Part 116

"The dispersion and suppression of the guerrilla bands [in Missouri] did not serve wholly to terminate local disturbances and offenses. The restraints of a common public opinion no longer existed. Neighborhood good-will had become changed to neighborhood hatred and feud. Men took advantage of the license of war to settle personal grudges by all the violations of law, varying from petty theft to assassination; and parallel with this thirst for private revenge was the cupidity which turned crime into a source of private gain. … A rearrangement of military command appears in an order of the President under date of September 19, 1862, directing that Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and the bordering Indian Territory should constitute a new department to be called the Department of the Missouri, to be commanded by Major-General Samuel R. Curtis. … This new arrangement served to change the relative positions of Schofield and Curtis. The former, gathering what troops he could, took the field in a campaign towards Southwest Missouri to meet the expected invasion from Arkansas, while the latter, recalled from a short leave of absence, came to St. Louis (September 24, 1862) to take up his headquarters and assume the general administration of the new Department of the Missouri. … The difficulties in the military situation had grown primarily out of the error of Halleck … in postponing the opening of the Mississippi River. When, in the spring and summer of 1862, Halleck abandoned all thought of pursuing that prime and comprehensive object, and left Vicksburg to grow up into an almost impregnable Confederate citadel, he blighted the possibility of successful Union campaigns on both sides of the great river. … From the midsummer of 1862, therefore, until the fall of Vicksburg in midsummer of 1863, military campaigning in the trans-Mississippi country ceases to have any general significance. … The only action of importance which marks the military administration of Curtis was the battle of Prairie Grove in the northwest corner of Arkansas, where on the 7th of December the detachments respectively commanded by the Union generals James G. Blunt (who had been hovering all summer along the border of Kansas) and Francis J. Herron, who, finding Blunt pressed by the enemy coming northward with a view of entering Missouri, advanced by forced marches from near Springfield and formed a junction with Blunt just in the nick of time to defeat the Confederates under General Hindman. The losses on each side were about equal, and on the day following the engagement the Confederates retreated southward across the protecting barrier of the Boston Mountains. It was in a diminished degree a repetition of the battle of Pea Ridge, fought in the preceding March within 20 or 30 miles of the same place. … So effectually did this engagement serve to scatter the rebel forces that Schofield reported January 31, 1863, 'There is no considerable force of the enemy north of the Arkansas River; indeed I believe they have all gone or are going, as rapidly as possible, to Vicksburg. Ten thousand infantry and artillery can be spared from Southern Missouri and Northern Arkansas.'"

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 6, chapter 18._

ALSO IN: _W. Baxter, Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove._

_O. J. Victor, History of the Southern Rebellion, division 10, chapter 4 (volume 3)._

_W. Britton, Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, chapter 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (October-December: Virginia). The final removal of McClellan. Burnside at Fredericksburg.

"Both armies … felt the need of some repose; and, glad to be freed from each other's presence, they rested on their arms—the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the vicinity of Winchester, and the army of the Potomac near the scene of its late exploits, amid the picturesque hills and vales of Southwestern Maryland. The movement from Washington into Maryland to meet Lee's invasion was defensive in its purpose, though it assumed the character of a defensive-offensive campaign. Now that this had been accomplished and Lee driven across the frontier, it remained to organize on an adequate scale the means of a renewal of grand offensive operations directed at the Confederate army and towards Richmond. The completion of this work, including the furnishing of transportation, clothing, supplies, etc., required upwards of a month, and during this period no military movement occurred, with the exception of a raid into Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the middle of October, that enterprising officer, with twelve or fifteen hundred troopers, crossed the Potomac above Williamsport, passed through Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, occupied Chambersburg, where he burnt considerable government stores, and after making the entire circuit of the Union army, recrossed the Potomac below the mouth of the Monocacy. He was all the way closely pursued by Pleasonton with 800 cavalry. … On the recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, McClellan hastened to seize the débouehé of the Shenandoah Valley, by the possession of Harper's Ferry. … At first McClellan contemplated pushing his advance against Lee directly down the Shenandoah Valley, as he found that, by the adoption of the line east of the Blue Ridge, his antagonist, finding the door open, would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being removed by the oncoming of the season of high-water in the Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of the Blue Ridge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the Potomac by a ponton-bridge at Berlin, five miles below Harper's Ferry. By the 2d November the entire army had crossed at that point. Advancing due southward towards Warrenton, he masked the movement by guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge, and by threatening to issue through these, he compelled Lee to retain Jackson in the Valley. With such success was this movement managed, that on reaching Warrenton on the 9th, while Lee had sent half of his army forward to Culpepper to oppose McClellan's advance in that direction, the other half was still west of the Blue Ridge, scattered up and down the Valley, and separated from the other moiety by at least two days' march. McClellan's next projected move was to strike across obliquely westward and interpose between the severed divisions of the Confederate force; but this step he was prevented from taking by his sudden removal from the command of the Army of the Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton. Late on the night of November 7th, amidst a heavy snow-storm, General Buckingham, arriving post-haste from Washington, reached the tent of General McClellan at Rectortown. He was the bearer of the following dispatch, which he handed to General McClellan: … 'By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.' … It chanced that General Burnside was at the moment with him in his tent. {3485} Opening the dispatch and reading it, without a change of countenance or of voice, McClellan passed over the paper to his successor, saying, as he did so: 'Well, Burnside, you are to command the army.' Thus ended the career of McClellan as head of the Army of the Potomac. … The moment chosen was an inopportune and an ungracious one; for never had McClellan acted with such vigor and rapidity-never had he shown so much confidence in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable fact that not only was the whole body of the army—rank and file as well his officers—enthusiastic in their affection for his person, but that the very general appointed as his successor was the strongest opponent of his removal."

