Part 1021

The last of the "Thirteen Colonies" to come into existence was the colony of Georgia, founded so late as 1733 by General James Oglethorpe. It occupied territory too close in neighborhood to the Spaniards of Florida to be attractive to settlers in the 17th century. Its colonization was undertaken by General Oglethorpe primarily as a philanthropic enterprise for the benefit of unfortunate English debtors, who were released from prison and permitted to emigrate under his care; but secondarily to strengthen the defence of the English colonies against the Spaniards. He obtained his grant from George II. "in trust for the poor," and the colony was governed by trustees until 1752, when it was surrendered to the crown. The first emigrants left England in the fall of 1732, and early in the next year Savannah was laid out by Oglethorpe in person. His scheme of colonization proved highly attractive, not only in England but on the continent, and numbers of Protestant Germans came over to become part of the original population of Georgia. At the outset, slavery was strictly prohibited; but the settlers thought themselves grievously oppressed by the denial of slaves, and their discontent became so great that in 1749 the trustees rescinded the prohibition.

See GEORGIA.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1620-1776. Constitutional relations of the colonies to the English Crown and Parliament. The working of the leaven of independence in New England Puritanism.

The history of the development of the question between England and her colonies, as to their constitutional relations to one another, "falls naturally into two periods: first, from the beginning of English colonization in America to the Revolution of 1688; second, from 1688 to the Declaration of Independence. … Passing now to the history of the first period, it is to be observed that the leading institution in the English government at that time was the King in Council. … But in the 17th century, owing to a combination of very strong political and religious forces, the struggle between the King in Parliament and the King in Council was … opened and pushed with vigor. It continued with alternations of success, but on the whole with results favorable to Parliament, till 1688. Then the King in Parliament finally gained the ascendancy, and this result was so secured by statute as never afterwards to be seriously called in question. The supremacy of Parliament was established by a series of royal concessions. The parliamentary party viewed these as compromises between Parliament and king. This gave color to the theory of social contract, which was now given new impulse and form by the parliamentarian writers of the 16th and 17th centuries. … It naturally follows from what has been said that the administration of colonial affairs previous to 1688 was in the hands of the King in Council. Such was the fact. The enterprises of discovery were fitted out under the patronage of the crown; the territories discovered or visited were taken possession of in its name; and grants of land, of rights of government and trade, were made to actual settlers by the kings. Every colonial charter is a proof of this. As the king was by the theory of English law feudal proprietor of England, so he became proprietor of colonial territory, though that territory was granted out in socage, one of the freest forms of English tenure. Certain superficial distinctions were introduced in the form of colonial governments, as royal, proprietary, and charter; but they all emanated from the crown. Its supremacy extended around and beneath them all. The fact that they were established by grant is proof of this, even though there had been no subsequent acts to enforce the control. They were colonies of the English crown; their inhabitants were its subjects. The true doctrine of sovereignty and allegiance necessitates this conclusion. … Parliament passed few statutes affecting the colonies. Yet, not to mention others, there were five such of very great importance which fall within this period: the Act of Supremacy (I Eliz. cap. I), and the four Navigation acts. In all these the colonies were expressly mentioned. But the relative position of crown and Parliament is illustrated by the fact that when in 1624 the Council was proceeding to annul the third Virginia charter, the House tried to interfere but was warned off—because the business concerned only the king and his advisers. {3169} Moreover there was no lack of precedents for the extension not only of common law but of royal ordinances and statute law outside of the original realm of England. … Such in outline was the status of English colonial law previous to 1688. It was in the process of formation and adaptation to the new empire. There were ample precedents for the exercise of the rights of British sovereignty in America, but those rights had not yet been called into the fullest operation. Their legitimacy however was in general fully acknowledged by the colonists. They had been allowed great liberty in establishing their governments, erecting courts, levying taxes, organizing and calling out their militia for defence against the Indians. Colonial society had been allowed to develop freely in all lines and the product was far different from anything which existed in the mother country. It was democratic rather than aristocratic; it was also extremely particularistic, and too remote from England to feel much interest in the general concerns of the empire. In this divergence of social organization and interests, as between the colonies and the mother country, lay the germ which might develop into resistance on the part of the