Part 8

"All the Spartan allies in Peloponnesus and the Boeotians refused to join in this treaty [of Nicias]. The latter concluded with the Athenians only a truce of ten days … , probably on condition, that, if no notice was given to the contrary, it was to be constantly renewed after the lapse of ten days. With Corinth there existed no truce at all. Some of the terms of the peace were not complied with, though this was the case much less on the part of Athens than on that of Sparta. … The Spartans, from the first, were guilty of infamous deception, and this immediately gave rise to bitter feelings. But before matters had come to this, and when the Athenians were still in the full belief that the Spartans were honest, all Greece was startled by a treaty of alliance between Athens and Sparta against their common enemies. This treaty was concluded very soon after the peace. … The consequence was, that Sparta suddenly found herself deserted by all her allies; the Corinthians and Boeotians renounced her, because they found themselves given over to the Athenians, and the Boeotians perhaps thought that the Spartans, if they could but reduce the Eleans to the condition of Helots, would readily allow Boeotia to be subdued by the Athenians. Thus Argos found the means of again following a policy which ever since the time of Cleomenes it had not ventured to think of, and … became the centre of an alliance with Mantinea, 'which had always been opposed to the Lacedaemonians,' and some other Arcadian towns, Achaia, Elis, and some places of the Acte. The Arcadians had dissolved their union, the three people of the country had separated themselves, though sometimes they united again; and thus it happened that only some of their towns were allied with Argos. Corinth at first would listen to neither party, and chose to remain neutral; 'for although for the moment it was highly exasperated against Sparta, yet it had at all times entertained a mortal hatred of Argos, and its own interests drew it towards Sparta.' But when, owing to Sparta's dishonesty, the affairs on the coasts of Thrace became more and more complicated, when the towns refused to submit to Athens, and when it became evident that this was the consequence of the instigations of Sparta, then the relation subsisting between the two states became worse also in Greece, and various negotiations and cavillings ensued. … After much delay, the Athenians and Spartans were already on the point of taking up arms against each other; but then they came to the singular agreement (Olympiad 89, 4), that the Athenians should retain possession of Pylos, but keep in it only Athenian troops, and not allow the Helots and Messenians to remain there. After this the loosened bonds between the Spartans, Corinthians, and Boeotians, were drawn more closely. The Boeotians were at length prevailed upon to surrender Panacton to the Spartans, who now restored it to the Athenians. This was in accordance with the undoubted meaning of the peace; but the Boeotians had first destroyed the place, and the Spartans delivered it to the Athenians only a heap of ruins. The Athenians justly complained, that this was not an honest restoration, and that the place ought to have been given back to them with its fortifications uninjured. The Spartans do not appear to have had honest intentions in any way. … While thus the alliance between Athens and Sparta, in the eyes of the world, still existed, it had in reality ceased and become an impossibility. Another alliance, however, was formed between Athens and Argos (Olympiad 89, 4) through the influence of Alcibiades, who stood in the relation of an hereditary proxenus to Argos. {1587} A more natural alliance than this could not be conceived, and by it the Athenians gained the Mantineans, Eleans, and other Peloponnesians over to their side. Alcibiades now exercised a decisive influence upon the fate of his country. … We generally conceive Alcibiades as a man whose beauty was his ornament, and to whom the follies of life were the main thing, and we forget that part of his character which history reveals to us. … Thucydides, who cannot be suspected of having been particularly partial to Alcibiades, most expressly recognises the fact, that the fate of Athens depended upon him, and that, if he had not separated his own fate from that of his native city, at first from necessity, but afterwards of his own accord, the course of the Peloponnesian war, through his personal influence alone, would have taken quite a different direction, and that he alone would have decided it in favour of Athens. This is, in fact, the general opinion of all antiquity, and there is no ancient writer of importance who does not view and estimate him in this light. It is only the moderns that entertain a derogatory opinion of him, and speak of him as an eccentric fool, who ought not to be named among the great statesmen of antiquity. … Alcibiades is quite a peculiar character; and I know no one in the whole range of ancient history who might be compared with him, though I have sometimes thought of Caesar. … Alcibiades was opposed to the peace of Nicias from entirely personal, perhaps even mean, motives. … It was on his advice that Athens concluded the alliance with Argos and Elis. Athens now had two alliances which were equally binding, and yet altogether opposed to each other: the one with Sparta, and an equally stringent one with Argos, the enemy of Sparta. This treaty with Argos, the Peloponnesians, etc., was extremely formidable to the Spartans; and they accordingly, for once, determined to act quickly, before it should be too late. The alliance with Argos, however, did not confer much real strength upon Athens, for the Argives were lazy, and Elis did not respect them, whence the Spartans had time again to unite themselves more closely with Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara. When, therefore, the war between the Spartans and Argives broke out, and the former resolutely took the field, Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to send succour to the Argives, and thus the peace with Sparta was violated in an unprincipled manner. But still no blow was struck between Argos and Sparta. … King Agis had set out with a Spartan army, but concluded a truce with the Argives (Olympiad 90, 2); this, however, was taken very ill at Sparta, and the Argive commanders who had concluded it were censured by the people and magistrates of Argos. Soon afterwards the war broke out again, and, when the Athenian auxiliaries appeared, decided acts of hostility commenced. The occasion was an attempt of the Mantineans to subdue Tegea: the sad condition of Greece became more particularly manifest in Arcadia, by the divisions which tore one and the same nation to pieces. The country was distracted by several parties; had Arcadia been united, it would have been invulnerable. A battle was fought (Olympiad 90, 3) in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, between the Argives, their Athenian allies, the Mantineans, and part of the Arcadians ('the Eleans, annoyed at the conduct of the Argives, had abandoned their cause'), on the one hand, and the Spartans and a few allies on the other. The Spartans gained a most decisive victory; and, although they did not follow it up, yet the consequence was, that Argos concluded peace, the Argive alliance broke up, and at Argos a revolution took place, in which an oligarchical government was instituted, and by which Argos was drawn into the interest of Sparta (Olympiad 90, 4). This constitution, however, did not last, and very soon gave way to a democratic form of government. Argos, even at this time, and still more at a later period, is a sad example of the most degenerate and deplorable democracy, or, more properly speaking, anarchy."

