Part 1044

"On March 17, 1776, Vergennes presented to his associates in the cabinet—Maurepas, Turgot (controller-general), Sartine (secretary of the navy), and St. Germain (secretary of war)—a paper entitled 'Considerations,' which, after for many years evading the search of historians, … was brought to light by De Witt and republished by Doniol. In this important paper Vergennes, after some general reflections on the advantages which the two crowns of France and Spain derived from the continuance of the civil war in America, and, on the other hand, on the inconveniences which might arise from the independence of the Colonies, and the probability that, in case of failure in North America, England would, to recover its credit, turn its arms against the French and Spanish possessions in America, proceeds to consider the course at once to be pursued. He bitterly attacks the English for their habitual breach of good faith, violation of treaties, and disregard of that observance of the sacred laws of morality which distinguish the French, and infers that they will take the first opportunity to declare war against France or invade Mexico. No doubt, if the kings of France and Spain had martial tendencies; if they obeyed the dictates of their own interests, and perhaps the justice of their cause, which was that of humanity, so often outraged by England; if their military resources were in a sufficiently good condition, they would feel that Providence had evidently chosen that very hour for humiliating England and revenging on her the wrongs she had inflicted on those who had the misfortune to be her neighbors and rivals, by rendering the resistance of the Americans as desperate as possible. The exhaustion produced by this internecine war would prostrate both England and her Colonies, and would afford an opportunity to reduce England to the condition of a second-rate power; to tear from her the empire she aimed at establishing in the four quarters of the world with so much pride and injustice, and relieve the universe of a tyranny which desires to swallow up both all the power and all the wealth of the world. But the two crowns not being able to act in this way, they must have recourse to a circumspect policy." Vergennes "draws the following inferences: (1) That they should continue dexterously to keep the English ministry in a state of false security with respect to the intentions of France and Spain. (2) That it would be politic to give the insurgents secret assistance in military stores and money; that the admitted utility would justify this little sacrifice, and no loss of dignity or breach of equity would be involved in it. (3) That it would not be consistent with the king's dignity or interest to make an open contract with the insurgents until their independence was achieved. (4) That in case France and Spain should furnish assistance, they should look for no other return than the success of the political object they had at that moment in view, leaving themselves at liberty to be guided by circumstances as to any future arrangements. (5) That perhaps a too-marked inactivity at the present crisis might be attributed by the English to fear, and might expose France to insults to which it might not be disposed to submit. The English, he adds, respect only those who can make themselves feared. (6) That the result to which all these considerations led was that the two crowns should actively prepare means to resist or punish England, more especially as, of all possible issues, the maintenance of peace with that power was the least probable. … It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the French support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and exercised a decisive influence. There was a conviction, and a right one, in France that for Britain to hold under control the whole of North America as well as of India would give her a maritime supremacy, as well as a superiority in wealth, which would constitute a standing menace to the rest of the civilized world. There was, again, an enthusiasm among the young nobility and among officers in the army for America, which, even aside from the bitterness towards Britain with which it was mingled, had great effect on people as well as on court; and to this was added the sympathy of doctrinaire political philosophers who then and for some time afterwards had great power in forming French public opinion. By the enthusiasm of the young nobility the queen—brilliant, bold, weary of the traditions of the old court, inconsiderate as to ultimate political results—was affected, and through her her husband was reached. But above this was the sense of right which was uppermost in the breast of the unfortunate sovereign who then, with little political experience but high notions of duty as well as of prerogative, occupied the throne."

_F. Wharton, editor, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Introduction, chapter 4 (volume 1)._

