Part 17

"Economically the general results of the trade regulations were important. Robert Giffen has repeatedly pointed out how difficult it is, even with modern comparatively accurate methods, to obtain reliable results from the use of export and import statistics. This difficulty is immeasurably enhanced when we have to rely on the meagre figures of a century and a half ago. For we neither know how these statistics were taken, nor at all how accurate they are; while their inadequacy becomes clearly evident when we consider the large amount of smuggling carried on both in England and the colonies. One general proposition, however, can be formulated from the examination of these statistics, and that is the balance of trade between England and the colonies was unfavorable to the latter. And this was an inherent consequence of the mercantile system, by which England regulated these commercial relations. {3181} The colonies were unable to pay England for her manufactures entirely in raw materials, and the residue was paid in coin obtained from the favorable trade with Spain, Portugal, and the West Indies. All metal had to be sent to England; it was, as De Foe says, 'snatched up for returns to England in specie.' An important consequence followed from this continuous drain of specie. The colonies could with difficulty retain coin, and hence were forced either to fall back on barter, or to issue paper money. … While, on the one hand, the acts of trade and navigation are partially responsible for many sad passages in the fiscal history of the colonies, on the other hand they conduced to the development of a most important colonial industry. This industry was ship-building, for which the colonies were especially adapted on account of the cheapness of lumber. In developing this natural fitness, the protection afforded to English and colonial shipping by the Navigation Acts was an important factor. As a rule England did not discriminate against colonial and in favor of English ships, although the colonies frequently attempted by legislation to secure advantages for their own shipping. As a result of this policy ship building and the carrying trade increased rapidly, especially in the New England colonies. … So important did this industry become that in 1724 the ship carpenters of the Thames complained to the King, 'that their trade was hurt and their workmen emigrated since so many vessels were built in New England.' Massachusetts built ships not only for England, but also for European countries, and for the West Indies. … Politically the commercial regulations were not so important. Up to 1763 only slight political importance attaches to the system, for only in a negative way did it affect the political ideas of the colonists. The colonies were peopled by men of varied race and religion, who had little common consciousness of rights and wrongs and few common political ideals. The centrifugal forces among them were strong. Among centripetal forces, such as a common sovereign and a common system of private law, must be reckoned the fact that their commerce was regulated by a system which, as a rule, was uniform for all the colonies. When the acts of trade worked to their advantage, the colonists reaped common benefits; when they inflicted hardships, the colonists made common complaint. Moreover, the fact that England was unable to enforce certain of her acts, especially the Molasses Act, caused contempt for parliamentary authority. The continued and, by the very nature of things, the necessary violation of this law lead to a questioning of its sanction, while the open favoritism shown in it towards the West India colonies naturally aroused disaffection in those of the continent. The colonial system, as it was administered before 1763, contributed but slightly in bringing about the revolution of 1776. As Mr. Ramsay has said, 'if no other grievances had been superadded to what existed in 1763, they would have been soon forgotten, for their pressure was neither great, nor universal. It was only when the fundamental basis of the acts was changed from one of commercial monopoly to one of revenue, that the acts became of vital political importance."

_G. L. Beer, The Commercial Policy of England toward the American Colonies (Columbia College Studies in History, etc., volume 3, number 2), chapter 7, section 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1763-1764. Pontiac's War.

See PONTIAC'S WAR.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1763-1764. Determination in England to tax the colonies. The Sugar (or Molasses) Act.-"

