Part 1016

See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 14-19TH CENTURIES (SERVIA).

TURKS: A. D. 1831-1840. Rebellion of Mehemed Ali, Pasha of Egypt. Intervention of Russia and the Western Powers. Egypt made an hereditary pashalik.

"The peace of Adrianople (1829) had greatly discredited the authority of the Porte; insurrections multiplied, and Turkish armies had to enter Bosnia and Albania. In these and all other matters by which the embarrassment of the Porte was increased, the ambitious Mehemed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, had a hand. As payment for his services against the Greeks, he had demanded the pashalik of Damascus. Sultan Mahmoud II. had refused the demand, and only given him the promised Candia. Hence, while the Western powers were occupied with the consequences of the July revolution [in France], and all Europe appeared to be on the verge of a new upheaval, he undertook to seize his booty for himself. In consequence of a quarrel with Abdallah, Pasha of Acre, Ibrahim Pasha [son of Mehemed Ali], notorious for his barbarous conduct of the war in Peloponnesus, crossed the Egyptian frontier, October 20th, 1831, with an army organized on the European system, took Gaza, Jaffa and Jerusalem without resistance, and besieged Acre, which was resolutely defended by Abdallah. Mehemed Ali now demanded both pashaliks—Damascus and Acre. The sultan commanded him to evacuate Syria. The demand was naturally refused; so Mehemed and his son Ibrahim were outlawed. But the latter proceeded with his operations, took Acre by storm May 25th, 1832, and entered Damascus. In the mean time, a Turkish army, under Hussein Pasha, had advanced into Syria. Mehemed Pasha, Hussein's lieutenant, was defeated at Homs, July 9th. Hussein himself, attempting to retrieve this loss, was defeated at Beylan July 27th, and his army scattered. The sultan sent a new army against Ibrahim, under Reshid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, who had displayed great efficiency in the reduction of the Albanians and Bosnians. Reshid … was utterly defeated at Konieh December 20th, and was himself taken prisoner. The sultan was in a critical situation. He could not at the moment bring together another considerable army, while Ibrahim had 100,000 well-trained troops, and the road to Constantinople lay open before him." Russia, having no wish to see the energetic Pasha of Egypt in possession of that coveted capital, offered her help to the sultan and he was driven to accept it. "A Russian fleet appeared in the Bosphorus, and landed troops at Scutari, while a Russian army was on the march from the Danube to cover Constantinople. … At length England and France perceived how dangerous it was to forget the East in their study of the Dutch-Belgian question. Their ambassadors had enough to do, by a hasty peace, to make Russia's help unnecessary. As their threats made no impression on the victorious Mehemed Ali, they filled the sultan with distrust of Russia, and by representing a cession of territory to his vassal as the lesser of the two evils, persuaded him into the peace of Kutayah (May 6th, 1833), by which Mehemed Ali received the whole of Syria and the territory of Adana, in south-eastern Asia Minor. Russia had to retire with her object unattained, but had no sooner been thrown out at the front door than she came in at the back. She called the sultan's attention to the favor shown to the insatiable pasha by England and France in the peace of Kutayah, and concluded with him, July 8th, 1833, the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, by which he entered into a defensive alliance with Russia for eight years, and pledged himself to permit no foreign vessel of war to pass through the Dardanelles. The Western powers took this outwitting very ill, and from that time on kept a sharp eye on Constantinople." Mehemed Ali was meantime giving another direction to his ambition. "The west coast of Arabia, as far as the English post at Aden, had been in his possession since 1829. He now sought to extend his sway over the eastern coast, and subdue