Part 1057

The military claims of Virginia were certainly very strong, but it was felt by the smaller States that an equitable consideration for the services of other colonies in defending the back country from the French, ought to induce Virginia to dispose of a portion of her western territory for the common good. It is easy now to conceive how royal grants to Massachusetts and Connecticut of lands stretching from ocean to ocean, must have conflicted with the charter claims and military title of Virginia to the great north-west. … The claims of Massachusetts were based upon the charter granted by William and Mary, in 1691, and those of Connecticut upon the charter granted by Charles II., in 1662. … {3281} The former's claim embraced the lands which now lie in southern Michigan and Wisconsin, or, in other words, the region comprehended by the extension westward of her present southern boundary and of her ancient northern limit, which was 'the latitude of a league north of the inflow of Lake Winnipiseogee in New Hampshire. The western claims of Connecticut [the zone lying between her northern and southern boundaries—41° and 42° 2' north latitude—extended westward] covered portions of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. … The extension of charter boundaries over the far west by Massachusetts and Connecticut led to no trespass on the intervening charter claims of New York. Connecticut fell into a serious controversy, however, with Pennsylvania, in regard to the possession of certain lands in the northern part of the latter State, but the dispute, when brought before a court appointed by Congress, was finally decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But in the western country, Massachusetts and Connecticut were determined to assert their chartered rights against Virginia and the treaty claims of New York; for, by virtue of various treaties with the Six Nations and allies, the latter State was asserting jurisdiction over the entire region between Lake Erie and the Cumberland mountains, or, in other words, Ohio and a portion of Kentucky. These claims were strengthened by the following facts: First, that the chartered rights of New York were merged in the Crown by the accession to the throne, in 1685, of the Duke of York as James II.; again, that the Six Nations and tributaries had put themselves under the protection of England, and that they had always been treated by the Crown as appendant to the government of New York; moreover, in the third place, the citizens of that State had borne the burden of protecting these Indians for over a hundred years. New York was the great rival of Virginia in the strength and magnitude of her western claims." In 1780, Maryland still insisting upon the surrender of these western land claims to the federal government, and refusing to ratify the Articles of Confederation until such cession was made, the claimant States began to yield to her firmness. On the 1st of March, 1781, the offer of New York to cede her claims, providing Congress would confirm her western boundary, was made in Congress. "On that very day, Maryland ratified the Articles and the first legal union of the United States was complete. The coincidence in dates is too striking to admit of any other explanation than that Maryland and New York were acting with a mutual understanding. … The offer of Virginia, reserving to herself jurisdiction over the County of Kentucky; the offer of Connecticut, withholding jurisdiction over all her back lands; and the offer of New York, untrammeled by burdensome conditions and conferring upon Congress complete jurisdiction over her entire western territory,—these three offers were now prominently before the country. … On the 29th of October, 1782, Mr. Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, moved that Congress accept the right, title, jurisdiction, and claim of New York, as ceded by the agents of that state on the first of March, 1781. … On the 13th day of September, 1783, it was voted by Congress to accept the cession offered by Virginia, of the territory north-west of the Ohio, provided that state would waive the obnoxious conditions concerning the guaranty of Virginia's boundary, and the annulling of all other titles to the north-west territory. Virginia modified her conditions as requested, and on the 20th of October, 1783, empowered her delegates in Congress to make the cession, which was done by Thomas Jefferson, and others, March 1, 1784."

_H. B. Adams, Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States (Johns Hopkins University Studies, 3d series, Number 1), pages 9-11, 19-22, 36-39._

The Massachusetts deed of cession was executed April 19, 1785. It conveyed the right and title of the state to all lands "west of a meridian line drawn through the western bent or inclination of Lake Ontario, provided such line should fall 20 miles or more west of the western limit of the Niagara River" —that being the western boundary of New York, fixed four years before. In May, 1786, Connecticut authorized a cession which was not complete. Instead of beginning at the western boundary line of Pennsylvania, her conveyance was of lands beyond a line 120 miles west of the Pennsylvania line—thus retaining her claim to the large tract in Ohio known subsequently as the Western Reserve, or Connecticut Reserve. "The acceptance of this cession was strongly opposed in Congress. … After a severe struggle it was accepted, May 26, 1786, Maryland alone voting in the negative."