_B. G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient History, lecture 49 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN: _Plutarch, Alcibiades._

_W. Mitford, History of Greece, chapter 17 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 416. Siege and conquest of Melos by the Athenians. Massacre of the inhabitants.

"It was in the beginning of summer 416 B. C. that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but, at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and Tisias."

_G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 56._

"They desired immediate submission on the part of Melos, any attempt at resistance being regarded as an inroad upon the omnipotence of Athens by sea. For this reason they were wroth at the obstinate courage of the islanders, who broke off all further negotiations, and thus made it necessary for the Athenians to commence a costly circumvallation of the city. The Melians even succeeded on two successive occasions in breaking through part of the wall built round them by the enemy, and obtaining fresh supplies; but no relief arrived; and they had to undergo sufferings which made the 'Melian famine' a proverbial phrase to express the height of misery; and before the winter ended the island was forced to surrender unconditionally. … There was no question of quarter. All the islanders capable of bearing arms who had fallen into the hands of the Athenians were sentenced to death, and all the women and children to slavery."

_E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapter 4 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN: _Thucydides, History, book 5, sections 84-116._

GREECE: B. C. 415. The mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 415.

GREECE: B. C. 415-413. The Peloponnesian War: Disastrous Athenian expedition against Syracuse. Alcibiades a fugitive in Sparta. His enmity to Athens.

See SYRACUSE: B. C. 415-413.

{1588}

GREECE: B. C. 413. The Peloponnesian War: Effects and consequences of the Sicilian expedition. Prostration of Athens. Strengthening of Sparta. Negotiations with the Persians against Athens. Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. The Decelian War.

