Part 103

"When Congress assembled … in the beginning of December, 1861, so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and so zealously had the people responded to their country's call, that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your committee by the adjutant general of the army, showed that, exclusive of the command of General Dix, at Baltimore, the army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men. During the time this large army had been collecting and organizing, nothing of importance had transpired in connexion with it, except the closing of the navigation of the Potomac by the rebels, which your committee treat of more at length in another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of Ball's Bluff, which is made the subject of a separate report. The weather during the fall season, and for some weeks after the convening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for active military operations. As month after month passed without anything being done by the army of the Potomac, the people became more and more anxious for the announcement that the work of preparation had been completed and active operations would soon be commenced. From the testimony before your committee it appeared that the army of the Potomac was well armed and equipped, and had reached a high state of discipline by the last of September or the first of October. The men were ready and eager to commence active operations. The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed to going into winter quarters, and the most of them declared they had no expectation of doing so. … Your committee endeavored to obtain as accurate information, as possible in relation to the strength and position of the enemy in front of Washington. The testimony of the officers in our army here upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Early in December an order had been issued from headquarters prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any persons who should come into our lines from the direction of the enemy; but all such persons were to be sent, without examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was, that the generals examined appeared to be almost entirely ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having only such information as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon information received at headquarters. … Subsequent events have proved that the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very greatly overestimated. Your committee also sought to ascertain what number of men could be spared from this army for offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the works of the enemy in front were of such a character that it would not be advisable to move directly upon them. The estimate of the force necessary to be left in and around Washington to act entirely on the defensive, to render the capital secure against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses examined upon that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men, leaving 100,000 or upwards that could be used for expeditions at other points. … The subject of the obstruction of the navigation of the Potomac naturally demanded the consideration of your committee. … As was well urged by the Navy Department, the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army co-operate with the navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed. After repeated efforts, General McClellan promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to proceed down the river. … The troops did not arrive, and the Navy Department was informed of the fact by Captain Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of General McClellan why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he had concluded not to send them. Captain Fox replied that the landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy Department had charge. … It was then agreed that the troops should be sent the next night. Captain Craven was again notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose. Captain Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the committee as to what reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as he could ascertain, was, that General McClellan feared it might bring on a general engagement. … Upon the failure of this plan of the Navy Department, the effective vessels of the Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter closed, and remained closed until the rebels voluntarily evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening communication by that route. On the 19th of January, 1862, the President of the United States, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the armies of the United States, one result of which was the series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every loyal man in the land. After this long period of inaction of the army of the Potomac, the President of the United States, on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following order: … 'Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the general-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next. Abraham Lincoln.'

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To this order General McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of the same date, objecting to the plan therein indicated as involving 'the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle, (the Occoquan,) and by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check.' He then proceeded to argue in favor of a movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, giving the preference to the Rappahannock route. He stated that 30 days would be required to provide the necessary means of transportation. He stated that he regarded 'success as certain, by all the chances of war,' by the route he proposed, while it was 'by no means certain that we can beat them (the enemy) at Manassas.' … Your committee have no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued or the arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President that led him to relinquish his own line of operations and consent to the one proposed by Genera] McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in February, 1862. That council, the first, so far as your committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by General McClellan, and then by direction of the President, was composed of twelve generals. … To them was submitted the question whether they would indorse the line of operations which General McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the deliberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake bay, up the Rappahannock, landing at Urbana, and across the country to Richmond. The four generals who voted against the proposed movement were Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Barnard. General Keyes voted for it with the qualification that no change should be made until the enemy were driven from their batteries on the Potomac. … Before the movement by way of Annapolis could be executed, the enemy abandoned their batteries upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at Centreville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the Rappahannock. When General McClellan, then in the city of Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuated Manassas, he proceeded across the river and ordered a general movement of the whole army in the direction of the position lately occupied by the enemy. The enemy moved on the morning of the 10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further than Fairfax Court-House. A small force of the army proceeded to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and destroyed the railroad bridge across it. … On the 13th of March General McClellan convened at Fairfax Court-House a council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of army corps, (General Banks being absent,) and informed them that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement by way of the York and James rivers."

_Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 37th Congress, 3d session, H. R. Rep., part 1, pages 6-12._

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, consisting of Senators Wade, Chandler, and Andrew Johnson, and of Representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell, was appointed in December, 1861. This Committee "was for four years one of the most important agencies in the country. It assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of both the army and the Government; it called soldiers and statesmen before it, and questioned them like refractory schoolboys. … It was often hasty and unjust in its judgments, but always, earnest, patriotic, and honest. … General McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee with something like contempt. But the President, with his larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take into account an agency of such importance; and though he steadily defended General McClellan and his deliberateness of preparation before the committee, he constantly assured him in private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself in readiness for a forward movement. … December was the fifth month that General McClellan had been in command of the greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was impossible to convince the country that a longer period of preparation was necessary before this army could be led against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in discipline or equipment. … McClellan reported to the Secretary of War, that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered 150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of 240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective total of 41,000 men. … Aware that his army was less than one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the time in drilling and disciplining his troops, who, according to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military operations, he says, were practicable until the end of December; but he was never molested."