the sultan of Muscat. … If this were to continue, the two most important roads to the East Indies, by Suez and by the Persian Gulf, would be in the hands of Mehemed Ali. … With Egypt, Syria, and Arabia in his hands, England's position in the East would receive a blow that must be felt. So it was a foregone conclusion which side England would take. In 1838 she concluded with the Porte a commercial treaty by which the abolition of all monopolies, as well as free exportation from all parts of the Turkish empire, including Egypt and Syria, was secured to her. Mehemed Ali hesitated about accepting this treaty; and Mahmoud, full of hate against a vassal who threatened ultimately to devour him, declared him a traitor, deprived him of all his dignities, and caused an army to advance into Syria under Hasiz Pasha. But again fortune was not favorable to the Turks. In their camp, as military adviser of the commander-in-chief, was a Prussian captain, Hellmuth von Moltke. For two years he had been assisting the sultan in planning and putting into execution military reforms. Recognizing the weakness and unreliable character of the Turkish army, he advised Hasiz Pasha to fall back on the strong camp at Biridshik, bring up the re-enforcements which were under way, and then risk a battle. But the Pasha would not listen to Moltke's advice, pronouncing retreat a disgrace. He was completely routed at Nisib, on the Euphrates, June 24th, 1839, and his army scattered. For the second time the road to Constantinople lay open to Ibrahim. Misfortunes fell thick and fast upon the Turks. Sultan Mahmoud died June 30th, and the empire fell to a sixteen-year old youth, his son Abdul Medshid. Five days later, Capudan Pasha, with the Turkish fleet, sailed out of the Dardanelles under orders to attack the Egyptians. Instead of this he went over to Mehemed Ali with his whole fleet—in consequence of French bribery, it was said. … In order to prevent Turkey from casting herself a second time into Russia's arms, four great powers—England, France, Austria, and Prussia—declared, July 27th, 1839, that they would themselves take the Eastern question in hand. {3152} To save herself from being wholly left out, Russia had to give her consent, and become a party to the treaty. But there were very different views as to the way in which the question was to be settled. France, which was striving after the control of the Mediterranean, and which, since Napoleon's campaign, had turned its eyes toward Egypt, wished to leave its friend Mehemed Ali in full possession. England saw her interests endangered by the pasha, thought France's occupation of Algiers quite enough, and was afraid that if Turkey were too weak she might become the defenceless prey of Russia. The latter wished at no price to allow the energetic pasha to enter upon the inheritance of Turkey, or even of a part of it, and was pleased at seeing the cordial understanding between France and England destroyed. Austria and Prussia supported England and Russia, and so France was left alone. The Anglo-Russian view found expression in the quadruple alliance which the great powers, with the exception of France, concluded in London, July 15th, 1840. By this the hereditary possession of the pashalik of Egypt, and the possession for life of a part of Syria, were secured to Mehemed Ali, in case he submitted to the conclusions of the conference within ten days. … The allied powers began hostilities against Mehemed Ali, who, relying on French assistance, refused to submit. The Anglo-Austrian fleet sailed to the Syrian coast, and took Beirut and Acre; and Alexandria was bombarded by Commodore Napier. This and the fall of the Thiers ministry brought Mehemed Ali to a full realization of his mistake. He might consider himself lucky in being allowed to hold Egypt as hereditary pashalik upon evacuating Syria, Arabia, and Candia, and restoring the Turkish fleet. For this favor he had to thank England, which sought by this means to secure his friendship and the Suez road to India. The catastrophe of the 'sick man' [the Turk] was again put off for a few years."