_B. A. Hinsdale, The Old Northwest, chapter 13._

South Carolina executed the cession of her western claims in 1787; North Carolina in 1790, and Georgia in 1802.

_A. Johnston, Connecticut, chapter 15._

ALSO IN: _T. Donaldson, The Public Domain: its History, chapter 3._

See, also, OHIO: A. D. 1786-1796.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (February-May). Peace Resolutions in the British House of Commons. Retirement of Lord North. Pacific overtures through General Carleton.

"Fortunately for the United States, the temper of the British nation on the question of continuing the American war was not in unison with that of its sovereign. That war into which the nation had entered with at least as much eagerness as the minister had now become almost universally unpopular. Motions against the measures of administration respecting America were repeated by the opposition, and on every new experiment the strength of the minority increased. At length, on the 27th of February [1782], general Conway moved in the house of commons, 'that it is the opinion of this house that a further prosecution of offensive war against America, would, under present circumstances, be the means of weakening the efforts of this country against her European enemies, and tend to increase the mutual enmity so fatal to the interests both of Great Britain and America.' The whole force of administration was exerted to get rid of this question, but was exerted in vain; and the resolution was carried. An address to the king in the words of the motion was immediately voted, and was presented by the whole house. The answer of the crown being deemed inexplicit, it was on the 4th of March resolved by the commons, 'that the house will consider as enemies to his majesty and the country, all those who should advise or attempt a further prosecution of offensive war on the continent of North America.' These votes were soon followed by a change of administration [Lord North resigning and being succeeded by Lord Rockingham, with Fox, Shelburne, Burke and Sheridan for colleagues], and by instructions to the commanding officers of his Brittanic majesty's forces in America which conformed to them. … {3282} Early in May, Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded Sir Henry Clinton in the command of all the British forces in the United States, arrived at New York. Having been also appointed in conjunction with admiral Digby a commissioner to negotiate a peace, he lost no time in conveying to general Washington copies of the votes of the British parliament, and of a bill which had been introduced on the part of administration, authorizing his majesty to conclude a peace or truce with those who were still denominated the revolted colonies of North America. These papers he said would manifest the dispositions prevailing with the government and people of England towards those of America, and if the like pacific temper should prevail in this country, both inclination and duty would lead him to meet it with the most zealous concurrence. He had addressed to congress, he said, a letter containing the same communications, and he solicited from the American general a passport for the person who should convey it. At this time, the bill enabling the British monarch to conclude a peace or truce with America had not passed into a law; nor was any assurance given that the present commissioners possessed the power to offer other terms, than those which had formerly been rejected. General Carleton therefore could not hope that negotiations would commence on such a basis; nor be disappointed that the passports he requested were refused by congress, to whom the application was, of course, referred. … The several states passed resolutions expressing their objections to separate negotiations, and declaring those to be enemies to America who should attempt to treat without the authority of congress. But the public votes which have been stated, and probably the private instructions given to the British general, restrained him from offensive war, and the state of the American army disabled general Washington from making any attempt on the posts held by the enemy. The campaign of 1782 consequently passed away without furnishing any military operations of moment between the armies under the immediate direction of the respective commanders in chief."

_J. Marshall, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 11._

ALSO IN: _Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope) History of England, 1713-1783, chapter 65 (volume 7)._

See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (April). Recognition by the Dutch Republic.

"Henry Laurens, the American plenipotentiary to the Netherlands, having been taken captive and carried to England, John Adams was appointed in his place. The new envoy had waited more than eight months for an audience of reception. Encouraged by the success at Yorktown, on the 9th of January 1782 Adams presented himself to the president of the states-general, renewed his formal request for an opportunity of presenting his credentials, and 'demanded a categorical answer which he might transmit to his sovereign.' He next went in person to the deputies of the several cities of Holland, and, following the order of their rank in the confederation, repeated his demand to each one of them. The attention of Europe was drawn to the sturdy diplomatist, who dared, alone and unsupported, to initiate so novel and bold a procedure. Not one of the representatives of foreign powers at the Hague believed that it could succeed;" but, beginning with Friesland, in February, the seven states, one by one, declared in favor of receiving the American envoy. "On the day which chanced to be the seventh anniversary of 'the battle of Lexington' their high mightinesses, the states-general, reporting the unanimous decision of the seven provinces, resolved that John Adams should be received as the minister of the United States of America. The Dutch republic was the second power in the world to recognise their independence."