"From the earliest moment France had been hopefully regarded by the colonists as probably their friend and possibly their ally. To France, therefore, the first American envoy was dispatched with promptitude [receiving his instructions in March and reaching Paris in the following June, 1776] even before there was a declaration of independence or an assumption of nationality. Silas Deane was the man selected. He was the true Yankee jack-at-all-trades; he had been graduated at Yale College, then taught school, then practiced law, then engaged in trade, had been all the while advancing in prosperity and reputation, had been a member of the first and second congresses, had failed of reëlection to the third, and was now without employment. Mr'. Parton describes him as 'of somewhat striking manners and good appearance, accustomed to live and entertain in liberal style, and fond of showy equipage and appointment.' Perhaps his simple-minded fellow-countrymen of the provinces fancied that such a man would make an imposing figure at an European court. {3242} He developed no other peculiar fitness for his position; he could not even speak French; and it proved an ill hour for himself in which he received this trying and difficult honor. … Deane arrived in France in June, 1776. He had with him a little ready money for his immediate personal expenses, and some letters of introduction from Franklin. It was intended to keep him supplied with money by sending cargoes of tobacco, rice, and indigo consigned to him, the proceeds of which would be at his disposal for the public service. He was instructed to seek an interview with de Vergennes, the French minister for foreign affairs, and to endeavor with all possible prudence and delicacy to find out what signs of promise the disposition of the French government really held for the insurgents. He was also to ask for equipment for 25,000 troops, ammunition, and 200 pieces of field artillery, all to be paid for—when Congress should be able! In France he was to keep his mission cloaked in secure secrecy, appearing simply as a merchant conducting his own affairs. … Before the arrival of Deane the interests of the colonies had been already taken in hand and substantially advanced in France by one of the most extraordinary characters in history. Caron de Beaumarchais was a man whom no race save the French could produce, and whose traits, career, and success lie hopelessly beyond the comprehension of the Anglo-Saxon. Bred a watchmaker, he had the skill, when a mere youth, to invent a clever escapement balance for regulating watches; had he been able to insert it into his own brain he might have held more securely his elusive good fortunes. From being an ingenious inventor he became an adventurer general, watchmaker to the king, the king's mistresses, and the king's daughters, the lover, or rather the beloved, of the wife of the controller of the king's kitchen, then himself the controller, thence a courtier, and a favorite of the royal princesses. Through a clever use of his opportunities he was able to do a great favor to a rich banker, who in return gave him chances to amass a fortune, and lent him money to buy a patent of nobility. This connection ended in litigation, which was near ruining him; but he discovered corruption on the part of the judge, and thereupon wrote his Memorials, of which the wit, keenness, and vivacity made him famous. He then rendered a private, personal, and important service to Louis XV., and soon afterwards another to the young Louis XVI. … He became frenzied in the American cause. In long and ardent letters he opened upon King Louis and his ministers a rattling fire of arguments sound and unsound, statements true and untrue, inducements reasonable and unreasonable, forecastings probable and improbable, politics wise and unwise, all designed to show that it was the bounden duty of France to adopt the colonial cause."

_J. T. Morse, Jr., Benjamin Franklin, chapter 9._

Soon after the arrival of Deane in Paris, the American Congress, having determined to declare the independence of the states represented in it, appointed a committee "to prepare the plan of a treaty to be proposed to foreign powers, which, after a long discussion, was at length agreed to, and ministers were appointed to negotiate the treaties proposed. Mr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Jefferson, were elected; but, the last mentioned gentleman having declined accepting the appointment offered him, Mr. Arthur Lee, then in London, was chosen in his place. These transactions were placed on the secret journals, and no member was permitted to give any specific information concerning them; or to state more than, 'that congress had taken such steps as they judged necessary for obtaining foreign alliances.' The secret committee were directed to make an effectual lodgment in France of £10,000 sterling, subject to the order of these commissioners. They assembled in Paris early in the winter, and had an immediate interview with the count De Vergennes. It was perceived that the success of the American cruisers, whose captures had been so considerable as to raise the price of insurance higher than it had been at any time during the war with both France and Spain, had excited a very favourable opinion of the capacities and energies of the nation. They were assured that the ports of France would remain open to their ships, and that the American merchants might freely vend in them every article of commerce, and purchase whatever might be useful for their country. But it was apparent that the minister wished to avoid a rupture with England, and was, therefore, unwilling to receive them openly as the ministers of the United States, or to enter into any formal negotiation with them."