_W. Müller, Political History of Recent Times, section 11._

ALSO IN: _A. A. Paton, History of the Egyptian Revolution, volume 2, chapters 1-20._

_C. A. Fyffe, History of Modern Europe, volume 2, chapter 6._

_S. Walpole, History of England from 1815, chapter 16 (volume 3)._

TURKS: A. D. 1839. Accession of Abdul Medjid.

TURKS: A. D. 1853-1856. The Crimean War.

See RUSSIA: A. D. 1853-1854, to 1854-1856.

A. D. 1861-1876. The reign of Abd-ul-Aziz, and accession of Abd-ul-Hamid.

"Troubles broke out in the Lebanon in 1860, a French army was dispatched to restore order, and in the adjustment of rival claims an opportunity was afforded to Lord Dufferin for displaying those diplomatic talents for which he is renowned. In 1861 the Sultan Abd-ul-Mejid died, and with him passed away the hope of regenerating Turkey. His brother and successor Abd-ul-Aziz was an ignorant bigot, whose extravagance brought his country to avowed insolvency (1875), and thus deprived her of that sympathy which is seldom given to the impecunious. The only remarkable thing he did was to travel. No Ottoman Sultan had ever before left his own dominions, except on the war path, but Abd-ul-Aziz ventured even as far as London, without, however, awakening any enthusiasm on the part of his Allies. In 1876 he was deposed, and—found dead. How he came by his death is a matter of doubt, but his end is said to have turned the brain of his successor, Murad V., a son of Abd-ul-Mejid, who after three months was removed as an imbecile, and succeeded by his brother, … Abd-ul-Hamid."

_S. Lane-Poole, The Story of Turkey, chapter 17._

TURKS: A. D. 1861-1877. Union of Wallachia and Moldavia. Revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reforms demanded by the Great Powers. War with Servia. Conference at Constantinople. Russian preparations for war.

"Before four years were over [after the termination of the Crimean War by the Treaty of Paris], one of the chief stipulations of the treaty was set aside. Wallachia and Moldavia, which it had been the policy of the Powers to separate, displayed a constant desire to join. Two of the great Continental Powers—France and Russia—favoured the junction. England, Austria, and Turkey, thinking that the union would ultimately lead to their independence, opposed their fusion under one prince. At last, after discussions, which at one moment seemed likely to rekindle the flames of war, an administrative union was arranged, which resulted, in due course, in the formal union of the two provinces in 1861. [In 1858, the two provinces chose the same prince, or hospodar, in the person of Prince John Couza, who took the title of Prince of Roumania. The Porte protested, but was induced, in 1861, to recognize this union of the coronets. Prince Couza aspired to absolutism, and was forced to abdicate in 1866. Then a German, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, was chosen by the two provinces to be his successor.] Thus, five years after the Peace of Paris, one of the stipulations on which England had insisted was surrendered. In 1870 the Franco-German War led to the obliteration of another of them. In November, when the armies of France were either beaten or besieged, Russia repudiated the clause of the Treaty of Paris which had limited the forces of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea. The declaration of the Russian Government came as a painful shock to the British people. The determination of a great European state to tear up the clause of a treaty excited indignation. It was recollected, moreover, that it was for the sake of this clause that the Crimean War had been prolonged after the Vienna negotiations; and that all the blood which had been shed, and all the money