Part 32

"The exploits of Allen and Arnold at Ticonderoga … had invited further conquests; but the Continental Congress hesitated to take any steps which might seem to carry war across the line till the Canadians had the opportunity of casting in their lot with their neighbors. On the 1st of June, 1775, Congress had distinctly avowed this purpose of restraint; and they well needed to be cautious, for the Canadian French had not forgotten the bitter aspersions on their religion which Congress had, with little compunction, launched upon its professors, under the irritation of the Quebec Act. Still their rulers were aliens, and the traditional hatred of centuries between races is not easily kept in abeyance. Ethan Allen was more eager to avail himself of this than Congress was to have him; but the march of events converted the legislators, and the opportunity which Allen grieved to see lost was not so easily regained when Congress at last authorized the northern invasion. Arnold and Allen had each aimed to secure the command of such an expedition, the one by appealing to the Continental Congress, the other by representations to that of New York. Allen had also gone in person to Philadelphia, and he and his Green Mountain Boys were not without influence upon Congress, in their quaint and somewhat rough ways, as their exuberant patriotism later made the New York authorities forget their riotous opposition to the policy which that province had been endeavoring to enforce in the New Hampshire Grants. Connecticut had already sent forward troops to Ticonderoga to hold that post till Congress should decide upon some definite action; and at the end of June, 1775, orders reached Schuyler which he might readily interpret as authorizing him, if the Canadians did not object, to advance upon Canada. He soon started to assume command, but speedily found matters unpromising. The Johnsons were arming the Indians up the Mohawk and beyond in a way that boded no good, and they had entered into compacts with the British commanders in Canada. Arnold had been at Ticonderoga, and had quarrelled with Hinman, the commander of the Connecticut troops. Schuyler heard much of the Green Mountain Boys, but he only knew them as the lawless people of the Grants, and soon learned that Allen and Warner had themselves set to quarrelling. … In August the news from Canada began to be alarming. Richard Montgomery, an Irish officer who had some years before left the army to settle on the Hudson and marry, was now one of the new brigadiers. He urged Schuyler to advance and anticipate the movement now said to be intended by Carleton, the English general commanding in Canada. At this juncture Schuyler got word from Washington that a coöperating expedition would be dispatched by way of the Kennebec, which, if everything went well, might unite with Schuyler's before Quebec."

_J. Winsor, The Conflict Precipitated (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6)._

The two movements were made, from Ticonderoga and from the Kennebec, with results which will be found related under CANADA: A. D. 1775-1776. "No expedition during the American Revolution had less elements of permanent value than those which were undertaken against Canada during the year 1775. Great results were anticipated, but none were realized. The obstacles were too substantial, and failure was inevitable. Wonderful endurance and great physical courage were manifested, and these were accompanied by a prodigious amount of faith, but there was neither ability nor opportunity for works commensurate with the faith. Certain Acts of Parliament, known as the Canadian Acts, were as offensive to Canadians as other legislation was to Americans; but the former were not pressed to the extremity of armed resistance. The people themselves having no harmony of religious or political views, were equally divided in language and race. Neither did the Canadians invite the aid of the colonies. The hypothesis that Canada would blend her destiny with that of New England, and would unite in resistance to the crown, certainly involved some identity of interest as well as of action. But the characters of the two people were too unlike to be unified by simple opposition to English legislation, and Canadians had no antecedents such as would prompt a hearty sympathy with New England and its controlling moral sentiment. Neither was there such a neighborly relation as admitted of prompt and adequate aid from one to the other, in emergencies calling for a combined effort. As a base of operations for a British army moving upon the colonies, Canada had the single advantage of being less distant from England than an Atlantic base, and many supplies could be procured without the expense and delay of their transportation across the Atlantic; but between Canada and the American colonies there was an actual wilderness. Hence a British offensive movement from Canada involved constant waste of men and materials, a deep line through an uninhabited or hostile region, and such a constant backing, as was both inconsistent with the resources of the base, and with a corresponding support of armies resting upon the sea coast. The British government was not ready for operations so extensive and so exhaustive of men and treasure; neither did it realize the necessity for that expenditure. {3229} There were two alternatives, one illustrated by General Carleton's plan, viz., to hold the forts of Lake Champlain, as advanced, defensive positions; and the other, that of Burgoyne, to strike through the country and depend upon support from the opposite base. The true defense of the colonies from such expeditions depended upon the prompt seizure and occupation of the frontier posts. An American advance upon Canada was not only through a country strategically bad, but the diversion of forces for that purpose endangered the general issue, and entrusted its interests to the guardianship of an army already insufficient to meet the pressing demands of the crisis. The occupation of New York in 1775, by an adequate British force, would have infinitely outweighed all possible benefit from the complete conquest of Canada. At the very time when Washington could hardly hold the British garrison of Boston in check,—when he had an average of but nine rounds of ammunition per man, he was required to spare companies, ammunition, and supplies for a venture, profitless at best,—with the certainty that reinforcements could not be supplied as fast as the enemy could draw veteran regiments from Great Britain and Ireland, to defend or recover Canadian soil. In giving a rapid outline of this first attempt of the colonies to enlarge the theatre of active operations, it should be noticed that the initiative had been taken before General Washington had been elected commander-in-chief, and that Congress itself precipitated the final movement."

