Part 99

The Virginians who volunteered were mustered in and organized at Camp Carlile, in Ohio, opposite Wheeling, under the command of Colonel Kelly, himself a Virginian. George B. McClellan, who had been appointed a Major-General and assigned to the command of the Department of the Ohio, remained at Cincinnati, his home. Three days after the election aforesaid, he issued from that city a spirited address 'To the Union men of Western Virginia.' … A brief and stirring address to his soldiers was issued simultaneously with the above; and, both being read to those in Camp Carlile that evening, the 1st Virginia, 1,100 strong, Colonel Kelly, crossed to Wheeling early next morning, closely followed by the 16th Ohio, Colonel Irvine. The 14th Ohio, Colonel Steedman, crossed simultaneously, and quietly occupied Parkersburg, the terminus of the Northwestern branch of the Baltimore and Ohio road. A Rebel force, then holding Grafton, which connected the branch aforesaid with the main or Wheeling division of the railroad, had meditated a descent on Wheeling; but, finding themselves anticipated and outnumbered, they obstructed and destroyed the railroad west of them," and fell back to Philippi, some fifteen miles southward. "General McClellan having ordered that Philippi be captured by surprise, the attempt was made on the night of June 2d. Two brigades of two regiments each approached the Rebel camp by different roads" and dispersed it completely, with some loss on both sides, capturing the tents, provisions and munitions. The Rebel commander, Colonel Porterfield, "gathering up such portion of his forces as he could find, retreated hastily to Beverly, and thence to Huttonsville; where the Rebel array was rapidly increased by conscription, and Governor Wise placed in command. General McClellan arrived at Grafton on the 23d. … His forces were rapidly augmented, till they amounted, by the 4th of July, to over 30,000 men; while the Rebels in his front could hardly muster 10,000 in all. {3433} He therefore resolved to advance. The Rebel main force, several thousand strong, under General Robert S. Garnett, was strongly intrenched on Laurel Hill, a few miles north of Beverly, … while a smaller detachment, under Colonel John Pegram was intrenched upon the summit and at either base of Rich Mountain … three or four miles distant from the Rebel main body." General Rosecrans, sent by a detour of eight miles through the mountains to Pegram's rear, drove the rebels (July 11) from their position, at the point of the bayonet; and the following day their commander, with about 600 men, was forced to surrender. "General McClellan pushed on to Beverly, which he entered early next morning, flanking General Garnett's position at Laurel Hill and compelling him to a precipitate flight northward. Six cannon, 200 tents, 60 wagons and over 100 prisoners, were the trophies of this success. The Rebel loss in killed and wounded was about 150; the Union about 50. General Garnett, completely flanked, thoroughly worsted, and fearfully outnumbered, abandoned his camp at Laurel Hill without a struggle, crossing the Laurel Mountains eastward, by a by-road, into the narrow valley of Cheat river. … At length, having crossed the Cheat at a point known as Carrick's Ford, which proffered an admirable position for defense. Garnett turned [July 14] to fight." But the Union force which pursued him was overpowering; Garnett himself was killed in the battle at the Ford and his command fled in confusion. General McClellan telegraphed to Washington, next day, from Huttonsville: "We have completely annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia. Our loss is about 13 killed and not more than 40 wounded; while the enemy's loss is not far from 200 killed; and the number of prisoners we have taken will amount to at least 1,000. We have captured seven of the enemy's guns in all. A portion of Garnett's forces retreated; but I look for their capture by General Hill, who is in hot pursuit." "This expectation was not realized. The pursuit was only continued two miles beyond the ford; when our weary soldiers halted, and the residue of the Rebels, under Colonel Ramsey, turning sharply to the right, made their way across the mountains, and joined General Jackson at Monterey." Meantime, simultaneously with General McClellan's advance on Beverly, another strong Union force, under General Cox, had moved from Guyandotte to the Kanawha, and up that river to Charleston, which it reached on the 25th of July. Governor Wise, who commanded the rebels in the Kanawha Valley, retreated, General Cox pursuing, until the pursuit was checked on the 29th by Wise's destruction of Gauley bridge. The rebels then made good their flight to Lewisburg, in Greenbrier county, where Wise was reinforced and superseded by General John B. Floyd.

_H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 1, chapter 32._

"The war in Western Virginia seemed to have ended with the dispersion of Garnett's forces, and there was much rejoicing over the result. It was premature. The 'Confederates' were not disposed to surrender to their enemy the granaries that would be needed to supply the troops in Eastern Virginia, without a severer struggle. General Robert E. Lee succeeded Garnett, and more important men than Wise and Floyd took the places of these incompetents. Rosecrans succeeded McClellan, who was called to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and the war in the mountain region of Virginia was soon renewed."

_B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 1, chapter 22._

ALSO IN: _Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series 1, volume 2, page 193-293._

_V. A. Lewis, History of West Virginia, chapter 28._

_J. D. Cox, McClellan in West Virginia (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July). First depredations of the Confederate cruiser Sumter.

