volume 1, part 2, page 596).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July). Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.

See (in this volume) HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: A. D. 1898.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 1). National Bankrupt Law.

After years of effort on the part of its advocates, a national bankrupt law was enacted by both Houses of Congress and received the President's signature on the 1st of July, 1898.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 3). Destruction of the Spanish squadron at Santiago.

On the morning of July 3, Admiral Cervera, convinced that Santiago would be taken by the American forces, and acting under orders from the Captain-General at Havana, made a desperate attempt to save his squadron by escaping to sea. The result was a total destruction of the Spanish ships, in an engagement with the blockading fleet, of which Admiral Sampson gave the following account in his official report:

"The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9.35 and 10 a. m., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9.31 and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later. The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment were as follows: The flagship 'New York' was 4 miles east of her blockading station and about 7 miles from the harbor entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shafter. {609} A discussion of the situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward, in the following order: The 'Indiana' about a mile and a half from shore, the 'Oregon'—the 'New York's' place being between these two—the 'Iowa,' 'Texas,' and 'Brooklyn,' the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from 2½ to 4 miles, the latter being the limit of day blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about 8 miles. The 'Massachusetts' had left at 4 a. m., for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the 'Iowa' and 'Texas.' The auxiliaries 'Gloucester' and 'Vixen' lay close to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the 'Gloucester' to the eastward and the 'Vixen' to the westward. The torpedo boat 'Ericsson' was in company with the flagship and remained with her during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning' Vizcaya.' …

"The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a speed estimated at from 8 to 10 knots, and in the following order: 'Infanta Maria Teresa' (flagship), 'Vizcaya,' 'Cristobal Colon,' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' The distance between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an interval of only about 12 minutes elapsed. Following the 'Oquendo,' at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyer 'Pluton,' and after her the 'Furor.' The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns. The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday 'quarters for inspection.' The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, 'Enemy ships escaping,' and general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within 8 minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The 'New York' turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, 'Close in towards harbor entrance and attack vessels,' and gradually increasing speed, until toward the end of the chase she was making 16½ knots, and was rapidly closing on the 'Cristobal Colon.' She was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the 'Gloucester.'

"The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in towards the Morro at the instant of the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle developed into a chase in which the 'Brooklyn' and 'Texas' had, at the start, the advantage of position. The 'Brooklyn' maintained this lead. The 'Oregon,' steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The 'Iowa' and the 'Indiana' having done good work, and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the 'Vizcaya' was beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels rescued many prisoners. The 'Vixen,' finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column and remained there during the battle and chase.

"The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the 'Gloucester' excited the admiration of everyone who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht 'Corsair'—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying about 2 miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the 'Pluton' and 'Furor,' the 'Gloucester' was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and was able to close to short range, while her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the 'Gloucester' was under the fire of the Socapa Battery. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago Harbor the careers of the 'Furor' and the 'Pluton' were ended, and two-thirds of their people killed. The 'Furor' was beached and sunk in the surf; the 'Pluton' sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships 'Iowa,' 'Indiana,' and the 'Texas,' yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the 'Gloucester's' battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the 'Gloucester' did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the 'Infanta Maria Teresa.'

"The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering in the same direction, and in formation, removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage, and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships which could not immediately work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in passing, and the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' and the 'Oquendo' were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. It was afterwards learned that the 'Infanta Maria Teresa's' fire main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach—the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' at about 10.15 a. m. at Nima Nima, 6½ miles from Santiago Harbor entrance, and the 'Almirante Oquendo' at about 10.30 a. m. at Juan Gonzales, 7 miles from the port.

{610}

"The 'Vizcaya' was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the 'Cristobal Colon' had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The 'Vizcaya' was soon set on fire, and, at 11.15, she turned inshore, and was beached at Aserraderos, 15 miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode. When about 10 miles west of Santiago the 'Indiana' had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos the 'Iowa' was signaled to 'Resume blockading station.' The 'Iowa' assisted by the 'Ericsson' and the 'Hist,' took off the crew of the 'Vizcaya,' while the 'Harvard' and the 'Gloucester' rescued those of the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.

"There remained now of the Spanish ships only the 'Cristobal Colon'—but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the 'Vizcaya' went ashore, the 'Colon' was about 6 miles ahead of the 'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon'; but her spurt was finished, and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the 'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' came the 'Texas,' 'Vixen,' and 'New York.' It was evident from the bridge of the 'New York' that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12.50 the 'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' opened fire and got her range—the 'Oregon's' heavy shell striking beyond her—and at 1.20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors, and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, 48 miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the 'Brooklyn,' went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up in the 'New York,' received his report, and placed the 'Oregon' in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the 'Resolute,' which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The 'Cristobal Colon' was not injured by our firing, and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the 'New York' bodily up on the beach, the 'New York's' stem being placed against her for this purpose—the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment—and sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

"I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it—the commodore in command on the second division, the captains of ships, their officers, and men. The fire of the battle ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. … Several of the [American] ships were struck—the 'Brooklyn' more often than the others—but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the 'Iowa.' Our loss was 1 man killed and 1 wounded, both on the 'Brooklyn.' It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by observation."

_Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,