plantations, if at any time England should attempt to enforce her rightful supremacy over them. But as yet there was too little of the spirit of union among the colonists to make possible any combined action. Also those dynasties whose government had been most arbitrary in England, the Tudors and Stuarts, had, till the reign of James II, treated the colonies with great leniency. But the statements just made do not cover the whole ground. They describe the attitude of the colonies in general toward the mother country, but they do not describe the special conditions which prevailed in New England. If we wish to know how the theory of colonial independence originated, we must look in that direction. The American revolution cannot be explained without reference to the political character and tendencies of Puritanism. … Puritanism then was a political as well as a religious movement. On the one hand its doctrines contained a strong democratic leaven; on the other they contained principles which might lead to the separation of church and state. How the former tendency worked itself out in New England is familiar; how the latter failed of accomplishment there is equally well known. The Puritans of Massachusetts were not opposed to the union of church and state or to the employment of the secular power to enforce religious conformity. … What they were opposed to was every other form of state church except their own. … In order to maintain her peculiar system, Massachusetts had to be on her guard against all interference from outside. … The Massachusetts charter was brought over to this country. A few years later the Plymouth company was dissolved, and representation of the colony in England, except by such agents as she might send, ceased. The terms of the charter were very liberal; but like all the others it was a royal grant, and expressly stated that the inhabitants of the colony were to be subjects of England and were to enjoy all the liberties and immunities of such, as if they were in the realm of England. The oaths of supremacy and allegiance were to be administered to all who should go to the colony. The company was made a 'body corporate and politic' and was given ample powers of government; but its laws, statutes, and ordinances were not to be contrary to the laws of England. The admission of freemen was left in the hands of the corporation. How did the Puritan oligarchy make use of this charter for serving the purposes of their government? In a word, they interpreted the expression 'body corporate and politic' to mean an independent state, and virtually abandoned all legal connection with England except an empty acknowledgment of allegiance. The oath of allegiance was not administered, but instead an oath of fidelity to the government of Massachusetts. An ecclesiastical system wholly different from that of England was established. Only those were admitted to political rights, made freemen, who were members of a Congregational church. … The colony also exercised full legislative and judicial powers, and denied the right of appeal both practically and theoretically. The proof of this is most direct and convincing. To illustrate: in 1646 the General Court refused to permit the appeal of Dr. Child and others who, as Presbyterians, desired to lay before Parliament the wrongs they suffered in Massachusetts. Not only was the right denied, but the petitioners were prevented by force from carrying their case to England. The same course was pursued in reference to appeals in ordinary judicial cases. During the discussion of the affair just mentioned it was boldly affirmed in the General Court that subjects were bound by English laws only so long as they lived in England; that neither statutes nor royal ordinances were in force beyond the seas. A little later than this both the magistrates and the elders were called upon to give their views on the legal relations between the colony and England. Both agreed that by their charter they 'had absolute power of government'; that their government was perfect and sufficient in all its parts, not needing the help of any superior to make it complete. They acknowledged that they had received the charter from England, and 'depended upon that state for protection and immunities as freeborn Englishmen'; but the duties which were correlative to those immunities, and which are necessary to a true conception of allegiance, were not mentioned. This position was consistently maintained by the Puritans of Massachusetts as long as they remained in power. In their correspondence with the home government and its officials between 1664 and 1684 the right of appeal was always denied. Its exercise was never allowed. If we add to this the further statements that Massachusetts coined money; strove to enlarge the bounds of her patent, not only without consulting the king, but in defiance of his absolute prohibition; taxed English imports; and, without the consent of the home government, entered the New England confederation, some notion can be formed of the degree of independence claimed and exercised by that colony. The exercise of this independence however did not make it legal. It only illustrates the fact that the roots of the American revolution extend back into the times of which we are speaking. … It was to be expected that England would interfere to bring Massachusetts within the bounds of constitutional dependence. Complaints against the colony, on the part of Gorges and of those who had been banished by the Puritans, began very early. {3170} These led to 'quo warranto' proceedings for the recall of the charter in 1635. But civil strife at home compelled the government of Charles I to abandon