Part 6

"Although Korkyra became the ally of Athens, the force sent to her aid was confined to the small number of ten ships, for the express purpose of making it clear to the Corinthians that no aggressive measures were intended; and the generals received precise instructions to remain strictly neutral unless the Corinthians should attempt to effect a landing either on Korkyra or on any Korkyraian settlements. The Corinthians lost no time in bringing the quarrel to an issue. With a fleet of 150 ships, of which 60 were furnished by their allies, they sailed to the harbor of Cheimerion near the lake through which the river Acheron finds its way into the sea about thirty miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Korkyra. The conflict which ensued exhibited a scene of confusion which the Athenian seamen probably regarded with infinite contempt. After a hard struggle the Korkyraians routed the right wing of the enemy's fleet, and chasing it to its camp on shore, lost time in plundering it and burning the tents. For this folly they paid a terrible price. The remainder of the Korkyraian fleet, borne down by sheer force of numbers, was put to flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open interference of the Athenians, who now dashed into the fight without scruple, and came into direct conflict with the Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships, they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes, but of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they conveyed their disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and, still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle cry, had already rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians, supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force, hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own kinsfolk. On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service, supported by the thirty Athenian ships. But the Corinthians, far from wishing to come to blows with the newcomers, were anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what they meant to do. The answer of the Athenians was plain and decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to her. … Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the hands of the Corinthians. Of these 250 were conveyed to Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard to their own interests. Their object was to send these prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted to put down the Demos, and thus to insure the hearty alliance of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic city.

_G. W. Cox, General History of Greece, book 3, chapter 1._

"The evils of this imprudent interference of the Athenians began now to be seen. In consequence of the Corcyrian alliance, the Athenians issued an order to Potidæa, a Macedonian town acknowledging their supremacy, to demolish its walls; to send back certain officers whom they had received from Corinth, and to give hostages for their good conduct. Potidæa, although an ally of Athens, had originally been a colony of Corinth, and thus arose the jealousy which occasioned these harsh and peremptory orders. Symptoms of universal hostility to Athens now appeared in the states around. The Corinthians and their allies were much irritated; the oppressed Potidæans were strongly instigated to revolt; and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who had some time since been at open war with the Athenians, now gladly seized the opportunity to distress them, by exciting and assisting the malcontents. The Potidæans, however, deputed ambassadors to Athens to deprecate the harsh orders which had been sent them; but in the mean time to prepare for the worst, they also sent messengers to Sparta entreating support, where they met deputies from Corinth and Megara. By these loud and general complaints Sparta was at length roused to head the conspiracy against Athens, and the universal flames of war shortly afterwards broke forth throughout Greece." The revolt of Potidæa followed immediately; the Corinthians placed a strong force in the town, under Aristeus, and the Athenians sent an army under Phormion to lay siege to it.

_Early History of Greece (Enc. Metropolitana), page 283._

GREECE: B. C. 432-431. Charges brought by Corinth against Athens. The hearing and the Congress at Sparta. Decision for war. Theban attack on Platæa. The Peloponnesian War begun.

The Corinthians "invited deputies from the other states of the confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there charged the Athenians with having broken the treaty, and trampled on the rights of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans held an assembly to receive the complaints of their allies, and to discuss the question of peace or war. Here the Corinthians were seconded by several other members of the confederacy, who had also wrongs to complain of against Athens, and urged the Spartans for redress. … It happened that at this time Athenian envoys, who had been sent on other business, were still in Sparta. {1581} They desired permission to attend and address the assembly. … When the strangers had all been heard, they were desired to withdraw, that the assembly might deliberate. The feeling against the Athenians was universal; most voices were for instant war. … The deputies of the allies were then informed of the resolution which the assembly had adopted, and that a general congress of the confederacy would shortly be summoned to deliberate on the same question, in order that war, if decided on, might be decreed by common consent. … The congress decided on the war; but the confederacy was totally unprepared for commencing hostilities, and though the necessary preparations were immediately begun and vigorously prosecuted, nearly a year elapsed before it was ready to bring an army into the field. In the meantime embassies were sent to Athens with various remonstrances and demands, for the double purpose of amusing the Athenians with the prospect of peace, and of multiplying pretexts for war. An attempt was made, not, perhaps, so foolish as it was insolent, to revive the popular dread of the curse which had been supposed to hang over the Alcmæonids. The Athenians were called upon, in the name of the gods, to banish all who remained among them of that blood-stained race. If they had complied with this demand, they must have parted with Pericles, who, by the mother's side, was connected with the Alcmæonids. This, indeed, was not expected; but it was hoped that the refusal might afford a pretext to his enemies at Athens for treating him as the author of the war. The Athenians retorted by requiring the Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had profaned the sanctuary of Tænarus, by dragging from it some Helots who had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of Pausanias. … Still, war had been only threatened, not declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the two confederacies. But early in the following spring, B. C. 431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an event took place which closed all prospects of peace, precipitated the commencement of war, imbittered the animosity of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of 300 Thebans, commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs. They had been invited by a Platæan named Nauclides, and others of the same party, who hoped, with the aid of the Thebans, to rid themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded, as in time of peace, and one of them was secretly opened to the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the marketplace. … The Platæans, who were not in the plot, imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered. … Having barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such other preparations as they thought necessary, a little before daybreak they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and were assisted by the women and slaves, who showered stones and tiles from the houses on the enemy, all, at the same time, raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet. … The main body, which had kept together, entered a large building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans, who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered at discretion. Before their departure from Thebes it had been concerted that as large a force as could be raised should march the same night to support them. The distance between the two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning; but the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. … The Thebans afterward alleged that they had received a promise, confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring from the Platæan territory, the prisoners should be released; and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The Platæans denied that they had pledged themselves to spare the lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is certain, however, that they retired, and that the Platæans, as soon as they had transported their movable property out of the country into the town, put to death all the prisoners— amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the greatest influence in Thebes. On the first entrance of the Thebans into Platæa, a messenger had been despatched to Athens with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid all the Bœotians in Attica under arrest; and when another messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the Platæans, they sent a herald to request that they would reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The herald came too late to prevent the execution; and the Athenians, foreseeing that Platæa would stand in great need of defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it with provisions, and removed the women and children and all persons unfit for service in a siege. {1582} After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only be decided by arms. Platæa was so intimately united with Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for immediate hostilities. Sparta, too, instantly sent notice to all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed day for the invasion of Attica."

_C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 19 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN: _Thucydides, History, books 1-2._

GREECE: B. C. 431-429. The Peloponnesian War: How Hellas was divided. The opposing camps. Peloponnesian invasions of Attica. The Plague at Athens. Death of Pericles. Surrender of Potidæa to the Athenians.

"All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two chief cities. … The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the liberators of Hellas. … The general indignation against the Athenians was intense; some were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of falling under their sway. … The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans—they were both neutral; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians at first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined them. Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only infantry. The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the line of Peloponnesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos and Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land forces and money. Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character of their respective forces. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the Lacedaemonians determined to invade Attica, and sent round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies, bidding them equip troops and provide all things necessary for a foreign expedition. The various states made their preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time, with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces of each, met at the Isthmus." Then followed the invasion of Attica, the siege of Athens, the plague in the city, the death of Pericles, and the success won by the indomitable Athenians, at Potidaea, in the midst of their sore distress.

_Thucydides, History (translated by Jowett), book 2, sections 8-70 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN: _E. Abbott, Pericles, chapters 13-15._

See ATHENS: 431 B. C. 431 and 430-429.

GREECE: B. C. 429-427. The Peloponnesian War: Siege, capture and destruction of Platæa.