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, Abraham Lincoln, volume 5, chapter 9._

McClellan says, "It certainly was not till late in November, 1861, that the Army of the Potomac was in any condition to move, nor even then were they capable of assaulting entrenched positions. By that time the roads had ceased to be practicable for the movement of armies, and the experience of subsequent years proved that no large operations could be advantageously conducted in that region during the winter season. Any success gained at that time in front of Washington could not have been followed up and a victory would have given us the barren possession of the field of battle, with a longer and more difficult line of supply during the rest of the winter. If the Army of the Potomac had been in condition to move before winter, such an operation would not have accorded with the general plan I had determined upon after succeeding General Scott as general in command of the armies"

_G. B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, pages 199-200._

ALSO IN: _J. E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, chapters 3-4._

_A. S. Webb, The Peninsula (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 3) chapter 2._

_Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, book 5, chapter 4 (volume 1)._

_G. B. McClellan, The Peninsular Campaign (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 2, pages 160-187)._

_G. B. McClellan, Complete Report._

_J. G. Barnard, The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents._

_J. C. Ropes, Gen. McClellan's Plans (Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 1)._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862 (December-April: Virginia). Jackson's first campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. Battle of Kernstown.

"Soon after the battle of Bull Run Stonewall Jackson was promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac District, and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes," In November, Jackson's force was about 10,000 men. "His only movement of note in the winter of 1861-62 was an expedition at the end of December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and a dam or two near Hancock, on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. … In March Johnston withdrew from Manassas, and General McClellan collected his army of more than 100,000 men on the Peninsula. … Jackson's little army in the Valley had been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so that at the beginning of March he did not have over 5,000 men of all arms available for the defense of his district, which began to swarm with enemies all around its borders, aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy had begun to withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to cooperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by an aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8,000 to 10,000 men. A little after the middle of March, Jack·son concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23d he occupied a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles south of Winchester. Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham county. The pursuit was not vigorous nor persistent. Although Jackson retired before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting qualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops from the Valley. The result was so pleasing to the Richmond government and General Johnston that it was decided to reënforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division to him at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May."

_J. D. Imboden, Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 282-285)._

"The losses at Kernstown were: Union, 118 killed, 450 wounded, 22 missing=590; Confederate, 80 killed, 375 wounded, 263 missing=718."

_N. Kimball, Fighting Jackson at Kernstown (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, page 307, footnote)._

ALSO IN: _G. H. Gordon, Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain, chapter 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1863. President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus.

On the 27th of April, 1861, President Lincoln issued the following order "To the Commanding General, Army of the United States"—at that time, General Scott: "You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ." On the 2d of July, another order was issued in exactly the same language, except that it gave authority to suspend the writ at "any point on or in the vicinity of any military line … between the city of New York and the city of Washington." On the 14th of October, a third order to General Scott declared: "The military line of the United States for the suppression of the insurrection may be extended so far as Bangor, Maine. You and any officer acting under your authority are hereby authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any place between that place and the city of Washington." On the 2d of December a specific order to General Halleck, commanding in the Department of Missouri, authorized the suspension of the writ within the limits of his command; and a similar order, long previously, had specially empowered the commander of the forces of the United States on the coast of Florida to do the same. On the 24th of September, 1862, a general proclamation by the President subjected to martial law "all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States"; and suspending the writ of habeas corpus "in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or military commission." On the 3d of March, 1863, the authority of the President to suspend habeas corpus (which some thought questionable) was confirmed by act of Congress; and on the 15th of September in that year another general proclamation was issued, referring to the act and declaring a suspension of the writ "throughout the United States, in the cases where, by the authority of the President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of them, hold persons under their command, or in their custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or drafted or mustered or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval service by authority of the President of the United States; or for resisting a draft, or for any other offense against the military or naval service."

_Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, volume 2, pages 38, 45, 54, 85, 93, 239, 406._

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"Whether it is the President or Congress that has power under the constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a burning question during the civil war. … The case of John Merryman … was the first to come up for judicial interpretation. Merryman lived near Baltimore, and appears to have been suspected of being captain of a secession troop, of having assisted in destroying railroads and bridges for the purpose of preventing troops from reaching Washington, and of obstructing the United States mail. By order of General Keim of Pennsylvania he was arrested at night in his own house, and taken to Fort McHenry at that time in command of General George Cadwallader. Taney, who was then chief justice of the United States, granted a habeas corpus, but Cadwallader refused to obey it, saying that the privilege had been suspended by the President. On the return of the writ, the Chief Justice filed an opinion denying that the President had any power to suspend habeas corpus and affirming that such power rested with Congress alone. Lincoln continued to arrest and imprison without any regard to this opinion, and indeed was advised by his Attorney-General that he was not bound to notice it. … The writ of habeas corpus was … not suspended by Congress until the rebellion was half over. In other words, Lincoln suspended it for two years of his own accord and without authority from anyone; for two years he made arrests without warrants and held men in prison as long as he pleased. … There are few things in American history more worthy of discussion than the power exercised by Lincoln in those two years. It was absolute and arbitrary and, if unauthorized, its exercise was a tremendous violation of the constitution. Whether it was justifiable and necessary is another matter. If it was unconstitutional and yet necessary in order to save the Union, it shows that the constitution is defective in not allowing the government the proper means of protecting itself. That Lincoln used this power with discretion and forbearance there is no doubt. He was the most humane man that ever wielded such authority. He had no taste for tyranny, and he knew the temper of the American people. But, nevertheless, injustice was sometimes done. His subordinates had not always their master's nature."

_S. G. Fisher, The Suspension of Habeas Corpus during the War of the Rebellion (Political Science Quarterly, September, 1888)._