volume 2, page 175.

In previous confidential orders to the commander of the North Atlantic squadron, issued April 6, in anticipation of hostilities, the Department had directed as follows: "In the event of hostilities with Spain, the Department wishes you to do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.

"2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object, viz, the destruction of the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. There are two reasons for this: First. There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of October. Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels.

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"3. The Department further desires that, in case of war, you will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over."

_Report of Secretary of Navy, 1898,