"In the third spring of the war, the Peloponnesians changed their plan of offence. By the invasion and ravage of Attica for two following summers, tho much injury had been done to the Athenians, little advantage had accrued to themselves: the booty was far from paying the expense of the expedition; the enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk a battle, and the great purpose of the war was little forwarded. The Peloponnesians were yet very unequal to attempt naval operations of any consequence. Of the continental dependencies of Athens none was so open to their attacks, none so completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by its danger to superinduce that war of the field which they wished, as Platæa. Against that town therefore it was determined to direct the principal effort. … Under the command still of Archidamus, the confederate army accordingly entered the Platæid, and ravage was immediately begun. … The town was small, as may be judged from the very small force which sufficed for an effectual garrison; only 400 Platæans, with 80 Athenians. There were besides in the place 110 women to prepare provisions, and no other person free or slave. The besieging army, composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian youth, was numerous. The first operation was to surround the town with a palisade, which might prevent any ready egress; the neighboring forest of Cithæron supplying materials. Then, in a chosen spot, ground was broken, according to the modern phrase, for making approaches. The business was to fill the town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, on which a force sufficient for assault might ascend. … Such was at that time the inartificial process of a siege. Thucydides appears to have been well aware that it did no credit to the science of his age. … To oppose this mode of attack, the first measure of the besieged was to raise, on that part of their wall against which the mound was forming, a strong wooden frame, covered in front with leather and hides; and, within this, to build a rampart with bricks from the neighboring houses. The wooden frame bound the whole, and kept it firm to a considerable height: the covering of hides protected both work and workmen against weapons discharged against them, especially fiery arrows. But the mound still rising as the superstructure on the wall rose, and this superstructure becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing height, while the mound was liable to no counterbalancing defect, it was necessary for the besieged to devise other opposition. Accordingly they broke through the bottom of their wall, where the mound bore against it, and brought in the earth. The Peloponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of loose earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed in baskets. This requiring more labor to remove, the besieged undermined the mound; and thus, for a long time unperceived, prevented it from gaining height. Still, however, fearing that the efforts of their scanty numbers would be overborne by the multitude of hands which the besiegers could employ, they had recourse to another device. Within their town-wall they built, in a semilunar form, a second wall, connected with the first at the extremities. These extended, on either side, beyond the mound; so that should the enemy possess themselves of the outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a far less favorable situation. … A ram, advanced upon the Peloponnesian mound, battered the superstructure on the Platæan rampart, and shook it violently; to the great alarm of the garrison, but with little farther effect. {1583} Other machines of the same kind were employed against different parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose. … No means however were neglected by the besiegers that either approved practice suggested, or their ingenuity could devise, to promote their purpose; yet, after much of the summer consumed, they found every effort of their numerous forces so completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to the tedious method of blockade, they determined to try one more experiment, for which their numbers, and the neighboring woods of Cithæron, gave them more than ordinary facility. Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage. On the faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on fire. The conflagration was such as was never before known, says Thucydides, to have been prepared and made by the hands or men. … But fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain, brought on by a thunderstorm without wind, extinguished the fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable than any they had before experienced. This attempt failing, the Peloponnesians determined immediately to reduce the siege to a blockade. … To the palisade, which already surrounded the town, a contravallation was added; with a double ditch, one without, and one within. A sufficient body of troops being then appointed to the guard of these works, the Bœotians undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy, and, a little after the middle of September, the rest of the army was dismissed for the winter."

_W. Mitford, History of Greece, chapter 15, section 1 (volume 2)._

When the blockade had endured for more than a year, and food in the city grew scarce, about half of the defending force made a bold dash for liberty, one stormy night, scaled the walls of circumvallation, and escaped. The remainder held out until some time in the next year, when they surrendered and were all put to death, the city being destroyed. The families of the Platæans had been sheltered at Athens before the siege began.

_Thucydides, History, books 2-3._

GREECE: B. C. 429-427. The Peloponnesian War: Phormio's sea-fights. Revolt of Lesbos. Siege and capture of Mitylene. The ferocious decree of Cleon reversed.