Part 47

"After his victory at Camden, Lord Cornwallis found it necessary to give his army some rest from the intense August heat. In September he advanced into North Carolina, boasting that he would soon conquer all the states south of the Susquehanna river. … In traversing Mecklenburg county Cornwallis soon found himself in a very hostile and dangerous region, where there were no Tories to befriend him. One of his best partisan commanders, Major Ferguson, penetrated too far into the mountains. The back-woodsmen of Tennessee and Kentucky, the Carolinas, and western Virginia were aroused; and under their superb partisan leaders—Shelby, Sevier, Cleaveland, McDowell, Campbell, and Williams—gave chase to Ferguson, who took refuge upon what he deemed an impregnable position on the top of King's Mountain. On the 7th of October the backwoodsmen stormed the mountain, Ferguson was shot through the heart, 400 of his men were killed and wounded, and all the rest, 700 in number, surrendered at discretion. The Americans lost 28 killed and 60 wounded. … In the series of events which led to the surrender of Cornwallis, the battle of King's Mountain played a part similar to that played by the battle of Bennington in the series of events which led to the surrender of Burgoyne. It was the enemy's first serious disaster, and its immediate result was to check his progress until the Americans could muster strength enough to overthrow him. The events, however, were much more complicated in Cornwallis's case, and took much longer to unfold themselves. … As soon as he heard the news of the disaster he fell back to Winnsborough, in South Carolina, and called for reinforcements. While they were arriving, the American army, recruited and reorganized since its crushing defeat at Camden, advanced into Mecklenburg county. Gates was superseded by Greene, who arrived upon the scene on the 2d of December. Under Greene were three Virginians of remarkable ability,—Daniel Morgan; William Washington, who was a distant cousin of the commander-in-chief; and Henry Lee, familiarly known as 'Light-horse Harry,' father of the great general, Robert Edward Lee. {3275} The little army numbered only 2,000 men, but a considerable part of them were disciplined veterans, fully a match for the British infantry." To increase this small force, Baron Steuben, the military organizer and disciplinarian of the Revolutionary armies, was sent down to Virginia, for the purpose of recruiting and organizing troops.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (JANUARY-DECEMBER).

Thereupon detachments from the British army at New York were dispatched by sea to Virginia, and Arnold, the traitor, was given command of them. "The presence of these subsidiary forces in Virginia was soon to influence in a decisive way the course of events. Greene, on reaching South Carolina, acted with boldness and originality. He divided his little army into two bodies, one of which cooperated with Marion's partisans in the northeastern part of the state, and threatened Cornwallis's communications with the coast. The other body he sent under Morgan to the southwestward, to threaten the inland posts and their garrisons. Thus worried on both flanks, Cornwallis presently divided his own force, sending Tarleton with 1,100 men to dispose of Morgan. Tarleton came up with Morgan on the 17th of January, 1781, at a grazing-ground known as the Cowpens, not far from King's Mountain. The battle which ensued was well fought, and on Morgan's part it was a wonderful piece of tactics. With only 900 men in open field he surrounded and nearly annihilated a superior force. The British lost 230 in killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and all their guns. Tarleton escaped with 270 men. The Americans lost 12 killed and 61 wounded. The two battles, King's Mountain and the Cowpens, deprived Cornwallis of nearly all his light-armed troops, and he was just entering upon a game where swiftness was especially required. It was his object to intercept Morgan and defeat him before he could effect a junction with the other part of the American army. It was Greene's object to march the two parts of his army in converging directions northwards across North Carolina and unite them in spite of Cornwallis. By moving in this direction Greene was always getting nearer to his reinforcements from Virginia, while Cornwallis was always getting further from his supports in South Carolina. … The two wings of the American army came together and were joined by the reinforcements; so that at Guilford Court House, on the 15th of March, Cornwallis found himself obliged to fight against heavy odds, 200 miles from the coast and almost as far from the nearest point in South Carolina at which he could get support. The battle of Guilford was admirably managed by both commanders and stubbornly fought by the troops. At nightfall the British held the field, with the loss of nearly one third of their number, and the Americans were repulsed. But Cornwallis could not stay in such a place, and could not afford to risk another battle. There was nothing for him to do but retreat to Wilmington, the nearest point on the coast. There he stopped and pondered. His own force was sadly depleted, but he knew that Arnold in Virginia was being heavily reinforced from New York. The only safe course seemed to march northward and join the operations in Virginia; then afterwards to return southward. This course Cornwallis pursued, arriving at Petersburg and taking command of the troops there on the 20th of May. Meanwhile Greene, after pursuing Cornwallis for about 50 miles from Guilford, faced about and marched with all speed upon Camden, 160 miles distant. … Lord Rawdon held Camden. Greene stopped at Hobkirk's Hill, two miles to the north, and sent Marion and Lee to take Fort Watson, and thus cut the enemy's communications with the coast. On April 23 Fort Watson surrendered; on the 25th Rawdon defeated Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, but as his communications were cut the victory did him no good. He was obliged to retreat toward the coast, and Greene took Camden on the 10th of May. Having thus obtained the commanding point, Greene went on until he had reduced every one of the inland posts. At last, on the 8th of September, he fought an obstinate battle at Eutaw Springs, in which both sides claimed the victory. … Here, however, as always after one of Greene's battles, it was the enemy who retreated and he who pursued. His strategy never failed. After Eutaw Springs the British remained shut up in Charleston under cover of their ships, and the American government was reëstablished over South Carolina. Among all the campaigns in history that have been conducted with small armies, there have been few, if any, more brilliant than Greene's."

