Part 1046

It was during this trying winter, while the army suffered at Valley Forge, that it was joined by Baron Steuben, an accomplished Prussian officer, trained in the school of Frederick the Great, with a record of distinguished service in the Seven Years War. He came as a volunteer, and was welcomed by Washington, who found in him the organizer, the disciplinarian, the instructor, which the rudely formed American army so greatly needed. The services rendered by Baron Steuben during that first winter of his stay in America were especially valuable, beyond measure. In his own account of the state of things which he found he says: "'My determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied, but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first place, I informed myself relative to the military administration. I found that the different branches were divided into departments. There were those of the quarter-master general, war commissary, provisions commissary, commissary of the treasury, or paymaster of forage, etc., etc. But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to say, they had imitated the English administration, which is certainly the most imperfect in Europe. The general asked me to give him some statements concerning the arrangements of the departments, and their various branches in the European armies. I gave them to him, and, detailing therein the duties of each department and of its different branches, dilated upon the functions of the quarter-masters (maréchaux généraux de logis) in particular, in which branch I had served myself for a long time in the Seven Years' War. But the English system, bad as it is, had already taken root. Each company and quarter-master had a commission of so much per cent. on all the money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the depreciation of our currency—hence the expense of so many millions. I pointed out to General Washington and several members of Congress the advantages of the contract system. I even drew up a memorandum on the subject, which Colonel Laurens translated into English, showing the way in which things were contracted for in the Prussian and French armies. But whether it was that they thought such a system impracticable in this country, or whether they were unable to check the torrent of expense, things remained as they were. I directed my attention to the condition of the troops, and I found an ample field, where disorder and confusion were supreme. … The number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for three, six, and nine months, who went and came every day, rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and division, were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number, that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers. Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one corporal! … The soldiers were scattered about in every direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants, and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more commissaries and quarter-masters at that time than all the armies of Europe together; the most modest had only one servant, but others had two and even three. {3248} If the captains and colonels could give no account of their men, they could give still less an account of their arms, accouterments, clothing, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all the articles. A company, which consisted, in May, of fifty men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits, who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the clothes, but the arms were carried off by those who had completed their time of service. General Knox assured me that, previous to the establishment of my department, there never was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish from 5,000 to 8,000 muskets to replace those which were lost in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was still greater. The American soldier, never having used this arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the States engaged their soldiers for from six to nine months. Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his successor received another from the public store. No captain kept a book. Accounts were never furnished nor required. As our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture to say that during an entire campaign there have not been twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. … The men were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color and make. I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge, mounting guard in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old blanket or woolen bed-cover. With regard to their military discipline, I may safely say no such thing existed. … I commenced operations by drafting 120 men from the line, whom I formed into a guard for the general-in-chief. I made this guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day; and to remove that English prejudice which some officers entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the musket myself to show the men the manual exercise which I wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., etc., and in a fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy, and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision. … I paraded them in presence of all the officers of the army, and gave them an opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They formed in column; deployed; attacked with the bayonet; changed front, etc., etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was eagerly embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations on a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterward to brigades, and in less than three weeks I executed maneuvers with an entire division in presence of the commander-in-chief.' … The most interesting narrative of the energy employed by Steuben, and the success of his system, is given by his favorite aid-de-camp and intimate friend, William North, who was with him from the beginning. He says in his biographical sketch: 'Certainly it was a brave attempt! Without understanding a word of the English language, to think of bringing men, born free, and joined together to preserve their freedom, into strict subjection; to obey without a word, a look, the mandates of a master! that master once their equal, or possibly beneath them, in whatever might become a man! It was a brave attempt, which nothing but virtue, or high-raised hopes of glory, could have supported. At the first parade, the troops neither understanding the command, nor how to follow in a changement to which they had not been accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Captain B. Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the orders and interpret to the troops. "If," said the baron, "I had seen an angel from heaven, I should not have more rejoiced." … Walker became from that moment his aid-de-camp, and remained to the end of the baron's life his dear and most worthy friend. From the commencement of instruction, no time, no pains, no fatigue were thought too great, in pursuit of this great object. Through the whole of each campaign, when troops were to maneuver, and that was almost every day, the baron rose at three o'clock; while his servant dressed his hair he smoked a single pipe and drank one cup of coffee, was on horseback at sunrise, and, with or without his suite, galloped to the parade. There was no waiting for a tardy aid-de-camp, and those who followed wished they had not slept. Nor was there need of chiding; when duty was neglected, or military etiquette infringed, the baron's look was quite sufficient.' … Steuben enjoyed the confidence of both officers and men, and every thing he proposed was executed with as much precision as if it were an order from the commander-in-chief. Although he was only a volunteer, without any specific rank in the army, he had greater power and authority than any general could boast of."