the project. Then came the period of the Commonwealth, when the views of the English government were so fully in harmony with those of the New England leaders that the practical independence of the colony was ignored. … From the restoration dates the beginning of a more comprehensive colonial policy." With the fall of the Massachusetts charter, in 1684, "closes the first stage in the development of the idea of colonial independence. The struggle between the Puritans of Massachusetts and the crown is the most significant fact in American history previous to 1760. The Puritans were defeated; the authority of England was reasserted. … But for our purpose the important result is that the Puritans left behind them an armory full of precedents and arguments in favor of colonial independence. They had constructed the American theory on that subject. That was the chief permanent result of their experiment. They had from first to last adhered to the theory which expediency taught them to adopt. They taught the colonists how to resist the exercise of the ecclesiastical and judicial supremacy of the crown. If now at any time in the future the Americans should consider themselves aggrieved by the acts of the English government, the Puritan spirit and theory would be likely to appear. Such was the aspect of affairs at the close of the first period of colonial history. After the revolution of 1688, Parliament assumes more and more the control of American concerns. Statutes on those subjects multiply. The administration of the colonies becomes a branch of the ministerial government of Great Britain. The development of an imperial as distinguished from an insular policy is begun. The interference of England in colonial affairs became more frequent and the control asserted more extensive than heretofore. … The attitude of the colonists during this period was one of passive rather than active resistance. Parliamentary restrictions were so far evaded as not to be burdensome. … The records show that the burden of opinion in the colonies was jealousy of all government, so far as it operated as a restraint. The interference of government, whether colonial or imperial, was welcomed by the colonists, when it could be used for the advancement of their private or local interests; when larger objects were aimed at, it was if possible ignored or resisted. … The political condition of the colonies was for the first time clearly revealed during the French and Indian war. The history of Germany can furnish no more vivid spectacle of the evils of particularism than does that struggle. … The condition of anarchy and helplessness revealed by the war was such as to convince all the servants of the crown in America that active parliamentary interference was necessary, if the colonies were to be defended and retained as an integral part of the British empire. The fact that the British government, within a reasonable time after the close of the war, proceeded to put this suggestion into execution, implies nothing arbitrary or unreasonable. It had the undoubted constitutional right to do so; and so far as could be seen at the time, expediency prompted in the same direction. But during the century since the Puritan oligarchy of Massachusetts yielded to the supremacy of the crown, the theory of social contract had been fully developed. It had formulated the needs of the opposition in all the European countries to the system of absolutism. It was the theory of government very generally held by the Puritans in both England and America. … This theory, as soon as it was understood, would naturally find general acceptance in the colonies. … The American revolution, as truly as the French, was the outgrowth of the doctrine of natural rights and social contract. By this I mean simply that the doctrine in question formed the theoretical basis of both movements. So far as the American revolution is concerned the proof of this statement is contained in the writings of the patriot leaders at the time, the various state papers that were issued, and the doctrine that was held respecting the right of imperial taxation. No man contributed so much to bringing about the revolution as Samuel Adams; and his mind was saturated with the theory of social contract. He made it the basis of all his reasonings. … The reason why New England became the leader of the movement clearly appears. The process of development through which the colonies passed was a natural, and therefore a necessary one. It was slow and obscure, and therefore could not be clearly recognized at the time. But that it was nevertheless revolutionary becomes evident when we compare the views and aims of the colonists with the constitution of the British empire. When the two systems came into collision the colonists adopted a theory which was 'in the air' at the time, but one under which no government can be successfully carried on. When they came to erect a government of their own, they had to abandon it. It is not claimed that the doctrine of natural rights ever found such general acceptance in America as in France. The character of the people and the absence of a despotic government prevented that. But that the American revolution cannot be explained without assigning it a prominent place is evident. It is not intended to convey the impression that the colonists had no grievances. There were causes for complaint, but they were doubtless greatly exaggerated. A mind filled with the democratic theories of the times, and with the loose notions concerning sovereignty and allegiance which then prevailed, could easily imagine that Parliament, unless resisted, would establish a despotic government in America."