_J. Marshall, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapter 7._

"It is … a settled rule of diplomacy that a minister should not be pressed upon a foreign court by which it is understood that he will not be received. To this may be added the rule that applications for loans should, unless as part of a treaty alliance, be made through business channels. In disregard of these rules the majority of Congress, under the influence of Richard H. Lee and Samuel Adams, instituted a series of missions to European courts for the bare purpose of borrowing money, when the courts so addressed not only gave no intimation that they would receive these envoys, but when, from the nature of things, as well as from unofficial intimation, it should have been known that such reception would be refused. With France there was no difficulty, as France had intimated unofficially that such envoys would be received, at least in a private capacity, France being then ready to take the consequence of war with Britain. And this reception was accorded … first to Silas Deane, then to Franklin, and then to Arthur Lee. Here Franklin thought Congress should stop, saying that ministers should not be sent to sovereigns without first having some sort of assurance of recognition of the United States as an independent sovereignty, and that a 'virgin' republic, as he called it, should wait till there was some such recognition before thrusting embassies on foreign courts with demands for money. Congress thought differently. Arthur Lee was instructed to go to Madrid with an alternate commission to Berlin; William Lee was sent to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The Hague, Izard to Florence, and the instructions in each case were to demand not only recognition, but subsidy. … The policy of sending ministers to European courts where such ministers were not received worked injuriously to the United States from the mere fact of their non-reception. Another difficulty arose from the circumstance that several of these ministers took up their residence in Paris, and, without specific authority, considered it their duty to take part in the counsels of the American legation. {3243} Thus Ralph Izard, commissioned to Tuscany, never went there, but remained in Paris, claiming a right to be informed of all the details of the negotiations with France, and occupying no small share of the time and care of Franklin with discussions of this claim, which Franklin could not accede to, but on which Izard continued to insist. When the triple legation of Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee (and afterwards Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Adams), was commissioned, it was understood that its members were to divide, so that one (Franklin) should remain in Paris, while the others should take charge of the missions to other capitals. But Arthur Lee, when he found that he could not be received in Madrid, or in Vienna, or in Berlin, made but brief excursions to Spain, to Austria, and to Berlin, reporting himself after each short trip promptly at Paris, there to differ from Franklin not only as to important business details, but as to the whole policy of the mission. When Adams was in Paris, during their joint mission, he concurred with Arthur Lee in what turned out to be the disastrous measure of removing Williams as commercial agent and putting in his place William Lee, with a nephew of William and Arthur Lee as clerk; while on the whole question of sending legations to foreign courts which had not consented to receive them, and in the still more important question of the attitude to be assumed by the commissioners to the French court, Adams agreed with Lee. … It is due to Adams to say that he saw the inherent difficulties of permanent missions conducted by three joint commissioners; that he recommended that there should be but one permanent minister to France; and that he recognized Franklin's great influence with the French ministry as a strong reason for his retention though without colleagues. But there can be no doubt that down to the period when Franklin became sole minister, the American cause in Europe was much embarrassed by the fact that he had colleagues associated with him."

_F. Wharton, Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of The United States, chapter 1, sections 16-17, and chapter 9, section 106 (volume 1)._