_F. Kapp, Life of Frederick William von Steuben, chapter 6._

ALSO IN: _W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapters 13, 18-19, and 23-27._

_G. W. Greene, Life of General Nathanael Greene, book 2, chapters 16-25 (volume l)._

_J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott, History of Philadelphia, chapter 17 (volume l)._

_C. J. Stille, Major-General Anthony Wayne, Chapter 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (June). Vermont denied admission to the Union.

See VERMONT; A. D. 1777-1778.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (July). The coming of Lafayette.

"La Fayette, barely nineteen years old, was in garrison at Metz, when he was invited to a dinner that his commander, the Count de Broglie, gave to the brother of the king of England, the Duke of Gloucester, then on his way through the city. News had just been received of the proclamation of the independence of the United States, and, the conversation having naturally fallen on this subject, La Fayette plied the duke with questions to acquaint himself with the events, entirely new to him, which were happening in America. Before the end of the dinner he had made his decision, and, from that moment, he no longer thought of anything else except setting out for the new world. {3249} He went to Paris and confided his project to his friends, the Count de Segur and the Viscount de Noailles, who were to accompany him. The Count de Broglie, whom he also informed, tried to turn him from his design. 'I saw your uncle die in Italy,' he said to him, 'and your father at Min·den, and I do not wish to contribute to the ruin of your family by allowing you to go.' Nevertheless, he put La Fayette in communication with the former agent of Choiseul in Canada, the Baron de Kalb, who became his friend. De Kalb presented him to Silas Deane, who, considering him too young, wished to dissuade him from his project. But the news of the disasters experienced by the Americans before New York, at White Plains and in New Jersey, confirmed La Fayette in his resolution. He bought and fitted out a vessel at his own expense, and disguised his preparations by making a journey to London. Nevertheless his design was disclosed at Court. His family became angry with him. He was forbidden to go to America, and, to render this order effective, a lettre de cachet was issued against him. Nevertheless he left Paris with an officer named Mauroy, disguised himself as a courier, went on board his ship at Passage in Spain, and set sail April the 26th, 1777. He had several officers on board. La Fayette successfully avoided the English cruisers and the French vessels sent in pursuit of him. Finally, after a hazardous passage of seven weeks, he reached Georgetown, and, furnished with letters of recommendation from Deane, he reported to Congress."

_T. Balch, The French in America during the War of Independence, chapter 7._

In consideration of the great personal sacrifice he had made in quitting France, and his offer to serve the American cause at his own expense and without pay, Congress, with hesitation, conferred on the young marquis the rank of Major General, but without command. He succeeded, too, in procuring a like commission for Baron de Kalb, who had accompanied him. While Lafayette was still busy with these arrangements, Washington came to Philadelphia, and they met at a dinner party. They seem to have been drawn to one another at the first exchange of words, and a friendship began which lasted through their lives. Lafayette was soon invited to become a member of the military family of the commander-in-chief.

_B. Tuckerman, Life of General Lafayette, chapter 2._

ALSO IN: _C. Tower, Jr., The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution, volume 1, chapter 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (July-October). The struggle for the Hudson. Burgoyne's expedition from Canada. His surrender at Saratoga.

