Part 131

She was relieved, however, on the north by the dissension in the Swedish army, which compelled the King to an inglorious retreat; and she became able to give an undivided attention to the affairs of the south. While an Austrian army, which supported her, was threatening the north-west of Turkey, her own forces conquered in the north-east. Under Souvarof the town of Oczakof was taken, and the battle of Rimnik was won. {2766} Ismail, that gave the key of the Danube, next fell, and in the horrors of its fall drew forth a cry from Europe. The triumph of Catherine was assured; but already the clouds of revolution had risen in the west; Austria, too busy with the affairs of the Netherlands, had withdrawn from the fight; and the Empress herself, disquieted, and satisfied for the time with her successes, concluded the Peace of Jassy, which extended her frontiers to the Dniester, and gave her the coast on which so soon arose the rich city of Odessa. The acquisitions of Catherine upon the south were completed. Those upon the west had still to receive important additions. Poland, already once partitioned was again to yield new provinces to Russia.

See POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792, and 1793-1796.

The internal government of the Empire was meant undoubtedly to rival these foreign successes, but unhappily fell short of them. … The long meditated secularization of the estates of the clergy was at last accomplished; the freedom of the serfs was now first urged; and, as a unique experiment in Russian history, the convoking of a kind of States General was made to discuss the project. But both project and parliament came to nothing. … There was much that was unreal in everything, and Europe, as well as the great Empress herself, was deceived. And so it came to pass that at the close of the reign there was the spectacle of much that had been begun but little finished. Before the death of Catherine [1796], in fact, her greatness may be said to have passed away."

_C. F. Johnstone, Historical Abstracts, chapter 6._

"The activity of Catherine was prodigious, and her autocratic instincts extremely strong, and these impulses, affected by the French doctrines, which we must not forget set up despotism, if enlightened, as the perfection of wisdom, made her government attempt to accomplish all things and to meddle in every department of the national life. She tried to force civilisation into premature growths; established modern institutions of many kinds in a backward and half-barbaric empire; arranged industrial and economic projects and works in the minutest details; and rigidly prescribed even court dress and fashions. Ségur thus describes this omni-present and ubiquitous interference:—'It is sought to create at the same time a third estate, to attract foreign commerce, to establish all kinds of manufactures, to extend agriculture, to increase paper money, to raise the exchanges, to reduce the interest of money, to found cities, to people deserts, to cover the Black Sea with a new navy, to conquer one neighbour and circumvent another, and finally to extend Russian influence all over Europe.' These liberal reforms and grand aspirations came, however, for the most part to nothing; and Catherine's internal government grew by degrees into a grievous, cruel and prying despotism. … The antithesis of the liberalism in words and of the tyranny in deeds in Catherine's reign may be attributed to four main causes. She gradually found out that reform and progress were impossible in the Russian Empire—half Asiatic, backward and corrupt—and she swung back to the old tyranny of the past. The great rising of the serfs under Pugacheff, too—a servile outbreak of the worst kind —changed to a great extent the type of her government, and gave it a harsh and cruel complexion:—'The domestic policy of Catherine bore, until the end, the traces of those terrible years, and showed, as it were, the bloody cicatrices of the blows given and received in a death struggle.' … The foreign policy of Catherine was more successful than her government and administration at home, and the reasons are sufficiently plain. She found grand opportunities to extend her power in the long quarrels between France and England, in the alliance she maintained with Frederick the Great—an alliance she clung to, though she felt the burden—in the instability and weakness of the Austrian councils, in the confusion and strife of the French Revolution, above all in the decay of Islam; and Russia justly hailed her as a great conqueror. … The Muscovite race would not see her misdeeds in the march of conquest she opened for it; and her reputation has steadily increased in its eyes. 'The spirit of the people passes, in its fulness, into her. It was this that enabled her to make a complete conquest of her empire, and by this we do not mean the power which she wrested from the weakness, the cowardice, and the folly of Peter III.; but the position which this German woman attained at the close of her life, and especially after her death, in the history, and the national life, and development of a foreign and hostile race. For it may be said that it is since her death, above all, that she has become what she appears now—the sublime figure, colossal alike and splendid, majestic and attractive, before which incline, with an equal impulse of gratitude, the humble Moujik and the man of letters, who shakes the dust of reminiscences and legends already a century old.' In one particular, Catherine gave proof of being far in advance of the ideas of her day, and of extraordinary craft and adroitness. She anticipated the growing power of opinion in Europe, and skilfully turned it to her side by the patronage of the philosophers of France. In Napoleon's phrase, she did not spike the battery, she seized it and directed its fire; she had Voltaire, Diderot, and D'Alembert, admiring mouthpieces, to apologise for, nay to extol, her government. This great force had prodigious influence in throwing a glamour over the evil deeds of her reign, and in deceiving the world as to parts of her conduct: —'All this forms part of a system—a system due to the wonderful intuition of a woman, born in a petty German court, and placed on the most despotic throne of Europe; due, too—and so better—to her clear apprehension of the great power of the modern world—public opinion. It is, we do not hesitate to believe and affirm, because Catherine discovered this force, and resolved to make use of it, that she was able to play the part she played in history. Half of her reputation in Europe was caused by the admiration of Voltaire, solicited, won, managed by her with infinite art, nay, paid for when necessary.'"

