Part 208

"Napoleon, before Moore's corps had actually left Corunna, conceived the war at an end, and, in issuing instructions to his marshals, anticipated, with no unreasonable confidence, the complete subjugation of the Peninsula. Excepting, indeed, some isolated districts in the east, the only parts now in possession of the Spaniards or their allies were Andalusia, which had been saved by the precipitate recall of Napoleon to the north; and Portugal, which, still in arms against the French, was nominally occupied by a British corps of 10,000 men, left there under Sir John Cradock at the time of General Moore's departure with the bulk of the army for Spain. The proceedings of the French marshals for the recovery of the entire Peninsula were speedily arranged. Lannes took the direction of the siege of Saragossa, where the Spaniards, fighting as usual with admirable constancy from behind stone walls, were holding two French corps at bay. Lefebvre drove one Spanish army into the recesses of the Sierra Morena, and Victor chased another into the fastnesses of Murcia. Meantime Soult, after recoiling awhile from the dying blows of Moore, had promptly occupied Gallicia upon the departure of the English, and was preparing to cross the Portuguese frontier on his work of conquest. In aid of this design it was concerted that while the last-named marshal advanced from the north, Victor, by way of Elvas, and Lapisse by way of Almeida, should converge together upon Portugal, and that when the English at Lisbon had been driven to their ships the several corps should unite for the final subjugation of the Peninsula by the occupation of Andalusia. Accordingly, leaving Ney to maintain the ground already won, Soult descended with 30,000 men upon the Douro, and by the end of March was in secure possession of Oporto. Had he continued his advance, it is not impossible that the campaign might have had the termination he desired; but at this point he waited for intelligence of the English in his front and of Victor and Lapisse on his flank. His caution saved Portugal, for, while he still hesitated on the brink of the Douro, there again arrived in the Tagus that renowned commander before whose genius the fortunes not only of the marshals, but of their imperial master, were finally to fail. England was now at the commencement of her greatest war. {3006} The system of small expeditions and insignificant diversions, though not yet conclusively abandoned, was soon superseded by the glories of a visible contest: and in a short time it was known and felt by a great majority of the nation, that on the field of the Peninsula England was fairly pitted against France. … At the commencement of the year 1809, when the prospects of Spanish independence were at their very gloomiest point, the British Cabinet had proposed and concluded a comprehensive treaty of alliance with the Provisional Administration of Spain; and it was now resolved that the contest in the Peninsula should be continued on a scale more effectual than before, and that the principal, instead of the secondary, part should be borne by England. … England’s colonial requirements left her little to show against the myriads of the continent. It was calculated at the time that 60,000 British soldiers might have been made disposable for the Peninsular service, but at no period of the war was such a force ever actually collected under the standards of Wellington, while Napoleon could maintain his 300,000 warriors in Spain, without materially disabling the arms of the Empire on the Danube or the Rhine. We had allies, it is true, in the troops of the country; but these at first were little better than refractory recruits, requiring all the accessories of discipline, equipment, and organisation; jealous of all foreigners, even as friends, and not unreasonably suspicious of supporters who could always find in their ships a refuge which was denied to themselves. But above all these difficulties was that arising from the inexperience of the Government in continental warfare. … When, however, with these ambiguous prospects, the Government did at length resolve on the systematic prosecution of the Peninsular war, the eyes of the nation were at once instinctively turned on Sir Arthur Wellesley as the general to conduct it. … He stoutly declared his opinion that Portugal was tenable against the French, even if actual possessors of Spain, and that it offered ample opportunities of influencing the great result of the war. With these views he recommended that the Portuguese army should be organised at its full strength; that it should be in part taken into British pay and under the direction of British officers, and that a force of not less than 30,000 English troops should be despatched to keep this army together. … Such was the prestige already attached to Wellesley’s name that his arrival in the Tagus changed every feature of the scene. No longer suspicious of our intentions, the Portuguese Government gave prompt effect to the suggestions of the English commander. … The command-in-chief of the native army was intrusted to an English officer of great distinction, General Beresford; and no time was lost in once more testing the efficacy of the British arms. … Of the Spanish armies we need only say that they had been repeatedly routed with invariable certainty and more or less disgrace, though Cuesta still held a nominal force together in the valley of the Tagus. There were, therefore, two courses open to the British commander: —either to repel the menaced advance of Soult by marching on Oporto, or to effect a junction with Cuesta, and try the result of a demonstration against Madrid. The latter of these plans was wisely postponed for the moment, and, preference having been decisively given to the former, the troops, at once commenced their march upon the Douro. The British force under Sir Arthur Wellesley’s command amounted at this time to about 20,000 men, to which about 15,000 Portuguese, in a respectable state of organisation, were added by the exertions of Beresford. Of these about 24,000 were now led against Soult, who, though not inferior in strength, no sooner ascertained the advance of the English commander, than he arranged for a retreat by detaching Loison with 6,000 men to dislodge a Portuguese post from his left rear. Sir Arthur’s intention was to envelope, if possible, the French corps by pushing forward a strong force upon its left, and thus intercepting its retreat toward Ney’s position, while the main body assaulted Soult in his quarters at Oporto. The former of these operations he intrusted to Beresford, the latter he directed in person. On the 12th of May the troops reached the southern bank of the Douro; the waters of’ which, 800 yards in width, rolled between them and their adversaries. … Availing himself of' a point where the river by a bend in its course was not easily visible from the town, Sir Arthur determined on transporting, if possible, a few troops to the northern bank, and occupying an unfinished stone building, which he perceived was capable of affording temporary cover. The means were soon supplied by the activity of Colonel Waters—an officer whose habitual audacity rendered him one of the heroes of this memorable war. Crossing in a skiff to the opposite bank, he returned with two or three boats, and in a few minutes a company of the Buffs was established in the building. Reinforcements quickly followed, but not without discovery. The alarm was given, and presently the edifice was enveloped by the eager battalions of the French. The British, however, held their ground; a passage was effected at other points during the struggle; the French, after an ineffectual resistance, were fain to abandon the city in precipitation, and Sir Arthur, after his unexampled feat of arms, sat down that evening to the dinner which had been prepared for Soult. … This brilliant operation being effected, Sir Arthur was now at liberty to turn to the main project of the campaign—that to which, in fact, the attack upon Soult had been subsidiary—the defeat of Victor in Estremadura. … Cuesta would take no advice, and insisted on the adoption of his own schemes with such obstinacy, that Sir Arthur was compelled to frame his plans accordingly. Instead, therefore, of circumventing Victor as he had intended, be advanced into Spain at the beginning of July, to effect a junction with Cuesta and feel his way towards Madrid. The armies, when united, formed a mass of 78,000 combatants; but of these 56,000 were Spanish, and for the brunt of war Sir Arthur could only reckon on his 22,000 British troops, Beresford’s Portuguese having been despatched to the north of Portugal. On the other side, Victor’s force had been strengthened by the succours which Joseph Bonaparte, alarmed for the safety of Madrid, had hastily concentrated at Toledo; and when the two armies at length confronted each other at Talavera, it was found that 55,000 excellent French troops were arrayed against Sir Arthur and his ally, while nearly as many more were descending from the north on the line of the British communications along the valley of the Tagus. {3007} On the 28th of July the British commander, after making the best dispositions in his power, received the attack of the French, directed by Joseph Bonaparte in person, with Victor and Jourdan at his side, and after an engagement of great severity, in which the Spaniards were virtually inactive, he remained master of the field against double his numbers, having repulsed the enemy at all points with heavy loss, and having captured several hundred prisoners and 17 pieces of cannon in this the first great pitched battle between the French and English in the Peninsula. In this well fought field of Talavera, the French had thrown, for the first time, their whole disposable force upon the British army without success; and Sir Arthur Wellesley inferred, with a justifiable confidence, that the relative superiority of his troops to those of the Emperor was practically decided. Jomini, the French military historian, confesses almost as much; and the opinions of Napoleon himself, as visible in his correspondence, underwent from that moment a serious change."

