History for ready reference, Volume 6
volume 1, pages 39-45).
"Aguinaldo … retired to Malalos, about 25 miles to the northward, leaving his troops entrenched round Manila, and there with considerable pomp and ceremony on September 29th, 1898, he was declared First President of the Philippine Republic, and the National Congress was opened with Pedro Paterno as President of that assembly."
_G. J. Younghusband, The Philippines and Round About, page 27._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-December). War with Spain. Suspension of hostilities. Negotiation of Treaty of Peace. Instructions to American Commissioners. Relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and cession of Porto Rico, the island of Guam and the Philippine Islands to the United States.
In his message to Congress, December 5, 1898, President McKinley gave the following account of his reception of overtures from Spain, for the termination of the war, and of the negotiations which resulted in a treaty of peace:
"The annihilation of Admiral Cervera's fleet, followed by the capitulation of Santiago, having brought to the Spanish Government a realizing sense of the hopelessness of continuing a struggle now become wholly unequal, it made overtures of peace through the French Ambassador, who, with the assent of his Government, had acted as the friendly representative of Spanish interests during the war. On the 26th of July M. Cambon presented a communication signed by the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish Minister of State, inviting the United States to state the terms upon which it would be willing to make peace. On the 30th of July, by a communication addressed to the Duke of Almodovar and handed to M. Cambon, the terms of this Government were announced, substantially as in the protocol afterwards signed. On the 10th of August the Spanish reply, dated August 7th, was handed by M. Cambon to the Secretary of State. It accepted unconditionally the terms imposed as to Cuba, Porto Rico and an island of the Ladrone group, but appeared to seek to introduce inadmissible reservations in regard to our demand as to the Philippine Islands. Conceiving that discussion on this point could neither be practical nor profitable, I directed that, in order to avoid misunderstanding, the matter should be forthwith closed by proposing the embodiment in a formal protocol of the terms upon which the negotiations for peace were to be undertaken. {621} The vague and inexplicit suggestion of the Spanish note could not be accepted, the only reply being to present as a virtual ultimatum a draft of protocol embodying the precise terms tendered to Spain in our note of July 30th, with added stipulations of detail as to the appointment of commissioners to arrange for the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles. On August 12th M. Cambon announced his receipt of full powers to sign the protocol submitted. Accordingly, on the afternoon of August 12th M. Cambon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain, and the Secretary of State, as the plenipotentiary of the United States, signed a protocol providing:
Article I— Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.
Article II- Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.
Article III- The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.
The fourth article provided for the appointment of joint commissions on the part of the United States and Spain, to meet in Havana and San Juan, respectively, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the stipulated evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies.
The fifth article provided for the appointment of not more than five commissioners on each side, to meet at Paris not later than October 1st, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.
The sixth and last article provided that upon the signature of the protocol hostilities between the two countries should be suspended and that notice to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces. Immediately upon the conclusion of the protocol I issued a proclamation of August 12th, suspending hostilities on the part of the United States. The necessary orders to that end were at once given by telegraph. The blockade of the ports of Cuba and San Juan de Porto Rico was in like manner raised. On the 18th of August the muster-out of 100,000 Volunteers, or as near that number as was found to be practicable, was ordered. On the 1st of December 101,165 officers and men had been mustered out and discharged from the service and 9,002 more will be mustered out by the 10th of this month. Also a corresponding number of general staff officers have been honorably discharged from the service. The military commissions to superintend the evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the adjacent islands were forthwith appointed: For Cuba, Major-General James F. Wade, Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, Major-General Matthew C. Butler. For Porto Rico, Major-General John R. Brooke, Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley and Brigadier-General William W. Gordon, who soon afterwards met the Spanish commissioners at Havana and San Juan respectively. … Pursuant to the fifth article of the protocol, I appointed William H. Day, late Secretary of State; Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye and George Gray, Senators of the United States, and Whitelaw Reid, to be the peace commissioners on the part of the United States. Proceeding in due season to Paris they there met on the first of October five commissioners, similarly appointed on the part of Spain."
_Message of the President to Congress, December 5, 1898._
The instructions given (September 16) by President McKinley to the commissioners appointed to treat for peace with Spain, and the correspondence between the commissioners at Paris and the President and the Secretary of State at Washington during the progress of the negotiations, were communicated confidentially to the United States Senate on the 30th of January, 1899, but not published until February, 1901, when the injunction of secrecy was removed and the printing of the papers ordered by vote of the Senate. The chief interest of these papers lies in their disclosure of what passed between the American executive and the peace commissioners on the subject of the Philippine Islands which led to the demand for their entire surrender by Spain.
In his instructions of September 16th to the commissioners, on their departure for the meeting with Spanish commissioners at Paris, the President wrote on this subject: "By article 6 of the protocol it was agreed that hostilities between the two countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each Government to the Commanders of its military and naval forces. Such notice was given by the Government of the United States immediately after the signature of the protocol, the forms of the necessary orders having previously been prepared. But before notice could reach the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States in the Philippines they captured and took possession by conquest of the city of Manila and its suburbs, which are therefore held by the United States by conquest as well as by virtue of the protocol. In view of what has taken place it is necessary now to determine what shall be our future relations to the Philippines. …
"Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to lasting results and to the achievement of the common good under the demands of civilization rather than to ambitious designs. The terms of the protocol were framed upon this consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that requirement we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and near our own territory that the Spanish flag should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere. The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we can not disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. A vowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we can not be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.
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"Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privileges. It is believed that in the practical application of these guiding principles the present interests of our country and the proper measure of its duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its exemption from unknown perils will be found in full accord with the just, moral, and humane purpose which was invoked as our justification in accepting the war.
"In view of what has been stated, the United States can not accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the United States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States into such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and rates of trade and commerce, together with other rights of protection and trade accorded to citizens of one country within the territory of another. You are therefore instructed to demand such concession, agreeing on your part that Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in the ports of any territory in the Philippines ceded to the United States."
On the 7th of October, Mr. Day, on behalf of the American commissioners, cabled a long communication from Paris to Mr. Hay, his successor in the United States Department of State, summarizing testimony given before the Commission by General Merritt, lately commanding in the Philippines, and statements brought by General Merritt from Admiral Dewey, General Greene, and others. In part, the telegram was as follows:
"General Anderson, in correspondence with Aguinaldo in June and July, seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and native authorities, but subsequently changed his tone. General Merritt reports that Admiral Dewey did not approve this correspondence and advised against it. Merritt and Dewey both kept clear of any compromising communications. Merritt expresses opinion we are in no way committed to any insurgent programme. Answering questions of Judge Day, General Merritt said insurrection practically confined to Luzon. Tribal and religious differences between the inhabitants of various islands. United States has helped rather than injured insurrection. Under no obligation other than moral to help natives. Natives of Luzon would not accept Spanish rule, even with amnesty. Insurgents would be victorious unless Spaniards did better in future than in past. Insurgents would fight among themselves if they had no common enemy. Think it feasible for United States to take Luzon and perhaps some adjacent islands and hold them as England does her colonies. Natives could not resist 5,000 troops. … General Merritt thinks that if United States attempted to take possession of Luzon, or all the group as a colony, Aguinaldo and his immediate followers would resist it, but his forces are divided and his opposition would not amount to anything. If the islands were divided, filibustering expeditions might go from one island to another, thus exposing us to constant danger of conflict with Spain. In answer to questions of Senator Frye, Merritt said insurgents would murder Spaniards and priests in Luzon and destroy their property if the United States withdrew. United States under moral obligation to stay there. He did not know whether the effect of setting up a government by the United States in Luzon would be to produce revolutions in other islands. It might cause reforms in their government. … Answering questions of Mr. Gray, Merritt said consequences in case of either insurgent or Spanish triumph made it doubtful whether United States would be morally justified in withdrawing. Our acts were ordinary acts of war, as if we had attacked Barcelona, but present conditions in Philippine Islands were partly brought about by us. Insurgents not in worse condition by our coming. Spaniards hardly able to defend themselves. If we restored them to their position and trenches, they might maintain themselves with the help of a navy when we withdrew. Did not know that he could make out a responsibility by argument, but he felt it. It might be sentimental. He thought it would be an advantage if the United States would change its policy and keep the islands. (He) thought our interests in the East would be helped by the cheap labor in the Philippines, costing only from 20 to 80 cents a day, according to skill. … Answering questions of Mr. Reid, Merritt said he considered capture of Manila practically capture of group. Nothing left of Spanish sovereignty that was not at mercy of the United States. Did not think our humanity bounded by geographical lines. After Dewey's victory we armed insurgents to some extent, but Dewey says it was over-estimated. Insurgents bought arms from Hongkong merchants with Dewey's cognizance, but Dewey was not in favor of allowing this to continue. Spaniards would destroy Aguinaldo and his principal followers, if allowed to do so."
October 25, Judge Day cabled a message to Washington, saying: "Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning Philippine Islands are set forth in statements transmitted herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in joint commission almost immediately." The differing statements then transmitted were three in number, the first of them signed by Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, who said: "Information gained by commission in Paris leads to conviction that it would be naval, political, and commercial mistake to divide the archipelago. Nearly all expert testimony taken tends to this effect. As instructions provide for retention at least of Luzon, we do not consider question of remaining in Philippine Islands at all as now properly before us. We therefore ask for extension of instructions. Spain governed and defended these islands from Manila, and with destruction of her fleet and the surrender of her army we became as complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with nothing needed to complete the conquest save to proceed with the ample forces we had at hand to take unopposed possession. {623} The Ladrones and Carolines were also governed from the same capital by the same governor-general. National boundaries ought to follow natural divisions, but there is no natural place for dividing Philippine Islands. … If we do not want the islands ourselves, better to control their disposition; that is, to hold the option on them rather than to abandon it. Could then at least try to protect ourselves by ample treaty stipulations with the acquiring powers. Commercially, division of archipelago would not only needlessly establish dangerous rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept."
Disagreeing with this view, Judge Day said:
"I am unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the entire Philippine island group. In the spirit of our instructions, and bearing in mind the often declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be consistent in our demands in making peace. Territory permanently held must be taken as war indemnity and with due regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents. Whether this conduct was wise or unwise is not now important. We cannot leave the insurgents to mere treaty stipulations or to their unaided resources, either to form a government or to battle against a foe which (although) unequal to us, might readily overcome them. On all hands it is agreed that the inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government. This is particularly true of Mindanao and the Sulu group. Only experience can determine the success of colonial expansion upon which the United States is entering. It may prove expensive in proportion to the scale upon which it is tried with ignorant and semibarbarous people at the other side of the world. It should therefore be kept within bounds." Judge Day, accordingly, suggested a division of the archipelago that would give to the United States Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan, and control the entrance to the China Sea. Senator Gray, in a third statement, dissented from both these views, saying: "The undersigned can not agree that it is wise to take Philippine Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs the case of Cuba and Porto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entangling alliances against which Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will make necessary a navy equal to largest of powers; a greatly increased military establishment; immense sums for fortifications and harbors; multiply occasions for dangerous complications with foreign nations, and increase burdens of taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap; no area for homes for American citizens; climate and social conditions demoralizing to character of American youth; new and disturbing questions introduced into our politics; church question menacing. On whole, instead of indemnity—injury. The undersigned can not agree that any obligation incurred to insurgents is paramount to our own manifest interests. … No place for colonial administration or government of subject people in American system. So much from standpoint of interest; but even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in the hour of victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. We should set example in these respects, not follow in the selfish and vulgar greed for territory which Europe has inherited from medieval times. Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our word. … At the very least let us adhere to the President's instructions and if conditions require the keeping of Luzon forego the material advantages claimed in annexing other islands. Above all let us not make a mockery of the injunction contained in those instructions, where, after stating that we took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations, and that we had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest, the President among other things eloquently says: 'It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action.' This and more, of which I earnestly ask a re-perusal, binds my conscience and governs my actions."