which had been spent, after the spring of 1855, were wasted in its abandonment. … All that diplomacy was able to do was to lessen the shock by persuading the Russian Government to submit its proposal for the abrogation of the clause to a conference. … The conference met. … It had practically nothing to do but to record its assent to the Russian proposal. … For five years more the Eastern Question remained undisturbed. In the spring of 1875 an insurrection broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, two of the northern provinces of European Turkey. The Porte failed to quench the disturbance; and, its efforts to do so increasing its pecuniary embarrassments, was forced in the autumn to repudiate the claims of its many creditors. … In the meanwhile the insurrection continued to spread, and attracted the attention of the great European Powers. {3153} At the instigation of Austria a note was drawn up [by Count Andrassy, and known, therefore, as the Andrassy Note], which was at once signed by all the European Powers except England, and which was ultimately accepted by England also, declaring that 'the promises of reform made by the Porte had not been carried into effect, and that some combined action by the Powers of Europe was necessary to insist on the fulfilment of the many engagements which Turkey had made and broken.' As the note failed to effect its object, the representatives of the Northern Powers—Germany, Austria, and Russia—met at Berlin, proposed a suspension of arms for two months, and intimated that if Turkey in the two months failed to fulfil her broken promises, 'force would be used to compel her' to do so. The British Government, unwilling to join in a threat, refused to sign this new note. The insurrection went on; Servia, sympathising with the insurgents, declared war against Turkey; Russian officers and Russian troops fought in the Servian battalions; and Russia herself, setting her legions in motion, evidently prepared for hostilities. When these events occurred, large numbers of the English people were prepared to support the Turk. Though they had been partially estranged from the cause of Turkey by the repudiation of the Ottoman debt in the previous autumn, they recollected the sacrifices of the Crimean War; they were irritated with the manner in which one part of the Treaty of Paris had been torn up in 1870; and they were consequently prepared to resist any further movement on the part of Russia. The Porte, however, dreading the extension of revolt, allowed its officers to anticipate disorder by massacre. The atrocious cruelty with which this policy was executed [especially in Bulgaria—see BALKAN and DANUBIAN STATES: A. D. 1875-1878] excited a general outburst of indignation in this country [England]; and the British Ministry, whose leader had hitherto displayed much sympathy with the Turks, found himself forced to observe a strict neutrality. In the short war which ensued in the autumn of 1876, the Servian troops proved no match for the Turkish battalions. At the request or command of Russia the Porte was forced to grant an armistice to the belligerents; and, on the suggestion of the British Ministry, a Conference of the Great Powers was held at Constantinople to provide for the better government of the Turkish provinces. The Constantinople Conference, held at the beginning of 1877, formed in many respects an exact parallel to the Vienna Conference held in the summer of 1855. … The Porte rejected all the proposals on which the other Powers were agreed. … In each case the failure of the Conference was followed by war. But the parallel ends at this point. … In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, Turkey was left to fight her own battle alone."

