part 2, pages 337-354).

See, also (in this volume), PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1806-1808.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-June). The War with Spain. Movements or the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera, and the blockading of it in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. Lieutenant Hobson's exploit. The sinking of the collier "Merrimac" in the channel.

The opening of hostilities found a Spanish squadron of four armored cruisers (the "Cristobal Colon," the "Almirante Oquendo," the "Vizcaya," and the "Infanta Maria Teresa,") with three torpedo-boat destroyers (the "Pluton," "Furor" and "Terror") and some lighter craft, assembled at the Cape Verde islands, under Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera. They were in Portuguese waters, and Portugal, though friendly to Spain, was forced to issue a proclamation of neutrality, on the 20th of April, which required the Spanish fleet to depart. Some of the vessels then returned to Spain; but the seven named above sailed westward, and their destination became a mystery, very exciting for some time to the American mind. They might attempt to surprise some American coast city; they might intercept the battle-ship "Oregon," then making her way from the Pacific coast, by the long circuit around Cape Horn; they might have some plan for breaking the Cuban blockade. Acting on the latter conjecture, and surmising that Porto Rico would be chosen for the Spanish naval base, Admiral Sampson moved in that direction to seek them. He attacked the forts at San Juan (May 12), and satisfied himself that no fleet was in the bay.

The truth was that Cervera was then just entering the Caribbean Sea, considerably to the south of Sampson's search. He touched at the French island of Martinique, and at the Dutch island of Curaçoa, and then slipped across to Santiago de Cuba, where he was to be overtaken by his fate. In the long hill-sheltered bay, with a narrow entrance, which forms this excellent Cuban harbor, the Spanish fleet was so hidden that nearly a fortnight passed before its whereabouts could be fully ascertained. It was not until May 20 that a blockade of Santiago was established by a flying squadron of the American fleet, under Commodore Schley, with certainty that the squadron of Cervera was harbored there. On the 1st of June, Admiral Sampson arrived on the scene, with a stronger naval force, and took command. To attempt to force the narrow entrance of the harbor, strongly fortified and thickly mined as it was, and attack the Spanish fleet in the bay, was not deemed practicable. The course resolved upon was to hold the enemy fast in the shelter he had sought, until Santiago could be taken, by a land attack. In pursuance of this plan, an exploit of splendid daring was performed, in the early morning of June 3, by a young officer, Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson, with a crew of seven volunteers, who placed and sank a huge coaling ship, the "Merrimac," in the channel that leads into Santiago Bay. The following is Admiral Sampson's report of the undertaking and its achievement:

"Before coming here, I decided to make the harbor entrance secure against the possibility of egress of the Spanish ships by obstructing the narrow part of the entrance by sinking a collier at that point. Upon calling upon Mr. Hobson for his professional opinion as to a sure method of sinking the ship, he manifested a most lively interest in the problem. After several days' consideration he presented a solution which he considered would insure the immediate sinking of the ship when she had reached the desired point in the channel. This plan we prepared for before we reached Santiago. This plan included ten electric torpedoes on the outside of the ship, each of 78 pounds of gunpowder, sinking the ship partially before going in, cutting the sea valves, and opening the cargo ports. The plan contemplated a crew of only seven men and Mr. Hobson, who begged that it might be intrusted to him. The anchor chains were ranged upon deck for both the anchors, forward and aft, the plan including the anchoring of the ship almost automatically. As soon as I reached Santiago and had the collier to work upon the details were commenced and diligently prosecuted, hoping to complete them in one day, as the moon and tide served best the first night after our arrival. Notwithstanding every effort, the hour of 4 o'clock in the morning arrived and the preparations were scarcely completed. After a careful inspection of the final preparations I was forced to relinquish the plan for that morning, as dawn was breaking. Mr. Hobson begged to try it at all hazards.