But the President had now arrived at a different state of mind, and directed Secretary Hay to make the following reply, on the 26th: "The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, can not be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required. The President reaches this conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we can not escape responsibility."
Two days later, the moral and political reflections of the President on the subject were expressed still further to the commissioners by Secretary Hay, in the following telegram:
"While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest, which position must not be yielded, yet their disposition, control, and government the President prefers should be the subject of negotiation as provided in the protocol. It is imperative upon us that as victors we should be governed only by motives which will exalt our nation. Territorial expansion should be our least concern; that we shall not shirk the moral obligations of our victory is of the greatest. {624} It is undisputed that Spain's authority is permanently destroyed in every part of the Philippines. To leave any part in her feeble control now would increase our difficulties and be opposed to the interests of humanity. The sentiment in the United States is almost universal that the people of the Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President fully concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We must either hold them or turn them back to Spain. Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen as are the difficulties which are before us, the President can see but one plain path of duty—the acceptance of the archipelago. Greater difficulties and more serious complications—administrative and international—would follow any other course. The President has given to the views of the commissioners the fullest consideration, and in reaching the conclusion above announced in the light of information communicated to the commission and to the President since your departure, he has been influenced by the single consideration of duty and humanity. The President is not unmindful of the distressed financial condition of Spain, and whatever consideration the United States may show must come from its sense of generosity and benevolence, rather than from any real or technical obligation. The terms upon which the full cession of the Philippines shall be made must be left largely with the commission."
On the 3d of November, Judge Day cabled: "After a careful examination of the authorities, the majority of the commission are clearly of opinion that our demand for the Philippine Islands can not be based on conquest. When the protocol was signed Manila was not captured, siege was in progress and capture made after the execution of the protocol. Captures made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded and status quo restored as far as practicable. We can require cession of Philippine Islands only as indemnity for losses and expenses of the war. Have in view, also, condition of islands, the broken power of Spain, anarchy in which our withdrawal would leave the islands, etc. These are legitimate factors."
On the 4th, Senator Davis added a personal telegram as follows: "I think we can demand cession of entire archipelago on other and more valid grounds than a perfected territorial conquest of the Philippine Islands, such as indemnity or as conditions of peace imposed by our general military success and in view of our future security and general welfare, commercial and otherwise. I think the protocol admits all these grounds, and that the ground alone of perfected territorial conquest of the Philippine Islands is too narrow and untenable under protocol."
Secretary Hay replied, for the President, on the 5th: "The President has no purpose to question the commission's judgment as to the grounds upon which the cession of the archipelago is to be claimed. His only wish in that respect is to hold all the ground upon which we can fairly and justly make the claim. He recognizes fully the soundness of putting forward indemnity as the chief ground, but conquest is a consideration which ought not to be ignored. How our demand shall be presented, and the grounds upon which you will rest it, he confidently leaves with the commissioners. His great concern is that a treaty shall be effected in terms which will not only satisfy the present generation but, what is more important, be justified in the judgment of posterity."
Discussion followed, in which Judge Day and Senator Gray repeated the views they had formerly expressed, in dissent from the policy determined upon by the President and his cabinet, the latter saying: "Believing that the result of a failure to obtain a treaty would be the forcible seizure of the whole Philippine Islands group, an event greatly to be deprecated as inconsistent with the traditions and civilization of the United States, I would be willing to take the islands by the cession of a treaty of peace, and I would, to that end, make such reasonable concessions as would comport with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak and prostrate foe. I mean that I would prefer the latter alternative to the former, not that I have changed my mind as to the policy of taking the Philippine Islands at all."
So far as concerned the demands of the United States (which Spain was powerless to resist), the question was settled, on the 13th of November, by a telegram from Secretary Hay to Mr. Day, in which he said: "We are clearly entitled to indemnity for the cost of the war. We can not hope to be fully indemnified. We do not expect to be. It would probably be difficult for Spain to pay money. All she has are the archipelagoes of the Philippines and the Carolines. She surely can not expect us to turn the Philippines back and bear the cost of the war and all claims of our citizens for damages to life and property in Cuba without any indemnity but Porto Rico, which we have and which is wholly inadequate. … You are therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole of the Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain ten to twenty millions of dollars, and if you can get cession of a naval and telegraph station in the Carolines, and the several concessions and privileges and guaranties, so far as applicable, enumerated in the views of Commissioners Frye and Reid, you can offer more."
_United States, 56th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Document Number 148 (Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain)._
Discussion between the Spanish and American commissioners at Paris was prolonged until the 10th of December, when the former yielded to what they protested against as hard terms, and the following Treaty of Peace was signed:
Treaty of Peace.
ARTICLE I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.
ARTICLE II. Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.
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ARTICLE III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line: A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.
ARTICLE IV. The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.
ARTICLE V. The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed. The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two Governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.
ARTICLE VI. Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States. Reciprocally the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article.
ARTICLE VII. The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.
ARTICLE VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to. In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.
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ARTICLE IX. Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.
ARTICLE X. The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.
ARTICLE XI. The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.
ARTICLE XII. Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules:
1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out.
2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor.
3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.
ARTICLE XIII. The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.
ARTICLE XIV. Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.
ARTICLE XV. The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. This article may at any time be terminated on six months notice given by either Government to the other.
ARTICLE XVI. It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations.
ARTICLE XVII. The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.
[Signed] William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, Geo. Gray, Whitelaw Reid, Eugenio Montero Ríos, B. de Abarzuza, J. de Garnica, W. R. de Villa Urrutia, Rafael Cerero.
That the treaty would be ratified by the Senate of the United States was by no means certain when it was signed, and remained questionable for two months.
See below: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY).
Some time after the conclusion of the treaty, it was discovered that the boundaries defined in it for the cession of the Philippine Islands failed to include the islands of Cagayan, or Kagayan, and Sibutu, in the southern part of the archipelago. Still later, it was found that several small islands (the Bachi or Bashee group, and others) belonging to the Spanish possessions in the East were left lying outside of the northern Philippine boundary, as laid down in the treaty of cession. It is said that the Japanese government called attention to this latter error, desiring to have the islands in question, which are near to Formosa, controlled by the United States, rather than by Spain. By a new treaty with Spain, negotiated in 1900, all these outlying islands were acquired by the United States, for the sum of $100,000.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August). Losses of the armies at Santiago and in the Philippines.
See below: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE).
{627}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August 21). The War with Spain. Letter from departing Spanish soldiers to the soldiers of the American army.
The following letter, addressed, on the eve of their departure for Spain, by the Spanish soldiers at Santiago, to the soldiers of the American army, "is surely," says Lieutenant-Colonel Miley, who quotes it in his book entitled "In Cuba with Shafter"—"is surely the most remarkable letter ever addressed by vanquished soldiers to their conquerors:
'Soldiers of the American Army: We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born men in whose breasts there lives gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor and with all our strength, endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been vanquished by you, so our generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitulation, but our surrender and the blood-battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective States. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before stated—a quality we had not met with during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without a religion, without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but shot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world; have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished; have cured their wounded with great humanity; have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort; and lastly, to us, whose condition was terrible, you have given freely of food and of your stock of medicines, and have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony. With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in this land, which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours. You have conquered it by force and watered it with your blood, as your conscience called for under the demands of civilization and humanity; but the descendants of the Congos and Guineas, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers—these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized humanity. From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers.
(Signed) Pedro Lopez De Castillo, Soldier of Infantry. Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898.'"
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August-December). Situation in the Philippines following the occupation of Manila by American forces. Growing distrust and unfriendliness of the Tagalos. Report of General Otis.
See (in this volume) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (December). Organization of military government in Cuba.
See (in this volume) CUBA: A. D. 1898-1899 (DECEMBER-OCTOBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899. Statistics of the Spanish-American War.
The following military and naval statistics of the war with Spain, compiled from official sources, were submitted to the House of Representatives, during its debate on the Army Bill, in December, 1900, as part of an appendix to a speech made in support of the Bill by Honorable Charles Dick, of Ohio:
ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF THE ARMY DURING AND AFTER THE WAR.
By an Act of Congress approved April 22, 1898, providing for the temporary increase of the military establishment of the United States, "the organized and active land forces were declared to consist of the Regular Army and of the militia of the several States when called into service, constituting two branches, designated, respectively, as be Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the United States. And the President was authorized to organize the regular and volunteer troops into divisions of three brigades, each brigade to be composed of three or more regiments, and when three or more divisions are present in the same army, to organize them into army corps, each corps to consist of not more than three divisions. Under the authority conferred upon him by the joint resolution of April 20 and the act of April 22, 1898, the President issued a proclamation, dated April 23, 1898, calling for volunteers to the number of 125,000 men, to be apportioned as far as practicable among the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, according to population, to serve for two years unless sooner discharged. Among the several arms of the service the troops were apportioned as follows: Five regiments and 17 troops of cavalry, 16 batteries of light artillery, 1 regiment and 7 batteries of heavy artillery, 119 regiments and 10 battalions of infantry. May 25, 1898, the President issued a proclamation calling for an additional force of 75,000 men. For controlling military reasons, it was determined to utilize so much of this additional force as was necessary to bring up the several State organizations in service to the full legal strength, the remainder to be apportioned among the several States and Territories according to their respective quotas as nearly as possible. The apportionment to the several arms of service under this second call was for 16 batteries of light artillery, 3 battalions of heavy artillery, and 22 regiments, ten battalions, and 46 companies of infantry."
The strength of the Regular Army on the 1st of April, 1898, just before the breaking out of the war, was as follows:
Officers. Enlisted Men.
General officers and staff corps. 532 2,026 Cavalry. 437 6,047 Artillery. 288 4,486 Infantry. 886 12,828 Miscellaneous. 653
Total. 2,143 26,040
The Regular Army was authorized to be increased to 65,000 men as a war footing. The total strength of the armies, Regular and Volunteer, at several later dates, was as follows:
{628}
DATE. Regulars. Volunteers. Total.
