History for ready reference, Volume 7
chapter 37.
JAPAN: A. D. 1904-1905 (October-May). War with Russia: The expedition of the Baltic Fleet to relieve Port Arthur. The Dogger Bank incident. The Seven Months Voyage. Battle of Tsushima. Destruction of the Fleet.
After the sea-fights of August 10-14, between Port Arthur and Vladivostok (see above, A. D. 1904, February-August) Russia had no naval force of any importance in the Pacific, and hastened preparations for sending out a fleet from the Baltic Sea.
See above, JAPAN: A. D. 1904 (February-August).
Under the command of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, this intended reinforcement of the defence of Port Arthur was despatched from Reval and Libau, sailing from the latter port on October 15. At the outset of its voyage, while traversing the North Sea, the Russian fleet experienced a misadventure which occasioned much excitement for a time and threatened to raise a serious question between the Russian and British governments. Briefly stated, the main facts of the case, according to evidence accepted subsequently by an International Commission of Inquiry, were these:
Before sailing from Reval, and, further, while anchored at the Skagen, making ready to pass to the North Sea, Admiral Rozhdestvensky had been warned by agents of his government that suspicious vessels were on the coast of Norway, and that he must beware of hostile undertakings, which were likely to have the form of torpedo attacks. Accordingly he sailed from the Skagen, October 20, twenty-four hours earlier than he had planned, sending off the fleet in six divisions, that which he accompanied being the last, and starting at 10 p. m. {353} In one of the preceding divisions a transport, by reason of defects in her engine, fell behind the cruisers which escorted her, and at 8 p. m. on October 21 was some fifty miles astern of the remainder of the fleet. She then met several Swedish vessels which she imagined to be torpedo craft, and fired on them, sending a wireless message to the Admiral that she was attacked by torpedo boats on all sides. This message led the Admiral to signal to his captains that they might expect attacks and must keep a doubly vigilant watch. At an early hour in the following morning his own immediate squadron arrived at the Dogger Bank, where, as usual, many fishing craft, mostly English, were "shooting their trawls," and doing so in a regulated way, under the direction of a fishing master or captain, who signalled with rockets to his fleet. One of the preceding divisions of the Russian armada had passed these without alarm, recognizing what they were; but Admiral Rozhdestvensky and the officers of his flagship were so expectant of enemies that the sight of a green rocket shot into the air, and a distant glimpse of some kind of a ship which seemed to be headed straight for them, at a great rate of speed, convinced them instantly that they were in the midst of swarming foes, and they opened fire.
According to testimony, their fire was kept up for about half an hour, as they passed through the fishing fleet, one of the vessels in which was sunk, her skipper and one other man killed, while all but one of the remaining crew received wounds. Two others of the fishing craft were struck, and the hospital ship of the National Mission which attended the fleet received some damage. Ultimately it was learned that the Russians, in their wild firing, did harm to one another, so seriously that the chaplain of one of their ships received a wound from which he died.
Wild excitement was created in England by the news of this strange performance. Hurried naval preparations were made for vigorous action, if found necessary, and formal demands for apology, inquiry and compensation were presented at St. Petersburg. Nothing, however, was done rashly, and the two governments concerned agreed sensibly and quickly to an investigation of the affair by an International Commission, which gave hearings in Paris soon afterwards. The Commission found precedents in recent naval experience—even in the manoeuvres of the British navy—of a similar mistaking of fishing boats and other vessels for torpedo craft, and was able to deal gently and pacifically with the facts brought before it. It decided that the fishing fleet had committed no hostile act, and that no torpedo boat was either among them or near them, and that, consequently, the Russian Admiral was not justified in opening fire. As for his not stopping to ascertain the damage he had done, the conclusion was that enough uncertainty on the subject of danger had been raised in his mind to warrant that neglect; but a majority of the commissioners expressed regret that he had not given notice of what had happened when he passed through the Straits. Then, as _The Naval Annual_ remarked, in reviewing the incident, "diplomacy steps in and seeks to soothe military and national susceptibilities by declaring that Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s ‘valeur militaire’ is unimpaired, and his ‘sentiments d’humanité’ unimpeachable."
_Naval Annual, 1905,