_The Empress Catherine II. (Edinburgh Review, July, 1893)._

"In 1781 Catherine had already sent to Grimm the following resume of the history of her reign, set forth by her new secretary and factotum, Besborodko, in the fantastic form of an inventory:

Governments instituted according to the new form, 29; Towns built, 144; Treaties made, 30; Victories won, 78; Notable edicts, decreeing laws, 88; Edicts on behalf of the people, 123; Total, 492.

{2767}

Four hundred and ninety-two active measures! This astonishing piece of book-keeping, which betrays so naïvely all that there was of romantic, extravagant, childish, and very feminine, in the extraordinary genius that swayed Russia, and in some sort Europe, during thirty-four years, will no doubt make the reader smile. It corresponds, however, truly enough, to a sum-total of great things accomplished under her direct inspiration. … In the management of men … she is simply marvellous. She employs all the resources of a trained diplomatist, of a subtle psychologist, and of a woman who knows the art of fascination; she employs them together or apart, she handles them with unequalled 'maestria.' If it is true that she sometimes takes her lovers for generals and statesmen, it is no less true that she treats on occasion her generals and statesmen as lovers. When the sovereign can do nothing, the Circe intervenes. If it avails nothing to command, to threaten, or to punish, she becomes coaxing and wheedling. Towards the soldiers that she sends to death, bidding them only win for her victory, she has delicate attentions, flattering forethought, adorable little ways. … Should fortune smile upon the efforts she has thus provoked and stimulated, she is profusely grateful: honours, pensions, gifts of money, of peasants, of land, rain upon the artisans of her glory. But she does not abandon those who have had the misfortune to be unlucky. … Catherine's art of ruling was not, however, without its shortcomings, some of which were due to the mere fact of her sex, whose dependences and weaknesses she was powerless to overcome. 'Ah!' she cried one day, 'if heaven had only granted me breeches instead of petticoats, I could do anything. It is with eyes and arms that one rules, and a woman has only ears.' The petticoats were not solely responsible for her difficulties. We have already referred to a defect which bore heavily upon the conduct of affairs during her reign: this great leader of men, who knew so well how to make use of them, did not know how to choose them. … It seems that her vision of men in general was disturbed, in this respect, by the breath of passion which influenced all her life. The general, the statesman, of whom she had need, she seemed to see only through the male whom she liked or disliked. … These mistakes of judgment were frequent. But Catherine did more than this, and worse. With the obstinacy which characterised her, and the infatuation that her successes gave her, she came little by little to translate this capital defect into a 'parti pris,' to formulate it as a system; one man was worth another, in her eyes, so long as he was docile and prompt to obey. … And her idea that one man is worth as much as another causes her, for a mere nothing, for a word that offends her, for a cast of countenance that she finds unpleasing, or even without motive, for the pleasure of change and the delight of having to do with some one new, as she avows naïvely in a letter to Grimm, to set aside, disgraced or merely cashiered, one or another of her most devoted servants."

_R. Waliszewski, Romance of an Empress, volume 2, book 2, chapter 1._

ALSO IN: _W. Tooke, Life of Catherine II._

_Memoirs of Catherine II., by herself._

_Princess Daschkaw, Memoirs._

_S. Menzies, Royal Favourites._

_F. C. Schlosser, History of the 18th Century, volumes 4-7._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1786. Establishment of the Jewish Pale.

See JEWS: A. D. 1727-1880.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1791-1793. Joined in the Coalitions against Revolutionary France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1790-1791; 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER); 1793 (MARCH-SEPTEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1796. Accession of Paul.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1798-1799. The war of the Second Coalition against Revolutionary France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST-APRIL).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1799. Suwarrow's victorious campaign in Italy and failure in Switzerland. Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland. Its disastrous ending.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER); (AUGUST-DECEMBER); and (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1800. Desertion of the Coalition by the Czar. His alliance with Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (JUNE-FEBRUARY).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1800-1801. War with England. The Northern Maritime League and its sudden overthrow at Copenhagen by the British fleet. Peace with England.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1801-1802.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1801. Paul's despotism and assassination. Accession of Alexander I.