_Memoir of Wellington, from "The Times" of September 15-16, 1852. _

ALSO IN: _R. Southey, History of the Peninsular War, chapters 22-24 (volumes 3-4)._

_Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 62 (volume 13)._

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (August-November). Battles of Almonacid, Puerto de Baños, Ocana, and Alba de Tormes.

Soon after Wellington's unfruitful victory at Talavera, "Venegas had advanced as far as Aranjuez, and was besieging Toledo; but the retreat of the British having set the French armies at liberty, he was attacked and defeated after a sharp action at Almonacid (August 11) by Dessoles and Sebastiani; and Sir Robert Wilson, who had approached Madrid with 6,000 Spaniards and Portuguese, was encountered and driven back by Ney (August 8) at Puerto de Banos. The British at length, after lying a month at Deleitosa, were compelled, by the scandalous failure of the Spanish authorities to furnish them with supplies or provisions, to cross the mountains and fix their headquarters at Badajos, after an angry correspondence between Wellesley and Cuesta, who soon after was removed from his command. A gleam of success at Tamanes, where Marchand was routed with loss (October 24) by Romana's army under the Duke del Parque, encouraged the Spaniards to make another effort for the recovery of Madrid; and an army of 50,000 men, including 7,000 horse and 60 pieces of cannon, advanced for this purpose from the Sierra Morena, under General Areizaga. The battle was fought (November 12) at Ocana, near Aranjuez; but though the Spaniards behaved with considerable spirit, the miserable incapacity of their commander counterbalanced all their efforts, and an unparalleled rout was the result. Pursued over the wide plains of Castile by the French cavalry, 20,000 prisoners were taken, with all the guns and stores: the wreck was complete and irretrievable; and the defeat of the Duke del Parque (November 25) at Alba de Tormes, dispersed the last force which could be called a Spanish army. It was evident from these events that Portugal was the only basis from which the deliverance of the Peninsula could be effected."