"This morning proved more propitious, as a prompt start could be made. Nothing could have been more gallantly executed. We waited impatiently after the firing by the Spaniards had ceased. When they did not reappear from the harbor at 6 o'clock I feared they had all perished. A steam launch, which had been sent in charge of Naval Cadet Powell to rescue the men, appeared at this time, coming out under a persistent fire from the batteries, but brought none of the crew. A careful inspection of the harbor from this ship showed that the 'Merrimac' had been sunk in the channel somewhat farther in than had been intended. {596} This afternoon the chief of staff of Admiral Cervera came out under a flag of truce with a letter from the Admiral extolling the bravery of the crew in an unusual manner. I can not myself too earnestly express my appreciation of the conduct of Mr. Hobson and his gallant crew. I venture to say that a more brave and daring thing has not been done since Cushing blew up the 'Albemarle.'" The sunken ship did not actually block the channel; but that fact takes nothing from the gallantry of the exploit. Why the intended spot in the channel was missed was explained by Lieutenant Hobson in a statement which he afterwards made: "When the 'Merrimac' poked her nose into the channel," says the Lieutenant, "our troubles commenced. The deadly silence was broken by the swash of a small boat approaching us from the shore. I made her out to be a picket boat. She ran close up under the stern of the 'Merrimac' and fired several shots from what seemed to be 3 pounder guns. The 'Merrimac's' rudder was carried away by this fire. That is why the collier was not sunk across the channel. We did not discover the loss of the rudder until Murphy [the volunteer assigned to that duty] had cast anchor. We then found that the 'Merrimac' would not answer to the helm and were compelled to make the best of the situation. … Submarine mines and torpedoes were exploded all around us, adding to the excitement. The mines did no damage, although we could hear the rumbling and feel the ship tremble. We were running without lights, and only the darkness saved us from utter destruction. When the ship was in the desired position and we found that the rudder was gone, I called the men on deck. While they were launching the catamaran I touched off the explosives. At the same time two torpedoes, fired by the 'Reina Mercedes,' struck the 'Merrimac' amidships. I can not say whether our own explosives or the Spanish torpedoes did the work, but the 'Merrimac' was lifted out of the water, and almost rent asunder."

What followed, in the experience of the crew, when their vessel went down, is described as follows by Lieutenant Hobson, in a narrative of "The Sinking of the Merrimac," which he published at a later day: "The stricken vessel now reeled to port. Some one said: 'She is going to turn over on us, sir,' to which I replied: 'No; she will right herself in sinking, and we shall be the last spot to go under.' The firing suddenly ceased. The vessel lowered her head like a faithful animal, proudly aware of its sacrifice, bowed below the surface, and plunged forward. The stern rose and heeled heavily; it stood for a moment, shuddering, then started downward, righting as it went. A great rush of water came up the gangway, seething and gurgling out of the deck. The mass was whirling from right to left 'against the sun'; it seized us and threw us against the bulwarks, then over the rail. Two were swept forward as if by a momentary recession, and one was carried down into a coal-bunker—luckless Kelly. In a moment, however, with increased force, the water shot him up out of the same hole and swept him among us. The bulwarks disappeared. A sweeping vortex whirled above. We charged about with casks, cans, and spars, the incomplete stripping having left quantities on the deck. The life-preservers stood us in good stead, preventing chests from being crushed, as well as buoying us on the surface; for spars came end on like battering-rams, and the sharp corners of tin cans struck us heavily. … When we looked for the life-boat we found that it had been carried away. The catamaran was the largest piece of floating debris; we assembled about it. The line suspending it from the cargo-boom held and anchored us to the ship, though barely long enough to reach the surface, causing the raft to turn over and set us scrambling as the line came taut.

"The firing had ceased. It was evident the enemy had not seen us in the general mass of moving objects; but soon the tide began to drift these away, and we were being left alone with the catamaran. The men were directed to cling close in, bodies below and only heads out, close under the edges, and were directed not to speak above a whisper, for the destroyer was near at hand, and boats were passing near. We mustered; all were present, and direction was given to remain as we were till further orders, for I was sure that in due time after daylight a responsible officer would come out to reconnoiter. It was evident that we could not swim against the tide to reach the entrance. Moreover, the shores were lined with troops, and the small boats were looking for victims that might escape from the vessel. The only chance lay in remaining undiscovered until the coming of the reconnoitering boat, to which, perhaps, we might surrender without being fired on. … The air was chilly and the water positively cold. In less than five minutes our teeth were chattering; so loud, indeed, did they chatter that it seemed the destroyer or the boats would hear. … We remained there probably an hour."

At daylight a steam launch approached, and was hailed by Lieutenant Hobson, who judged that there must be officers on board to whom it would be safe to surrender. He was more than right. The commander of the launch was Admiral Cervera, in person, who took the nearly exhausted men from the water and treated them with great kindness, admiring the bravery of their exploit, and sending a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson to announce their safety. They were taken aboard the 'Reina Mercedes,' and, as prisoners of war, were confined at first in Morro Castle, and afterwards in the city. It so happened that they were locked in the Morro during a bombardment of the Spanish coast defences and fleet by ten of our vessels on June 6th, when about 1,500 projectiles were fired; and much anxiety and indignation were expressed in this country in view of that circumstance; but Mr. Ramsden, British consul at Santiago, explained in a despatch that they were removed as soon as lodgings could be prepared in the barracks—actually on June 7th. They were released on July 6th in exchange for prisoners captured by our forces.

