Part 7

TURKS: A. D. 1806-1807. Alliance with Napoleon, and hostilities with Russia and England. British fleet before Constantinople. Its humiliating retreat. The English again in Egypt. Disastrous failure of their expedition.

"Before the end of 1806, Russia had driven Selim into the arms of France; and war was declared at the Porte just after Napoleon's victories in Prussia had filled Alexander with alarm. His troops had overrun some Turkish territory before war was declared; but just at this juncture he wanted all his forces for the defence of his own frontier. He dreaded the effects of withdrawing them from the Turkish provinces, which would immediately fight for France; but he must do it. He besought the British to undertake another of those 'diversions' which began to sound so disagreeably to the ears of Englishmen. … The Grenville Cabinet … gave orders to Sir John Duckworth, then cruising off Ferrol, to join Admiral Louis at the mouth of the Dardanelles. … Neither the efforts of Sebastiani [French representative at Constantinople] … nor any other warning that the English were coming, had roused the Turks to make the slightest preparation. The ships sailed proudly up the strait [February, 1807], undelayed by the fire of the forts at the narrowest part of the channel, and belching out flames and cannonballs as they went. They took and burned some Turkish ships, and appeared before Constantinople, to the horror of the whole population, who were absolutely without means of defence. The Divan would have yielded at once; but Sebastiani prevented it, and instigated a negotiation which proved a fatal snare to Sir John Duckworth, notwithstanding express warnings and instructions, strong and clear, from Lord Collingwood. {3148} He was unwilling to destroy the city, and shoot down the defenceless inhabitants; and he allowed himself to be drawn on, from day to day, exchanging notes and receiving promises. … Meantime, not a moment was lost by Sebastiani and the Turks, whom he was instructing in Napoleon's methods of warfare. Women and children, Christians and Mohammedans, worked day and night at the defences; and in a few days the whole coast was bristling with artillery, and the chance was over. … There was nothing to be done but to get away as safely as they yet might. … For thirty miles (reckoning the windings of the channel) the ships ran the gauntlet of an incessant fire—and such a fire as was never seen before. Stone balls, weighing 700 or 800 lbs., broke down the masts, crushed in the decks, snapped the rigging, and amazed the hearts of the sailors. The hills smoked from end to end, and the roar of the artillery rolled from side to side. In another week, Sir J. Duckworth declared in his dispatch, any return would have been impossible. The news of this singular affair spread fast over Europe. Every body thought the expedition gallantly conceived, and miserably weak in its failure. … So ended the second of the 'diversions' proposed under the Grenville Ministry. The third legacy of this kind that they left was a diversion on the side of Egypt. For some time, a notion had been gaining ground, in the minds of English politicians, that the Sultan would, some day soon, be giving Egypt to Napoleon, in return for the aid afforded to Constantinople, on the Danube, and elsewhere. Egypt was in an unhappy state. Mohammed Alee, the Viceroy, was at feud with the Memlooks; and the Arab inhabitants were made a prey of by both. The Grenville Ministry thought that a diversion in that direction would be of great service to Russia, and great injury to Napoleon; and they confidently reckoned on being enthusiastically received by the Arab inhabitants, and probably by the Memlooks also. In laying their plans, however, they strangely underrated the forces and the ability of Mohammed Alee; and they sent only between 4,000 and 5,000 men to the mouth of the Nile, instead of an army large enough to cope with the able and warlike Pasha of Egypt, and his Albanian troops. The small British force was drafted from the troops in Sicily. It landed without opposition on the 17th of March, supposing that Sir John Duckworth must by this time have conquered the Sultan, and that his province of Egypt would come very easily into our hands. No opposition was made to the landing of the troops, and Alexandria capitulated immediately. Only seven lives were lost on the British side. Within the city, however, no provisions were found." A detachment of 1,200 men sent to Rosetta for supplies were trapped in the city by Mohammed Alee's Albanians, and 400 of them, with their general, were shot down in the streets. Then Rosetta was besieged, with results of disastrous failure and the loss of 1,000 or 1,200 more men. General Fraser, the Commander, "was discouraged from home, and hourly harassed by the enemy. … More and more of the enemy came up as his little force dwindled away; and at last, on the appearance of a column which he was unable to encounter, he sent out a flag of truce, with an offer to evacuate Egypt on the restoration of the prisoners taken since the invasion. This was in August, 1807; and in September the last English soldier left the mouth of the Nile. By this time, the Sultan had declared war against England, and had caused a seizure of all the British property in his dominions."

_H. Martineau, History of England, 1800-1815, book 2, chapter 1._

TURKS: A. D. 1807. Accession of Mustapha IV.

TURKS: A. D. 1807. Schemes of Napoleon and Alexander I. at Tilsit for the partition of Turkey.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE-JULY).

