volume 1, exhibit 2 (page 185).

{379}

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (January-February). Causes of and responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities between the Americans and the Filipinos.

"The Philippine Information Society," organized for the purpose of "placing within reach of the American people the most reliable and authoritative evidence attainable in regard to the people of the Philippine Islands and our relations to them," has published in Number VII of the First Series of its pamphlets a carefully made collection of information, from official and other sources, relative to the circumstances in which hostilities between the American and Filipino forces came about. On this as on other subjects which the society has investigated it seems to have pursued its inquiries with no aim but to learn and set forth the truth. Its conclusions, resting on the evidence which it submits, are stated in an introduction to the pamphlet as follows:

"It will presumably he admitted that the important question with regard to the Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899, is not, who fired the first shot, but who was responsible for the conditions that made it evident to every observer weeks before the clash came that a single shot might bring on war. … The situation may be briefly explained as follows: We believed that the Philippine Archipelago was and ought to be ours, and we were moving to take possession as rapidly as possible. The Filipinos, or at least Aguinaldo's government and followers, believed that the country was theirs and they resented every effort on our part to occupy it. We considered it ours through cession from Spain and right of conquest. They claimed that Spain no longer held possession of the country and therefore had no right to cede it to us; moreover, that by right of conquest we were entitled only to temporary occupation of Manila. We wished to extend our sovereignty throughout the Archipelago with all possible dispatch. They desired independence, or at least a protectorate which, while securing them from foreign aggression, should leave them control of their internal affairs. While a discussion of the justice of either position does not come within the limits of the present inquiry, it is important to remember that from the first a minority in this country urged that the Filipinos were entitled to a promise of ultimate independence, and that a resolution of Congress, similar to that passed in the case of Cuba, would avert all occasion for war. This course having been rejected by our country, the question arises, did the assertion of United States sovereignty render war inevitable? …

"No doubt most Americans believe that left to themselves the Filipinos would soon have lapsed into anarchy, while a few maintain that with temporary assistance in international affairs they would have developed a government better suited to their peculiar needs than we can ever give them. Still others who are familiar with the Filipinos and kindred races believe that their aspiration for an independent national existence was not deep rooted, that had we adopted an affectionate, admiring tone to their leaders, had we recognized their government and approved of it, we could soon have made their government our government, could have been as sovereign as we pleased, and had the people with us. Whatever view one may hold, it must be admitted that if we were to establish our sovereignty by peaceful methods it was essential to win the confidence and affection of the Filipinos. … There is every indication that the Filipinos were prepared, at first, to treat us as friends and liberators. General Anderson tells the following interesting story: The prevailing sentiment of the Filipinos towards us can be shown by one incident. About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in Cavite invited a number of our army and navy officers to a banquet. There was some post-prandial speech-making, the substance of the Filipino talk being that they wished to be annexed but not conquered. One of our officers in reply assured them that we had not come to make them slaves, but to make them free men. A singular scene followed. All the Filipinos rose to their feet, and Buencomeno, taking his wine-glass in his hand, said: We wish to be baptized in that sentiment. Then he and the rest poured the wine from their glasses over their heads. After the very first, however, the cultivation of intimate relations with the Filipino leaders seems to have been considered unimportant or inadvisable. General Merritt states that he never saw Aguinaldo. Social intercourse between our officers and the Filipinos was discouraged by General Otis. In fact after the surrender of Manila General Whittier seems to have been the only one of our superior officers who ever had a personal interview with Aguinaldo.

"Certainly after the proclamation of January 4, [see above: A. D. 1898-1899 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY)] war could only have been avoided by a decisive action of Congress promising ultimate independence to the Filipinos. That proclamation of January 4 raised the issue and provoked the counter proclamation of January 5, which so stirred the people against us—a proclamation in which Aguinaldo once and a thousand times and with all the energy of his soul protested against American sovereignty, and which closed with the words, 'upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed.' …

"Aguinaldo's proclamation was followed by a series of conferences of which General Otis reports 'It was one continued plea for some concession that would satisfy tho people.' On January 16th he cabled to Washington, 'Aspiration Filipino people is independence with restrictions resulting from conditions which its government agree with American when latter agree to officially recognize the former.' Finally on January 25th he sent word to the insurgent commissioners that 'To this dispatch no reply has been received.' From this time General Otis states, the insurgents hurried forward preparations for war. Contemporaneous with these events in the Philippines the Treaty of Peace was pending in the United States Senate where it had been assigned for a vote on February 6th.