April 15, 1898 28,183 28,183 May 31, 1898 38,816 124,776 162,592 August 31, 1898 56,362 216,256 272,618 January 31, 1899 65,531 90,241 155,772 June 30, 1899 63,535 16,550 80,085
Maximum force at any one time during Spanish-American war, 274,717 officers and men. On the 29th of November, 1898, the Army of the United States consisted of 2,324 officers and 61,444 enlisted men of the regular force, and of 5,216 officers and 110,202 enlisted men of the volunteer force, making an aggregate of 7,540 officers and 171,646 enlisted men.
PAY OF ARMY.
Payments made to Regular and Volunteer armies engaged during Spanish-American war, from April 21, 1898, to April 11, 1899, $67,065,629.56.
CASUALTIES IN ACTION.
In Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines between May 1, 1898, and June 30, 1899.
Killed Cuba Porto Rico Philippines Officers 21 16 Enlisted men 223 4 219
Wounded: Officers 101 92 Enlisted men 1,344 36 1,349
Died of Wounds: Officers 10 10 Enlisted men 64 8 82
Died of Disease: Officers 34 4 11 Enlisted men. 888 251 369
Grand total, 5,136.
Casualties in Fifth Army Corps in campaign against Santiago, June 22, 1898, to July 17, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 21 222 Wounded 101 1,344
At battle of Las Guasimas, June 24, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men. Killed. 1 15 Wounded 6 43
At battle of El Caney, July 1, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men. Killed. 4 77 Wounded 25 335
At Aguadores, July 1-2, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men. Killed. 2 Wounded 10
At battle of San Juan, July 1-3, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men. Killed. 15 127 Wounded 69 945
Casualties around Santiago, July 10-12, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men. Killed. 1 1 Wounded 1 11
Grand total of casualties in killed and wounded during the war with Spain.
WHERE. KILLED. WOUNDED.
Officers. Enlisted Men. Officers. Enlisted Men.
Cuba 23 237 99 1,332 Porto Rico. 3 4 36 Manila 17 10 96
Total 23 257 113 1,464
The deaths from all causes (including casualties in action) in the whole Army, regulars and volunteers, for the fourteen months from May, 1898, to June, 1899, inclusive, were 6,619. This is equivalent to an annual rate of 33.03 per thousand of strength. The deaths from disease during the whole period were at an annual rate of hut 25.68 per thousand. These were as follows:
STATIONS. Number of Deaths Rate per 1,000.
United States 3,577 23.81 Cuba 928 45.14 Porto Rico 238 38.15 Philippines 402 17.20
{629}
Deaths in the armies of the United States, by countries, between May 1, 1898, and June 30, 1899.
[Off. = Officer; Enl. = Enlisted Men.]
COUNTRY KILLED. DIED OF DISEASE. ACCIDENT. WOUNDS Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. REGULARS. United States 1 5 10 32 874 1 51 Cuba 19 184 5 60 8 381 7 Porto Rico 3 73 3 Hawaiian Islands 10 1 Philippine Islands 4 81 1 33 4 109 10 At sea 1 11 4 77
Total 24 270 7 114 51 1,524 1 72
VOLUNTEERS. United States 1 87 2,836 3 111 Cuba 3 39 10 16 457 2 12 Porto Rico 3 1 157 5 Hawaiian Islands 33 1 Philippine Islands 14 146 3 67 5 215 6 At sea 5 122 2
Total 17 188 3 78 114 3,820 5 137
Aggregate 38 458 10 192 165 5,344 6 209
COUNTRY. DROWNED. SUICIDE. MURDER TOTAL. HOMICIDE Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. REGULARS. United States 1 16 19 18 35 993 Cuba 7 5 6 32 650 Porto Rico 1 3 1 3 81 Hawaiian Islands 1 12 Philippine Islands 19 1 3 1 10 256 At sea 1 4 2 6 94
Total 2 48 1 32 26 86 2,086
VOLUNTEERS. United States 23 1 15 22 91 3,008 Cuba 4 3 21 525 Porto Rico 2 1 1 1 169 Hawaiian Islands 34 Philippine Islands 1 9 3 23 446 At sea 2 1 5 127
Total 1 40 1 20 26 141 4,309
Aggregate 3 88 2 52 52 224 6,395
{630}
Recapitulation of casualties in action in the armies of the United States between May 1, 1898, and June 30, 1899.
[Off. = Officer; Enl. = Enlisted Men.]
COUNTRY. KILLED. WOUNDED. TOTAL. AGGREGATE Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. REGULARS.
Cuba 18 183 86 1,126 104 1,309 1,413 Porto Rico 1 2 15 2 16 18 United States 1 5 10 1 15 16 Philippines, to August 13, 1898 7 1 25 1 32 33 Philippines since February 4, 1899 2 74 20 410 22 484 506
Total 21 270 109 1,586 130 1,856 1,986
VOLUNTEERS.
Cuba 3 39 15 218 18 257 275 Porto Rico 3 2 21 2 24 26 Philippines, to Aug. 13, 1898 11 9 74 9 85 94 Philippines, since February 4, 1899 14 135 62 865 76 1,000 1,076
Total 17 188 88 1,178 105 1,366 1,471
Grand total 38 458 197 2,764 235 3,222 3,457
HOSPITALS.
From the declaration of war with Spain to September 20, 1899, there have been established:
Beds. 20 field division hospitals, averaging 250 beds each 5,000 31 general hospitals with a total capacity of about 13,800 Railroad ambulance train 270 4 hospital ships 1,000
Total 20,070
In addition to these over 5,000 cases were treated in civil hospitals. It is difficult even to approximate the number of men treated in these hospitals. During that period somewhat over 100,000 cases were admitted on sick report, a number equal to 2,147 per 1,000 of strength during the year, or to 179 per 1,000 per month—the ratio of admissions to hospital cases being 13 to 8. Using these data as a basis, and assuming the mean strength of the Army (Regulars and Volunteers) to have been 154,000, it would appear that from May 1, 1898, to September 20, 1899, about 275,000 cases have been treated in these hospitals.
TRANSPORTATION OF SPANISH PRISONERS OF WAR TO SPAIN.
The following is a statement showing the dates of embarkation, names of vessels, and number of officers, enlisted men, and others who took passage:
[Date = Date of Embarkation, Off. = Officers Men = Enlisted men, Women = Women and children over 5 years of age, Priests = Priests and Sisters of Charity.]
Date Name of Vessel. Off. Men Women Priests Total
August 9 Alicante 38 1,069 6 11 1,124 August 14 Isla de Luzon 137 2,056 40 4 2,237 August 16 Covadonga 109 2,148 79 2,336 August 19 Villaverde 52 565 34 651 August 19 Isla de Panay 99 1,599 26 5 1,729 August 22 P. de Satrustegui 128 2,359 68 2,555 August 25 Montevideo 136 2,108 122 2 2,368 August 27 Cherihon 18 905 37 960 August 28 Colón 100 1,316 59 1,475 August 30 do 23 726 5 754 September 1 Leon XIII 113 2,209 108 2,430 September 3 San Ignacio 59 1,408 20 12 1,499 September 6 Leonora 15 1,118 1,333 September 12 Cindad de Cadiz 53 19 14 86 September 17 San Augustin 65 800 45 910 September 17 San Francisco 18 588 11 617
Total 1,163 20,974 679 48 22,864
ARMS AND AMMUNITION CAPTURED AT SANTIAGO.
Mauser carbines, Spanish, 7 mm 16,902 Mauser rifles, Argentine, 7½ mm 872 Remington rifles, 7 mm 6,118 Total rifles 23,892
Mauser carbines, Spanish 833 Mauser carbines, Argentine 7½ mm 84 Remington carbines, 7½ mm 330
Total carbines 1,247
Revolvers 75
{631}
Mauser-Spanish—cartridges, 7 mm. 1,500,000 Mauser-Argentine—cartridges, 7½ mm. 1,471,200 Remington cartridges, 7½ mm 1,680,000
Total. 4,651,200
Nine hundred and seventy-three thousand Remington cartridges, 7½ mm., worthless.
STRENGTH OF THE NAVY, REGULAR AND AUXILIARY.
The number of enlisted men allowed by law prior to the outbreak of hostilities was 12,500. On August 15, when the enlisted force reached its maximum, there were 24,123 men in the service. This great increase was made necessary by the addition of 128 ships to the Navy. The maximum fighting force of the Navy, separated into classes, was as follows:
Battle ships (first class). 4 Battle ships (second class). 1 Armored cruisers. 2 Coast defense monitors. 6 Armored ram. 1 Protected cruisers. 12 Unprotected cruisers. 3 Gunboats. 18 Dynamite cruiser. 1 Torpedo boats. 11 Vessels of old Navy, Including monitors. 14 Auxiliary Navy: Auxiliary cruisers. 11 Converted yachts. 28 Revenue cutters. 15 Light-house tenders. 4 Converted tugs. 27 Converted colliers. 19 Miscellaneous. 19
NAVAL, PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED OFF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898.
Officers. 99 Enlisted men. 1,675
CASUALTIES IN ACTION.
ENGAGEMENT. Casualties Killed Wounded Died later from wounds Action at Manila Bay, May 1 9 9 Action off Cienfuegos, May 11 12 1 11 1 Action off Cardenas, May 11. 8 5 3 Action off San Juan, Porto Rico, May 12 8 1 7 Engagements at Guantanamo, Cuba, June 11 to 20 22 *6 16 Engagement off Santiago: June 22 10 1 9 July 3 11 1 10 Miscellaneous: Yankee, June 13. 1 1 Eagle, July 12 1 1 Bancroft, August 2 1 1 Amphitrite, August 7 1 1 †l
Total 84 16 68 2
* One accidentally killed. † Accidentally shot.
_Congressional Record, February 1, 1901, pages 1941-1962._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899. Investigation of the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain.
Severe criticism of the conduct of the War Department during the war with Spain, including many charges of inefficiency in its service, produced by improper appointments made for political reasons, and other charges of misdoing in the purchase of supplies, under influences either political or otherwise corrupt, led to the appointment by the President, in September, 1898, of an investigating commission, composed of nine soldier and civilian members, as follows: General Grenville M. Dodge, President. Colonel James A. Sexton. Colonel Charles Denby, Captain Evan P. Howell, Honorable Urban A. Woodbury, Brigadier-General John M. Wilson, U. S. A., General James A. Beaver, Major-General Alexander McD. Cook, U. S. A., Dr. Phineas S. Conner.
The report of the Commission, made in the following February, cannot be said to have been a convincing and satisfactory one to the country at large. It was indignantly described as a "whitewashing report," even by many journals and writers of the party in power. Its inquiries did not appear to have been keenly and impartially searching; its conclusions were not thought to be drawn with a rigorous and fearless hand.