_H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapter 19._

ALSO IN: _B. J. Lossing, Life and Times of Philip Schuyler, volume 1, chapters 19-29, and volume 2, chapters 1-4._

_J. Armstrong, Life of Richard Montgomery (Library of American Biographies, volume 1)._

_J. Henry, Account of Arnold's Campaign against Quebec, by one of the Survivors._

_I. N. Arnold, Life of Benedict .Arnold, chapters 3-5._

_W. Irving, Life of Washington. volume 2, chapters 4-5, 8-9, 12, 15-16, 19-20._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (September). Flight of Govern or Tryon from New York.

See NEW YORK: A. D. 1775 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775-1776. Washington in command at Cambridge. The British forced out of Boston.

Washington "arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the 2d of July [1775], and on the following day presented himself at the head of the army. His head-quarters remained at Cambridge, till the evacuation of Boston by the royal forces on the 17th of March, 1776. The position of affairs was one of vast responsibility and peril. The country at large was highly excited, and expected that a bold stroke would be struck and decisive successes obtained. But the army was without organization and discipline; the troops unused to obey, the officers for the most part unaccustomed, some of them incompetent, to command. A few of them only had had a limited experience in the Seven Years' War. Most of the men had rushed to the field on the first alarm of hostilities, without any enlistment; and when they were enlisted, it was only till the end of the year. There was no military chest; scarce anything that could be called a commissariat. The artillery consisted of a few old field-pieces of various sizes, served with a very few exceptions by persons wholly untrained in gunnery. There was no siege train, and an almost total want of every description of ordnance stores. Barrels of sand, represented as powder, were from time to time brought into the camp, to prevent the American army itself from being aware of its deficiency in that respect. In the autumn of 1775, an alarm of small-pox was brought from Boston, and the troops were subjected to inoculation: There was no efficient power, either in the Provincial Assembly or the Congress at Philadelphia, by which these wants could be supplied and these evils remedied. Such were the circumstances under which General Washington took the field, at the head of a force greatly superior in numbers to the royal army, but in all other respects a very unequal match. Meantime the British were undisputed masters of the approaches to Boston by water. Washington's letters disclose extreme impatience under the inaction to which he was condemned; but the gravest difficulties attended the expulsion of the royal forces from Boston. It could only be effected by the bombardment and assault of that place; an attempt which must in any event have been destructive to the large non-combatant population, that had been unable to remove into the country, and which would have been of doubtful success, for the want of a siege train, and with troops wholly unused to such an undertaking. Having in the course of the year received some captured ordnance from Canada [from Fort Ticonderoga], and a supply of ammunition taken by privateers at sea, Washington was strongly disposed to assault the town, as soon as the freezing of the bay on the western side of the peninsula would allow the troops to pass on the ice. The winter, however, remained open longer than usual, and a council of war dissuaded this attempt. He then determined to occupy Nook's Hill (an eminence at the extremity of Dorchester 'Neck,' as it was called, separated from Boston by a narrow arm of the harbor), and Dorchester Heights, which commanded Nook's Hill and the town itself. In this way the royal forces would be compelled to take the risk of a general action, for the purpose of dislodging the Americans, or else to evacuate the town. The requisite preparations having been made with secrecy, energy, and despatch, the heights were covered with breastworks on the night of the 4th of March, 1776, as 'by enchantment.' A partial movement, undertaken by the royal army to dislodge the Americans, was frustrated by stress of weather; and on the 17th of March, in virtue of an agreement to that effect with the municipal government, the town and harbor of Boston were evacuated by the British army and army without firing a gun. Thus, without a battle and without the destruction of a building in Boston, the first year of the war was brought to a successful and an auspicious close."