The Emperor Paul's "choice of his Ministers was always directed by one dominant idea—that of surrounding himself with servants on whom he could entirely rely; for from the moment of his accession he foresaw and dreaded a Palace revolution. … He erred in the selection, and especially in the extent, of the means which he employed to save his life and his power; they only precipitated his deplorable end. Among the men whom he suspected, he persecuted some with implacable rigour, while he retained others at their posts and endeavoured to secure their fidelity by presents; this, however, only made them ungrateful. Never was there a sovereign more terrible in his severity, or more liberal when he was in a generous mood. But there was no certainty in his favour. A single word uttered intentionally or by accident in a conversation, the shadow of a suspicion, sufficed to make him persecute those whom he had protected. The greatest favourites of to-day feared to be driven from the Court on the morrow, and banished to a distant province. Yet the Emperor wished to be just. … All who belonged to the Court or came before the Emperor were thus in a state of continual fear." This fear, and the hatred which it inspired, produced in due time a conspiracy, headed by Counts Panin and Pahlen, of the Emperor's Council. Purporting to have for its object only the deposition of the Czar, the conspiracy was known and acquiesced in by the heir to the throne, the Grand-Duke Alexander, who had been persuaded to look upon it as a necessary measure for rescuing Russia from a demented ruler. "Paul was precipitating his country into incalculable disasters, and into a complete disorganisation and deterioration of the Government machine. … Although everybody sympathised with the conspiracy, nothing was done until Alexander had given his consent to his father's deposition." Then it was hurried to its accomplishment. The conspirators, including a large number of military and civil officials, supped together, on the evening of March 3, 1801. At midnight, most of them being then intoxicated, they went in a body to the palace, made their way to the Emperor's bed-chamber—resisted by only one young valet—and found him, in his night-clothes, hiding in the folds of a curtain. "They dragged him out in his shirt, more dead than alive; the terror he had inspired was now repaid to him with usury. … {2768} He was placed on a chair before a desk. The long, thin, pale, and angular form of General Bennigsen [a Hanoverian officer, just admitted to the conspiracy, but who had taken the lead when others showed signs of faltering], with his hat on his head and a drawn sword in his hand, must have seemed to him a terrible spectre. 'Sire,' said the General, 'you are my prisoner and have ceased to reign; you will now at once write and sign a deed of abdication in favour of the Grand-Duke Alexander.' Paul was still unable to speak, and a pen was put in his hand. Trembling and almost unconscious, he was about to obey, when more cries were heard. General Bennigsen then left the room, as he has often assured me, to ascertain what these cries meant, and to take steps for securing the safety of the palace and of the Imperial family. He had only just gone out when a terrible scene began. The unfortunate Paul remained alone with men who were maddened by a furious hatred of him. … One of the conspirators took off his official scarf and tied it round the Emperor's throat. Paul struggled. … But the conspirators seized the hand with which he was striving to prolong his life, and furiously tugged at both ends of the scarf. The unhappy emperor had already breathed his last, and yet they tightened the knot and dragged along the dead body, striking it with their bands and feet." When Alexander learned that an assassination instead of a forced abdication had vacated the throne for him, he "was prostrated with grief and despair. … The idea of having caused the death of his father filled him with horror, and he felt that his reputation had received a stain which could never be effaced. … During the first years of his reign, Alexander's position with regard to his father's murderers was an extremely difficult and painful one. For a few months he believed himself to be at their mercy, but it was chiefly his conscience and a feeling of natural equity which prevented him from giving up to justice the most guilty of the conspirators. … The assassins all perished miserably."

_Prince Adam Czartoryski, Memoirs, volume 1, chapters 9 and 11._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1805. The Third Coalition against France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (JANUARY-APRIL).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1805. The crushing of the Coalition at Austerlitz.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (MARCH-DECEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1806-1807. War with Napoleon in aid of Prussia. Battle of Eylau. Treaty of Bartenstein with Prussia. Decisive defeat at Friedland.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER); 1806-1807; and 1807 (FEBRUARY-JUNE).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1807. Ineffective operations of England as an ally against Turkey. Treaty of Tilsit. Secret understandings of Napoleon with the Czar.

See TURKS: A. D.1806-1807; and GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE-JULY).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1807-1810. Northern fruits of the Peace of Tilsit. English seizure of the Danish fleet. War with England and Sweden. Conquest of Finland. Peculiar annexation of the Grand Duchy to the Empire.

See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1807-1810.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1808. Imperial conference and Treaty of Erfurt.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1809. Cession of Eastern Galicia by the Emperor of Austria.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1809-1812. War with Turkey. Treaty of Bucharest. Acquisition of Bessarabia.

See TURKS: A. D. 1789-1812.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1810. Grievances against France. Desertion of the Continental System. Resumption of commerce with Great Britain. Rupture with Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (June-September). Napoleon's invasion. Battles of Smolensk and Borodino. The French advance to Moscow.