The charges against the War Department which excited most feeling and drew most public attention related to the quality of the fresh beef supplied to the army, which was in two forms, refrigerated and canned. Major-General Miles, commanding the Army, had declared that much of the refrigerated beef furnished to the soldiers should be called "embalmed beef," maintaining that it had been "apparently preserved with secret chemicals, which destroy its natural flavor" and which were believed to be "detrimental to the health of the troops." He intimated that hundreds of tons of such beef had been contracted for by the Commissary-General "under pretense of experiment." In repelling this serious accusation, Commissary-General Charles P. Eagan read a statement before the Commission, so violent and unmeasured in its vituperation of the commanding general that it was returned to him for correction; many newspapers declined to publish it, and he was subsequently tried by court-martial in consequence—as related below. The conclusion of the Commission on the subject of the charges relating to refrigerated beef was stated in its report as follows:
"The Commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef furnished by contractors and issued to the troops during the war with Spain was subjected to or treated with any chemicals by the contractors or those in their employ."
Concerning the canned beef, which had caused much disgust in the army, the Commission reported:
"The result of our own testing and of all the analyses made at our instance … is that the canned meat which has been brought to our attention is pure, sound, and nutritive. It has not been found to contain any acids or any deleterious substance, but to be unadulterated meat. The testimony before us is that the canned meat is not, in general, intended to be issued to troops except as an emergency ration. The preponderance of the proof is that meat on the hoof and the refrigerated beef are more acceptable. A number of officers and others have testified that the meat is unpalatable. Its palatability greatly depends upon the mode in which it is cooked. In a tropical climate, carried on the march, exposed to heat, the meat so changes in appearance as to become repulsive. In the Navy, where the meat is properly cared for, there has been no complaint, so far as has appeared in evidence before us. After careful consideration we find that canned meat, as issued to the troops, was generally of good quality, was properly prepared, and contained no deleterious substance. {632} At times probably material of poor quality is issued; in one of the cans sent to us and examined by the chemist a large amount of gristle was found. That it was not issued 'under pretense of an experiment' is indicated by the fact that it has been in use in the Army for more than 20 years."
On the general management of the Quarter-master's Department, with which much fault had been found, the Commission reported: "The conclusions drawn … are as follows:
"1. The Quartermaster's Department, a month before war was declared, was neither physically nor financially prepared for the tremendous labor of suddenly equipping and transporting an army over ten times the size of the Regular Army of the United States.
"2. That the department devoted the ability, zeal, and industry of its officers to accomplish the herculean task before it so soon as funds were made available and war was declared.
"3. That it deserves credit for the great work accomplished, for the immense quantity of materials obtained and issued within so short a period, and for its earnest efforts in reference to railroad transportation and in protecting the great interests of the General Government committed to its charge. Its officers, especially those at the head-quarters of the department and at its depots, worked earnestly and laboriously day and night, sparing themselves in no possible way.
"4. There appears to have been a lack of system, whereby, even as late as October, troops in camps and in the field were lacking in some articles of clothing, camp and garrison equipage; and hospitals, at least at two important localities in the South—Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Huntsville, Alabama—lacked stoves, while at Huntsville fuel was wanting.
"5. There appears to have been lack of executive or administrative ability, either on the part of the Quartermaster's Department or the railroad officials, in preventing the great congestion of cars at Tampa and Chickamauga when these camps were first established, which congestion caused delay, annoyance, and discomfort to the large bodies of troops concentrating at those places.
"6. There appears to have been a lack of foresight in preparing and promptly having available at some central locality on the seacoast the necessary fleet of transports which it seemed evident would be required for the movement of troops to a foreign shore, and, finally, when the call came suddenly and the emergency was supreme, the department appears not to have fully comprehended the capacity of the fleet under its command; not to have supplied it with a complete outfit of lighters for the immediate disembarkation of troops and supplies; to have accepted without full investigation the statement that the vessels were capable of transporting 25,000 men, while really they could not and did not transport more than 17,000 with their artillery, equipments, ammunition, and supplies, and lacked sufficient storage room for the necessary amount of wagon transportation—that very important element in the movement of an army in the face of an enemy.
"7. The Quartermaster's Department should maintain on hand at all times a complete supply for at least four months for an army of 100,000 men of all articles of clothing, camp and garrison equipage, and other quartermaster's supplies which will not deteriorate by storage or which cannot at once be obtained in open market.
"Finally. In the opinion of this commission, there should be a division of the labor now devolving upon the Quartermaster's Department."
In another part of its report, dealing especially with the Santiago campaign, the Commission makes a statement which seems to reflect some additional light on the sixth paragraph of the finding quoted above, relative to the unpreparedness of the quartermaster's department for the landing of the Santiago expedition. It says:
"The Navy Department, on the 31st of May, 1898, sent the following communication to the honorable the Secretary of War: 'This Department begs leave to inquire what means are to be employed by the War Department for landing the troops, artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other heavy objects when the pending military expedition arrives on the Cuban coast near Santiago. While the Navy will be prepared to furnish all the assistance that may be in its power, it is obvious that the crews of the armored ships and of such others as will be called upon to remove the Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish fleet in action can not be spared for other purposes, and ought not to be fatigued by the work incident to landing of the troops and stores, etc.' This information, so far as can be ascertained, was never communicated to either General Miles or General Shafter; the expedition therefore left Tampa with no facilities for landing other than were afforded by the boats of the several transports conveying the expedition, with the exception of several lighters and steam tugs of light draft, such as could be hastily secured."
On the conduct of the Medical Department, which was another matter of investigation, the Commission reported: "To sum up, in brief, the evidence submitted shows:
" 1. That at the outbreak of the war the Medical Department was, in men and materials, altogether unprepared to meet the necessities of the army called out.
"2. That as a result of the action through a generation of contracted and contracting methods of administration, it was impossible for the Department to operate largely, freely, and without undue regard to cost.
"3. That in the absence of a special corps of inspectors, and the apparent infrequency of inspections by chief surgeons, and of official reports of the state of things in camps and hospitals, there was not such investigation of the sanitary conditions of the army as is the first duty imposed upon the Department by the regulations.
"4. That the nursing force during the months of My, June, and July was neither ample nor efficient, reasons for which may be found in the lack of a proper volunteer hospital corps, due to the failure of Congress to authorize its establishment, and to the nonrecognition in the beginning of the value of women nurses and the extent to which their services could be secured.
"5. That the demand made upon the resources of the Department in the care of sick and wounded was very much greater than had been anticipated, and consequently, in like proportion, these demands were imperfectly met.
{633}
"6. That powerless as the Department was to have supplies transferred from point to point, except through the intermediation of the Quartermaster's Department, it was seriously crippled in its efforts to fulfil the regulation duty of 'furnishing all medical and hospital supplies.'
"7. That the shortcomings in administration and operation may justly be attributed, in large measure, to the hurry and confusion incident to the assembling of an army of untrained officers and men, ten times larger than before, for which no preparations in advance had been or could be made because of existing rules and regulations.
"8. That notwithstanding all the manifest errors, of omission rather than of commission, a vast deal of good work was done by medical officers, high and low, regular and volunteer, and there were unusually few deaths among the wounded and the sick.
"What is needed by the medical department in the future is—
"1. A larger force of commissioned medical officers.
"2. Authority to establish in time of war a proper volunteer hospital corps.
"3. A reserve corps of selected trained women nurses, ready to serve when necessity shall arise, but under ordinary circumstances, owing no duty to the War Department, except to report residence at determined intervals.
"4. A year's supply for an army of at least four times the actual strength, of all such medicines, hospital furniture, and stores as are not materially damaged by keeping, to be held constantly on hand in the medical supply depots.
"5. The charge of transportation to such extent as will secure prompt shipment and ready delivery of all medical supplies.
"6. The simplification of administrative 'paper work,' so that medical officers may be able to more thoroughly discharge their sanitary and strictly medical duties.
"7. The securing of such legislation as will authorize all surgeons in medical charge of troops, hospitals, transports, trains, and independent commands to draw from the Subsistence Department funds for the purchase of such articles of diet as may be necessary to the proper treatment of soldiers too sick to use the army ration. This to take the place of all commutation of rations of the sick now authorized.
"Convalescent soldiers traveling on furlough should be furnished transportation, sleeping berths or staterooms, and $1.50 per diem for subsistence in lieu of rations, the soldier not to be held accountable or chargeable for this amount."
_Report of the Commission, volume 1._
Public opinion of the report, when divested of partisan prejudice, was probably expressed very fairly in the following comments of "The Nation," of New York:
"The two leading conclusions of the court of inquiry as to the quality of the beef supplied to our troops during the war with Spain, are in accordance with the evidence and will be accepted as fairly just by the country. The court finds that so far as the canned roast beef was concerned, the charges which General Miles made against it as an unsuitable ration are sustained, but that as regards the use of chemicals in the treatment of refrigerated beef his charges were not established. If instead of saying 'not established,' the court had said 'not fully sustained,' its verdict would have been above criticism on these two points. There was evidence of the use of chemicals, but it was not conclusive and was flatly contradicted. There is no doubt whatever that the use of the refrigerated beef was a blunder, but there was very little evidence to sustain a more serious charge than that against it.
"But while the court has found justly on these points, it is difficult to read its report without feeling that its members did so reluctantly, and that, if left to follow their inclinations, they would have censured General Miles and allowed everybody else concerned to go free. General Miles is the one person involved whom they allow no extenuating circumstances to benefit in their report. At every opportunity they take the worst possible view of his conduct, while almost invariably taking the most lenient view possible of nearly everybody else. … So far as the findings of the court apply to Eagan's conduct, they are condemnatory in general terms, but they do not seek to go behind him for the reasons for his conduct. … No attention whatever is paid to the evidence of several reputable witnesses that Eagan had told them that he had to buy of certain contractors; none is paid, either, to the evidence of Eagan's subordinates that he himself so altered the refrigerated beef contracts that no one could say whether they called for preservation for seventy-two hours or twenty-four. Leniency of this kind is never shown toward General Miles."
_The Nation, May 11, 1899._
Perhaps a weightier criticism is represented by the following, which we quote from an article contributed to "The Independent" by General Wingate, President of the National Guard Association of the United States: "So far as the refrigerated beef was concerned, the truth probably is that there was little, if any, 'embalming' about it. Soldiers generally agree that the beef itself was almost universally good. … General Miles, on the other hand, was clearly right in asking that the troops might be furnished with beef cattle on the hoof, which could follow the army over any road and which would keep in good condition on the luxuriant grasses of Cuba and Porto Rico. This was the system pursued in our Civil War. No one has yet explained why it was abandoned for the experiment of furnishing this kind of beef to places in the tropics where it had to be hauled in wagons for many hours over muddy roads, and when most of the wagons required to move it promptly had to be left behind for want of water transportation.
