chapter 26 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons).

"Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A portion of the money, $400,000, was deposited in banks at Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms, and if they failed to do so, it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho $5,000. No steps have been taken to introduce the reforms, more than 2,000 insurgents, who had been deported to Fernando Po and other places, are still in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to carry on the operations of the present insurrection."

_F. V. Greene, Memorandum concerning the Situation in the Philippines, August 30, 1898 (Treaty of Peace and Accompanying Papers: 55th Congress, 3d Session, Senate Document Number 62, part 1, page 421._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1897. Refusal of United States Government to negotiate with the insurgent republic.

See (in this volume) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (NOVEMBER).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (April-May). Circumstances in which Aguinaldo was brought to Manila to co-operate with American forces.

See (in this volume) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (APRIL-MAY: PHILIPPINES).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (April-July). Destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Blockade and siege of the city. Co-operation of insurgents under Aguinaldo.

See (in this volume) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (APRIL-JULY).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (May-August). Conduct of English and German naval officers at Manila.

See (in this volume) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (MAY-AUGUST).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (July-August). Correspondence between the American commander and Aguinaldo.

This is fully given (showing the relations between the American and Filipino forces, before the capture of Manila), in the general account of the Spanish-American War.

See (in this volume) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (JULY-AUGUST: PHILIPPINES).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (July-September). American capture of Manila. Relations with the Filipino insurgents. General Merritt's report. Aguinaldo declared President of the Philippine Republic.

See (in this volume) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (August). Suspension of hostilities between the United States and Spain. Manila held by the former pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace.

See (in this volume) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (JULY-DECEMBER).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (August). Losses of the American army during the war with Spain.

See (in this volume) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (August-December). The state of things following the occupation of Manila by American forces. Growing distrust and unfriendliness of the Tagalos. General Otis's report.

Of the state of things which followed the departure of General Merritt, August 30, General Otis, who succeeded him in command, reported subsequently as follows:

"Until October 14 [1898], the United States troops in the Philippines remained stationed at Manila and Cavite, as provided in General Merritt's orders of August 23, with very slight exceptions, Major-General Anderson retaining supervision of the district of Cavite and Major-General MacArthur of the troops stationed in Manila, the three organizations composing the provost guard continuing, however, under the control of Brigadier-General Hughes. They were most bountifully supplied with subsistence and medicines, but light clothing suited to the climate and facilities necessary for occupying and messing in barracks were needed. These were soon obtained through contract and purchase from the merchants of Hongkong and Manila and by shipment from the United States. The troops received tactical instructions daily, but the weather was too hot for much physical exertion, and time hung heavily upon them. They entertained the impression that the Spanish war had terminated, and the volunteers appeared to believe that they should be recalled to the United States at once and regular troops sent out to perform the monotonous garrison duties which were about to follow the victory of Manila. Many became ill from too free indulgence in the fruits and manufactured drinks of the country, and indifference to that care and attention of person which a tropical climate makes necessary. Homesickness alone produced illness in numerous cases, so that early in September the hospitals began to be rapidly filled. This led to the adoption of judicious precautionary measures. … In November improvement was noticeable, and in January the health of this army would compare favorably with those of any concentrated army of like proportions in existence. To be sure the men had become by this time fairly acclimatized, and new troops arriving here will be obliged to pass through this period of acclimatization before they become properly efficient for prolonged service in the field.

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"During my first weeks of duty here I was impressed with the spirit of suspicion and the partially concealed unfriendly feeling manifested by the Tagalos toward the American forces. That they either had very little confidence in our promises or were then forming conclusions to oppose any establishment of United States authority in Luzon was apparent, however loudly they might disclaim hostile intent or declare as an excuse for their attitude fear of the return of Spain. I saw, however, with satisfaction, their ablest men by education, and mental equipment taking part in their authoritative deliberations, and I had considerable confidence in the efficacy of their suggestions and advice. Still, after carefully weighing conditions, I was unable to arrive at any satisfactory conclusions. …

"Measures were being applied constantly to improve the sanitary condition of the city, to increase the efficiency of the troops, and to meet any emergency which might develop from an uprising of the inhabitants, or from hasty action by any portion of our or the insurgent forces, which, though maintaining amicable intercourse, were, in fact, in an attitude of resistance and hostility upon all questions involving the right of armed occupation of the suburbs and defenses of Manila. The insurgent soldiers had looted extensively the portions of the city to which they gained access, and were greatly disappointed that this privilege over other parts of the same was not accorded them. Their enforced withdrawal to outer lines was the cause of discontent, and augmented any desire which they may have formerly entertained to resist or attack the American troops. This growing discontent was observable among the lower classes of the city's inhabitants, from whom a considerable share of Aguinaldo's army was drawn, and was undoubtedly increased by the reprehensible conduct and illegal actions of some of our own men, who were severely punished for their misdeeds when detected. Outwardly, however, relations of the most friendly character were maintained. The officers and enlisted men of the two armies mingled in friendly social intercourse. To the casual observer the only discordant element in this dense complex population, made up of every nation and tongue in existence, were the hated Spanish prisoners, whom the Filipinos still longed to persecute and kill, and who were obliged to keep within the walls of Old Manila for safety. Repeated conferences were held with influential insurgents, whose chief aim appeared to be to obtain some authoritative expression on the intent of the United States with regard to the Philippines, and complained that they were unable to discover anyone who could speak ex cathedra. They asserted that their Malolos arrangement was a government de facto, which had the right to ask an expression of intent from the United States Government. …

"My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered from a dispatch sent to Washington on December 7, wherein I stated that conditions were improving and that there were signs of revolutionary disintegration; that I had conferred with a number of the members of the revolutionary government and thought that the most of them would favor peaceful submission to United States authority. I had strong reasons for this expressed confidence from assurances made to me by some of the ablest Filipinos who had occupied positions of importance in the insurgent government and had signified their intention to withdraw from it."

_Report of General Otis, August 31, 1899 (Message and Documents: Abridgement, 1899-1900,