"With regard to the actual outbreak of' hostilities, there is a sharp difference of opinion. The United States press dispatches announcing the outbreak, and the contemporaneous newspaper statements by the Filipinos … are of interest as evidence that from the very first each side claimed the other to be the aggressor. {380} As to which of these opposing claims is borne out by the facts, the editors would say that after careful study of all the accessible evidence they find that according to the most authoritative statements the outbreak occurred as the result of a trespass by four armed Filipinos on territory admitted by the Filipino in command to be within the jurisdiction of the United States. The number of Filipinos has been variously estimated. The editors follow the report of General MacArthur in command of the division in which the firing began, which agrees with the report of Second-Lieutenant Wheedon of the First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry, stationed at Santa Mesa. The action of the Filipino trespassers seems to have been an instance of bad discipline in the insurgent army. Certainly it was not ordered on that date by the insurgent leaders, although there are some indications that the leaders had planned to attack in a few days. The claim that our forces instigated the attack for the purpose of securing the votes necessary to ratify the treaty is absolutely unsupported by any evidence which has come to the attention of the editors."

_Philippine Information Society, Publications, First Series, VII., Introduction._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (January-November). Attack on American forces by the Tagalos. Continued hostilities. Progress of American conquest.

"No definite date had been set for the attack [by the hostile Tagalos], but a signal by means of rockets had been agreed upon, and it was universally understood that it would come upon the occurrence of the first act on the part of the American forces which would afford a pretext; and in the lack of such act, in the near future at all events. Persistent attempts were made to provoke our soldiers to fire. The insurgents were insolent to our guards and made persistent and continuous efforts to push them back and advance the insurgent lines farther into the city of Manila. … With great tact and patience the commanding general had held his forces in check, and he now made a final effort to preserve the peace by appointing a commission to meet a similar body appointed by Aguinaldo and to 'confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aims, and desires of the Filipino people and of the people of the United States.' Six sessions were held, the last occurring on January 29, six days before the outbreak of hostilities. No substantial results were obtained, the Filipino commissioners being either unable or unwilling to give any definite statements of the 'intent, purposes, and aims of their people.' At the close of the last session they were given full assurances that no hostile act would be inaugurated by the United States troops. The critical moment had now arrived. Aguinaldo secretly ordered the Filipinos who were friendly to him to seek refuge outside the city. The Nebraska regiment at that time was in camp on the east line at Santa Mesa, and was guarding its front. For days before the memorable 4th of February, 1899, the outposts in front of the regiment had been openly menaced and assaulted by insurgent soldiers; they were attempting to push our outposts back and advance their line. They made light of our sentinels and persistently ignored their orders. On the evening of the 4th of February, an insurgent officer came to the front with a detail of men and attempted to pass the guard on the San Juan Bridge, our guard being stationed at the west end of the bridge. The Nebraska sentinel drove them back without firing, but a few minutes before 9 o'clock that evening a large body of insurgent troops made an advance on the South Dakota outposts, which fell back rather than fire. About the same time the insurgents came in force to the east end of the San Juan Bridge, in front of the Nebraska regiment. For several nights prior thereto a lieutenant in the insurgent army had been coming regularly to our outpost No. 2, of the Nebraska regiment, and attempting to force the outpost back and insisting on posting his guard within the Nebraska lines; and at this time and in the darkness he again appeared with a detail of about six men and approached Private Grayson, of Company D, First Nebraska Volunteers, the sentinel on duty at outpost No. 2. He, after halting them three times without effect, fired, killing the lieutenant, whose men returned the fire and then retreated. Immediately rockets were sent up by the Filipinos, and they commenced firing all along the line, … and continued to fire until about midnight; and about 4 o'clock on the morning of February 5 the insurgents again opened fire all around the city and kept it up until the Americans charged them and drove them with great slaughter out of their trenches."

_Philippine Commission, Preliminary Report (Exhibit 1.—Report, January 31, 1900,