Early in the summer of 1777 a formidable expedition under General Burgoyne was set in motion from Canada toward Lake Champlain. "It was a part of Burgoyne's plan, not merely to take Ticonderoga, but to advance thence upon Albany, and, with the co-operation of the troops at New York, to get possession also of the posts in the Highlands. The British would then command the Hudson through its whole extent, and New England, the head of the rebellion, would be completely cut off from the middle and southern colonies. Burgoyne started on this expedition with a brilliant army of 8,000 men, partly British and partly Germans, besides a large number of Canadian boatmen, laborers and skirmishers. On the western shore of Lake Champlain, near Crown Point, he met the Six Nations in council, and after a feast and a speech, some 400 of their warriors joined this army. His next step was to issue a proclamation … threatening with all the extremities of war all who should presume to resist his arms. Two days after the issue of this proclamation, Burgoyne appeared [July 1] before Ticonderoga." The commander of that important fort, General St. Clair, found defense impracticable and evacuated the place. He was vigorously pursued in his retreat and only escaped with the loss of most of his bag·gage and stores, besides several hundred men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. "After a seven days' march, he joined Schuyler at Fort Edward, on the Hudson. Here was assembled the whole force of the northern army, amounting to about 5,000 men; but a considerable part were militia hastily called in; many were without arms; there was a great deficiency of ammunition and provisions; and the whole force was quite disorganized. The region between Skenesborough [now Whitehall, where Burgoyne had halted] and the Hudson was an almost unbroken wilderness. Wood Creek was navigable as far as Fort Anne [which the Americans had fired and abandoned]; from Fort Anne to the Hudson, over an exceedingly rough country, … extended a single military road. While Burgoyne halted a few days at Skenesborough to put his forces in order, and to bring up the necessary supplies, Schuyler hastened to destroy the navigation of Wood Creek," and to make the road from Fort Anne as nearly impassable as a wilderness road can be made. "All the stock in the neighborhood was driven off, and the militia of New England was summoned to the rescue. … The advance from Skenesborough cost the British infinite labor and fatigue; but … [the] impediments were at length overcome; and Burgoyne, with his troops, artillery, and baggage, presently appeared [July 29] on the banks of the Hudson. … Fort Edward was untenable. As the British approached, the Americans crossed the river, and retired, first to Saratoga, and then to Stillwater, a short distance above the mouth of the Mohawk. Hardly had Schuyler taken up this position, when news arrived of another disaster and a new danger. While moving up Lake Champlain, Burgoyne had detached Colonel St. Leger, with 200 regulars, Sir John Johnson's Royal Greens, some Canadian Rangers, and a body of Indians under Brant, to harass the New York frontier from the west. St. Leger laid siege to Fort Schuyler, late Fort Stanwix, near the head of the Mohawk, then the extreme western post of the State of New York. General Herkimer raised the militia of Tryon county, and advanced to the relief of this important post, which was held by Gansevoort and Willett, with two New York regiments. About six miles from the fort [near Oriskany, August 6], owing to want of proper precaution, Herkimer fell into an ambush. Mortally wounded, he supported himself against a stump, and encouraged his men to the fight. By the aid of a successful sally by Willett, they succeeded at last in repulsing the assailants, but not without a loss of 400, including many of the leading patriots of that region, who met with no mercy at the hands of the Indians and refugees. Tryon county, which included the whole district west of Albany, abounded with Tories. {3250} It was absolutely necessary to relieve Fort Schuyler." General Arnold was accordingly despatched thither, with three regiments, and on his approach St. Leger, deserted by most of his Indian allies, retreated precipitately, leaving most of his stores and baggage behind. Meantime, Burgoyne was beginning to find his situation serious. To feed and otherwise supply his army was the chief difficulty. He could bring enough of stores to the head of Lake George, by the water carriage which he commanded, from Canada; but to transport them thence to the Hudson, though the distance was only eighteen miles, proved nearly impracticable. "The roads were so bad, and the supply of draft cattle so small, that, after a fortnight's hard labor, the British army had only four days' provision in advance." To improve his supplies, and partly, moreover, in the hope of finding discontent among the settlers of the New Hampshire Grants, Burgoyne sent 800 men, under Colonel Baum, into Vermont, They were defeated [August 16] at Bennington by the New Hampshire and Vermont militia under Colonel John Stark, and again defeated a second time the same day, after reinforcements had been sent to them. "Besides the killed, about 200 in number, the Americans took near 600 prisoners, 1,000 stand of arms, as many swords, and four pieces of artillery. … The American loss was only 14 killed and 42 wounded. … The victory of Stark had a magical effect in reviving the spirits of the people and the courage of the soldiers."

_R. Hildreth, History of the United States, chapter 36 (volume 3)._

"Burgoyne's position was by this time very dangerous. His Indians were leaving him; many of his best men had been killed or captured; and he was getting short of provisions. The army opposed to him was increasing: Congress was hurrying men up the Hudson; and the country militia were coming in rapidly. Burgoyne, therefore, desperately attempted to force his way through the American army. He crossed the Hudson, and moved slowly down its west bank toward the Mohawk. About the same time, Gates, who had been sent by Congress to take Schuyler's place, felt strong enough to move up the west bank of the Hudson, away from the Mohawk. The two armies met [September 19] at Bemis Heights, between Saratoga Lake and the Hudson. The battle which followed [called by some writers the battle of Freeman's Farm] was not decisive: the British held the ground; but the Americans had shown that Burgoyne could not break through."

_A. Johnston, History of the United States for Schools, sections 222-223._