It did not take four years after the peace of 1763 to show how rapidly the new situation of affairs was bearing fruit in America. … The overthrow of their ancient enemy [the French in Canada], while further increasing the self-confidence of the Americans, at the same time removed the principal check which had hitherto kept their differences with the British government from coming to an open rupture. Formerly the dread of French attack had tended to make the Americans complaisant toward the king's ministers, while at the same time it made the king's ministers unwilling to lose the good will of the Americans. Now that the check was removed, the continuance or revival of the old disputes at once foreboded trouble; and the old occasions for dispute were far from having ceased. On the contrary the war itself had given them fresh vitality. If money had been needed before, it was still more needed now. The war had entailed a heavy burden of expense upon the British government as well as upon the colonies. The national debt of Great Britain was much increased, and there were many who thought that, since the Americans shared in the benefits of the war, they ought also to share in the burden which it left behind it. People in England who used this argument did not realize that the Americans had really contributed as much as could reasonably be expected to the support of the war, and that it had left behind it debts to be paid in America as well as in England. But there was another argument which made it seem reasonable to many Englishmen that the colonists should be taxed. It seemed right that a small military force should be kept up in America, for defence of the frontiers against the Indians, even if there were no other enemies to be dreaded. The events of Pontiac's war now showed that there was clearly need of such a force; and the experience of the royal governors for half a century had shown that it was very difficult to get the colonial legislatures to vote money for any such purpose. Hence there grew up in England a feeling that taxes ought to be raised in America as a contribution to the war debt and to the military defence of the colonies; and in order that such taxes should be fairly distributed and promptly collected, it was felt that the whole business ought to be placed under the direct supervision and control of parliament. … It was in 1763 that George Grenville became prime minister, a man of whom Macaulay says that he knew of 'no national interests except those which are expressed by pounds, shillings, and pence.' Grenville proceeded to introduce into Parliament two measures which had consequences of which he little dreamed. The first of these measures was the Molasses Act [often called the Sugar Act], the second was the Stamp Act. Properly speaking, the Molasses Act was an old law which Grenville now made up his mind to revive and enforce. The commercial wealth of the New England colonies depended largely upon their trade with the fish which their fishermen caught along the coast and as far out as the banks of Newfoundland. The finest fish could be sold in Europe, but the poorer sort found their chief market in the French West Indies. {3182} The French government, in order to ensure a market for the molasses raised in these islands, would not allow the planters to give any thing else in exchange for fish. Great quantities of molasses were therefore carried to New England, and what was not needed there for domestic use was distilled into rum, part of which was consumed at home, and the rest carried chiefly to Africa wherewith to buy slaves to be sold to the southern colonies. All this trade required many ships, and thus kept up a lively demand for New England lumber, besides finding employment for thousands of sailors and shipwrights. Now in 1733 the British government took it into its head to 'protect' its sugar planters in the English West Indies by compelling the New England merchants to buy all their molasses from them; and with this end in view it forthwith laid upon all sugar and molasses imported into North America from the French islands a duty so heavy that, if it had been enforced, it would have stopped all such importation. … It proved to be impossible to enforce the act without causing more disturbance than the government felt prepared to encounter. Now in 1764 Grenville announced that the act was to be enforced, and of course the machinery of writs of assistance was to be employed for that purpose. Henceforth all molasses from the French islands must either pay the prohibitory duty or be seized without ceremony. Loud and fierce was the indignation of New England over this revival of the Molasses Act. Even without the Stamp Act, it might very likely have led that part of the country to make armed resistance, but in such case it is not so sure that the southern and middle colonies would have come to the aid of New England. But in the Stamp Act, Grenville provided the colonies with an issue which concerned one as much as another."

_J. Fiske, The War of Independence, chapter 4._

ALSO IN: _J. G. Palfrey, History of New England, book 6, chapters 2-3 (volume 5)._

_W. B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England, chapter 19 (volume 2)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1764. The climax of the mercantile colonial policy of England, and its consequences.