"The Sicilian expedition ended in a series of events which, to this day, it is impossible to recall without a feeling of horror. … Since the Persian wars it had never come to pass, that on the one side all had been so completely lost, while on the other all was won. … When the Athenians recovered from the first stupefaction of grief, they called to mind the causes of the whole calamity, and hereupon in passionate fury turned round upon all who had advised the expedition, or who had encouraged vain hopes of victory, as orators, prophets, or soothsayers. Finally, the general excitement passed into the phase of despair and terror, conjuring up dangers even greater and more imminent than existed in reality. The citizens every day expected to see the Sicilian fleet with the Peloponnesians appear off the harbor, to take possession of the defenceless city; and they believed that the last days of Athens had arrived. … Athens had risked all her military and naval resources for the purpose of overcoming Syracuse. More than 200 ships of state, with their entire equipment, had been lost; and if we reckon up the numbers despatched on successive occasions to Sicily, the sum total, inclusive of the auxiliary troops, may be calculated at about 60,000 men. A squadron still lay in the waters of Naupactus; but even this was in danger and exposed to attack from the Corinthians, who had equipped fresh forces. The docks and naval arsenals were empty, and the treasury likewise. In the hopes of enormous booty and an abundance of new revenues, no expense had been spared; and the resources of the city were entirely exhausted. … But, far heavier than the material losses in money, ships, and men, was the moral blow which had been received by Athens, and which was more dangerous in her case than in that of any other state, because her whole power was based on the fear inspired in the subject states, so long as they saw the fleets of Athens absolutely supreme at sea. The ban of this fear had now been removed; disturbances arose in those island-states which were most necessary to Athens, and whose existence seemed to be most indissolubly blended with that of Attica, —in Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos; everywhere the oligarchical parties raised their head, in order to overthrow the odious dominion of Athens. … Sparta, on the other hand, had in the course of a few months, without sending out an army or incurring any danger or losses, secured to herself the greatest advantages, such as she could not have obtained from the most successful campaign. Gylippus had again proved the value of a single Spartan man: inasmuch as in the hour of the greatest danger his personal conduct had altered the course of the most important and momentous transaction of the entire war. He was, in a word, the more fortunate successor of Brasidas. The authority of Sparta in the Peloponnesus, which the peace of Nicias had weakened, was now restored; with the exception of Argos and Elis, all her allies were on amicable terms with her; the brethren of her race beyond the sea, who had hitherto held aloof, had, by the attack made by the Athenian invasion, been drawn into the war, and had now become the most zealous and ardent allies of the Peloponnesians. … Moreover, the Athenians had driven the most capable of all living statesmen and commanders into the enemy's camp. No man was better adapted than Alcibiades for rousing the slowly-moving Lacedæmonians to energetic action; and it was he who supplied them with the best advice, and with the most accurate information as to Athenian politics and localities. Lastly, the Spartans were at the present time under a warlike king, the enterprising and ambitious Agis, the son of Archidamus. … Nothing was now required, except pecuniary means. And even these now unexpectedly offered themselves to the Spartans, in consequence of the events which had in the meantime occurred in the Persian empire. … Everywhere [in that empire] sedition raised its head, particularly in Asia Minor. Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had on several previous occasions interfered in Greek affairs, rose in revolt. He was supported by Greek soldiers, under the command of an Athenian of the name of Lycon. The treachery of the latter enabled Darius to overthrow Pissuthnes, whose son, Amorges, maintained himself by Athenian aid in Caria. After the fall of Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear in Asia Minor as the first dignitaries of the Great King. Tissaphernes succeeded Pissuthnes as satrap in the maritime provinces. He was furious at the assistance offered by Athens to the party of his adversary; moreover, the Great King (possibly in consequence of the Sicilian war and the destruction of the Attic fleet) demanded that the tributes long withheld by the coast-towns, which were still regarded as subject to the Persian empire, should now be levied. Tissaphernes was obliged to pay the sums according to the rate at which they were entered in the imperial budget of Persia; and thus, in order to reimburse himself, found himself forced to pursue a war policy. … Everything now depended for the satrap upon obtaining assistance from a Greek quarter. He found opportunities for this purpose in Ionia itself, in all the more important cities of which a Persian party existed. … The most important and only independent power in Ionia was Chios. Here the aristocratic families had with great sagacity contrived to retain the government. … It was their government which now became the focus of the conspiracy against Athens, in the first instance establishing a connection on the opposite shore with Erythræ. Hereupon Tissaphernes opened negotiations with both cities, and in conjunction with them despatched an embassy to Peloponnesus charged with persuading the Spartans to place themselves at the head of the Ionian movement, the satrap at the same time promising to supply pay and provisions to the Peloponnesian forces. The situation of Pharnabazus was the same as that of Tissaphernes. Pharnabazus was the satrap of the northern province. … Pharnabazus endeavored to outbid Tissaphernes in his promises; and two powerful satraps became rival suitors for the favor of Sparta, to whom they offered money and their alliance. … While thus the most dangerous combinations were on all sides forming against Athens, the war had already broken out in Greece. This time Athens had been the first to commence direct hostilities. … A Peloponnesian army under Agis invaded Attica, with the advent of the spring of B. C. 413 (Olympiad xci. 3); at which date it was already to be anticipated how the Sicilian war would end. For twelve years Attica had been spared hostile invasions, and the vestiges of former wars had been effaced. {1589} The present devastations were therefore doubly ruinous; while at the same time it was now impossible to take vengeance upon the Peloponnesians by means of naval expeditions. And the worst point in the case was that they were now fully resolved, instead of recurring to their former method of carrying on the war and undertaking annual campaigns, to occupy permanently a fortified position on Attic soil." The invaders seized a strong position at Decelea, only fourteen miles northward from Athens, on a rocky peak of Mount Parnes, and fortified themselves so strongly that the Athenians ventured on no attempt to dislodge them. From this secure station they ravaged the surrounding country at pleasure. "This success was of such importance that even in ancient times it gave the name of the Decelean War to the entire last division of the Peloponnesian War. The occupation of Decelea forms the connecting link between the Sicilian War and the Attico-Peloponnesian, which now broke out afresh. … Its immediate object … it failed to effect; inasmuch as the Athenians did not allow it to prevent their despatching a fresh armament to Sicily. But when, half a year later, all was lost, the Athenians felt more heavily than ever the burden imposed upon them by the occupation of Decelea. The city was cut off from its most important source of supplies, since the enemy had in his power the roads communicating with Eubœa. … One-third of Attica no longer belonged to the Athenians, and even in the immediate vicinity of the city communication was unsafe; large numbers of the country-people, deprived of labor and means of subsistence, thronged the city; the citizens were forced night and day to perform the onerous duty of keeping watch."