_J. Fiske, The War of Independence, chapter 7._

ALSO IN: _J. Fiske, The American Revolution, chapter 15 (volume 2)._

_H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapters 65-71._

_G. W. Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, volume 3, chapters 1-23._

_L. C. Draper, King's Mountain and its Heroes._

_H. Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, chapters 18-34._

_J. Graham, Life of General Daniel Morgan, chapters 13-17._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January). The Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line.

"As the year 1781 opened and the prospect of a new year of struggle became certain, and the invasion of the Southern States began to indicate the prospect of a southern campaign, which was at all times unpopular with northern troops, a disaffection was developed which at last broke forth in open mutiny, and a peremptory demand for discharge. This irritation was aggravated by hunger, cold, and poverty. Marshall says: 'The winter brought not much relaxation from toil, and none from suffering. The soldiers were perpetually on the point of starvation, were often entirely without food, were exposed without proper clothing to the rigors of winter; and had now served almost twelve months without pay.' … On the 1st of January the Pennsylvania line revolted; Captain Billings was killed in an attempt to suppress the mutiny; General Wayne was powerless to restore order, and 1,300 men, with six guns, started to Princeton, with the declared purpose to march to Philadelphia, and obtain redress. They demanded clothing, the residue of their bounty, and full arrears of pay. A committee from Congress and the State authorities of Pennsylvania at once entered into negotiations with the troops for terms of compromise. The American Commander-in-chief was then at New Windsor. A messenger from General Wayne informed him on the 3d of January of the revolt, and the terms demanded. It appears from Washington's letters that it was his impulse, at the first intimation of the trouble, to go in person and attempt its control. His second impression was to reserve his influence and authority until all other means were exhausted. {3276} The complaint of the mutineers was but a statement of the condition of all the army, so far as the soldiers had served three years; and the suffering and failure to receive pay were absolutely universal. Leaving the preliminary discussion with the civil authorities who were responsible for much of the trouble, the Commander-in-chief appealed to the Governors of the northern States for a force of militia to meet any attacks from New York, and declined to interfere until he found that the passion had passed and he could find troops who would at all hazards execute his will. It was one of the most difficult passages in the war, and was so handled that the Commander-in-chief retained his prestige and regained control of the army. … General Clinton received information of the revolt as early as Washington, on the morning of the 23d, and sent messengers to the American army with propositions, looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents were retained in custody. It is sufficient to say that a portion of the troops were discharged without critical examination of their enlistments, on their own oath; that many promptly reenlisted, that as soon as Washington found that he had troops who did not share in the open mutiny, he used force and suppressed the disaffection, and that the soldiers themselves hung several agents who brought propositions from General Clinton which invited them to abandon their flag and join his command. The mutiny of the American army at the opening of the campaign of 1781, was a natural outbreak which human nature could not resist, and whatever of discredit may attach to the revolt, it will never be unassociated with the fact that, while the emergency was one that overwhelmed every military obligation by its pressure, it did not affect the fealty of the soldiers to the cause for which they took up arms. … La Fayette thus wrote to his wife, 'Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer the tenth part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens to support hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the condition of our soldiers, the hardiest and most patient that are to be found in the world.'"