"Historians, in treating of the American rebellion, have confined their arguments too exclusively to the question of internal taxation, and the right or policy of exercising this prerogative. The true source of the rebellion lay deeper, in our traditional colonial policy. Just as the Spaniards had been excited to the discovery of America by the hope of obtaining gold and silver, the English merchants utilized the discovery by the same fallacious method, and with the same fallacious aspirations. … A hundred years ago the commercial classes believed that the prime object of their pursuits was to get as much gold and silver into England as they could. They sought, therefore, to make their country, as nearly as they might, a solitary centre of the exportation of non-metallic commodities, that so she might be also the great reservoir into which the precious metals would flow in a return stream. On this base their colonial policy was erected. … So long as the colonies remained in their infancy the mercantile policy was less prejudicial to their interests. The monopoly of their commerce, the limitation of their markets, the discouragement of their manufactures, in some cases amounting to absolute prohibition, were all less fatal in a country where labour was dear, than they would be in a state where population was more fully developed and land had become scarcer. … A contraband trade sprung up between them and the colonies of Spain. Our settlers imported goods from England, and re-exported them to the Spanish colonies, in return for bullion and other commodities. The result of this was that the Spanish colonists had access to useful commodities from which they would otherwise have been debarred, that the American colonists could without distress remit the specie which was required by the nature of their dealings with England, and that a large market was opened for English products. This widely beneficial trade was incontinently suppressed in 1764, by one of those efforts of short-sighted rigour which might be expected from any government where George Grenville's influence was prominent. All smuggling was to be put down, and as this trade was contraband, it must be put down like the rest. The Government probably acted as they did in answer to the prayers of the mercantile classes, who could not see that they were cutting off the streams that fed their own prosperity. They only saw that a colonial trade had sprung up, and their jealousy blinded them to the benefits that accrued to themselves as a consequence of it. Their folly found them out. The suppression of the colonial trade was entrusted to the commanders of men-of-war. … We may be sure that the original grievance of the colonists was not softened by the manners of the officers who had to put the law into execution. The result of the whole transaction was the birth of a very strong sense in the minds of the colonists that the mother country looked upon them as a sponge to be squeezed. This conviction took more than a passing hold upon them. It was speedily inflamed into inextinguishable heat, first by the news that they were to be taxed without their own consent, and next by the tyrannical and atrocious measures by which it was proposed to crush their resistance. The rebellion may be characterised as having first originated in the blind greediness of the English merchants, and as having then been precipitated by the arbitrary ideas of the patricians, in the first instance, and afterwards of the King and the least educated of the common people. If the severe pressure of the mercantile policy, unflinchingly carried out, had not first filled the colonists with resentment and robbed them of their prosperity, the imperial claim to impose taxes would probably have been submitted to without much ado. And if the suppression of their trade in 1764 had not been instantly followed by Grenville's plan for extorting revenue from them, they would probably in time have been reconciled to the blow which had been dealt to their commerce. It was the conjunction of two highly oppressive pieces of policy which taught them that they would certainly lose more by tame compliance than they could possibly lose by an active resistance."

_J. Morley, Edmund Burke, chapter 4._

ALSO IN: _W. Massey, History of England, Reign of George III., volume 1, chapter 5._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1764-1767. Patriotic self-denials.

"Upon the news of the intention to lay [the Stamp Tax] … on the colonies, many people, the last year, had associated, and engaged to forbear the importation, or consumption, of English goods; and particularly to break off from the custom of wearing black clothes, or other mourning [it being generally of British manufacture—Foot-note], upon the death of relations. This agreement was then signed by some of the council, and representatives, and by great numbers of people in the town of Boston, and the disuse of mourning soon became general. This was intended to alarm the manufacturers in England. And now [in 1765], an agreement was made, and signed by a great proportion of the inhabitants of Boston, to eat no lamb during the year. This was in order to increase the growth, and, of course, the manufacture of wool in the province. Neither of these measures much served the purpose for which they were professedly intended, but they served to unite the people in an unfavourable opinion of parliament."

_T. Hutchinson, History of the province of Massachusetts Bay, 1749-1774, pages 116-117._

The movement thus started in Boston before the passage of the Stamp Act spread rapidly through the other provinces after the Act had been passed, and continued to be for several years a very serious expression of colonial patriotism and opposition to the oppressive policy of the mother country.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1765.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1765. The Stamp Act.

