volume 1, part 2, page 16.

The troops from Tampa, under General Shafter, arriving on the 20th, were disembarked on the 22d, 23d and 24th, at Daiquiri, and advanced to Siboney. The first resistance encountered was at La Guasima, three miles from Siboney, on the Santiago road, where the Spaniards were driven from strong entrenchments by a part of Young's brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division (dismounted). The brigade thus first in the fighting was composed of the 1st and 10th regiments of regular cavalry and the 1st United States Volunteer cavalry, commonly called the "Rough Riders." After the engagement at La Guasima, six days were occupied in concentrating the army (including the Cuban auxiliaries of General Garcia), mostly at Sevilla, a short distance beyond La Guasima, on the same road, and in overcoming great difficulties of transportation for supplies.

On June 30, General Shafter reconnoitered the country around Santiago and made his plan of attack. "From a high hill," says his subsequent report, "from which the city was in plain view, I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The roads were very poor, and, indeed, little better than bridlepaths, until the San Juan River and El Caney were reached. The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be used to assail the right flank and rear of any force operating against San Juan Hill. In view of this I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney with one division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to Santiago, passing by El Poso House, and, as a diversion, to direct a small force against Aguadores from Siboney along the railroad by the sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the Spaniards in the latter direction and of preventing them from attacking our left flank.

"During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders and explained to them my general plan of battle. Lawton's division [composed of Chaffee's, Miles' and Ludlow's brigades], assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon toward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning.

{603}

[Image: Map Illustrating the Santiago Campaign …]

{604}

After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney road toward Santiago and take position on the right of the line. Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry [embracing Sumner's brigade—3d, 6th and 9th regular cavalry, and Young's brigade mentioned above] and Kent's division of infantry [Wikoft's, Hawkins's and Pearson's brigades] were directed on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El Poso, toward which heights Grimes's battery moved on the afternoon of the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the next morning and at the proper time prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The attack at this point was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard at El Caney and his infantry fire showed he had become well engaged.

"The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted to cutting out and repairing the roads and to other necessary preparations for battle. These preparations were far from what I desired them to be; but we were in a sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road, which the rains might at any time render impassable; fear was entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies; and lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with 8,000 reenforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manzanillo and might be expected in a few days. Under those conditions I determined to give battle without delay.

"Early on the morning of July 1, Lawton was in position around El Caney, Chaffee's brigade [7th, 12th, and 13th U. S. Infantry] on the right, across the Guantanamo road; Miles's brigade [1st, 4th, and 25th U. S. Infantry] in the center, and Ludlow's [8th and 22d U. S. Infantry and 2d Microcassettes Volunteers] on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy's retreat along the Santiago road was assigned to the latter brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6.15 A. M. The battle here soon became general and was hotly contested. The enemy's position was naturally strong and was rendered more so by blockhouses, a stone fort, and entrenchments cut in solid rock, and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church. The opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been anticipated, and prevented Lawton from joining the right of the main line during the day, as had been intended.

"After the battle had continued for some time Bates's brigade of two regiments (3d and 20th United States Infantry] reached my headquarters from Siboney. I directed him to move near El Caney, to give assistance, if necessary. He did so and was put in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued with varying intensity during most of the day and until the place was carried by assault, about 4.30 p. m. As the Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road, Ludlow's position enabled him to do very effective work and to practically cut off all retreat in that direction.

"After the battle at El Caney was well opened and the sound of the small-arms fire caused us to believe that Lawton was driving the enemy before him, I directed Grimes's battery to open fire from the heights of El Poso on the San Juan' blockhouse, which could be seen situated in the enemy's entrenchments extending along the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire was effective and the enemy could be seen running away from the vicinity of the blockhouse. The artillery fire from El Poso was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently had the range of this hill, and their first shells killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the positions of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.

"At this time the cavalry division [of General Wheeler] under General Sumner (commanding temporarily in consequence of the illness of General Wheeler, who returned to duty that day], which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of the El Poso House, was ordered forward, with directions to cross the San Juan River and deploy to the right on the Santiago side, while Kent's division was to follow closely in its rear and deploy to the left. These troops moved forward in compliance with orders, but the road was so narrow as to render it impracticable to retain the column of fours formation at all points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the long range rifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded a number of our men while marching along this road and before there was any opportunity to return this fire. At this time Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to push forward with all possible haste and place their troops in position to engage the enemy. General Kent, with this end in view, forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left. … After crossing the stream, the cavalry moved to the right with a view of connecting with Lawton's left when he should come up, and with their left resting near the Santiago road. In the meanwhile Kent's division, with the exception of two regiments of Hawkins's brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing both trails, but more especially the one to the left, and crossing the creek formed for attack in the front of San Juan Hill."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,