_E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapters 4-5 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN: _G. Grote, History of Greece, chapter 61 (volume 7)._

GREECE: B. C. 413-412. The Peloponnesian War: Revolt of Chios, Miletus, Lesbos, and Rhodes from Athens. Revolution at Samos. Intrigues of Alcibiades for a revolution at Athens and for his own recall.

"Alkibiades … persuaded the Spartans to build a fleet, and send it over to Asia to assist the Ionians in revolting. He himself crossed at once to Chios with a few ships, in order to begin the revolt. The government of Chios was in the hands of the nobles; but they had hitherto served Athens so well that the Athenians had not altered the government to a democracy. Now, however, they revolted (B. C. 413). This was a heavy blow to Athens, for Chios was the most powerful of the Ionian States, and others would be sure to follow its example. Miletus and Lesbos revolted in B. C. 412. The nobles of Samos prepared to revolt, but the people were in favour of Athens, and rose against the nobles, killing 200 of them, and banishing 400 more. Athens now made Samos its free and equal ally, instead of its subject, and Samos became the head-quarters of the Athenian fleet and army. … The Athenians … had now manned a fresh navy. They defeated the Peloponnesian and Persian fleets together at Miletus, and were only kept from besieging Miletus by the arrival of a fleet from Syracuse. [This reinforcement of the enemy held them powerless to prevent a revolt in Rhodes, carried out by the oligarchs though opposed by the people.] Alkibiades had made enemies among the Spartans, and when he had been some time in Asia Minor an order came over from Sparta to put him to death. He escaped to Tissaphernes, and now made up his mind to win back the favour of Athens by breaking up the alliance between Tissaphernes and the Spartans. He contrived to make a quarrel between them about the rate of pay, and persuaded Tissaphernes that it would be the best thing for Persia to let the Spartans and Athenians wear one another out, without giving help to either. Tissaphernes therefore kept the Spartans idle for months, always pretending that he was on the point of bringing up his fleet to help them. Alkibiades now sent a lying message to the generals of the Athenian army at Samos that he could get Athens the help of Tissaphernes, if the Athenians would allow him to return from his exile: but he said that he could never return while there was a democracy; so that if they wished for the help of Persia they must change the government to an oligarchy (B. C. 412). In the army at Samos there were many rich men willing to see an oligarchy established at Athens, and peace made with Sparta. … Therefore, though the great mass of the army at Samos was democratical, a certain number of powerful men agreed to the plan of Alkibiades for changing the government. One of the conspirators, named Pisander, was sent to Athens to instruct the clubs of nobles and rich men to work secretly for this object. In these clubs the overthrow of the democracy was planned. Citizens known to be zealous for the constitution were secretly murdered. Terror fell over the city, for no one except the conspirators knew who did, and who did not, belong to the plot; and at last, partly by force, the assembly was brought to abolish the popular government."

_C. A. Fyffe, History of Greece (History Primer), chapter 5, sections 36-39._

ALSO IN: _G. W. Cox, The Athenian Empire, chapter 6._

_Thucydides, History, book 8, chapters 4-51._

GREECE: B. C. 411-407. The Peloponnesian War: Athenian victories at Cynossema and Abydos. Exploits of Alcibiades. His return to Athens and to supreme command. His second deposition and exile.