, number 15._

"Many of the States refused or neglected to pay even their allotted shares of interest upon the public debt, and there was no power in Congress to compel payment. Eighteen months were required to collect only one-fifth of the taxes assigned to the States in 1783. The national credit became worthless. Foreign nations refused to make commercial treaties with the United States, preferring a condition of affairs in which they could lay any desired burden upon American commerce without fear of retaliation by an impotent Congress. The national standing army had dwindled to a corps of 80 men. In 1785 Algiers declared war against the United States. Congress recommended the building of five 40-gun ships of war. But Congress had only power to recommend. The ships were not built, and the Algerines were permitted to prey on American commerce with impunity. England still refused to carry out the Treaty of 1783, or to send a Minister to the United States. The Federal Government, in short, was despised abroad and disobeyed at home. The apparent remedy was the possession by Congress of the power of levying and collecting internal taxes and duties on imports, but, after long urging, it was found impossible to gain the necessary consent of all the States to the article of taxation by Congress. In 1786, therefore, this was abandoned, and, as a last resort, the States were asked to pass an Amendment intrusting to Congress the collection of a revenue from imports. This Amendment was agreed to by all the States but one. New York alone rejected it, after long debate, and her veto seemed to destroy the last hope of a continuance of national union in America. Perhaps the dismay caused by the action of New York was the most powerful argument in the minds of many for an immediate and complete revision of the government. The first step to Revision was not so designed. In 1785 the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, in pursuance of their right to regulate commerce, had appointed Commissioners to decide on some method of doing away with interruptions to the navigation of Chesapeake Bay. The Commissioners reported their inability to agree, except in condemning the Articles of Confederation. The Legislature of Virginia followed the report by a resolution, inviting the other States to meet at Annapolis, consider the defects of the government, and suggest some remedy. In September, 1786, delegates from five of the Middle States assembled, but confined themselves to discussion, since a majority of the States were not represented. The general conclusion was that the government, as it then stood, was inadequate for the protection, prosperity or comfort, of the people, and that some immediate and thorough reform was needed. After drawing up a report for their States and for Congress, recommending another Convention to be held at Philadelphia, in May, 1787, they adjourned. Congress, by resolution, approved their report and the proposed Convention. The Convention met, as proposed, May 14th, 1787."

_A. Johnston, History of American Politics, 2d edition, chapter 1._

"Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the downfall of a government which had been framed with the hope and promise of perpetual duration. … But this brief interval was full of suffering and peril. There are scarcely any evils or dangers, of a political nature, and springing from political and social causes, to which a free people can be exposed, which the people of the United States did not experience during that period."

_G. T. Curtis, History of the Constitution, book 3, chapter 1_.

"It is not too much to say that the period of five years following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all the history of the American people."

_J. Fiske, Critical Period of American History, page 55._

ALSO IN: _J. S. Landon, Constitutional History and Government of the United States, lecture 3._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1789. Depressed state of Trade and Industry. Commercial consequences of the want of nationality.

"The effect of the Revolutionary War on the merchant marine of the colonies, which thereby secured their independence as the United States, was not so disastrous as might have been expected. Many ships were lost or captured, and the gains of maritime commerce were reduced; but to offset these losses an active fleet of privateers found profitable employment in the seizure of English merchantmen, and thus kept alive the maritime spirit of the country, and supplied a revenue to the shipowners whose legitimate pursuits were suspended by the war. In 1783, therefore, the American merchant marine was in a fairly healthy condition. During the next six years the disadvantages of the new situation made themselves felt. Before the Revolution the colonies had had open trade with their fellow-subjects in the British West India Islands. The commerce thus carried on was a very profitable business. The island colonies were supplied with lumber, corn, fish, live stock, and surplus farm produce, which the continent furnished in abundance, together with rough manufactured articles such as pipe staves, and in return the ships of New York and New England brought back great quantities of coffee, sugar, cotton, rum, and indigo. … As a result of independence, the West India business was entirely cut off. The merchantmen of the United States then came in on the footing of foreign vessels, and all such vessels, under the terms of the Navigation Act, were rigorously excluded from trade with the British colonies. It was evident, however, that the sudden cessation of this trade, whatever loss it might inflict on the newly created state, would be tenfold more harmful to the islands, which had so long depended upon their neighbors of the mainland for the necessaries of life. Pitt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, appreciated this difficulty, and in 1783 brought a bill into Parliament granting open trade as to articles that were the produce of either country. The measure failed, owing to Pitt's resignation, and the next ministry, in consequence of the violent opposition of British shipowners, passed a merely temporary act, vesting in the crown the power of regulating trade with America. This power was occasionally exercised by suspending certain provisions of the navigation laws, under annual proclamations, but it did not serve to avert the disaster that Pitt had foreseen. Terrible sufferings visited the population of the West India colonies, and between 1780 and 1787 as many as 15,000 slaves perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the necessary supply of food when their own crops had been destroyed by hurricanes. Apart from the unfavorable condition of the West India trade, another and more important cause had operated to check the prosperous development of American commerce. The only bond of political union at this time was that formed by the Articles of Confederation, constituting a mere league of independent States, any one of which could pass laws calculated to injure the commerce of the others."

_J. R. Soley, Maritime Industries of America (The United States of America, edition by N. S. Shaler, volume 1, chapter 10)._

"The general commerce of the granulated mass of communities called the United States, from 1783 to 1780, was probably the poorest commerce known in the whole history of the country. England sent America £3,700,000 worth of merchandise in 1784, and took in return only £750,000. The drain of specie to meet this difference was very severe, and merchants could not meet the engagements so rashly made. They had imported luxuries for customers who were poor, and non-payment through all the avenues of trade was the consequence. One circumstance and detail of the internal management of this commerce added to the distress and to the necessary difficulties of the time. Immediately after the peace, British merchants, factors, and clerks came across the seas in streams, to take advantage of the new opportunities for trade. It seemed to the citizens to be a worse invasion of their economic rights than the coming of the troops had been to the political rights of the old colonists. The whole country was agitated, but action was initiated in Boston in 1785. The merchants met and discussed all these difficulties. They pledged themselves to buy no more goods of British merchants or factors in Boston. In about three weeks the mechanics and artisans met in the old Green Dragon Tavern and committed themselves to the same policy. But the merchants went beyond mere non-intercourse with traders at home. The root of the difficulty was in the ill-regulation or want of regulation of our commerce with all foreign countries. The confederation was giving and not getting. Where it should have gotten, foreigners were getting, because the parts of the country had not agreed to unite in acquiring for the common benefit, lest some part should be injured in the process. Congress made treaties for the Confederation. But if unable to treat with any} power which excluded American shipping from its ports, or laid duties on American produce, Congress did not control our ports in an equivalent manner. Each individual state was to decide whether the unfriendly power should trade at its own ports. This in effect nullified any retaliatory action. England, being the best market, virtually controlled any change in commerce, as it was then conducted. Her ports were closed to American products unless they were brought in British vessels. France admitted our vessels to her ports, but her merchants cried out against the competition. It was feared that the ministers would be obliged to yield to their clamor and close the ports. Probably the poor economic condition of the country affected the foreign trade even more than the bad adjustment of foreign relations. All causes combined to form two parties, one advocating imposts upon foreign trade or a Navigation Act, the other opposing this scheme, and insisting upon absolute freedom of commerce. It was in this direction that the Boston people moved, after they had instituted non-intercourse in their own market with British traders. They petitioned Congress to remedy these embarrassments of trade, and sent a memorial to their own legislature. This document urged that body to insist on action by Congress. They formed a Committee of Correspondence to enforce these plans upon the whole country."

_W. B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1780, chapter 22 (volume 2)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. Plans for new States in the Northwest Territory.

See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: A. D. 1784.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. Revolt in Tennessee against the territorial cession to Congress. The State of Franklin.

See TENNESSEE; A. D. 1776-1784; and 1785.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. The first daily Newspaper publication.

See PRINTING and PRESS; A. D. 1784-1813.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. The financial administration of Robert Morris. Cost of the war.