"The matter of the refrigerated or so-called 'embalmed' beef is, however, of very slight consequence compared with that of the canned roast beef. The use of that beef as an army ration in this country, at least, was new. Officer after officer has testified before the court of inquiry that they never saw it so issued before the Cuban campaign. It is true that the navy uses it, but the facilities on shipboard for caring for and cooking food are so different and so superior to those of an army in the field that no comparison can justly be made between them. Moreover, as was recently stated in the 'Army and Navy Journal,' the belief is general in the navy that the canned beef it had rejected on inspection was afterward sold to the army and accepted by it without inspection. {634} Be this as it may, the evidence is overwhelming that the canned roast beef which was issued to the army was repulsive in appearance and disagreeable in smell. … Governor Roosevelt says in his testimony that 'from generals to privates he never heard any one who did not condemn it as an army ration.' Its defects appeared on the voyage to Santiago, if not before. It was then so bad that the men would not touch it, and as Governor Roosevelt says in his article in 'Scribner's,' his Rough Riders, who certainly were not particular, could not eat it, and as it constituted one-third of the rations, his men had to go hungry. And yet, in spite of these facts, a million pounds of that beef was purchased from Armour & Co. alone, and its issue was continued not only in Cuba but in Porto Rico. What is worse than all, after its defects were fully known it was issued as a traveling ration to the fever-racked men on their homeward voyage to this country; men who needed and were entitled to receive the most nourishing food and to whom this indigestible stuff was poison. This should never be forgotten or forgiven by the plain people of the country. …
"No one in authority has been willing to admit that there was the slightest thing wrong, or the least need for improvement in his department. … This is another of the hundreds of examples which have occurred in our past war, and which will continue to take place in the future until the whole staff system of the army has been rectified, of the reign of that hide bound bureaucratic spirit which induces the head of a department in Washington to decide in his office what should be used by the troops in the field without practical experience on the subject, and to stubbornly close his eyes and ears to everything which will tend to show that it is possible that his department has made a mistake. …
"It is noticeable that so far not an official in any of the supply or medical departments is known to have been court martialed or even censured. Yet I do not hesitate to say that the summary dismissal from the service, in the beginning, of two or three quartermasters and commissaries, including the gentlemen who were the cause of sending thousands of cars to Tampa without invoices or anything on the outside of them to indicate their contents, would have saved the lives of hundreds of our soldiers. Under these circumstances it is most lamentable to find that the awful experiences which have made so many homes desolate, and so many of our best young men invalids, have borne no practical fruit. Both the army officials and Congress are like the Bourbons, they 'have learned nothing and forgotten nothing.'"
_G. W. Wingate, What the Beef Scandal Teaches (Independent, April 6, 1899)._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899. Joint High Commission for settlement of pending questions with Canada.
See (in this volume) CANADA: A. D. 1898-1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899 (October-October). Military government of Porto Rico.
See (in this volume) PORTO RICO: A. D. 1898-1899 (OCTOBER-OCTOBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899 (December-January). Instructions by the President to General Otis, Military Governor of the Philippines. Their proclamation by the latter in a modified form. The effect.
See (in this volume) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898-1899 (DECEMBER-JANUARY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January). The case of Commissary-General Eagan.
A court-martial, sitting in January, 1899, for the trial of Commissary-General Eagan, on the charge that he had been guilty of "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline," in the abusive language that he had applied to the commanding general of the army, in the course of his testimony before the Commission to investigate the conduct of the War Department found the accused officer guilty, and imposed the inevitable penalty of dismissal from the service, but recommended executive clemency in his case.
See: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.
The sentence was commuted by the President to suspension from rank and duty for six years. This involved no loss of pay, and, at the end of six years, General Eagan will go on the retired list.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January). Appointment of the First Commission to the Philippines. The President's instructions to the Commissioners.
See (in this volume) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (JANUARY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January-February). The Treaty of Peace in the Senate. Its ratification.
The Treaty of Peace with Spain, signed at Paris December 10, 1898, was sent by the President to the Senate on the 4th of January, 1899, and held under debate in that body until the 6th of February following. The opposition to it was very strong, being especially directed against the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, involving, as that acquisition did, the embarkation of the Republic in a colonial or imperial policy, of conquest and of government without the consent of the governed, which seemed to a great number of thoughtful people, not only incongruous with its constitution, but a dangerous violation of the principles on which its republican polity is founded. But even those most opposed to the acquisition of the Philippine Islands were reluctant to reopen the state of war by rejection of the treaty, and directed their efforts mainly towards the securing of a definite declaration from Congress of the intention of the government of the United States to establish independence in the islands.
"Even before the signing of the treaty at Paris, on the 6th of December, when the demand of the American commissioners for cession of the Philippines was known, the opposition expressed itself in the following resolution, introduced by Senator Vest, of Missouri:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies. The colonial system of European nations can not be established under our present Constitution, but all territory acquired by the Government, except such small amount as may be necessary for coaling stations, correction of boundaries, and similar governmental purposes, must be acquired and governed with the purpose of ultimately organizing such territory into States suitable for admission into the Union."
This resolution became the ground of much senatorial debate during the following weeks. The arguments opposed to it, and supporting the policy of the administration, are represented fairly by the following passage from a speech made by Senator Platt, of Connecticut, on December 16:
{635}
"I propose to maintain that the United States is a nation; that as a nation it possesses every sovereign power not reserved in its Constitution to the States or the people; that the right to acquire territory was not reserved, and is therefore an inherent sovereign right; that is a right upon which there is no limitation, and with regard to which there is no qualification; that in certain instances the right may be inferred from specific clauses in the Constitution, but that it exists independent of these clauses; that in the right to acquire territory is found the right to govern it; and as the right to acquire is a sovereign and inherent right, the right to govern is a sovereign right not limited in the Constitution, and that these propositions are in accordance with the views of the framers of the Constitution, the decisions of the Supreme Court, and the legislation of Congress.
"Mr. President, this is a nation. It has been called by various names. It has been called a Confederated Republic, a Federal Union, the Union of States, a league of States, a rope of sand; but during all the time these names have been applied to it it has been a nation. It was so understood by the framers of the Constitution. It was so decided by the great judges of the Supreme Court in the early days of the Constitution. It is too late to deny it, and, Mr. President, it is also too late to admit it, and not have faith in it. Intellectual assent to the doctrines of Christianity does not make a man a Christian. It is saving faith that makes the Christian. And a mere intellectual assent to the doctrine that we are a nation does not make the true patriot. It is high time that we come to believe without qualification, to believe in our hearts, in the exercise of patriotic faith, that the United States is a nation. When we come to believe that, Mr. President, many of the doubts and uncertainties which have troubled men will disappear.
"It is time to be heroic in our faith and to assert all the power that belongs to the nation as a nation. … The attempt to shear the United States of a portion of its sovereign power is an attempt which may well be thoroughly and fully discussed. In the right to acquire territory is found the right to govern, and as the right to acquire is sovereign and unlimited, the right to govern is a sovereign right, and I maintain is not limited in the Constitution. If I am right in holding that the power to acquire is the sovereign power without limitation, I think it must be admitted that the right to govern is also sovereign and unlimited. But if it is sought to rest the right to govern upon that clause of the Constitution which gives Congress the power to dispose of or make 'all needful rules and regulations' for the government of the territory of the United States, I submit there is no limitation there. There is no qualification there."
On the 4th of January the Senate received the treaty from the President. On the 7th, Senator Mason, of Illinois, introduced the following resolution, and, subsequently, spoke with earnestness in its support:
"Whereas all just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed: Therefore, be it
"Resolved by the Senate of the United States, That the Government of the United States of America will not attempt to govern the people of any other country in the world without the consent of the people themselves, or subject them by force to our dominion against their will."
On the 9th an impressive speech was made by Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, mainly in reply to Senator Platt. He spoke partly as follows:
"Mr. President, I am quite sure that no man who will hear or who will read what I say today will doubt that nothing could induce me to say it but a commanding sense of public duty. I think I dislike more than most men to differ from men with whom I have so long and so constantly agreed. I dislike to differ from the President, whose election I hailed with such personal satisfaction and such exulting anticipations for the Republic. I dislike to differ from so many of my party associates in this Chamber, with whom I have for so many years trod the same path and sought the same goal. I am one of those men who believe that little that is great or good or permanent for a free people can be accomplished without the instrumentality of party. And I have believed religiously, and from my soul, for half a century, in the great doctrines and principles of the Republican party. I stood in a humble capacity by its cradle. I do not mean, if I can help it, to follow its hearse. I am sure I render it a service; I am sure I help to protect and to prolong the life of that great organization, if I can say or can do anything to keep it from forsaking the great principles and doctrines in which alone it must live or bear no life. I must, in this great crisis, discharge the trust my beloved Commonwealth has committed to me according to my sense of duty as I see it. However unpleasant may be that duty, as Martin Luther said, 'God help me. I can do no otherwise.'
"I am to speak for my country, for its whole past and for its whole future. I am to speak to a people whose fate is bound up in the preservation of our great doctrine of constitutional liberty. I am to speak for the dead soldier who gave his life for liberty that his death might set a seal upon his country's historic glory. I am to speak for the Republican party, all of whose great traditions are at stake, and all of whose great achievements are in peril. …
"The question with which we now have to deal is whether Congress may conquer and may govern, without their consent and against their will, a foreign nation, a separate, distinct, and numerous people, a territory not hereafter to be populated by Americans, to be formed into American States and to take its part in fulfilling and executing the purposes for which the Constitution was framed, whether it may conquer, control, and govern this people, not for the general welfare, common defense, more perfect union, more blessed liberty of the people of the United States, but for some real or fancied benefit to be conferred against their desire upon the people so governed or in discharge of some fancied obligation to them, and not to the people of the United States.
"Now, Mr. President, the question is whether the men who framed the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, meant to confer that power among the limited and restrained powers of the sovereign nation that they were creating. Upon that question I take issue with my honorable friend from Connecticut. {636} I declare not only that this is not among the express powers conferred upon the sovereignty they created, that it is not among the powers necessarily or reasonably or conveniently implied for the sake of carrying into effect the purposes of that instrument, but that it is a power which it can be demonstrated by the whole contemporaneous history and by our whole history since until within six months they did not mean should exist—a power that our fathers and their descendants have ever loathed and abhorred—and that they believed that no sovereign on earth could rightfully exercise it, and that no people on earth could rightfully confer it. They not only did not mean to confer it, but they would have cut off their right hands, everyone of them, sooner than set them to an instrument which should confer it. …
"The great contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution is to be found in the Declaration of Independence. Over every clause, syllable, and letter of the Constitution the Declaration of Independence pours its blazing torch-light. The same men framed it. The same States confirmed it. The same people pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to support it. The great characters in the Constitutional Convention were the great characters of the Continental Congress. There are undoubtedly, among its burning and shining truths, one or two which the convention that adopted it were not prepared themselves at once to put into practice. But they placed them before their countrymen as an ideal moral law to which the liberty of the people was to aspire and to ascend as soon as the nature of existing conditions would admit. Doubtless slavery was inconsistent with it, as Jefferson, its great author, has in more than one place left on record. But at last in the strife of a great civil war the truth of the Declaration prevailed and the falsehood of slavery went down, and at last the Constitution of the United States conformed to the Declaration and it has become the law of the land, and its great doctrines of liberty are written upon the American flag wherever the American flag floats. Who shall haul them down?"
Two days later (January 11) the following resolutions were introduced by Senator Bacon, of Georgia:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
First, That the Government and people of the United States have not waged the recent war with Spain for conquest and for the acquisition of foreign territory, but solely for the purposes set forth in the resolution of Congress making the declaration of said war, the acquisition of such small tracts of land or harbors as may be necessary for governmental purposes being not deemed inconsistent with the same.
"Second. That in demanding and in receiving the cession of the Philippine Islands it is not the purpose of the Government of the United States to secure and maintain dominion over the same as a part of the territory of the United States, or to incorporate the inhabitants thereof as citizens of the United States, or to hold said inhabitants as vassals or subjects of this Government.
"Third. That whereas at the time of the declaration of war by the United States against Spain, and prior thereto, the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were actively engaged in a war with Spain to achieve their independence, and whereas said purpose and the military operations thereunder have not been abandoned, but are still being actively prosecuted thereunder, therefore, in recognition of and in obedience to the vital principle announced in the great declaration that governments derive 'their just powers from the consent of the governed,' the Government of the United States recognizes that the people of the Philippine Islands of a right ought to be free and independent; that, with this view and to give effect to the same, the Government of the United States has required the Government of Spain to relinquish its authority and government in the Philippine Islands and to withdraw its land and naval forces from the Philippine Islands and from the waters thereof.
"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination when an independent government shall have been duly erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people."
On the 13th, Senator McLaurin, of South Carolina, returned to the question of constitutional power in the government of the United States to hold territory in a permanently subject state, and spoke against the view maintained by Senator Platt, of Connecticut: "To hold," he said, "that there is an inherent power of sovereignty in the nation, outside of the Constitution, to do something not authorized by that instrument is to place this 'inherent sovereignty' above the Constitution and thus destroy the very foundation upon which constitutional government rests. Judge Gray in the Chinese-exclusion case, said: 'The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are invested by the Constitution with the entire control of international relations and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control and make it effective.' While holding that the United States are a sovereign and independent nation, it will be seen that he also holds that the sovereignty of the nation is vested by the Constitution; and if so, it can only be exercised in the mode pointed out in the Constitution and is controlled by the words of the grant of this sovereignty. There was no nation of the United States until the adoption of the Federal Constitution; hence before that time there could be no sovereignty of the nation. What conferred this sovereignty? Clearly the States, by and through the Federal Constitution. If so, then there can be no inherent right of sovereignty except that conferred by the Constitution.
"The Senator further contends that we are a sovereign nation, and as such have the same inherent right to acquire territory as England, France, Germany, and Mexico. I controvert that proposition. The sovereignty of the nation of Great Britain and the others is vested in the people, and has never been delegated and limited as in our country. These Governments enjoy sovereignty in its elementary form. {637} What the government wills it may do without considering the act or its consequences in the light of an organic law of binding obligation. Our Government is in a very different position. The Federal Constitution is the embodiment of the sovereignty of the United States as a nation, and this sovereignty can only be exercised in accordance with the powers contained in its provisions. Great Britain can do anything as a nation in the way of the exercise of governmental functions. There is nothing to prohibit or restrict the fullest exercise of her sovereignty as a nation. Hence there is no analogy, and the sovereignty of the United States as a nation differs widely from that of Great Britain.
"It is further contended that a sovereign right can not be limited and that all our Constitution can do is to prescribe the manner in which it can be exercised. If, as already shown, the sovereignty of the United States was conferred by the States through the Federal Constitution, it is clear that, in conferring the power and prescribing the manner of its exercise, they did set a limit in the very terms of the instrument itself. I deny, therefore, that the United States as a nation has a sovereign, inherent right and control outside of the grant of such power in the Constitution. This is not an essential element of nationality so far as our nation is concerned, although it may be in England or Russia, where the nationality and sovereignty incident to it are not created and limited by a written constitution."
On the 14th of January, Mr. Hoar submitted the following:
"Resolved, That the people of the Philippine islands of right ought to be free and independent; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the Spanish Crown, and that all political connection between them and Spain is and ought to be totally dissolved, and that they have, therefore, full power to do all acts and things which independent states may of right do; that it is their right to institute a new government for themselves, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness; and that with these rights the people of the United States do not propose to interfere."
On the 18th, Mr. Bacon amended his resolutions, given above, by changing the phrase "an independent government" to "a stable and independent government," and then spoke upon them with force, saying, among other things: "The simple fact that we went to war with Spain did not devolve upon us any obligation with reference to the Philippine Islands. We went to war with Spain not for the purpose of correcting all the evils with which her people were afflicted; we went to war with Spain not to break the chains of tyranny with which she might be binding her different colonies: we did not undertake to be the great universal benefactor and to right all the wrongs of all the world, or even all the wrongs that Spain might be inflicting upon any of her people. "We went to war because a particular colony which she was afflicting lay at our doors; we went to war because the disorders of that Government affected the peace of our community and were injurious to our material interest. We said there was a condition of affairs which was unbearable and that we would put an end to it.
"To that extent and to that alone we claimed and avowed the reason for the declaration of war. So it follows that the mere declaration of war did not affect in any manner our relations with the Philippine Islands except to put us in a state of war with them as a part of the Spanish domain, and in no manner laid any obligations upon us as to those islands. We were not charged with the duty of preserving order in Asia. We were not charged with the obligations of seeing that they had a stable and orderly government in any part of that hemisphere. No such duty rested upon us. None such was assumed by us. Therefore the simple declaration of war did not lay any obligation upon us as to the Philippine Islands, and I desire that any Senator will put his finger upon the act which laid us under any obligations to the Philippine Islands outside of the fact that in the war which ensued we took those who were the insurgents in those islands to be our allies and made a common cause with them.
"Now, Mr. President, all that grows out of that—all that grows out of the fact of that cooperation and that alliance—is to impose upon us a single obligation which we must not ignore. How far does that obligation go? Does it require that we shall for all time undertake to be the guardians of the Philippine Islands? Does that particular obligation lay upon us the duty hereafter, not only now but for years to come, to maintain an expensive military establishment, to burden our people with debt, to run the risk of becoming involved in wars in order that we may keep our hands upon the Philippine Islands and keep them in proper condition hereafter? I am unable to see how the obligation growing out of the fact that they were our allies can possibly be extended to that degree. No Senator has yet shown any reason why such an obligation rests upon us, and I venture to say that none which is logical will or can be shown."
The practical considerations, of circumstance and expediency, which probably had more influence than those of law or principle, were strongly urged by Senator Lodge, of Massachusetts, who said, on the 24th:
"Suppose we ratify the treaty. The islands pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without committing us to any policy. I believe we can be trusted as a people to deal honestly and justly with the islands and their inhabitants thus given to our care. What our precise policy shall be I do not know, because I for one am not sufficiently informed as to the conditions there to be able to say what it will be best to do, nor, I may add, do I think anyone is. But I believe that we shall have the wisdom not to attempt to incorporate those islands with our body politic, or make their inhabitants part of our citizenship, or set their labor alongside of ours and within our tariff to compete in any industry with American workmen. I believe that we shall have the courage not to depart from those islands fearfully, timidly, and unworthily and leave them to anarchy among themselves, to the brief and bloody domination of some self-constituted dictator, and to the quick conquest of other powers, who will have no such hesitation as we should feel in crushing them into subjection by harsh and repressive methods. It is for us to decide the destiny of the Philippines, not for Europe, and we can do it alone and without assistance. …
{638}
"During the campaign of last autumn I said in many speeches to the people of my State that I could never assent to hand those islands back to Spain; that I wanted no subject races and no vassal States; but that we had by the fortunes of war assumed a great responsibility in the Philippines; that we ought to meet it, and that we ought to give to those people an opportunity for freedom, for peace, and for self-government; that we ought to protect them from the rapacity of other nations and seek to uplift those whom we had freed. From those views I have never swerved, and I believed then, as I believe now, that they met with the approbation of an overwhelming majority of the people of Massachusetts. …
"Take now the other alternative. Suppose we reject the treaty or strike out the clause relating to the Philippines. That will hand the islands back to Spain; and I cannot conceive that any American should be willing to do that. Suppose we reject the treaty: what follows? Let us look at it practically. We continue the state of war, and every sensible man in the country, every business interest, desires the re-establishment of peace in law as well as in fact. At the same time we repudiate the President and his action before the whole world, and the repudiation of the President in such a matter as this is, to my mind, the humiliation of the United States in the eyes of civilized mankind and brands us a people incapable of great affairs or of taking rank where we belong, as one of the greatest of the great world powers.
"The President cannot be sent back across the Atlantic in the person of his commissioners, hat in hand, to say to Spain, with bated breath, 'I am here in obedience to the mandate of a minority of one-third of the Senate to tell you that we have been too victorious, and that you have yielded us too much, and that I am very sorry that I took the Philippines from you.' I do not think that any American President would do that, or that any American would wish him to."
Senator Harris, of Kansas, submitted the following on the 3d of February:
"Resolved by the Senate of the United States of America, That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the Philippine Islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people."
The following was offered on the 27th of January by Senator Sullivan, of Mississippi:
"Resolved, That the ratification of the pending treaty of peace with Spain shall in no wise determine the policy to be pursued by the United States in regard to the Philippines, nor shall it commit this Government to a colonial policy; nor is it intended to embarrass the establishment of a stable, independent government by the people of those islands whenever conditions make such a proceeding hopeful of successful and desirable results."
On the same day a joint resolution was proposed by Senator Lindsay, of Kentucky:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the acquisition by the United States, through conquest, treaty, or otherwise, of territory, carries with it no constitutional obligation to admit said territory, or any portion thereof, into the Federal Union as a State or States.
"Section 2. That it is against the policy, traditions, and interests of the American people to admit states erected out of other than North American territory into our union of American States.
"Section 3. That the United States accept from Spain the cession of the Philippine Islands with the hope that the people of those islands will demonstrate their capacity to establish and maintain a stable government, capable of enforcing law and order at home and of discharging the international obligations resting on separate and independent States, and with no expectation of permanently holding those islands as colonies or provinces after they shall demonstrate their capacity for self-government, the United States to be the judge of such capacity."
None of the resolutions given above obtained favorable consideration in the Senate. On the 6th of February the treaty was ratified, by one vote in excess of the two-thirds which the constitution requires. It received 57 votes against 27, or 61 against 29 if account be taken of senators absent and paired. Of the supporters of the treaty, 42 were Republicans; of its opponents, 24 were Democrats. It was signed by President McKinley on the 10th of February, and by the Queen of Spain on the 17th of March.
After the ratification of the treaty, the Senate, by 26 votes against 22, adopted the following resolution, offered by Mr. McEnery of Louisiana:
"Resolved, That by the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippine islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States. But it is the intention of the United States to establish on said islands a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said islands, to prepare them for local self-government, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands."
_Congressional Record, December 6, 1898—February 6, 1899._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January-November). Attack on Americans at Manila by Aguinaldo's forces. Continued hostilities. Progress of American conquest.
See (in this volume) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (JANUARY-NOVEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (March). Appointment of the Isthmian Canal Commission.