Before Franklin or Lee reached France, Silas Deane had already entered into negotiations with Beaumarchais and opened a train of dealings which proved unfortunate for both. Leaving aside "all the long controversy about the rights and wrongs of Beaumarchais, which have never been completely and satisfactorily solved, … it appears that a large part of the misunderstanding between him and Deane and Arthur Lee is attributable to a change of plan between April and July, 1776. Beaumarchais's scheme of operation, when he saw Lee in London, was to expend money which should, at least in pretence and form, be obtained from the voluntary contributions of wealthy Frenchmen in aid of the American cause; but in July, when he saw Deane, that scheme had been dropped, and the project was that he should appear as a merchant. … In May, there was a plan on the part of the French government to employ a real merchant; now the plan was to employ a comedy merchant. This was exactly the role which Beaumarchais was qualified to fill, and he proceeded to establish and open a large house, with all the accessories of a house of business, as the same are understood and represented on the stage, At that time it was believed that the colonists had plenty of exportable products which they could and would contribute for the purpose [purchase?] of arms and ammunition. It was thought that their main difficulty would be to find any market in which they could purchase contraband of war. The chief assistance, therefore, which they would need from France would be secret permission to make this exchange in France. Beaumarchais's commercial operations would be real commercial operations, and at worst could only issue in some expenses and losses, on the balance of account, which the French government might have to make good. Beaumarchais approached Deane with all the forms and reality of a commercial proposition, and Deane assured him that he should have some returns in six months, and full pay for everything which he supplied in a year. Two days later they made a contract by which Congress was to pay the current price of the goods in America when they should arrive, or take them at the cost price, with insurance, charges, and commission 'proportioned to the trouble and care, which cannot now be fixed.' … August 18, Beaumarchais writes to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that, led by esteem for a people struggling for liberty, he has established an extensive commercial house, solely for the purpose of supplying them with all things useful, even gold for the payment of troops; and that without waiting for their consent he has already procured 200 cannons, 200,000 pounds of powder, 20,000 guns, with balls, lead, clothing, etc. He wants the cargoes consigned to him in return, and promises that he has great power to use any consignments whatsoever; but he wants especially tobacco. He signs this letter Roderique Hortales & Co. … A million livres were advanced by Spain to Beaumarchais, August 11, 1776, and the Farmers-general of France advanced a million livres, but took advantage of the distress of the Americans to stipulate that it should be paid for in tobacco at half its then current price. Beaumarchais also advanced money to Deane for his personal expenses; and it has never been doubted that he exerted himself with the utmost energy, if not always with the greatest prudence, to expedite the shipment of the goods. Of the three ships which he despatched at the end of the year, two were captured by the English; but the one which arrived was of the greatest possible value to the cause. … When Arthur Lee received his appointment as Commissioner to France and entered upon the discharge of his duties, he found that the promises made to him by Beaumarchais … had not been kept. He reported to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that a change in the mode of sending had been settled between Deane and Hortales. … Arthur Lee always held the attitude of suspicion that Deane and Beaumarchais were in a conspiracy to levy contributions for themselves on the free gifts of France to the United States. Franklin always affected to ignore the dealings with Beaumarchais, and to treat them as exclusively in the hands of Deane; while Congress always showed themselves very careful not to pay for anything which possibly was intended as a gift. Therefore Deane and Beaumarchais were left for years to claim and protest that there had been genuine mercantile contracts which had not been fulfilled, and they could scarcely obtain attention. … September 8, 1777, Congress voted that Deane had no authority to make contracts with persons to come to America. {3244} November 21, they voted to recall him. Undoubtedly the vexation which Deane had caused them by sending over a great number of persons to serve in the army, under contracts which enabled them to demand large pay and high rank, was the chief cause of irritation against him; but Arthur Lee had also been poisoning the mind of his brother, and through him, of the whole Lee-Adams faction in Congress, with suspicions of Deane's honesty. Deane had found himself transferred, within a period of two or three years, from an utterly obscure existence at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to the position of a quasi-ambassador at the court of France. He adopted a large and expensive style of living, and kept open house for the Americans at Paris. It is very reasonable to suppose that this large expenditure on his part was one of the chief grounds of belief that he was making great gain out of his position. … The affair of Silas Deane has importance far beyond the merits or the fate of that individual. The quarrel over him and his rights and wrongs, as will presently be seen, entered into the hottest party contests in Congress during the next two or three years, and it comes up again often subsequently. It has even been asserted that the intimacy into which John Adams was thrown with the Lees, in this connection, was what made him President of the United States, by winning him votes from Virginia in 1796. January 1, 1778, Beaumarchais, having heard that money had been given to the Americans through Grand, the banker, writes to Vergennes: 'So I have lost the fruit of the most noble and incredible labour by those very exertions which conduct others to glory.' … He is in terror of bankruptcy. Inasmuch as a treaty of alliance between France and the United States was now made, matters had entered upon a new stage. Beaumarchais, with his fictitious firm of Hortales, was no longer necessary or useful. The French government dealt directly with the American envoys in granting supplies and subsidies. April 7, Congress made a contract with Hortales that they should pay, for all the cargoes already shipped and those to be shipped, the first cost, charges, and freight, in France. The contract between Beaumarchais and Deane is recognized. Hortales is to pay bills drawn every two months at double usance for twenty-four million livres annually. This article, however, is subject to ratification by the house in Paris and the American Commissioners at Paris. American produce is to be exported and consigned to this house. Interest is to be paid on all sums due, with a commission of two and a half per cent. From this time Beaumarchais falls out of sight as an agent of aid and supplies to the American cause, and becomes a claimant, who considers that he has been treated with injustice and ingratitude by the United States."

_W. G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, chapter 8 (volume 1)._