_Epitome of Alison's History of Europe, section 576 (chapter 62, volume 13 of complete work)._

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (August-December). Wellington's difficulties. His retreat into Portugal.

"In the course of the 29th, the army was reinforced by the arrival of a troop of horse-artillery, and a brigade of light troops from Lisbon, under General Crawford. Under the circumstances of his situation, however, it was impossible for Sir Arthur Wellesley to follow up his victory. The position he occupied was still one of extreme peril. A powerful enemy was advancing on his rear; and no reliance could be placed for the supply of his army, either on the promises of the Spanish General, or of the Junta. The army of Vanegas, which, in obedience to the orders of the Supreme Junta, had advanced from Madrilejos, was engaged, during the 28th and 29th, in endeavouring to dislodge the French garrison from Toledo. His advance pushed on during the night to the neighbourhood of Madrid, and took prisoners some patroles of the enemy. Vanegas, however no sooner learned from the prisoners that Joseph and Sebastiani were approaching, than he … desisted from any further offensive operations. The intelligence that Vanegas had failed in executing the part allotted to him, was speedily followed by information that Soult had with facility driven the Spaniards from the passes leading from Salamanca to Placentia. It was in consequence arranged between the Generals, that the British army should immediately march to attack Soult, and that Cuesta should remain in the position of Talavera, to protect this movement from any operation of Victor. The wounded likewise were to be left in charge of Cuesta. … On the morning of the 3rd of August, the British accordingly commenced their march on Oropesa. On his arrival there, Sir Arthur Wellesley received intelligence that Soult was already at Naval Moral. … Shortly after, a courier arrived from Cuesta, announcing, that, as the enemy were stated to be advancing on his flank, and as it was ascertained that the corps of Ney and Mortier had been united under Soult, he had determined on quitting his position, and joining the British army at Oropesa. This movement was executed the same night; and nearly the whole of the British wounded were left unprotected in the town of Talavera. The conduct of Cuesta, in this precipitate retreat, is altogether indefensible. … In quitting the position of Talavera, Cuesta had abandoned the only situation in which the advance of Victor on the British rear could be resisted with any prospect of success. … The whole calculations of Sir Arthur Wellesley were at once overthrown. … Sir Arthur determined to throw his army across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobisbo. … Cuesta … followed the British in their retreat to the bridge of Arzobisbo, and leaving the Duke del Albuquerque with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to defend it, he withdrew the remainder of his army to Paraleda de Garben. The French, however, having taken post on the opposite side of the river, soon succeeded in discovering a ford by which they crossed, and surprising the Spaniards, drove them at once from the works, with the loss of 30 pieces of cannon. After this, Cuesta with his whole force fell back on Deleytosa, while the British moved to Xaraicejo. … Vanegas … remained with his army in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez. On the 5th of August, he succeeded in gaining a decided advantage over an advanced division of the enemy. … {3008} Harassed by inconsistent orders, Vanegas was unfortunately induced again to advance, and give battle to the corps of Sebastiani at Almonacid. This engagement, though many of the Spanish troops behaved with great gallantry, terminated in the complete defeat of the army of Vanegas. It was driven to the Sierra Morena, with the loss of all its baggage and artillery. With this action terminated the campaign which had been undertaken for the relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the enemy from the central provinces of Spain. The British army at Xaraicejo, still served as a shield to the southern provinces, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, (whom the gratitude of his country had now ennobled,) [raising him to the peerage as Baron Duke of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera] considered it of importance to maintain the position he then occupied. But the total failure of supplies rendered this impossible, and about the 20th of August he fell back through Merida on Badajos, in the neighbourhood of which he established his army. At this period all operations in concert ceased between the English and Spanish armies. The Supreme Junta complained bitterly of the retreat of the former, which left the road to Seville and Cadiz open to the enemy, while the Marquis Wellesley, then ambassador in Spain, made strong representations of the privations to which the British army had been exposed, by the inattention and neglect of the authorities. In the correspondence which ensued, it appeared that the measure of retreat had been forced on Lord Wellington, by the absolute impossibility of supporting his army in the ground he occupied. … The year had closed in Spain triumphantly for the French arms, as it had commenced. The Spanish armies had sustained a series of unparalleled defeats. The British had retired into Portugal; and the efforts of Lord Wellington, were for the present, limited to the defence of that kingdom."

_T. Hamilton, Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns, chapters 7 and 9._

ALSO IN: _R. Waite, Life of the Duke of Wellington, chapter 6._

_Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, book 8, chapters 7-9, book 9 (volume 2). _

SPAIN: A. D. 1809-1810 (October-September). The Lines of Torres Vedras.