_Professor H. L. Osgood, England and the Colonies (Political Science Quarterly, September, 1887)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1651-1672. The Navigation Acts and the colonies. Spirit and objects of the English restrictive commercial system.

To the Act of Navigation, passed in 1651 (see NAVIGATION LAWS) is due a change in the relations of the colonies to the mother-country. "Henceforth they were regarded mainly as feeders to its carrying-trade, as consumers of its manufactures, as factories for the distribution of its capital, and, in a word, as mere commercial appendages of what was now the great commercial power. Dominion became subordinate to trade. … Beginning … with the re-enactment of the Navigation Act after the Restoration, we find that the new system which is to regulate colonial trade and define the relations of the colonies to the parent, is contained in three Acts of Parliament. {3171} First, in the re-enactment itself of the Act of Navigation in 1660; secondly, in an act, passed in 1663, entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of trade'; and, thirdly, in an act, passed in 1672, and entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of the Greenland and Eastland fisheries, and for the better securing the plantation trade.' … The three acts which created the system, were all passed in the reign of Charles II.; the others followed rapidly, and in great numbers, for a century, until the failure of the attempt to transform this system of trade into one of trade and revenue, by means of what is known as the Stamp Act. St. John's Navigation Act was reenacted in 1660, under Charles II., as the first-fruits of the Restoration. This act forbade importation into or exportation out of the colonies, save what came and went in English ships, and its object was, to shut the doors of the colonies against foreign trade. In 1663 another step was taken, and an act was passed with the object, openly avowed in its fifth section, of keeping the colonies in 'a firmer dependence' upon England, and of making that kingdom the staple, or place of distribution, not only of colonial produce, 'but also of the commodities of other countries and places, for the supplying of them.' To effect this, the Act of 1663 went beyond that of 1660, and exacted, that no European products or manufactures should be imported into any colony, except what had been actually laden and shipped in an English port, and carried 'directly thence' to the importing colony. This act forced the colonists to get such supplies as they could not themselves furnish in England only, and thus not only could none but mariners of whom three fourths were English transport merchandise to and from the colonies, but the colonists themselves were not suffered to go anywhere but to England for that which they could not get at home. … This position of factor between the colonies and foreign markets was a lucrative one. But the spirit of trade is such, that it regards much as only a stepping-stone to more, and the next enactment concerning colonial trade, or that of 1672, betrays this characteristic. The existing factorage was maintained only between the colonial and foreign trade; it had no place in intercolonial traffic. … As this intercolonial trade developed, it attracted the observation of the English merchants, who at last demanded the control of it. In compliance with this demand, an act was passed in 1672, subjecting any enumerated commodity to a duty specified in the statute—and thus was destroyed the freedom, and, to a great extent, the incentive of intercolonial traffic. This act was well entitled 'an Act for the encouragement of the Greenland and Eastland fisheries, and for the better securing of the plantation trade.' History is silent respecting the fisheries, but it has been very outspoken concerning its effect on the plantations. The effect was this: if Rhode Island wished to be supplied by Massachusetts with one of the enumerated commodities, and Massachusetts desired to furnish Rhode Island with that commodity, the delivery of the goods could not be made by the producer to the consumer, but the article would have to be sent to England first, and landed there, and then be sent back from England to Rhode Island before the consumer could touch it. A line drawn from Boston, in Massachusetts, to Bristol, in England, and thence back to Newport, in Rhode Island, will show the course which such article must take, if sold by Massachusetts to Rhode Island, before the demands of English commerce were satisfied; it will in all probability likewise show the least angle with the longest sides ever subtended on the chart of trade. Should, however, the parties to the transaction desire to avoid the risk and delay incident to this phenomenal voyage, they could do so by paying the certain rates and duties prescribed by this statute."

_E. G. Scott, The Development of Constitutional Liberty in the English Colonies of America, chapter 8 (with corrections by the author)._

"Unfortunately there does not exist any history of the commerce of the American colonies, from the Commonwealth to 1774, as affected by navigation laws, acts of trade, and revenue measures. No one who has read the 29 acts which comprise this legislation will recommend their perusal to another; for, apart from their volume, the construction of these acts is difficult,—difficult even to trained lawyers like John Adams, whose business it was to advise clients in respect to them. Nor have special students, like Bancroft, stated their effect with exact precision."

_M. Chamberlain, The Revolution Impending: Critical Essay (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6), page 64._