TURKS: A. D. 1808. Accession of Mahmud II.

TURKS: A. D. 1821-1829. Revolt and recovery of independence by the Greeks. Battle of Navarino. Treaty of Adrianople.

See GREECE: A. D. 1821-1829.

TURKS: A. D. 1822-1823. The Congress of Verona.

See VERONA, CONGRESS OF.

TURKS: A. D. 1826. Reforms of Mahmud II. Insurrection of the Janissaries. Their subjugation and destruction.

"While the struggle in Greece was proceeding, Mahmud had been busily engaged with his internal reforms, many of which were of a nature to offend the prejudices of his subjects. His great object was to give a European character to the institutions and the manners of his country. He introduced the western style of dress into Turkey; abandoned the use of the turban, which Mohammedans generally regard with much veneration; and gave musical and theatrical entertainments within the sacred enclosure of the Seraglio. He resolved also to recommence the military reforms of his uncle Selim, and again to establish the Nizam Jedid, or body of troops organized after European models. This last design roused once more the savage fanaticism of the Janizaries. On the 15th of June, 1826, when the Sultan and the Grand Vizier were in the country, the dissatisfied troops rose in insurrection, and committed great excesses. The Grand Vizier, hastily recalled to the metropolis, took measures for vindicating his master's authority, and at once found himself supported, not only by the new troops, but by the Ulemas and Students. Mahmud arrived shortly afterwards at the Seraglio, and by his orders the Mufti unfolded the standard of the Prophet, and summoned all faithful Mohammedans to rally round that holy symbol. The city was soon divided into two hostile factions. The Janizaries concentrated their forces in one of the great squares, and threw up entrenchments. The supporters of the Sultan gathered in their front, and an attack was made by ordnance, before which the Janizaries retired into their fortified barracks, where they continued to fight with the resolution of despair. … The building was presently on fire from one end to the other. The frightful struggle was continued in the midst of the flames; all who endeavoured to escape were at once shot down; and before the day was over 6,000 Janizaries had perished at the hands of their fellow-troops. Fifteen thousand who had not taken part in the movement were exiled to different places in Asia Minor, and on the following day a Hatti-Sherif pronounced the abolition of a corps which had contributed so much to the military predominance of Turkey, but which had at length become a source of internal danger too great to be suffered."

_E. Ollier, Cassell's Illustrated History of the Russo-Turkish War, volume 1, chapter 23._

{3149}

TURKS: A. D. 1826-1829. Convention of Ackerman. War with Russia. Surrender of Varna and Silistria. Disastrous battle of Koulevscha. Treaty of Hadrianople. Cessions of territory.

"It was not to be expected that an event so remarkable as the destruction of the Janizaries would fail to be taken advantage of by the court of St. Petersburg. The Emperor Nicholas had brought with him to the Russian throne a thorough determination to carry out that aggressive policy of the Empress Catherine, of which the terms of the celebrated treaty of Kutschouc-Kainardji [see above: A. D. 1768-1774] afforded so striking an illustration, and the annihilation of the Ottoman army, as well as the distracted condition of many of the provinces of that empire, afforded an opportunity too tempting to be neglected. The Czar, therefore, demanded that the Sultan should conclude with him a treaty, the provisions of which were made the subject of discussion at Ackerman, a town in Bessarabia; and Mahmoud, pressed by the necessity of his condition, … had found it requisite to conclude the arrangement, and the celebrated convention of Ackerman was ratified in October 1826. This treaty proved of great importance to Russia. In addition to other provisions, it recognised the whole stipulations of the two treaties of Bucharest and Kainardji, by which Russia claimed the right to interpose in behalf of the members of the Greek church in the Ottoman dominions. … During the year which succeeded the ratification of the convention of Ackerman, Russia was occupied with the Persian war, which was prosecuted with great vigour by General Paskewitch, by whom very considerable advantages were obtained; and in November 1827 the treaty of Tourkmantchai was concluded between Russia and Persia. … It left the Emperor … at leisure to carry out those hostile intentions which his ready interference in the affairs of Greece, and a variety of other considerations, clearly proved him to entertain. The approaching war was indicated by the mutual recriminations of the hostile powers. Russia accused the Porte of an endeavour to cause a revolution in the Caucasus, and of a violation of treaties by closing the Bosphorus against Russian ships, and by its conduct towards its Christian subjects. There was no inconsiderable foundation for such a complaint, and especially for the latter part of it. … Both sides immediately prepared for the struggle, which a variety of circumstances have proved that the Czar had long contemplated, and only waited for a suitable opportunity of entering upon. … In the month of May [1828] the [Russian] force began to assemble on the banks of the Pruth, and crossed that river at three different points. Being unopposed by the Ottomans, the Russian forces almost immediately entered Jassy and Bucharest, took possession of Galatz, and in a few weeks had occupied the whole of the left bank of the Danube. To accomplish as rapidly as possible the objects of the campaign, as well as to avoid having their very wide]y extended line exposed to the enemy, it was resolved by the leaders of the Russian forces to cross the Danube at Brahilow, and thence to advance with rapidity upon Silistria, Varna, and Schumla. This resolution they immediately proceeded to carry into effect. … About the middle of July, the Russian force under General Rudiger on the right, and Generals Woinoff and Diebitcb on the left wing, accompanied by the Emperor Nicholas, moved toward Schumia; and the Ottoman army, whose instructions were to avoid general actions, and to throw their whole energy upon the defence of their fortifications, having engaged in battle with the enemy, retired within the entrenched camp surrounding that fortress, which now contained a force of 40,000 men. … The Emperor … resolved … to leave a corps of observation of 30,000 men before Schumla, under General Wittgenstein, and to direct the principal efforts of his army, in the first instance, to the reduction of Varna. … On the 5th of September, after having been absent at Odessa for about a month, during which he was engaged making arrangements for obtaining levies from Russia, and in negotiating loans in Holland, the Emperor Nicholas arrived at Varna, to inspect the progress and encourage the operations of the besiegers. … The besieging force, towards the end of August, amounted to 40,000 men, which, on the arrival of the Emperor, were reinforced by more than 20,000, with a great addition to the artillery already possessed by the invading army. This large force was further supported by the Russian fleet. … The details of the siege exhibit a series of assaults repulsed with the utmost valour and spirit by the besieged, and entailing an immense loss upon the Russians, both in men and superior officers; but the circumstance that the reinforcement sent to relieve the garrison could not approach, so closely was the place invested, and the destruction of a part of the walls by the cannon of the Russians, led to a surrender, and Jussouf Pasha delivered up the fortress to the Emperor on the 10th of October, after a siege of more than two months. The utmost efforts were made to reduce Silistria, after Varna had been surrendered, but the advance of the season, and the difficulties of the attempt, as well as the disastrous circumstances of the Russian army before Schumla, soon proved that nothing more could be attempted till the following spring. The campaign, therefore, was brought to a conclusion, and orders were issued for the Russians to retire beyond the Danube, and take up their winter quarters in Wallachia. The fall of Brahilow and Varna were the only important events of the campaign of 1828 in Europe, and even these successes had been attained at a vast expense of human life. Out of nearly 160,000 men who had crossed the Danube at the beginning of the campaign, only about one-half remained. … In Asia operations were carried on by the Russians with equal vigour and much more success, in consequence, in a great measure, of the military genius and experience of General Paskewitch, who commanded the troops on the east of the Black Sea. … The first attack of the Russians in Asia was made upon the fortress of Anapa. … After a siege of about a month, the place was taken, with 85 guns and 3,000 prisoners, and the fleet sailed immediately to Varna. … After some other successes, General Paskewitch resolved upon attacking the town and fortress of Akhalzikh, a very important place in the pashalik of that name, and which was not only strongly fortified by nature and art, but had for its chief strength a resolute garrison of 10,000 Ottomans, besides the armed inhabitants of the place. The Sultan's troops defended this important fortress with the most undaunted resolution. … The surrender of Akhalzikh was followed by that of other important places of strength, which closed the campaign of 1828 in Asia. … The campaign of 1828 had rendered the most active preparations requisite on the part of both belligerents for the commencement of hostilities in the following spring. {3150} The Ottoman soldiers, according to their usual custom, hastened from the garrisons to pass the winter in their homes, but the utmost efforts were made by the Porte to gather an adequate force to meet the exigencies of the struggle so soon to be renewed. Although only 10,000 men were left in Schumla during the winter, 40,000 assembled in that fortress early in spring. They were, however, for the most part new levies. … The Russians, on the other hand, were no less energetic in their arrangements. … It was impossible, however, before the month of May, from the condition of the Danube, to commence the campaign with the whole force, but by the tenth of that month the passage of the river was completed at Hirchova and Kalavatsch, below Silistria, the siege of which was immediately begun, while General Kouprianoff was stationed with a force at Pravadi, a fortress on the east of Schumla, and which, lying in the line of communication between Silistria and Varna, was important to the Russians as the means of keeping open a communication between the army of General Roth near Varna and the troops destined to act upon Silistria. Redschid Pasha, who on being recalled from Greece had been appointed Grand Vizier, had arrived at Schumla on the 21st of March, and on perceiving the position of the invading army, formed the well-conceived design of attacking Pravadi and the force under General Roth. … This movement of the Vizier became immediately known to General Roth, who by means of a courier conveyed information of it to Count Diebitch. That General was too acute not to perceive the purpose of his adversary, and too enterprising not to endeavour immediately to take advantage of it. The Count therefore adopted a movement of the highest importance, and which, indeed, had the effect of deciding the campaign. Instead of marching to attack Redschid Pasha at Pravadi, he resolved to intercept his communication with the fortress he had quitted, and thus compel the Ottoman general either to come to a general engagement, which could hardly fail to result to the advantage of the Russians, or to fight his way towards Schumla through the Russian army, or leave the fortress of Schumla to its fate, which, feebly garrisoned as it was, could not be long delayed. This skilful manœuvre was no sooner resolved upon than it was carried into execution. … While the Russian force were rapidly advancing towards Koulevscha, a village between Pravadi and Schumla, and scarcely three miles from the latter, the Grand Vizier remained wholly ignorant of the fact that Diebitch had quitted Silistria, and persisted in the belief that the only opponents of his retreat to Schumla were Generals Roth and Rudiger. … The mistake was fatal. The Ottoman cavalry attacked the infantry of the Russians, who were overwhelmed by their charge; and Diebitch, having waited in expectation that the Vizier would descend from the eminence on which he was posted to complete his supposed victory, and finding that he did not make this movement, broke from his concealment among the hills, and suddenly attacked the Ottoman troops with his whole force. The effect was instantaneous. A universal panic seized the Vizier's forces, his cavalry and infantry fled in confusion, every attempt to bring them to a stand proved abortive, and he himself escaped with difficulty. The artillery and baggage all fell into the hands of the enemy. … The muster at Schumla on the return of the Vizier and his remaining troops exhibited the magnitude of their loss. Out of a fine army of 40,000 men, who a few days before had marched from the fortress full of confidence, only 12,000 foot and about 6,000 cavalry remained. After the fatal battle of Koulevscha, the siege of Silistria was carried on with redoubled vigour, and on the 30th of June the fortress surrendered, when the whole garrison were made prisoners of war, and to the number of 8,000, and the Russians found on the ramparts 238 cannon, in addition to those on board the vessels in the harbour. The fall of Silistria now determined the Russian commander-in-chief to push across the Balkans. … After defeating with great facility such troops as opposed their advance, the Russian army pressed on with the utmost activity towards Hadrianople, and entered the city not only unopposed, but amidst the rejoicings of a multitude of the Greek population. … The terror which this extraordinary event inspired at Constantinople may easily be imagined to have been extreme. The very heart of the empire had been assailed by the victorious invaders in Europe, while the tidings from the Asiatic provinces of the defeats sustained by the Sultan's forces opposed to General Paskewitch, greatly contributed to the public alarm. … In the midst of this tumult of public feeling, the ambassadors of England and Austria exerted themselves to the utmost to bring about a pacification; and … the Sultan reluctantly agreed to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. … The celebrated treaty of Hadrianople, which concluded the war of 1828-29, … contained sixteen distinct articles, by which, among other matters, the following conditions were agreed upon:—The principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and all the conquered places in Bulgaria and Roumelia, were restored to the Porte, with the exception of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, which were to remain the possession of Russia. In Asia all the recent conquests were to revert to the Porte, with the exception of Anapa, on the north-eastern shore of the Black Sea, several important fortresses, together with an extensive district situated to the north and east of a line of demarcation supposed to be drawn from the then existing boundary of the province of Gouriel, and thence by that of Imeritia direct to the point where the frontiers of Kars unite with those of Georgia. The conditions of the treaties of Kainardji, Bucharest, and Ackerman were confirmed; … the passage of the Dardanelles was declared open to all Russian merchant ships, as well as the undisputed navigation of the Black Sea; an indemnity for losses by Russian subjects was fixed at £750,000, to be paid in eighteen months; and the expenses of the war were to be paid to the Russian Government, amounting to 10,000,000 ducats, about £5,000,000. … To this treaty two separate acts were annexed, the provisions of which are of scarcely less importance than the treaty itself. {3151} By these acts it was arranged that the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be elected for life instead of for seven years; that no interference in the affairs of these provinces by any of the officers of the Porte should take place; that no fortified towns, nor any establishment of Muslims, should be retained by the Porte on the left bank of the Danube; that the Turkish towns on that bank of the river should belong to Wallachia; and that the Mussulmans who possessed property in such places should be required to sell it in the space of eighteen months. … The conclusion of these treaties, on the 14th September 1829, terminated the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire."

_R. W. Fraser, Turkey, Ancient and Modern, chapters 30-31._

ALSO IN: _Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, from 1815 to 1852, chapter 15._

TURKS: A. D. 1830. Recognition of the autonomy of Servia.