See (in this volume) CANAL, INTEROCEANIC: A. D. 1889-1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (May). Modification of Civil Service Rules by President McKinley.
See (in this volume) CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: A. D. 1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (May-July). Representation in the Peace Conference at The Hague.
See (in this volume) PEACE CONFERENCE.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (June-October). Arbitration and settlement of the Venezuela boundary question.
See (in this volume) VENEZUELA: A. D. 1896-1899.
{639}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (July). Cabinet change.
General Russel A. Alger resigned his place in the President's Cabinet as Secretary of War, in July, and was succeeded by the Honorable Elihu Root, of New York.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (July). Provisional government established in the island of Negros.
See (in this volume) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (MARCH-JULY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (October). Report of conditions in Cuba by the Military Governor.
See (in this volume) CUBA: A. D. 1898-1899 (DECEMBER-OCTOBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (October). Modus Vivendi fixing provisional boundary line between Alaska and Canada.
See (in this volume) ALASKA BOUNDARY QUESTION.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (November). Death of Vice-President Hobart.
Honorable Garret A. Hobart, Vice-President of the United States, died November 21. Under the Act provided for this contingency, the Secretary of State then became the successor to the President, in the event of the death of the latter before the expiration of his term.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (November). Re-arrangement of affairs in the Samoan Islands. Acquisition of the eastern group, with Pago Pago harbor.
See (in this volume) SAMOAN ISLANDS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899-1900 (September-February). Arrangement with European Powers of the commercial policy of the "open-door" in China.
See (in this volume) CHINA: A. D. 1899-1900 (SEPTEMBER-FEBRUARY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899-1900 (November-November). Continued military operations in the Philippines.
See (in this volume) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899-1900.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899-1901. Reciprocity arrangements under the Dingley Tariff Act, not ratified by the Senate.
The Dingley Tariff Act, which became law on the 24th of July, 1897, authorized the making of tariff concessions to other countries on terms of reciprocity, if negotiated within two years from the above date. At the expiration of two years, such conventions of reciprocity had been arranged with France and Portugal, and with Great Britain for her West Indian colonies of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Trinidad, Bermuda, and British Guiana. With France, a preliminary treaty signed in May, 1898, was superseded in July, 1899, by one of broader scope, which opens the French markets to an extensive list of American commodities at the minimum rates of the French tariff, and cuts the American tariff from 5 to 20 per cent. on many French products, not inclusive of sparkling wines. In the treaty with Portugal, the reduction of American duties on wines is more general. The reciprocal reduction on American products extends to many agricultural and mineral products. The reciprocal agreement with the British West Indies covers sugar, fruits, garden products, coffee and asphalt, on one side, and flour, meat, cotton goods, agricultural machinery, oils, etc., on the other.
None of these treaties was acted upon by the United States Senate during the session of 1899-1900, and it became necessary to extend the time for their ratification, which was done. Some additional reciprocity agreements were then negotiated, of which the following statement was made by the President in his Message to Congress, December 3, 1900:
"Since my last communication to the Congress on this subject special commercial agreements under the third section of the tariff act have been proclaimed with Portugal, with Italy and with Germany. Commercial conventions under the general limitations of the fourth section of the same act have been concluded with Nicaragua, with Ecuador, with the Dominican Republic, with Great Britain on behalf of the island of Trinidad and with Denmark on behalf of the island of St. Croix. These will be early communicated to the Senate. Negotiations with other governments are in progress for the improvement and security of our commercial relations."
The question of the ratification of all these treaties was pending in the Senate when the term of the 56th Congress expired, March 4, 1901. Opposing interests in the United States seemed likely then to defeat their ratification. On the last day of the special session of the Senate, March 5-9, an agreement extending the time for the ratification of the French reciprocity treaty was received and referred to the committee on foreign relations. On the 15th of March, Secretary Hay and Lord Pauncefote signed protocols extending for one year the time of ratification for four of the British West Indian reciprocity treaties, namely, Jamaica, Bermuda, Guiana and Turks and Caicos islands.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900. Naval strength.
See (in this volume) NAVIES OF THE SEA POWERS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900. State of Indian schools. Recent Indian policy. Indian population.
See (in this volume) INDIANS, AMERICAN: A. D. 1899-1900.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (January). Report of the First Philippine Commission.
See (in this volume) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (JANUARY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (January-March). The outbreak of the "Boxers" in northern China.
See (in this volume) CHINA: A. D. 1900 (JANUARY-MARCH).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (February). Negotiation of the Hay-Pauncefote Convention relative to the Nicaragua Canal.
See (in this volume) CANAL, INTEROCEANIC: A. D. 1900 (DECEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (March-December). Passage of the Financial Bill. Settlement of the question of the monetary standard. The working of the act.
Legislation in the direction sought by the advocates of the gold standard and of a reformed monetary system for the country, whose agitations are referred to above, was attained in the spring of 1900, by the passage of an important "Financial Bill" which became law on the 14th of March.
See (in this volume) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896-1898
The provisions and the effect of the Act were summarized at the time by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gage, in a published statement, as follows:
"The financial bill has for its first object what its title indicates, the fixing of the standard of value and the maintaining at a parity with that standard of all forms of money issued or coined by the United States. It reaffirms that the unit of value is the dollar, consisting of 25.8 grains of gold, nine tenths fine, but from that point it goes on to make it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain all forms of money issued or coined at a parity with this standard. It puts into the hands of the Secretary ample power to do that. {640} For that purpose, the bill provides in the Treasury bureaus of issue and redemption and transfers from the general fund of the Treasury's cash $150,000,000 in gold coin and bullion to redemption fund, that gold to be used for the redemption of United States notes and Treasury notes. That fund is henceforth absolutely cut out of and separated from the cash balance in the Treasury and the available cash balance will hereafter show a reduction of $150,000,000 from the figures that have heretofore prevailed. This $150,000,000 redemption fund is to be used for no other purpose than the redemption of United States notes and Treasury notes and those notes so redeemed may be exchanged for the gold in the general fund or with the public, so that the reserve fund is kept full with gold to the $150,000,000 limit. If redemptions go on so that the gold in this reserve fund is reduced below $100,000,000, and the Secretary is unable to build it up to the $150,000,000 mark by exchange for gold in the general fund or otherwise, he is given power to sell bonds and it is made his duty to replenish the gold to the $150,000,000 mark by such means.
"The 'endless chain' is broken by a provision which prohibits the use of notes so redeemed to meet deficiencies in the current revenues. The act provides for the ultimate retirement of all the Treasury notes issued in payment for silver bullion under the Sherman act. As fast as that bullion is coined into silver dollars Treasury notes are to be retired and replaced with an equal amount of silver certificates. The measure authorizes the issue of gold certificates in exchange for deposits of gold coin, the same as at present, but suspends that authority whenever and so long as the gold in the redemption fund is below $100,000,000 and gives to the Secretary the option to suspend the issue of such certificates whenever the silver certificates and United States notes in the general fund of the Treasury exceed $40,000,000. The bill provides for a larger issue of silver certificates, by declaring that hereafter silver certificates shall be issued only in denominations of $10 and under except as to 10 per cent. of the total volume. Room is made for this larger use of silver certificates in the way of small bills by another provision which makes it necessary as fast as the present silver certificates of high denominations are broken up into small bills to cancel a similar volume of United States notes of small denominations and replace them with notes of denominations of $10 and upward. Further room is made for the circulation of small silver certificates by a clause which permits national banks to have only one third of their capital in denomination under $10.
"One clause of the bill which the public will greatly appreciate is the right it gives to the Secretary to coin any of the 1890 bullion into subsidiary silver coins up to a limit of $100,000,000. There has for years been a scarcity of subsidiary silver during periods of active retail trade, but this provision will give the Treasury ample opportunity to supply all the subsidiary silver that is needed. Another provision that the public will greatly appreciate is the authority given to the Secretary to recoin worn and uncurrent subsidiary silver now in the Treasury or hereafter received.
"A distinct feature of the bill is in reference to refunding the 3 per cent. Spanish war loan, the 2 per cent. bonds maturing in 1907 and the 5 per cent. bonds maturing in 1904, a total of $839,000,000, into new 2 per cent. bonds. These new 2 per cent. bonds will not be offered for sale, but will only be issued in exchange for an equal amount, face value, of old bonds. This exchange will save the Government, after deducting the premium paid, nearly $23,000,000, if all the holders of the old bonds exchange them for the new ones. National banks that take out circulation based on the new bonds are to be taxed only one half of 1 per cent. on the average amount of circulation outstanding, while those who have circulation based on a deposit of old bonds will be taxed, as at present, 1 per cent. There are some other changes in the national banking act. The law permits national banks with $25,000 capital to be organized in places of 3,000 inhabitants or less, whereas heretofore the minimum capital has been $50,000. It also permits banks to issue circulation on all classes of bonds deposited up to the par value of the bonds, instead of 90 per cent. of their face, as heretofore. This ought to make an immediate increase in national bank circulation of something like $24,000,000, as the amount of bonds now deposited to secure circulation is about $242,000,000. If the price of the new 2s is not forced so high in the market that there is no profit left to national banks in taking out circulation, we may also look for a material increase in national bank circulation based on additional deposits of bonds. National banks are permitted under the law to issue circulation up to an amount equal to their capital. The total capital of all national banks is $616,000,000. The total circulation outstanding is $253,000,000. There is, therefore, a possibility of an increase in circulation of $363,000,000, although the price of the 2 per cent. bonds, as already foreshadowed by market quotations in advance of their issue, promises to be so high that the profit to the banks in taking out circulation will not be enough to make the increase anything like such a possible total."
Upon the working of the Act, during the first nine months of its operation, Secretary Gage remarked as follows, in his annual report dated December 14, 1900:
"The operation of the act of March 14 last with respect to these two important matters of our finances has well exemplified its wisdom. Confidence in the purpose and power of the Government to maintain the gold standard has been greatly strengthened. The result is that gold flows toward the Treasury instead of away from it. At the date of this report the free gold in the Treasury is larger in amount than at any former period in our history. Including the $150,000,000 reserve, the gold in the Treasury belonging to the Government amounts to over $242,000,000, while the Treasury holds, besides, more than $230,000,000, against which certificates have been issued. That provision of the act which liberalized the conditions of bank-note issue was also wise and timely. Under it, … there has been an increase of some $77,000,000 in bank-note issues. To this fact may be chiefly attributed the freedom from stress for currency to handle the large harvests of cotton, wheat, and corn. In this respect the year has been an exception to the general rule of stringency which for several years has so plainly marked the autumn season.