_E. Everett, Life of Washington, chapter 5._

ALSO IN: _G. Washington, Writings; edited. by Ford, volume 3._

_R. Frothingham, History of the Siege of Boston, chapters 8-13._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775-1776. The beginning of the American Navy, and the early fitting out of Privateers.

"Before the end of 1775 the Continental Congress ordered that five ships of 32 guns should be built, five of 28, and three of 24. This order was carried out, and these vessels are the proper beginning of the navy of the United States. Almost everyone of them, before the war was over, had been captured, or burned to avoid capture. {3230} But the names of the little fleet will always be of interest to Americans, and some of those names have always been preserved on the calendar of the navy. They are the 'Washington,' 'Raleigh,' 'Hancock,' 'Randolph,' 'Warren,' 'Virginia,' 'Trumbull,' 'Effingham,' 'Congress,' 'Providence,' 'Boston,' 'Delaware,' 'Montgomery.' The State of Rhode Island, at the very outbreak of hostilities, commissioned Abraham Whipple, who went with his little vessel as far as Bermuda, and, from his experience in naval warfare earned in the French War, he was recognized as commodore of the little fleet of American cruisers. … Meanwhile, every maritime State issued commissions to privateers, and established admiralty or prize courts, with power to condemn prizes when brought in. Legitimate commerce had been largely checked, and … the seamen of the country, who had formerly been employed in the fisheries, or in our large foreign trade with the West India Islands and with Europe, gladly volunteered in the private service. Till the end of the war the seamen preferred the privateer service to that of the government. … The larger maritime States had in commission one or more vessels from the beginning, but they found the same difficulty which the Congress found in enlisting seamen, when any bold privateer captain came into rivalry with them. … As early as the 22d of December, in 1775, Congress had appointed Esek Hopkins, of Rhode Island, commander-in-chief of its navy, and had named four captains besides, with several lieutenants, the first of whom was John Paul Jones. … On the 10th of October [1776] a resolution of Congress fixed the rank of captains in the navy, … Paul Jones eighteenth on a list of twenty-four. Jones was not pleased that his rank was not higher, but eventually his achievements were such that his reputation probably now stands higher as a successful officer than that of any of the number."

_E. E. Hale, Naval History of the American Revolution (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6, chapter 7)._

ALSO IN: _J. F. Cooper, Naval History of the United States, volume 1, chapters 4-6._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (January). Adoption of a Constitution in New Hampshire.

See NEW HAMPSHIRE: A. D. 1775-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (January-June). King George's war measures and Paine's "Common Sense." The setting of the tide of opinion toward national independence.