{597}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-July). War with Spain, Destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Despatches of Admiral Dewey. His relations with Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief. Arrival of American troops for the occupation of the city.

Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic Squadron, then awaiting orders at Hongkong, received on the 25th of April the following despatch by cable from the Secretary of the Navy: "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors." On the sixth day after receiving these orders (namely on May 1st), he was able to report from Manila, by a telegram sent from Hongkong on the 7th: "The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: 'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de Biloa,' 'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de Cuba,' 'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Curreo,' 'Velasco,' one transport, 'Isla de Mandano,' water battery at Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dispensatory. The squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. I request the Department will send immediately from San Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul at Hongkong."

In due time the post brought particulars of the action, in the following report from Commodore Dewey, dated May 4: "The squadron left Mirs Bay, [China] on April 27, immediately on the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at Manila, who brought important information and who accompanies the squadron. Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30 and, finding no vessels there, proceeded down the coast and arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon. The 'Boston' and 'Concord' were sent to reconnoiter Port Subic, I having been informed that the enemy intended to take position there. A thorough search of the port was made by the 'Boston' and 'Concord,' but the Spanish fleet was not found, although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal ( inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their intention to go there. Entered the Boca Grande, or south channel, at 11.30 p. m., steaming in column at distance at 8 knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots taking effect. The 'Boston' and 'McCulloch' returned the fire. The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed, and arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5.15 a. m. by three batteries at Manila and two at Cavite and by the Spanish fleet anchored in an approximately east and west line across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal water in Canacao Bay. The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the flagship 'Olympia,' under my personal direction, leading, followed at distance by the 'Baltimore,' 'Raleigh,' 'Petrel,' 'Concord,' and 'Boston,' in the order named, which formation was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5.41 a. m. While advancing to the attack, two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective. The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5,000 to 2,000 yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective.

"Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the 'Olympia' with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before an opportunity occurred to fire torpedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish flagship 'Reina Christina' made a desperate attempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the 'Olympia' being concentrated upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished until she sank. At 7.35 a. m., it having been erroneously reported to me that only 15 rounds per gun remained for the 5-inch rapid-fire battery, I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, if necessary. The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance to the Pasig River, the second on the south bastion of the walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one-ha]f mile farther south. At this point I sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of silencing them.

"At 11.16 a. m., finding that the report of scarcity of ammunition was incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the attack. By this time the flagship and almost the entire Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12.30 p. m. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burnt, and deserted. At 12.40 p. m. the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the 'Petrel' being left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats, which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible. The Spanish lost the following vessels: Sunk—'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de Ulloa.' Burnt—'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de Cuba,' 'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Correo,' 'Velasco,' and 'Isla Mindanao,' (transport). Captured—'Rapido,' and 'Hercules' (tugs), and several small launches. I am unable to obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded, but believe their loss to be very heavy. The 'Reina Christina' alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded.

"I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron under my command was inconsiderable. There were none killed, and only 7 men in the squadron very slightly wounded. As will be seen by the reports of the commanding officers which are herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were struck and even penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle. I beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander in chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more loyal, efficient, and gallant captains than those of the squadron now under my command. … On May 2, the day following the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavite, where it remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns and magazines of the batteries there. … On the 3d the military forces evacuated the Cavite Arsenal, which was taken possession of by a landing party."

{598}

Promptly in response to this report of his victory, a joint resolution of thanks to Commodore Dewey and his officers and men, by the two Houses of Congress, was despatched to them, with announcement to the former of his promotion to the rank of rear-admiral. The admiral replied, on the 13th, from Cavite, making due acknowledgments, and adding: "I am maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe rebels are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and making no demonstrations. Great scarcity of provisions in the city. I believe the Spanish Governor-General will be obliged to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To retain possession and thus control Philippine Islands would require, in my best judgment, a well equipped force of 5,000 men."

On the 20th he reported, further: "Aguinaldo, the rebel commander in chief, was brought down by the 'McCulloch' [from Hongkong]. Organizing forces near Cavite and may render assistance that will be valuable." On the 27th of June, in reply to inquiries from the Navy Department, he explained his relations with Aguinaldo, as follows: "Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by permission, on 'Nanshan.' Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The United States has not been bound in any way to assist insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they not yet having many guns. In my opinion these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races."

_Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1898,