{641}
"Nevertheless, the measures referred to, prolific as they have been in good results, will yet need re-enforcement in some important particulars. Thus, as to the redemption fund provided for in said act, while the powers conferred upon the Secretary are probably ample to enable a zealous and watchful officer to protect fully the gold reserve, there appears to be lacking sufficient mandatory requirement to furnish complete confidence in the continued parity, under all conditions, between our two forms of metallic money, silver and gold. Upon this point further legislation may become desirable. As to the currency, while the liberalizing of conditions has, as previously noted, found response in a necessary increase of bank-note issues, there is under our present system no assurance whatever that the volume of bank currency will be continuously responsive to the country's needs, either by expanding as such needs require or by contracting when superfluous in amount. The truth is that safe and desirable as is our currency system in many respects, it is not properly related. The supply of currency is but remotely, if at all, influenced by the ever changing requirements of trade and industry. It is related most largely, if not entirely, to the price of Government bonds in the market."
_Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1900, pages 72-73._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (April). Speech of Senator Hoar in denial of the right of the government of the United States, under the Constitution, to hold the Philippine Islands as a subject state.
On the 17th of April, the following joint resolution was under consideration in the Senate: "Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the Philippine Islands are territory belonging to the United States; that it is the intention of the United States to retain them as such and to establish and maintain such governmental control throughout the archipelago as the situation may demand." Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, spoke in opposition to the resolution, and some passages from his speech are quoted here, because they are notably representative of the ground and spirit of an opposition which existed within the party controlling the government to the war of subjugation in the Philippine Islands, to which the party and the government were finally committed by the adoption of this Congressional declaration. The attitude and argument of parties on the question are set forth below, in the platforms and manifestos of the presidential election. This speech exhibits a feeling on that question which was overridden in the winning party, and it has an importance both forensic and historical:
"The American people, so far as I know, were all agreed that their victory [in the Spanish American war] brought with it the responsibility of protecting the liberated peoples from the cupidity of any other power until they could establish their own independence in freedom and in honor. I stand here to-day to plead with you not to abandon the principles that have brought these things to pass. I implore you to keep to the policy that has made the country great, that has made the Republican party great, that has made the President great. I have nothing new to say. But I ask you to keep in the old channels, and to keep off the old rocks laid down in the old charts, and to follow the old sailing orders that all the old captains of other days have obeyed, to take your bearings, as of old, from the north star,
Of whose true fixed and resting quality There is no fellow in the firmament,
and not from this meteoric light of empire.
"Especially, if I could, would I persuade the great Republican party to come back again to its old faith, to its old religion, before it is too late. There is yet time. The President has said again and again that his is only an ad interim policy until Congress shall act. It is not yet too late. Congress has rejected, unwisely, as I think, some declarations for freedom. But the two Houses have not as yet committed themselves to despotism. The old, safe path, the path alike of justice and of freedom, is still easy. It is a path familiar, of old, to the Republican party. If we have diverged from it for the first time, everything in our history, everything in our own nature calls us back. The great preacher of the English church tells you how easy is the return of a great and noble nature from the first departure from rectitude:—
'For so a taper, when its crown of flame is newly blown off, retains a nature so symbolical to light, that it will with greediness reenkindle and snatch a ray from the neighbor fire.'
"I, for one, believed, and still believe that the pathway to prosperity and glory for the country was also the pathway to success and glory for the Republican party. I thought the two things inseparable. If, when we made the treaty of peace, we had adhered to the purpose we declared when we declared war; if we had dealt with the Philippine Islands as we promised to deal, have dealt, and expect to deal with Cuba, the country would have escaped the loss of 6,000 brave soldiers, other thousands of wrecked and shattered lives, the sickness of many more, the expenditure of hundreds of millions, and, what is far worse than all, the trampling under foot of its cherished ideals. There would have been to-day a noble republic in the East, sitting docile at our feet, receiving from us civilization, laws, manners, and giving in turn everything the gratitude of a free people could give-love, obedience, trade. The Philippine youth would throng our universities; our Constitution, our Declaration, the lives of Washington and Lincoln, the sayings of Jefferson and Franklin would have been the textbooks of their schools. How our orators and poets would have delighted to contrast America liberating and raising up the republic of Asia, with England subduing and trampling under foot the republic of Africa. Nothing at home could have withstood the great party and the great President who had done these things. We should have come from the next election with a solid North and have carried half the South. You would at least have been spared the spectacle of great Republican States rising in revolt against Republican policies. I do not expect to accomplish anything for liberty in the Philippine Islands but through the Republican party. Upon it the fate of these Islands for years to come is to depend. If that party can not be persuaded, the case is in my judgment for the present hopeless. …
{642}
"The practical question which divided the American people last year, and which divides them to-day, is this: Whether in protecting the people of the Philippine Islands from the ambition and cupidity of other nations we are bound to protect them from our own. … In dealing with this question, Mr. President, I do not mean to enter upon any doubtful ground. I shall advance no proposition ever seriously disputed in this country till within twelve months. … If to think as I do in regard to the interpretation of the Constitution; in regard to the mandates of the moral law or the law of nations, to which all men and all nations must render obedience; in regard to the policies which are wisest for the conduct of the State, or in regard to those facts of recent history in the light of which we have acted or are to act hereafter, be treason, then Washington was a traitor; then Jefferson was a traitor; then Jackson was a traitor; then Franklin was a traitor; then Sumner was a traitor; then Lincoln was a traitor; then Webster was a traitor; then Clay was a traitor; then Corwin was a traitor; then Kent was a traitor; then Seward was a traitor; then McKinley, within two years, was a traitor; then the Supreme Court of the United States has been in the past a nest and hotbed of treason; then the people of the United States, for more than a century, have been traitors to their own flag and their own Constitution.
"'We are presented with an issue that can be clearly and sharply stated as a question of constitutional power, a question of international law, a question of justice and righteousness, or a question of public expediency. This can be stated clearly and sharply in the abstract, and it can be put clearly and sharply by an illustration growing out of existing facts.
"The constitutional question is: Has Congress the power, under our Constitution, to hold in subjection unwilling vassal States?
"The question of international law is: Can any nation rightfully convey to another sovereignty over an unwilling people who have thrown off its dominion, asserted their independence, established a government of their own, over whom it has at the time no practical control, from whose territory it has been disseized, and which it is beyond its power to deliver?
"The question of justice and righteousness is: Have we the right to crush and hold under our feet an unwilling and subject people whom we had treated as allies, whose independence we are bound in good faith to respect, who had established their own free government, and who had trusted us?
"The question of public expediency is: Is it for our advantage to promote our trade at the cannon's mouth and at the point of the bayonet?
"All these questions can be put in a way of practical illustration by inquiring whether we ought to do what we have done, are doing, and mean to do in the case of Cuba; or what we have done, are doing, and some of you mean to do in the case of the Philippine Islands.
"It does not seem to me to be worth while to state again at length the constitutional argument which I have addressed to the Senate heretofore. It has been encountered with eloquence, with clearness and beauty of statement, and, I have no doubt, with absolute sincerity by Senators who have spoken upon the other side. But the issue between them and me can be summed up in a sentence or two, and if, so stated, it can not be made clear to any man's apprehension, I despair of making it clear by any elaboration or amplification. I admit that the United States may acquire and hold property, and may make rules and regulations for its disposition. I admit that, like other property, the United States may acquire and hold land. It may acquire it by purchase. It may acquire it by treaty. It may acquire it by conquest. And it may make rules and regulations for its disposition and government, however it be acquired. When there are inhabitants upon the land so acquired it may make laws for their government. But the question between me and the gentlemen on the other side is this: Is this acquisition of territory, of land or other property, whether gained by purchase, conquest, or treaty, a constitutional end or only a means to a constitutional end? May you acquire, hold, and govern territory or other property as an end for which our Constitution was framed, or is it only a means toward some other and further end? May you acquire, hold, and govern property by conquest, treaty, or purchase for the sole object of so holding and governing it, without the consideration of any further constitutional purpose? Or must you hold it for a constitutional purpose only, such as the making of new States, the national defense and security, the establishment of a seat of government, or the construction of forts, harbors, and like works, which, of course, are themselves for the national defense and security?
"I hold that this acquisition, holding and governing, can be only a means for a constitutional end—the creation of new States or some other of the constitutional purposes to which I have adverted. And I maintain that you can no more hold and govern territory than you can hold and manage cannon or fleets for any other than a constitutional end; and I maintain that the holding in subjection an alien people, governing them against their will for any fancied advantage to them, is not only not an end provided for by the Constitution, but is an end prohibited therein. … It is an end which the generation which framed the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence declared was unrighteous and abhorrent. So, in my opinion, we have no constitutional power to acquire territory for the purpose of holding it in subjugation, in a state of vassalage or serfdom, against the will of its people.
"It is to be noted just here that we have acquired no territory or other property in the Philippine Islands, save at few public buildings. By every other acquisition of territory the United States became a great land owner. She owned the public lands as she had owned the public lands in the Northwest ceded to her by the old States. But you own nothing in the Philippines. The people own their farms and dwellings and cities. The religious orders own the rest. The Filipinos desire to do what our English ancestors did in the old days when England was Catholic. The laity feared that the Church would engross all the land. So they passed their statute of mortmain. You have either got to let the people of the Philippine Islands settle this matter for themselves, or you must take upon you the delicate duty of settling it for them. {643} Your purchase or conquest is a purchase or conquest of nothing but sovereignty. It is a sovereignty over a people who are never to be admitted to exercise it or to share it. In the present case we have not, I repeat, bought any property. We have undertaken to buy mere sovereignty. There were no public lands in the Philippine Islands, the property of Spain, which we have bought and paid for. The mountains of iron and the nuggets of gold and the hemp-bearing fields—do you purpose to strip the owners of their rightful title? We have undertaken to buy allegiance, pure and simple. And allegiance is just what the law of nations declares you can not buy. …
"I have been unable to find a single reputable authority more than twelve months old for the power now claimed for Congress to govern dependent nations or territories not expected to become States. The contrary, until this war broke out, has been taken as too clear for reasonable question. I content myself with a few authorities. Among them are Daniel Webster, William H. Seward, the Supreme Court of the United States, James Madison.
"Daniel Webster said in the Senate, March 23, 1848: 'Arbitrary governments may have territories and distant possessions, because arbitrary governments may rule them by different laws and different systems. We can do no such thing. They must be of us, part of us, or else strangers. I think I see a course adopted which is likely to turn the Constitution of the land into a deformed monster, into a curse rather than a blessing; in fact, a frame of an unequal government, not founded on popular representation, not founded on equality, but on the grossest inequality; and I think that this process will go on, or that there is danger that it will go on, until this Union shall fall to pieces. I resist it to-day and always! Whoever falters or whoever flies, I continue the contest!'
"James Madison said in the Federalist: 'The object of the Federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhood, which we can not doubt will be practicable.'
_James Madison, Federalist, Number 14._
"William H. Seward said: 'It is a remarkable feature of the Constitution of the United States that its framers never contemplated colonies, or provinces, or territories at all. On the other hand, they contemplated States only, nothing less than States, perfect States, equal States, as they are called here, sovereign States. … There is reason—there is sound political wisdom in this provision of the Constitution excluding colonies, which are always subject to oppression, and excluding provinces, which always tend to corrupt and ultimately to break down the parent State.'
_Seward's Works