"The scheme of the imposition by Parliament of a tax on the American colonists to be collected by stamps was not a new one. Nearly forty years before this time, 'Sir William Keith, the late Governor of Pennsylvania, presented an elaborate disquisition to the King … proposing the extension of the stamp duties to the Colonies by Act of Parliament.' It had been one of the projects of the factious Dunbar, during his short career of turbulence and intrigue in New Hampshire. Governor Sharpe of Maryland and Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia had recommended a resort to it at the time of the abortive movement for a union of the Colonies. Its renewal at this time has been said to have been especially due to Charles Jenkinson, then only private secretary to Lord Bute, but who rose afterwards to be Earl of Liverpool. The project, as now resolved upon, was pursued with inconsiderate obstinacy, though it encountered a spirited debate when it was brought into the House of Commons [February, 1765]. … The bill was pending in the House between three and four weeks, at the end of which time it was passed, the largest number of votes which had been given against it in any stage of its progress not having amounted to fifty. It was concurred in by the House of Lords, where it appears to have met no resistance, and in due course [March 22] received the royal assent. No apprehension of consequences counselled a pause. The Stamp Act—as it has ever since been called by eminence—provided … for the payment, by British subjects in America to the English Exchequer, of specified sums, greater or less, in consideration of obtaining validity for each of the common transactions of business."

_J. G. Palfrey, History of New England, book 6, chapter 3 (volume 5)._

The following is the text of the Stamp Act:

Whereas, by an act made in the last session of parliament, several duties were granted, continued, and appropriated, towards defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the British colonies and plantations in America: and whereas, it is first necessary, that provision be made for raising a further revenue within your majesty's dominions in America, towards defraying the said expenses; we, your majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the commons of Great Britain, in parliament assembled, have therefore resolved, to give and grant unto your majesty the several rites and duties hereinafter mentioned; and do most humbly beseech your majesty that it may be enacted, And be it enacted, by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That from and after the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and sixty five, there shall be raised, levied, collected and paid, unto his majesty, his heirs and successors, throughout the colonies and plantations in America, which now are, or hereafter may be, under the dominion of his majesty, his heirs and successors.

1. For every skin of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, demurrer, or other pleading, or any copy thereof, in any court of law within the British colonies and plantations in America, a stamp duty of three pence.

2. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any special bail, and appearance upon such bail in any such court, a stamp duty of two shillings.

3. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which may be engrossed, written or printed, any petition, bill, or answer, claim, plea, replication, rejoinder, demurrer, or other pleading, in any court of chancery or equity, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling and six pence.

4. For every skin or piece of vellum, or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any copy of any petition, bill, answer, claim, plea, replication, rejoinder, demurrer, or other pleading, in any such court, a stamp duty of three pence.

5. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written, or printed, any monition, libel, answer, allegation, inventory, or renunciation, in ecclesiastical matters, in any court of probate, court of the ordinary, or other court exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling.

6. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any copy of any will, (other than the probate thereof,) monition, libel, answer, allegation, inventory, or renunciation, in ecclesiastical matters, in any such court, a stamp duty of six pence.

7. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any donation, presentation, collation or institution, of or to any benefice, or any writ or instrument for the like purpose, or any register, entry, testimonial or certificate of any degree taken in any university, academy, college, or seminary of learning, within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of two pounds.

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8. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any monition, libel, claim, answer, allegation, information, letter of request, execution, renunciation, inventory, or other pleading, in any admiralty court within the said colonies and plantations, a stamp duty of one shilling.

9. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which any copy of any such monition, libel, claim, answer, allegation, information, letter of request, execution, renunciation, inventory or other pleading, shall be engrossed, written or printed, a stamp duty of six pence.

10. For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be engrossed, written or printed, any appeal, writ of error, writ of dower, 'ad quod damnum,' certiorari, statute merchant, statute staple, attestation, or certificate, by any officer, or exemplification of any record or proceeding, in any court whatsoever within the said colonies and plantations, (except appeals, writs of error, certiorari, attestations, certificates, and exemplifications, for, or relating to the removal of any proceedings from before a single justice of the peace,) a stamp duty of ten shillings.