See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1861-1862.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July: Virginia). The seat of the rebel government transferred to Richmond.

See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JULY).

[Image: The Principal Theatre of War in Virginia.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July: Virginia). On to Richmond. The First Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas.

"The Southern Government having inclined to the defensive policy as that upon which they should act, their first object was to prevent an advance of any Federal force into Virginia. Early in the month of May troops were assembled in Richmond, and pushed forward toward the northeastern boundary of the State, to a position known as Manassas Junction. … It is here that a railroad from Alexandria, another from Staunton up the valley and through Manassas Gap, and another from Gordonsville unite. At Gordonsville the railroad from Richmond and the line from East Tennessee unite. As a point for concentration none more eligible exists in northeastern Virginia. The advantages for fortification are naturally such that the place can be rendered impregnable. Here the centre of the northern force of the Southern army was posted, with the left wing pushed forward to Winchester [under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, with the Union General Patterson opposed to him] and the right extended to the Potomac, and sustained by heavy batteries which served to blockade the river. The Federal force, the advance of which was assembled at Washington for the defence of that city against any attack by the Southern troops, was posted on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on Arlington Heights, which were strongly fortified. Their right was pushed some distance up the Potomac, and chiefly on the Maryland side, while their left occupied Alexandria. The armies of both sides consisted of raw militia hastily brought together, and of volunteers who for the first time had put on the uniform, and taken up the weapons of the soldier. On both sides the forces were constantly accumulating. On the morning of June 27th, the consolidated report of General Mansfield, commanding the Department of Washington, gives the number of troops in that city and vicinity. The privates, including regulars and volunteers present for duty, numbered 22,846 men. The grand aggregate of the force, including officers, etc., present and absent, was 34,160 men. The force of General Patterson, commanding in Maryland above Washington, and also on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on the 28th of June, was returned, embracing officers and men enlisted and present for duty, 15,923. Of these about 550 were reported as sick."

_W. J. Tenney, Military and Naval History of the Rebellion, page 67._

{3434}

"The return of Johnston's [Confederate] army for June 30th showed his total force present for duty to have been 10,654; but this includes some troops which, though assigned to his army, did not join him till after July 3d. … A prime object of Johnston in taking post at Winchester was, that he might be enabled to join the army at Manassas in case of need. On June 2d, only a week after Johnston's arrival at Harper's Ferry, Beauregard had reached Manassas and assumed command. He and Johnston at once communicated with each other, and agreed in their views of the importance of mutual support. … As soon as Johnston ascertained … that McClellan [from West Virginia] was not moving on Romney and Winchester, the feasibility of this movement to Manassas at the right time became greater. The only problem then remaining was to so time it as to arrive just long enough before the impending battle to take part in it, and not so long as to cause, by the news of his arrival, a corresponding transfer of Patterson. … It was for the purpose of gaining as much start as possible on Patterson that Johnston had retired to Winchester, instead of remaining opposite the Northern force at Martinsburg. He kept his cavalry well out, in order to be informed as promptly as possible of the slightest change in Patterson's position. Meanwhile the grand Federal advance upon Manassas had commenced."

_R. M. Hughes, General Johnston, pages 47-51._

The advance from Washington, which began on the 16th of July, and which resulted in the grievous defeat of the Union forces at Bull Run, or Manassas, on Sunday, the 21st, was undertaken to appease the impatient, ignorant clamor of Northern newspapers, and in opposition to the judgment and the plans of General Scott, who was then at the head of the National army. The cry "On to Richmond" was taken up by Congressmen and Senators, and the pressure on the government became too strong to be resisted. Instead of keeping the raw troops, hurriedly gathered at Washington, in camps of instruction, until they were properly drilled and until their officers had acquired some experience in handling them, they were hurriedly pushed into a serious campaign movement, against an enemy likewise untrained, to be sure, but who was far better prepared to receive an attack than the assailants were to make one. General Irwin McDowell had been recently placed in command of the army intended for the field, with General Mansfield commanding the troops in Washington. The former had "entered on his new and responsible duties with great alacrity, working night and day to prepare his command for the approaching conflict. … McDowell was laboring at a great disadvantage—drilling and preparing his troops as best he could—under the heavy pressure from the North to deliver battle to the enemy in his front. Secretary Chase was the champion, in the Cabinet, of the intense feeling in the North that the war should be pushed at once, with a vigor that would end it soon. … There is no doubt that General Scott was weakened with the administration, for the reason that he did not believe in the prevailing opinion that a few days would crush the rebellion; and the more the old hero insisted, or faithfully stood by his views, the more it antagonized the opinion of those who hoped and said it would end speedily. At the Cabinet meeting a week before, General Hamilton says: 'General Montgomery Blair said he would march to Richmond with 10,000 men, armed with lathes.' 'Yes,' said General Scott, 'as prisoners of war.' Continuing General Hamilton's statement of the events which occurred prior to the battle and during its progress, he says: 'On the Sunday preceding the battle of Bull Run, Scott directed me, his military secretary, to say to McDowell that he wished him to dine with him without fail. At the dinner, at which General McDowell appeared, General Scott used every possible argument to dissuade General McDowell from fighting the first battle of Bull Run under the then existing condition of public affairs. … He then begged General McDowell to go to Secretary Chase, his kinsman, and aid him (General Scott) in preventing a forward movement at that moment; one of the arguments used by General Scott being that the Union sentiment of the South had been surprised by the suddenness and promptitude of the movement in favor of secession; that he (General Scott) was well advised that the Union sentiment was recovering itself, and gaining head in the South; that from the moment blood was shed the South would be made a unit. General McDowell regretted that he could not agree with General Scott in his views, and arose and retired. … In the course of the succeeding week General McDowell reported to General Scott his proposed plan of battle. It was hung upon the wall, and I followed with a pointer the positions indicated by General McDowell as those he intended the forces under his command should occupy. After General McDowell had gone through a detailed statement of his plan, and had finished, General Scott remarked, "General McDowell, that is as good a plan of battle as I ever saw upon paper." General McDowell said in rep]y: "General Scott, the success of this whole plan depends upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check at Winchester." General Scott remarked that General Johnston was a very able soldier, that he had a railroad at his command with which to move his troops, and if General McDowell's plan of battle, which had just been presented to him, depended upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check, his plan was not worth the paper it was drawn upon.' That ended that interview."