"Disastrous news arrived from England before the close of the winter of 1775-6. The King had opened Parliament with a speech in which he had denounced the Colonists as rebels, seeking, with deceitful pretences, to establish an independent empire; and his Majesty recommended decisive, coercive measures against them. … The answer to the Royal Address (adopted by a vote of seventy-six to thirty-three in the Lords, and two hundred and seventy-eight to one hundred and eight in the Commons) gave assurances of the firm support of Parliament to the proposed measures. The very moderately conciliatory propositions made by the Duke of Richmond, Mr. Burke, and the Duke of Grafton, were summarily voted down, and not far from the middle of December the atrocious' Prohibitory Act,' as it was generally designated, passed. It was, in effect, a declaration of war, and a war unrestrained by the customs, and unmitigated by the decencies of civilization. It authorized the confiscation of American vessels and cargoes, and those of all nations found trading in American ports. It authorized British commanders to impress American crews into the British Navy, and to place them on the same footing with voluntarily enlisted seamen; that is, to give them a choice between parricide and being hung at a yardarm! Finally, it referred all future negotiations to two Commissioners, to be sent out along with a conquering armament, who were allowed to grant pardons to individuals and Colonies, on submission, thus leaving no future alternative opposed to the latter but the sword, and indicating that henceforth all appeals to King or Parliament were cut off. … Concurrently with these legislative steps, the practical ones for carrying on the war, with a large army, were entered upon. Finding it difficult or impossible to obtain the necessary recruits at home, and that the existing English and Irish regiments embarked with such reluctance that it was necessary to keep a guard upon the transports 'to keep them from deserting by wholesale,' the Ministry successively applied to Russia, the States-General, and finally, several of the German States for mercenaries. … The infamy of filling up the British armament was reserved for the Princes of three or four petty German States. … As the news of these events successively reached the American Congress and people, in the winter and spring of 1775-6, the contest took a new coloring. Not only the bold, but the moderate began now to see the real alternative before them. And at a critical moment the remedy, and the path to it, were pointed out by a master hand. 'Common Sense' was published by Thomas Paine, and a more effective popular appeal never went to the bosoms of a nation. Its tone, its manner, its biblical illusions, its avoidance of all openly impassioned appeals to feeling, and its unanswerable common sense were exquisitely adapted to the great audience to which it was addressed; and calm investigation will satisfy the historical student that its effect in preparing the popular mind for the Declaration of Independence, exceeded that of any other paper, speech, or document made to favor it, and it would scarcely be exaggeration to add, than all other such means put together. John Adams, with a childish perpetuance, and with a rancor so vehement that it appears ridiculous, spares no occasion to underrate Paine's services, and to assault his opinions and character. … His transparent motive seems to be to decry the author of a paper which had too much the credit of preparing the public mind for the Declaration of Independence, a credit which Mr. Adams was more than anxious to monopolize. Let us be just. Paine's services in paving the way to the Declaration are not to be mentioned on the same page with John Adams's. Moreover, Independence would have been declared, and, perhaps, nearly as early, had Paine never written. But he did, at a propitious moment, and with consummate adaptation, write a paper which went like the arrow which pierces the centre of the target. Its effect was instantaneous and tremendous. … The work ran through innumerable editions in America and France. The world rung with it. … It admits of no doubt that pretty early in 1776, all the true Whigs in Congress, moderates as well as ultras, became satisfied of the necessity and expediency of separation, and that henceforth it was only a question of time with them. {3231} Enactments placing the struggle on the footing of open war, instead of mere insurrection—issuing letters of marque and reprisal against the enemies of our commerce—advising the local authorities to disarm the disaffected—opening the ports of the country to all nations but Great Britain—directing negotiations for foreign alliances to be undertaken—were successively made. Finally, on the 10th of May, a resolution, prepared by John Adams and R. H. Lee, passed the House, advising all the Colonies to form governments for themselves; and in this, unlike preceding instances of giving advice on the same subject, no limitation of the duration of the governments to be formed 'to the continuance of the present dispute' was inserted. This, with a befitting preamble, written by John Adams, was adopted on the 15th, … and was, obviously, a long and bold stride in the direction of independence, and must have been understood by all as its signal and precursor. … Congress cheered on those whom peculiar circumstances had rendered more backward, and it tarried for them a little by the way; on the other hand, it prudently waited for the prompting of the more forward. Thus it avoided the appearance of dominating over public opinion—thus it 'kept front and rear together.' Early in April (12th), North Carolina 'empowered' her delegates 'to concur with the delegates of other Colonies in declaring independency.' At its 'May session' (the day of the month not appearing in the record under our eye), the General Assembly of Rhode Island abolished its act of allegiance, and directed all commissions and legal processes henceforth to issue in the name and under the authority of the 'Governor and Company.' The Connecticut General Assembly, which met on the 9th of May, before its adjournment (date not before us), repealed its act against high treason, and made the same order with Rhode Island in regard to legal processes. On the 15th of May, Virginia took a still more decisive step, by instructing its delegates in Congress to move for a Declaration of Independence. … The Virginia delegates in Congress made choice of Richard H. Lee to move the resolutions contained in their instructions of May 15th; and he did so on Friday, the 7th day of June, John Adams seconding them. Their consideration was postponed until the next day, when they were referred to a committee of the whole, and debated throughout Saturday and the succeeding Monday. On the latter day (10th) Congress resolved: 'That the consideration of the first resolution be postponed to Monday, the first day of July next; and in the meanwhile, that no time be lost, in case the Congress agree thereto, that a committee be appointed to prepare a declaration to the effect of the said first resolution, which is in these words: That these Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown; and that all Political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.'"

_H. S. Randall, Life of Jefferson, volume 1, chapter 4._

ALSO IN: _G. Bancroft, History of United States (Author's last revision), volume 4, chapters 24-28._

_R. Frothingham, Rise of the Republic, chapter 11._

_W. C. Rives, Life and Times of Madison, volume 1, chapters 4-5._

_American Archives, series 4, volume 6._

_E. G. Scott, The Development of Constitutional Liberty in the English Colonies, chapter 11._

_C. J. Stille, Life and Times of John Dickinson, chapter 5._

See, also, NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776; and VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776.