_W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 6, sections 2-3. _

"It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle, and our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates'; it is more dangerous to change the plans of troops moving in the vicinity of the enemy. But as if impelled to do some new thing … the new commander of the Army of the Potomac determined upon a flank movement by his left on the north of the river towards Fredericksburg. … Only by movements equally wary and rapid, as well as by sure means of crossing the river, could Burnside's manœuvre possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on Halleck, and, of course, failed. The promised pontoons did not, and could scarcely have been expected to come. Arrived at Fredericksburg Burnside still might have crossed by the fords, for the water was low. And once in possession of the heights beyond the city he could afford to wait. But, slower than even his predecessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north side of the river, while Lee, having learned of his movement, by forced marches concentrated his army on the opposite bank, and prepared to erect impregnable defences in his front. … Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps, Marye's Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been crowned by a triple line of works, and Lee had brought together nearly 90,000 troops to man them. Two canals and a stone wall in front of the left, as well as open, sloping ground on both flanks, served to retain an attacking party for a long period under fire. To assault these works in front was simple madness. To turn them below necessitated the crossing of a wide and now swollen river, in the face of a powerful enemy in his immediate front. … To turn them above was practicable, but it was a confessed return to McClellan's plan. Burnside chose the first. Preparations foe crossing were begun. The better part of three days [December 11-13] was consumed in throwing the bridges and putting over the two Grand Divisions of Franklin and Sumner, all of which was accomplished under fire. But Lee was by no means unwilling to meet the Army of the Potomac after this fashion. Such another happy prospect for him was not apt soon again to occur. He did not dispute the crossing in force. Burnside's one chance in a hundred lay in a concentrated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy could oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one well-sustained attack, or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered away this single chance by putting in Franklin on the left and Sumner on the right, without concerted action." Both assaults were bloodily repulsed. "Hooker is ordered across. Under protest, and yet Hooker lacked not stomach for a fight, he obeys the useless order, and leads his men into the slaughter pen. … All is in vain. Even the Army of the Potomac cannot do the impossible. The defeated troops are huddled into Fredericksburg, and gradually withdrawn across the river. Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault next day. But the counsels of his officers prevailed on him to desist. No such useless slaughter, with the exception, perhaps, of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and 13,000 men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but one in three of ours."

_T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War, chapter 21._

ALSO IN: A. Woodbury, Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps, part 2, chapters 4-8.

_F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapters 5-6._

_B. P. Poore, Life of Burnside, chapters 18-19._

_Official Records, series 1, volume 21._

_J. Longstreet, D. N. Couch, and others, Burnside at Fredericksburg, (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_F. W. Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5), pages 129-135._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (December: On the Mississippi). The second attempt against Vicksburg. General Sherman and Admiral Porter. Miscarriage of Grant's plans.