_G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 5, page 527._

ALSO IN: _J. Q. and C. F. Adams, Life of John Adams, chapter 6 (volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (September). The opening of negotiations for Peace.

The Rockingham ministry, which succeeded Lord North's in the British government, in March, 1782 (see ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783), "though soon dissolved by the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, were early distracted by a want of unanimity, and early lost the confidence of the people. The negotiation with America during May and June made no progress. Mr. Oswald was the agent of Lord Shelburne, known to be opposed to the acknowledgment, and Mr. Grenville, of Mr. Fox. This ministry had been forced upon the king by a vote of the House of Commons. The hopes of regaining America were again excited by the decisive victory of Lord Rodney in the West Indies [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1780-1782], and the unexpected successes of Sir Eyre Coote against Hyder Ali in the East; and, if credit may be given to the reports of the day, the government looked forward with some confidence to the making a separate peace with Congress by means of Sir Guy Carleton, who had been appointed to the command of the forces in North America. … Mr. Adams, writing from the Hague, June 13, 1782, observes, 'I cannot see a probability that the English will ever make peace, until their finances are ruined, and such distress brought upon them, as will work up their parties into a civil war.' It was not till September of the same year, under Lord Shelburne's administration, formed upon the dissolution of the Rockingham, that the British government took a decisive and sincere step to make peace, and authorized their commissioner, Mr. Oswald, at Paris, to acknowledge the independence of the colonies. … This is the first instruction given by the British Ministry in which it was proposed to recognize the celebrated act of July 4th, 1776. A great and immediate progress was now made in the preliminaries. … The commission, under which the preliminaries of the treaty were actually concluded, was issued by Congress in June 1781. It empowered 'John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson, or the majority of them, or such of them as may assemble, or in case of the death, absence, indisposition, or other impediment of the others, to any one of them, full power and authority, general and special commission, … to sign, and thereupon make a treaty or treaties, and to transact every thing that may be necessary for completing, securing and strengthening the great work of pacification, in as ample form, and with the same effect, as if we were personally present and acted therein.' {3283} All the commissioners, except Mr. Jefferson, were present during the discussions, being in Europe at the time the meeting was appointed. Mr. Jefferson was in America, and did not leave it, as a report reached the government that the preliminaries were already signed. Mr. Oswald's commission in proper form was not issued till the 21st of September."

_The Diplomacy of the United States, chapter 8._

"At the moment … that negotiations were set on foot, there seemed but little hope of finding the Court of France peaceably inclined. Fox alone among the Ministers, though strongly opposed to a French alliance, inclined to a contrary opinion, and imagined that the independence of America once recognized, no further demands would be made upon England. It was therefore his wish to recognize that independence immediately, and by a rapid negotiation to insure the conclusion of what he believed would prove a favourable peace. Shelburne on the contrary believed that further concessions would be asked by France, and that the best chance England possessed of obtaining honourable terms, was to reserve the recognition of independence as part of the valuable consideration to be offered to the Colonies for favourable terms, and to use the points where the interests of France, Spain, and the Colonies were inconsistent, to foment difficulties between them, and be the means of negotiating, if necessary, a separate peace with each of the belligerents, as opportunity might offer. The circumstances of the time favoured the design. Vergennes had not gone to war for the sake of American independence, but in order to humiliate England. He not only did not intend to continue the war a day longer than was necessary to establish a rival power on the other side of the Atlantic, but was desirous of framing the peace on conditions such as would leave England, Spain, and the United States to balance one another, and so make France paramount. He therefore intended to resist the claim which the Colonies had invariably advanced of pushing their frontiers as far west as the Mississippi, and proposed following the example of the Proclamation of 1763, to leave the country between Florida and the Cumberland to the Indians, who were to be placed under the protection of Spain and the United States, and the country north of the Ohio to England, as arranged by the Quebec Act of 1774. Nor was he prepared to support the claim of the New Englandmen to fish on the banks off Newfoundland, over a considerable portion of which he desired to establish an exclusive right for his own countrymen, in keeping with the French interpretation of the Treaties of Utrecht and Paris. Of a still more pronounced character were the views of Spain. Her troops had recently conquered West Florida and threatened East Florida as well. She had determined to obtain formal possession of these territories, and to claim that they ran into the interior till they reached the great lakes. The United States, according to both the French and Spanish idea, were therefore to be restricted to a strip of land on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, bounded by almost the same line which France had contended for against England after the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1779, when the alliance of France was not a year old, and the great triumph over Burgoyne was fresh, Congress notwithstanding the pressure of M. Gerard, the French envoy, had adopted the following conditions as the ultimatum of peace:

(l.) The acknowledgment of the independence of the United States by Great Britain, previous to any treaty or negotiation for peace.

(2.) The Mississippi as their western boundary.

(3.) The navigation of that river to the southern boundary of the States with a port below it.

They also passed a resolution to the effect that any interference after the conclusion of peace by any power with the fishery off Newfoundland hitherto exercised by the inhabitants of the Colonies, should be regarded as a casus belli. 'The advice of the allies, their knowledge of American interests, and their own discretion,' were in other matters to guide the American Commissioners sent to the European Courts. As however the war progressed, and French assistance, especially in money, became of greater and greater importance to the Congress, the tone of their instructions became sensibly modified, under the pressure, first of M. Gérard and then of Count Luzerne, his successor. On the 25th January 1780, M. Gérard having obtained the appointment of a Committee of Congress, informed them that the territories of the United States extended no further west than the limits to which settlements were permitted by the English proclamation of 1763; that the United States had no right to the navigation of the Mississippi, having no territories adjoining any part of the river; that Spain would probably conquer both Floridas, and intended holding them; and that the territory on the east side of the Mississippi belonged to Great Britain, and would probably be conquered by Spain. He at the same time urged upon Congress the immediate conclusion of an alliance with that power, to which Jay had been sent as Commissioner in 1779. On the 15th February, Congress having considered this communication, resolved to instruct Jay to abandon the claim to the navigation of the Mississippi. This practically implied the abandonment of the claim to that river as the western boundary. Shortly after, and again on the demand of Luzerne, the instructions to Adams, who had been appointed Commissioner for negotiating a peace, and was then in Europe, were altered. Independence was to be the sole ultimatum, and Adams was to undertake to submit to the guidance of the French Minister in every respect. 'You are to make the most candid and confidential communications,' so his amended instructions ran, 'upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally the King of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge or concurrence, and to make them sensible how much we rely upon his Majesty's influence for effectual support in every thing that may be necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the United States of America.' As a climax Count Luzerne suggested and Congress agreed to make Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and Laurens, joint Commissioners with Mr. Adams. Of the body thus appointed Jefferson refused to serve, while Laurens, as already seen, was captured on his way to England. Of the remaining Commissioners, John Adams was doubly odious to the diplomatists of France and Spain, because of his fearless independence of character, and because of the tenacity with which as a New Englander he clung to the American rights in the Newfoundland fisheries; Jay had been an enthusiastic advocate for the Spanish alliance, but the cavalier treatment he had received at Madrid, and the abandonment of the Mississippi boundary by Congress, had forced upon him the conviction that his own country was being used as a tool by the European powers, for their own ulterior objects. The French he hated. {3284} He said 'they were not a moral people, and did not know what it was.' Not so Franklin, influenced partly by his long residence in the French capital, and by the idea that the Colonies were more likely to obtain their objects, by a firm reliance upon France than by confidence in the generosity of England. He also pointed to the terms of the treaty he had negotiated with the former power, which forbade either party to conclude a separate peace without the leave previously obtained of the other, as imposing a moral and legal obligation on his countrymen to follow the policy which he believed their interests as a power required them to adopt. Meanwhile the King of France congratulated Congress on having entrusted to his care the interests of the United States, and warned them that if France was to be asked to continue hostilities for purely American objects it was impossible to say what the result might be, for the system of France depended not merely on America, but on the other powers at war."

_Lord E. Fitzmaurice, Life of William, Earl of Shelburne, volume 3, chapter 4._