_J. H. Stine, History of the Army of the Potomac, pages 7-10._

Says General McDowell, in his subsequent report of the movement and the disastrous battle: "When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday). Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my ever seeing them and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending re-enforcements to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move. {3435} I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 10th ultimo. When I did set out on the 10th I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go in to action on the 19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only come from Vienna, about 6 miles, and it was not more than 6½ miles farther to Centreville, in all a march of 12½ miles; but the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the load of 'light marching order.'"

_Brig. General I. McDowell, Report (Official Records, series 1, volume 2, pages 323-324)._

The advance of the Union Army was made "in five divisions, commanded by Generals Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, Runyon, and Miles. Among the brigade commanders that afterward rose to eminence were William T. Sherman, Ambrose E. Burnside, Erastus D. Keyes, and Oliver O. Howard. The total force was somewhat over 34,000 men; but Runyon's division was left to guard the line of communication with Washington, and the number that actually moved against the enemy was about 28,000 with 49 guns and a battalion of cavalry. So little did strict military discipline as yet enter into the policy of the Government that a large number of civilians, including several members of Congress, obtained passes enabling them to ride out in carriages, close in the rear of the army, to witness the expected battle. … The troops marched by the Warrenton turnpike, and found themselves in the presence of the enemy on the banks of Bull Run on the 18th. … The enemy's outposts had fallen back as the army advanced, and the first serious opposition was met at Blackburn's Ford," where some sharp fighting occurred between Tyler's division and the Confederate troops under Longstreet. "McDowell, finding that Beauregard was very strongly intrenched on his right, and that the roads in that direction were not good, changed his plan and determined to attack on the north or left wing. Another reason for doing this lay in the fact that McDowell had distrusted Patterson from the first, having no faith that he would hold Johnston. … The action at Blackburn's Ford had been fought on Thursday. Friday and Saturday were consumed in reconnoissances and searching for a suitable ford on the upper part of the stream, where a column could cross and, marching down on the right bank, uncover the fords held by the enemy and enable the remainder of the army to cross. Such a ford was found at length, and on Sunday morning, the 21st, the army was put in motion. McDowell did not know that Johnston had easily eluded Patterson and with two fifths of his forces joined Beauregard on Saturday. … The Confederate commanders had actually ordered a forward movement of their own right wing; but as they saw the development of McDowell's plan they recalled that, and gradually strengthened their left to meet the onset. … The battleground was a plateau, wooded and broken."

_R. Johnson, Short History of the War of Rebellion, chapter 4._

In the Report of the Confederate General Beauregard, the plateau which now became the principal battle ground of the conflict is described as follows: "It is inclosed on three sides by small water-courses, which empty into Bull Run within a few yards of each other a half a mile to the south of the stone bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite 100 feet above the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three sides to the level of the enclosing streams in gentle slopes, but which are furrowed by ravines of irregular direction and length, and studded with clumps and patches of young pines and oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is oblique to the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the Brentsville and turnpike roads, which intersect each other at right angles. Immediately surrounding the two houses … [mentioned below] are small open fields of irregular outline, not exceeding 150 acres in extent. The houses, occupied at the time, the one by the Widow Henry and the other by the free negro Robinson, are small wooden buildings, the latter densely embowered in trees and environed by a double row of fences on two sides. Around the eastern and southern brow of the plateau an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth pines gave excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of it with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining the fields, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across the crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which during the battle regiments of both armies met and contended for the mastery. From the open ground of this plateau the view embraces a wide expanse of woods and gently undulating open country of broad grass and grain fields in all directions."

_General G. T. Beauregard, Report (Official Records, series 1, volume 2, pages 493-494)._