_S. Walpole, Foreign Relations, chapter 3._

ALSO IN: _E. Ollier, Cassell's Illustrated History of the Russo-Turkish War, volume 1, chapters 1-10._

_Duke of Argyll, The Eastern Question, volume 1, chapters 3-9._

_S. Menzies, Turkey Old and New, book 4. chapter 4 (volume 2)._

TURKS: A. D. 1877-1878. War with Russia. Heroic defense of Plevna. Defeat and surrender.

"Russia had already massed large numbers of troops on her frontier, and Turkey was also engaged in the work of mobilization. On the 24th April the Emperor of Russia issued a manifesto to his subjects, in which he recited the interest of the empire in the Christian population of the Balkan peninsula, and the general desire that their condition should be ameliorated. He declared that all efforts at peace had been exhausted. … He had given the orders for the army to cross the frontier, and the advance upon Turkey was begun without delay. … The Turks had not been idle, though their preparations were by no means as complete as those of Russia. They had massed heavy bodies of troops along the Danube, and were prepared to resist the movements of the Russians south of that stream. … The first crossing [of the Russians] was made at Galatz, on the 22d June, by General Zimmermann, who went over with two regiments in pontoons and drove out the Turks who were posted on the heights on the opposite shore. Having obtained a footing in the Dobrudja, as the peninsula between the Danube and Black Sea is called, the Russians were able to throw bridges over the great stream, by which the whole left wing of the army moved across. Meantime the right wing, on the 26th June, sent a pontoon force over the Danube from Simnitza, under command of General Skobeleff, who drove out the small force of Turks posted there, though not without hard fighting. More pontoons followed, and then a bridge was thrown across on which the army could march. … By the first week of July the whole Russian army was safely encamped on the southern bank of the Danube, and getting in readiness to assume the offensive. … The advance did not begin in force until after the middle of the month. But before that time General Gourko … had pushed forward on the road to the Balkans, heading first for Tirnova. … On the 5th July the cavalry occupied Biela, … and on the 7th Gourko was in possession of Tirnova. … The Emperor joined the army at Biela on the 8th or 9th. Gourko was soon reported past the Balkans. … The first check of the Russians was at Plevna. They had previously captured Nicopolis with its garrison of 7,000 men, having themselves lost about 1,300 officers and men killed and wounded. Orders had been given to occupy Plevna as soon as possible, and Baron Krudener sent forward General Schilder-Schuldner to carry out the orders. … Schilder-Schuldner had 6,500 men and 46 guns in the division with which he went to capture Plevna; he was attacked by a vastly superior force of Turks before he had reached his objective point, and the first battle of Plevna was disastrous to the Russians. … Nearly 3,000 men and 74 officers were killed or wounded. … The Russians retired to Nicopolis, and the Turks set to work to strengthen Plevna. … From the 20th to the 30th of July the Russians were engaged in bringing up reinforcements and getting ready for another attack. An order came for the assault of the Turkish position; Baron Krudener did not believe the assault advisable, but the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas left him no discretion." The assault was made on the 31st of July, and was repulsed, with a loss to the Russians of 170 officers and 7,136 men. "There was nothing for the Russians to do but send for reinforcements, and wait until they arrived. The advance into Turkey had received a severe check, from which recovery was not easy. From the offensive the Russians were thrown upon the defensive, and all as the result of a single battle of six or eight hours' duration. Happily for Russia, the Turkish army had no competent leader, or the army of the Czar might have been captured or drowned in the Danube. {3154} The Turks had three armies in the field. … Mehemet Ali was at Shumla with 65,000 men; Osman Pasha at Plevna, with 50,000; and Suleiman Pasha at Yeni Zagra, with 40,000. … The order of the Czar for reinforcements was quickly issued, and resulted in the despatch of 120,000 regulars and 180,000 militia for the front. With these reinforcements went 460 pieces of artillery. … General Gourko took up his position in the Shipka Pass whence Suleiman Pasha sought in vain to dislodge him. … Towards the end of August the Russian reinforcements were assembled in such numbers that an advance could again be ventured. … The total Russian and Roumanian force for the attack of Plevna amounted to 90,000 men and 440 guns, while the Turks were estimated to have about 56,000 men—and Osman Pasha. … The attack began with a bombardment on the 6th September," which was kept up until the 11th, when the Russians again endeavored to carry the Turkish works by assault. Skobeleff, conspicuous, as he always was, in daring and in success, took one of the redoubts and held it until the next day, waiting vainly for reinforcements which were not sent. Elsewhere the assault failed. "The Russian killed and wounded were estimated at 18,000 to 20,000, and the Turkish about 5,000 less than the Russian. The capture by assault having been given up, the Russians sat down to invoke the aid of that engine, more powerful than all their batteries, the engine of starvation. … One by one the roads leading into Plevna were occupied, but it was nearly two months from the terrible battle of the 11th September before the routes for supplies and reinforcements destined for Osman Pasha could be secured. The investment was completed on the 3d November; 120,000 Russians and Roumanians were around Plevna." On the morning of December 10 the beleaguered Turks made a desperate sortie, attempting to break the line of investment, having failed in which their stout-hearted commander surrendered unconditionally. "With the fall of Plevna and the surrender of its garrison of 40,000 men, the Turkish opposition practically ceased. Within a month from that event General Gourko had captured Sophia, and General Radetsky took the village of Shipka, in the Shipka Pass, and compelled the surrender of a Turkish army of 23,000 men. … Gourko and Skobeleff advanced upon Philippopolis by different routes and narrowly missed capturing Suleiman Pasha with his entire force. Skobeleff advanced upon Adrianople, which the Turks abandoned, and Slivno and Yeni-Zagra were occupied, all inside of thirty days. Plevna had made the Russians the masters of the situation, and they advanced upon Constantinople, the Turks retiring before them, and occasionally making a feeble resistance. Turkey asked the mediation of England, and finally, despairing of her aid, signed an armistice that became the basis of the treaty of San Stefano."

_T. W. Knox, Decisive Battles Since Waterloo, chapter 21._