_H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapter 67._

ALSO IN: _W. H. Egle, History of Pennsylvania, chapter 12._

_C. J. Stillé, Major-General Anthony Wayne, chapter 6._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January-May). Benedict Arnold and the British in Virginia. Opening of Lafayette's campaign in that state.

"In January, 1781, the news reached headquarters in the Highlands of New York that General [Benedict] Arnold had landed in Virginia with a considerable force, was laying waste the country, and had already destroyed the valuable stores collected at Richmond; opposed to him were only the small commands of Steuben and Muhlenberg. The situation was very alarming, and threatened to place all the Southern States in the hands of the British. If Arnold succeeded in destroying the few American troops in Virginia, he could then march to the assistance of Cornwallis, who, with a superior force, was pressing General Greene very hard in the Carolinas. To defeat or capture Arnold before he could further prosecute his designs was, therefore, of the utmost importance. For this purpose it was necessary to send a detachment from the main army against Arnold by land, and a naval force to Chesapeake Bay to prevent his escape by sea. Washington at once communicated the state of affairs to Rochambeau, who, with the French fleet, had long been blockaded at Newport. Taking advantage of the serious injuries lately suffered by the blockading English fleet in consequence of a storm, Admiral Destouches despatched M. de Tilly to the Chesapeake with a ship-of-the-line and two frigates. To cooperate with these French vessels, Washington detached 1,200 light infantry from the main army, and placed them under the command of Lafayette. That officer was particularly chosen for this important trust, because the confidence reposed in him by both the American and French troops made him, in Washington's opinion, the fittest person to conduct a combined expedition. Thus opened the only campaign in America which afforded Lafayette an opportunity to show what abilities he possessed as an independent commander, and on this campaign his military reputation must chiefly rest. Lafayette moved rapidly southward," to Annapolis; but, the coöperating movement of the French fleet having, meantime, been frustrated by an attack from the English squadron, his instructions required him to abandon the expedition and return. He had already set his troops in motion northward when different instructions reached him. Two more British regiments had been sent to Virginia, under General Philips, who now took command of all the forces there, and this had increased the anxiety of Washington. "The situation of the Southern States had become extremely perilous. General Greene had all he could do to fight Lord Cornwallis's superior force in North Carolina. Unless a vigorous opposition could be made to Philips, he would have no difficulty in dispersing the militia of Virginia, and in effecting a junction with Cornwallis. With their forces so combined, the British would be masters in the South. Washington at once determined to place the defence of Virginia in Lafayette's hands. … Lafayette marched with such rapidity … that he reached Richmond, where there were valuable stores to be protected, a day in advance of General Philips. From his post on the heights of the town he saw the British set fire to the tobacco warehouses at Manchester, just across the river, but there were neither men nor boats enough to make an attack possible. Philips, on his part, was too much impressed with the show of strength made by the Americans to prosecute his plans on Richmond, and retreating down the James river, burning and laying waste as he went, he camped at Hog Island. Lafayette followed, harassing the enemy's rear, as far as the Chickahominy. Here the situation underwent a considerable change. Lord Cornwallis, after his long and unsuccessful campaign against Greene in North Carolina, made up his mind that his exhausting labors there would prove unprofitable until Virginia should be subjugated. His men were worn out with incessant marching and fighting, while no substantial advantage had been gained. Hearing that General Greene had marched to attack Lord Rawdon at Camden in South Carolina, he determined to join Philips. {3277} That officer, accordingly, received orders while at Hog Island to take possession of Petersburg and there await Cornwallis's arrival. … On the 13th of May, General Philips died at Petersburg of a fever. … Cornwallis arrived at Petersburg on the 20th of May. His forces now amounted to over 5,000 men, which number was soon increased to 8,000."

_B. Tuckerman, Life of Lafayette, chapter 6._

ALSO IN: _J. E. Cooke, Virginia, part 3, chapter 17._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (May-October). Cornwallis in Virginia and the trap into which he fell. Siege of Yorktown by the French and Americans. Surrender of the British army.