"Rear-Admiral Porter took command of the Mississippi squadron in October, 1862. … Up to this time the gun-boats had, strictly speaking, been under the control of the Army, but now all this was changed, and the Mississippi Squadron, like all the other naval forces, was brought directly under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. … The new arrangement left the commander of the squadron at liberty to undertake any expedition he thought proper, and he was not in the least hampered by any instructions from the Navy Department. … Before Admiral Porter left Washington he was informed by the President that General McClernand had been ordered to raise an Army at Springfield, Illinois, to prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. The President expressed the hope that the rear-admiral would co-operate heartily with General McClernand in the operations to be carried on. But as Vicksburg never would have been taken if it had depended on General McClernand's raising an Army sufficient for the purpose, the Admiral, immediately on his arrival at Cairo, sent a message to General Grant, at Holly Springs, Mississippi, informing him of McClernand's intention; that he, Porter, had assumed command of the Mississippi Squadron, and was ready to cooperate with the Army on every occasion where the services of the Navy could be useful. A few days afterwards General Grant arrived at Cairo and proposed an expedition against Vicksburg, and asking the rear-admiral, if he could furnish a sufficient force of gun-boats, to accompany it. Grant's plan was to embark Sherman from Memphis, where he then was, with 30,000 soldiers, to be joined at Helena, Arkansas, by 10,000 more. Grant himself would march from Holly Springs with some 60,000 men upon Granada. General Pemberton would naturally march from Vicksburg to stop Grant at Granada, until reinforcements could be thrown into Vicksburg from the south, and while Pemberton was thus absent with the greater part of his Army, Sherman and Porter could get possession of the defences of Vicksburg. {3486} General Grant having been informed that the gun-boats would be ready to move at short notice, and having sent orders to Sherman to put his troops aboard the transports as soon as the gun-boats arrived in Memphis, returned immediately to Holly Springs to carry out his part of the programme. … The expedition from Memphis got away early in December, 1862. Commander Walke, in the 'Carondelet,' being sent ahead with [three iron-clads and two so-called 'tin-clads'] … to clear the Yazoo River of torpedoes and cover the landing of Sherman's Army when it should arrive. This arduous and perilous service was well performed," but one of the iron-clads engaged in it, the Cairo, was sunk by a torpedo. "General Sherman moved his transports to a point on the river called Chickasaw Bayou without the loss of a man from torpedoes or sharpshooters, his landing [December 27] being covered in every direction by the gunboats. Sherman first made a feint on Haines' Bluff, as if to attack the works, and then landed at Chickasaw Bayou. Owing to the late heavy rains he found the roads to Vicksburg heights almost impassable, and when he attempted to advance with his Army he was headed off by innumerable bayous, which had to be bridged, or corduroy roads built around them. It was killing work. Even at this time Vicksburg had been fortified at every point, and its only approaches by land led through dense swamps or over boggy open ground, where heavy guns were placed, so as to mow down an advancing Army. A general has seldom had so difficult a task assigned him, and there was little chance of Sherman's succeeding unless Pemberton had drawn off nearly all his forces to oppose Grant's advance on Granada. … Sherman and his Army overcame everything and at last reached terra firma. In the meanwhile the Navy was doing what it could to help the Army. … Grant had left Holly Springs with a large Army at the time he had appointed, merely with the design of drawing Pemberton from Vicksburg and thus helping Sherman in his attack on that place. … Grant moved towards Granada, and everything looked well; but the Confederate General, Earl Van Dorn, dashed into Holly Springs, 28 miles in the rear of the Union Army, capturing the garrison and all their stores. At the same time General Forrest pushed his cavalry into West Tennessee, cutting the railroad to Columbus at several points between that place and Jackson. … Due precautions had been taken to prevent this mishap by leaving a strong force behind at Holly Springs, but the commanding officer was not on the alert and his capture was a complete surprise. In this raid of the Confederates a million dollars' worth of stores were destroyed. Under the circumstances it was impossible for Grant to continue his march on Granada, which Pemberton perceiving, the latter returned to Vicksburg in time to assist in Sherman's repulse. … Sherman made all his arrangements to attack the enemy's works on the 20th of December, 1862, and the assault took place early on that day. One division succeeded in occupying the batteries on the heights, and hoped shortly to reach those commanding the city of Vicksburg, but the division that was to follow the advance was behind time and the opportunity was lost. A portion of Pemberton's Army had returned from Granada just in time to overwhelm and drive back the small force that had gained the hills. … The enemy did not follow, being satisfied with driving our troops from the heights, and there was nothing left for Sherman to do but to get his Army safely back to the transports."

_D. D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, chapter 24._

ALSO IN: _S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, Sherman and his Campaigns, chapter 7._

_W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 11._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862-1863 (December-January: Tennessee). Bragg and Rosecrans. The Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough.