Part 228

"In 1828 came another tariff bill, so bad and so extreme in many respects that it was called the 'bill of abominations.' It originated in the agitation of the woollen manufacturers which had started the year before, and for this bill Mr. Webster spoke and voted. He changed his ground on this important question absolutely and entirely, and made no pretence of doing anything else. The speech which he made on this occasion is a celebrated one, but it is so solely on account of the startling change of position which it announced. … A few lines from the speech give the marrow of the whole matter. Mr. Webster said: 'New England, sir, has not been a leader in this policy. … The opinion of New England up to 1824 was founded in the conviction that, on the whole, it was wisest and best, both for herself and others, that manufactures should make haste slowly. … When, at the commencement of the late war, duties were doubled, we were told that we should find a mitigation of the weight of taxation in the new aid and succor which would be thus afforded to our own manufacturing labor. Like arguments were urged, and prevailed, but not by the aid of New England votes, when the tariff was afterwards arranged at the close of the war in 1816. Finally, after a winter's deliberation, the act of 1824 received the sanction of both Houses of Congress and settled the policy of the country. … What, then, was New England to do? Was she to hold out forever against the course of the government, and see herself losing on one side and yet make no effort to sustain herself on the other? No, sir. Nothing was left to New England but to conform herself to the will of others. Nothing was left to her but to consider that the government had fixed and determined its own policy, and that policy was protection.' … Opinion in New England changed for good and sufficient business reasons, and Mr. Webster changed with it. Free trade had commended itself to him as an abstract principle, and he had sustained and defended it as in the interest of commercial New England. But when the weight of interest in New England shifted from free trade to protection Mr. Webster followed, it."

_H. C. Lodge, Daniel Webster, chapter 6._

"There was force in Webster's assertion, in reply to Hayne, that New England, after protesting against the tariff as long as she could, had conformed to a policy forced upon the country by others, and had embarked her capital in manufacturing. October 23, 1826, the Boston woollen manufacturers petitioned Congress for more protection. … This appeal of the woollen manufacturers brought out new demands from other quarters. Especially the wool-growers came forward. … May 14, 1827, the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Manufactures and the Mechanic Arts called a convention of wool growers and manufacturers. The convention met at Harrisburg, July 30, 1827. It was found necessary to enlarge the scope of the convention in order to make allies of interests which would otherwise become hostile. The convention went on the plan of favoring protection on everything which asked for it. The result was that iron, steel, glass, wool, woollens, hemp, and flax were recommended for protection. Louisiana was not represented, and so sugar was left out. {3071} It was voted to discourage the importation of foreign spirits and the distillation of spirits from foreign products, by way of protection to Western whiskey. … When the 20th Congress met, the tariff was the absorbing question. Popular interest had become engaged in it, and parties were to form on it, but it perplexed the politicians greatly. … The act which resulted from the scramble of selfish special interests was an economic monstrosity. … May 19, 1828, the bill became a law. The duty on wool costing less than 10 cents per pound was 15 per cent., on other wool 20 per cent. and 30 per cent. That on woollens was 40 per cent. for a year, then 45 per cent., there being four minima, 50 cents, $1.00, $2.50, $4.00. All which cost over $4.00 were to be taxed 45 per cent. for a year, then 50 per cent. … The process of rolling iron had not yet been introduced into this country. It was argued that rolled iron was not as good as forged, and this was made the ground for raising the tax on rolled iron from $30.00 to $37.00 per ton, while the tax on forged iron was raised from $18.00 to $22.40. Rolled iron was cheaper and was available for a great number of uses. The tax, in this case, 'countervailed' an improvement in the arts, and robbed the American people of their share in the advantage of a new industrial achievement. The tax on steel was raised from $20.00 to $30.00 per ton; that on hemp from $35.00 to $45.00 per ton; that on molasses from 5 cents to 10 cents per gallon; that on flax from nothing to $35.00 per ton. The tax on sugar, salt, and glass remained unchanged, and that on tea also, save by a differential tonnage duty. Coffee was classified and the tax reduced. The tax on wine, by a separate act, was reduced one half or more. This was the 'tariff of abominations,' so called on account of the number of especially monstrous provisions which it contained."

_W. G. Sumner, Andrew Jackson as a Public Man, chapter 9._

"The tariff of 1828 … was the work of politicians and manufacturers; and was commenced for the benefit of the woollen interest, and upon a bill chiefly designed to favor that branch of manufacturing industry. But, like all other bills of the kind, it required help from other interests to get itself along."

_T. H. Benton, Thirty Years' View, volume 1, chapters 34._

_J. Schouler, History of the United States, chapter 12, section 2 (volume 3)._

TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1832. Clay's delusive act to diminish revenue.

President Jackson, in his message of December, 1831, "invited attention to the fact that the public debt would be extinguished before the expiration of his term, and that, therefore, 'a modification of the tariff, which shall produce a reduction of the revenue to the wants of the government,' was very advisable. He added that, in justice to the interests of the merchant as well as the manufacturer, the reduction should be prospective, and that the duties should be adjusted with a view 'to the counteraction of foreign policy, so far as it may be injurious to our national interests.' This meant a revenue tariff with incidental retaliation. He had thus arrived at a sensible plan to avoid the accumulation of a surplus. Clay took the matter in hand in the Senate, or rather in Congress. … He recognized the necessity of reducing the revenue, but he would reduce the revenue without reducing protective duties. The 'American System' should not suffer. It must, therefore, not be done in the manner proposed by Jackson. He insisted upon confining the reduction to duties on articles not coming into competition with American products. … Instead of abolishing protective duties he would rather reduce the revenue by making some of them prohibitory. … When objection was made that this would be a defiance of the South, of the President, and of the whole administration party, he replied, as Adams reports, that 'to preserve, maintain and strengthen the American System, he would defy the South, the President and the devil.' He introduced a resolution in the Senate, 'that the existing duties upon articles imported from foreign countries, and not coming into competition with similar articles made or produced within the United States, ought to be forthwith abolished, except the duties upon wines and silks, and that those ought to be reduced; and that the Committee on Finance be instructed to report a bill accordingly.'" After long debate Clay's" tariff resolution was adopted, and in June, 1832, a bill substantially in accord with it passed both houses, known as the tariff act of 1832. It reduced or abolished the duties on many of the unprotected articles, but left the protective system without material change. As a reduction of the revenue it effected very little. … The reduction proposed by Clay, according to his own estimate, was not over seven millions; the reduction really effected by the new tariff law scarcely exceeded three millions. Clay had saved the American System at the expense of the very object contemplated by the measure. It was extremely short-sighted statesmanship. The surplus was as threatening as ever, and the dissatisfaction in the South grew from day to day."

_C. Schurz, Life of Henry Clay, chapter 13 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN _H. Clay, Life, Correspondence and Speeches (Colton edition), volume 5, pages 416-428._

TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1833. The Southern opposition to protection. Nullification in South Carolina. The compromise tariff.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1828-1833.

TARIFF: (Germany): A. D. 1833. The Zollverein.

"The German Customs Union (Deutsche Zollverein) is an association of states, having for its declared object to secure freedom of trade and commerce between the contracting states, and a common interest in the customs revenue. The terms of the union are expressed in the treaty between Prussia and the other states, dated 22d March, 1833, which may be regarded as the basis of the association. The states now [1844] forming the union are Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Nassau, the Thuringian states, Frankfort, Brunswick, Lippe-Schaumburg, and Luxemburg. The population of these, with the exception of the three last mentioned states, was, in 1839, 26,858,886. Including these three states, which have since joined the union, the present population cannot be less than twenty-seven millions and a half. The German powers which have not joined the union are Austria, with twelve millions of German subjects, and Hanover, Oldenburg, Holstein, the two Mecklenburgs, and the Hanse Towns, whose united population is about three millions more. {3072} The inhabitants of Germany are, therefore, divided in the proportions of twenty-seven and a half within, to fifteen without, the sphere of the Zollverein. The treaty provides in the thirty-eighth article, for the admission of other German states, and the thirty-ninth article for the making of treaties with foreign states, but these latter are not admissible into the union. … The declared principle of the league—namely, the commercial and financial union of the German states—is not only one to which no foreign power has any right to object, but is excellent in itself; and is, in fact, the establishment of free trade among the associated states. … But it is not merely to its avowed principle that the league owes its successful accomplishment. There are other motives which have entered largely into the causes of its existence. In the first place, it has given practical effect to that vehement desire for national unity which so generally pervades the German mind. … Then, it so happened that this general desire for union fell in exactly with the policy of Prussia—a power which has not failed to seize so favourable an opportunity of extending her political influence, and occupying a position which, though of nominal equality, has in reality secured her predominance among the German states. To these inducements we regret to be obliged to add another—namely, the prevalent opinion in Germany that their manufacturing industry ought to be protected against foreign competition, and that the tariff of the Zollverein ought to be used as an instrument for the exclusion of foreign manufactures from the German market. … Although the Congress of Vienna had established a new Germanic confederation, (Deutsche Bund) and a federative diet charged with the maintenance of peace at home and abroad, yet it was soon perceived and felt that the kind of union obtained by means of this confederation was more formal than real. … The late King of Prussia was one of the first to perceive, that, in order to unite Germany in reality, something more cogent than the federative diet was indispensable. He found his own power rather weakened than strengthened by the addition of the Rhenish provinces, so long as they remained separated, not only by distance, but by the customs-barriers of intervening states, from his ancient territories. He accordingly effected, in 1829, a convention with those states, by which he became the farmer of their customs-revenues, and so removed the barriers between Eastern and Western Prussia. Some years, however, previous to this, the Prussian Government had deemed it expedient to comply with the demands of the manufacturers (especially those in the Rhenish provinces) for protection against foreign goods, which, since the peace, had begun to make their appearance; and on the 26th May, 1818, a new Prussian Tariff had been issued, which was designed to afford a moderate protection to the home industry, and which may be regarded as the groundwork of the present Tariff of the Zollverein. … But the proceedings of Prussia were considered in a hostile light by the manufacturers of the South. They formed a counteracting association in 1819 which numbered from five to six thousand members, had its headquarters in Nuremberg, and agents in all the principal towns, and published a weekly newspaper devoted to the cause. They addressed the Diet, the German courts, and the Congress at Vienna in 1820, in favor of a general customs-union. They so far succeeded that, in 1826, the small Thuringian States, occupying the central portion of Germany, with one or two others, formed themselves into a customs-union, under the name of the Mittel-Verein; and within the two succeeding years a more important union was accomplished, consisting of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, with their small enclosed states; the Tariff of which union is stated to have been as high, or very nearly so, as that of Prussia. Thus Germany contained three separate customs-associations, with separate Tariffs, and it became obviously desirable to unite these conflicting interests. Prussia made overtures to the other unions, but was for a long time unsuccessful; they objecting principally to the high scale of Prussian duties on colonial produce. At last, however, all obstacles were removed, (principally, as Dr. List states, through the exertions of Baron von Cotta, the eminent publisher, and proprietor of the Allgemeine Zeitung,) and on the 22d of March, 1833, the treaty was signed by which, for the first time, Germany was knit together in anything like a binding national confederation. Between that date and the present, the league has been enlarged by the accession of other states; but, as we have already mentioned, Hanover and some other northern states have hitherto refused to join it. Hanover formed a distinct union with three neighbouring states, viz.: Brunswick, Lippe-Schaumburg, and Oldenburg, which assumed the title of the North-western League; but the two former having subsequently seceded from it and joined the Zollverein, the North-western League has been reduced to Hanover and Oldenburg only. The Hanse towns, Mecklenburg, and Holstein, are not yet members of any customs-union. The revenues of the Zollverein are divided among the contracting states according to the population of each state respectively."

_Edinburgh Review, January, 1844 (volume 79, page 108)._

ALSO IN _G. Krause, The Growth of German Unity, chapter 10._

_F. List. National System of Political Economy, book 4, chapter 4._

TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1836-1839. Beginning of the Anti-Corn-Law agitation.

"Cobden was in no sense the original projector of an organized body for throwing off the burden of the corn duties. In 1836 an Anti-Corn-Law Association had been formed in London; its principal members were the parliamentary radicals, Grote, Molesworth, Joseph Hume, and Mr. Roebuck. But this group, notwithstanding their acuteness, their logical penetration, and the soundness of their ideas, were in that, as in so many other matters, stricken with impotence. Their gifts of reasoning were admirable, but they had no gifts for popular organization. … It was not until a body of men in Manchester were moved to take the matter in hand, that any serious attempt was made to inform and arouse the country. The price of wheat had risen to seventy-seven shillings in the August of 1838; there was every prospect of a wet harvesting; the revenue was declining; deficit was becoming a familiar word; pauperism was increasing; and the manufacturing population of Lancashire were finding it impossible to support themselves, because the landlords, and the legislation of a generation of landlords before them, insisted on keeping the first necessity of life at an artificially high rate. … {3073} In October, 1838, a band of seven men met at a hotel in Manchester, and formed a new Anti-Corn Law Association. They were speedily joined by others, including Cobden, who from this moment began to take a prominent part in all counsel and action. That critical moment had arrived, which comes in the history of every successful movement, when a section arises within the party, which refuses from that day forward either to postpone or to compromise. The feeling among the older men was to stop short in their demands at some modification of the existing duty. … The more energetic members protested against these faltering voices. … The meeting was adjourned, to the great chagrin of the President, and when the members assembled a week later, Cobden drew from his pocket a draft petition which he and his allies had prepared in the interval, and which after a discussion of many hours was adopted by an almost unanimous vote. The preamble laid all the stress on the alleged facts of foreign competition, in words which never fail to be heard in times of bad trade. It recited how the existing laws prevented the British manufacturer from exchanging the produce of his labour for the corn of other countries, and so enabled his foreign rivals to purchase their food at one half of the price at which it was sold in the English market; and finally the prayer of the petition called for the repeal of all laws relating to the importation of foreign corn and other foreign articles of subsistence, and implored the House to carry out to the fullest extent, both as affects manufactures and agriculture, the true and peaceful principles of free-trade. In the following month, January, 1839, the Anti-Com-Law Association showed that it was in earnest in the intention to agitate, by proceeding to raise a subscription of an effective sum of money. Cobden threw out one of those expressions which catch men's minds in moments when they are already ripe for action. 'Let us,' he said, 'invest part of our property, in order to save the rest from confiscation.' Within a month £6,000 had been raised, the first instalment of many scores of thousands still to come. A great banquet was given to some of the parliamentary supporters of Free Trade; more money was subscribed, convictions became clearer and purpose waxed more resolute. On the day after the banquet, at a meeting of delegates from other towns, Cobden brought forward a scheme for united action among the various associations throughout the country. This was the germ of what ultimately became the League."

_J. Morley, Life of Richard Cobden, chapter 6 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN _W. Robertson, Life and Times of John Bright, chapters 8 and 11-14._

TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1842. Peel's modification of the Corn Laws. His sliding-scale. His Tariff reductions. The first great step towards Free-Trade.