"On the 24th of May, Cornwallis, having rested his troops, marched from Petersburg, and endeavored to engage the American forces. But Lafayette, having removed the military stores from Richmond, retreated across the Chickahominy to Fredericksburg, where he expected to meet General Wayne and a battalion of Pennsylvania troops, without whose assistance he could not venture any fighting. … Cornwallis … moved between Lafayette and the town of Albemarle, where had been placed a great part of the military stores from Richmond, which now seemed doomed to destruction. But on the 10th of June Lafayette had received his expected reënforcement of Wayne's Pennsylvanians, and thus strengthened felt able to assume the offensive. Rapidly crossing the Rapidan he approached close to the British army which blocked the road to Albemarle. Nothing could have better suited Cornwallis, who prepared for a conflict in which he felt sure of a decisive victory. Lafayette, however, had not lost sight of the vital feature of his campaign,—to protect the property of the State without losing his army. Through his scouts he discovered an old unused road to Albemarle, unknown to the enemy. While Cornwallis was preparing for battle, he had the road cleared, and under cover of the night marched his men through it and took up a strong position before the town. There he was joined by militia from the neighboring mountains, and he showed so strong a front that the British commander did not venture an attack. … The British commander, so far foiled in his objects, had to march back to Richmond and thence to Williamsburg, near the coast, thus practically abandoning control over any part of Virginia except where naval forces gave possession. Lafayette effected a junction with Baron Steuben on the 18th of June, and thus increased his force to about four thousand men. The Americans had now become the pursuers instead of the pursued, and followed the British, harassing their rear and flanks."

_B. Tuckerman, Life of General Lafayette, volume 1, chapter 6._

"There now came a pause in the Virginia Campaign, at least in daily operations and excitements. The State north of the James was relieved. Cornwallis crossed to the south side, at Cobham, on the 7th [July]; and Lafayette, retiring up the river, encamped, about the 20th, on the now historic Malvern Hill, then described as one of the healthiest and best watered spots in the State. … The entire British army was soon after concentrated at Portsmouth, and preparations made to transport a considerable portion of it to New York. Lafayette, meanwhile, at Malvern Hill, could only await developments. He thought of sending re-enforcements to Greene, and asked Washington if, in case Cornwallis left Virginia, he might not return to the Northern army. … But while the marquis and Washington and Greene were speculating on the future movements of Cornwallis and were persuaded, from embarkations at Portsmouth, that he was to be deprived of a large part of his force by Clinton, unexpected intelligence came to hand. Instead of any part going to New York, the British force suddenly made its appearance, during the first days in August, at Yorktown, on the Virginia peninsula, which it had abandoned but three weeks before. Here again was a new situation. Cornwallis, at last, at Yorktown—the spot he was not to leave except as a prisoner of war. Why he went there is a simple explanation. Clinton decided, upon certain dissenting opinions expressed by Cornwallis respecting the situation in Virginia, not to withdraw the force in the Chesapeake which he had called for, and which was about to sail for New York, but permitted Cornwallis to retain the whole—all with which he had been pursuing Lafayette and the large garrison at Portsmouth, a total of about seven thousand, rank and file. His new instructions, conveyed at the same time, were to the effect that his Lordship should abandon Portsmouth, which both generals agreed was too unhealthy for the troops, and fortify Old Point Comfort, where Fort Monroe now stands, as a naval station for the protection of the British shipping. In addition, if it appeared necessary, for the better security of the Point, to occupy Yorktown also, that was to be done. Obeying these instructions, Cornwallis ordered a survey of Old Point Comfort; but, upon the report of his engineers, was obliged to represent to Clinton that it was wholly unfit and inadequate for a naval station, as it afforded little protection for ships, and could not command the channel, on account of its great width. Then, following what he believed to be the spirit of his orders, Cornwallis, before hearing from Clinton, moved up to Yorktown, and began to fortify it in connection with Gloucester, on the opposite shore, as the best available naval station. Clinton made no subsequent objections, and there Cornwallis remained until his surrender. His occupation of the place was simply an incident of the campaign—a move taken for convenience and in the interests of the navy and the health of his command."

_H. P. Johnston, The Yorktown Campaign, chapter 3._