Part 55

"With the accession of Lord Auckland, Bentinck's successor, began a new era in Anglo-Indian history, in which the long-sown seeds of fresh political complications, which even now seem as far from solution as ever, began to put forth fruit. All danger from French ambition had passed away: but Russian intrigue was busy against us. We had brought the danger on ourselves. False to an alliance with Persia, which dated from the beginning of the century, we had turned a deaf ear to her entreaties for help against Russian aggression, and had allowed her to fall under the power of her tyrant, who thenceforth used her as an instrument of his ambition. The result of our selfish indifference appeared in 1837, when Persia, acting under Russian influence, laid siege to Herat, which was then under Afghan rule. While Herat was still holding out, the Shah was at last threatened with war, and raised the siege. Then was the time for Auckland to destroy the Russian danger once for all, by making a friend of the power which seemed to be the natural barrier against invasion from the north-west. After a long series of revolutions, Dost Mahomed, the representative of the now famous tribe of Baruckzyes, had established himself upon the throne, with the warm approval of the majority of the people; while Shah Sooja, the leader of the rival Suddozyes, was an exile. The ruling prince did not wait for Auckland to seek his friendship. He treated the Russian advances with contempt, and desired nothing better than to be an ally of the English. Auckland was urged to seize the opportunity. It was in his power to deal Russia a crushing blow, and to avert those troubles which are even now harassing British statesmen. He did not let slip the opportunity. He flung it from him, and clutched at a policy that was to bring misery to thousands of families in England, in India, and in Afghanistan, and to prove disastrous to the political interests of all three countries. … Those who are least interested in Indian history are not likely to forget how the Afghan mob murdered the British Envoy and his associates; how the British commander, putting faith in the chiefs of a people whom no treaties can bind, began that retreat from which but one man escaped to tell how 16,000 had perished; how poor Auckland, unmanned by the disaster, lacked the energy to retrieve it; how the heroic Sale held out at Jellalabad till Pollock relieved him; how Auckland's successor, Lord Ellenborough, dreading fresh disasters, hesitated to allow his generals to act till, yielding to their indignant zeal, he threw upon them the responsibility of that advance to Cabul which retrieved the lost prestige of our arms.

See AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 1838-1842, and 1842-1869.

{1736}

Thus closed the first act of a still unfinished drama. After celebrating the triumph of the victorious army, Ellenborough sent Charles Napier to punish the Ameers of Scinde [see SCINDE], who, emboldened by the retreat from Cabul, had violated a treaty which they had concluded with the British Government. The result of the war was the annexation of the country: but the whole series of transactions is only remembered now as having given rise to the dispute on the question of the guilt of the Ameers between Napier and James Outram. Less talked of at the time, but historically more important, was Ellenborough's reconstitution of the British relations with the Sindia of the day. Political disturbances had for some time agitated that prince's court, while his army had swollen to a dangerous size, and, like the Sikh army since Runjeet Singh's death, which had taken place a few years before, had passed beyond the control of the civil power. In these two armies Ellenborough saw a danger which might disturb the peace of Hindostan. He foresaw that the Sikh soldiers, released from the stern discipline of Runjeet Singh, would soon force a government which they despised to let them cross the Sutlej in quest of plunder. Two years later his character as a prophet was vindicated; and, if he had not now, in anticipation of the invasion which then took place, disbanded the greater part of Sindia's army, and over-awed the remainder by a native contingent under the command of British officers, the Sikhs would probably have joined their forces with the Mahrattas. … But the Directors took a different view of their Governor-General's conduct of affairs. In June, 1844, all India was astonished by the news that Ellenborough had been recalled. He had helped to bring about his own downfall, for in the controversies with his masters in which he, like some of the ablest of his predecessors, had found himself involved, he had shown an unfortunate want of discretion; but, though by bombastic proclamations and a theatrical love of display he had sometimes exposed himself to ridicule, many of his subordinates felt that in him they had lost a vigorous and able ruler. Sir Henry Hardinge, who was raised to the peerage before the close of his administration, succeeded to the office of Governor-General, and waited anxiously for the breaking of the storm which his predecessor had seen gathering. The Sikhs, the Puritans of India [see SIKHS], who were not strictly speaking a nation, but a religious brotherhood of warriors called the Khalsa, were animated by two passions equally dangerous to the peace of those around them, a fierce enthusiasm, half military, half religious, for the glory of their order, and an insatiable desire for plunder. By giving them full scope for the indulgence of these passions, and by punishing all disobedience with merciless severity, Runjeet Singh had governed his turbulent subjects for forty years: but, when he died, they broke loose from all control; and the weak Government of Lahore found that they could only save their own capital from being plundered by the Khalsa army by sending it to seek plunder in British territory. Thus began the first Sikh war."

_T. R. E. Holmes, History of the Indian Mutiny, chapter 1._

ALSO IN: _Sir L. Griffin, Ranjit Singh._

_L. J. Trotter, The Earl of Auckland, chapters 4-13._

INDIA: A. D. 1843. Conquest of Scinde.

See SCINDE.

INDIA: A. D. 1845-1849. The Sikh Wars. Conquest and annexation of the Punjab.

"There had always been an expectation that whenever Runjeet Singh died, there would be trouble with his soldiery; and it soon appeared that some incursion was in contemplation, for which the Sikh troops were prepared by an able European training under French officers. While the strife about the succession was going on in the Punjaub, the military element of society there became supreme; and the government at Calcutta considered it necessary to move troops to the frontier to preserve peace, and reassure the inhabitants of whole districts which dreaded the incursions of a haughty and lawless soldiery. The Sikhs were alarmed at the approach of English troops, and adopted the same course towards us that we had tried with their western neighbours—they crossed the frontier to forestall our doing it. Whether this move was a device of the Sikh chiefs, as some say it was, to get rid of the army, and perhaps to cause its destruction by the British, and thus to clear the field for their own factions; or whether war with the British was considered so inevitable that the invasion of our territory was intended as a measure of prudence, we need not here decide. The fact was that the Sikh soldiery gathered round the tomb of Runjeet Singh, preparing themselves for a great battle soon to happen; and that war was virtually declared at Lahore in November, 1845, and fairly begun by the troops crossing the Sutlej on the 11th of December, and taking up a position near Ferozepore. The old error prevailed in the British councils, the mistake denounced by Charles Metcalfe as fatal—that of undervaluing the enemy. The Sikhs had been considered unworthy to be opposed to the Afghans in Runjeet's time; and now we expected to drive them into the Sutlej at once; but we had never yet, in India, so nearly met with our match. The battle of Moodkee was fought under Sir Hugh Gough, on the 18th of December, and 'the rabble' from the Punjaub astonished both Europeans and Sepoys by standing firm, manœuvring well, and rendering it no easy matter to close the day with honour to the English arms. This ill-timed contempt was truly calamitous, as it had caused miscalculations about ammunition, carriage, hospital-stores, and everything necessary for a campaign. All these things were left behind at Delhi or Agra; and the desperate necessity of winning a battle was only enough barely to save the day. The advantage was with the British in the battle of Moodkee, but not so decisively as all parties had expected. After a junction with reinforcements, the British fought the invaders again on the 21st and 22nd, at Ferozeshur. On the first night our troops were hardly masters of the ground they stood on, and had no reserve, while their gallant enemy had large reinforcements within reach. {1737} The next day might easily have been made fatal to the English army, at times when their ammunition fell short; but the Sikhs were badly commanded at a critical moment, then deserted by a traitorous leader, and finally driven back. For a month after this nothing was done by the British, and the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej at their ease. The valour of Gough and of Hardinge, who, while Governor-General, had put himself under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, had saved the honour of the English; but their prestige was weakened among their own Sepoys, and even the European regiments; much more among the Sikhs; and most of all in the eyes of the vigilant surrounding states. It was a matter of life and death now to bring up guns, ammunition and treasure. A considerable portion fell into the enemy's hands on the 21st of January, on its way to the relief of Loodeeana; but the battle of Aliwal on the 28th was again a true British fight. The Sikhs were driven into the Sutlej; and as soon as they had collected in their stronghold of Sobraon on the other side, they were driven thence by a closing struggle on the 10th of February. The Sikhs were beaten, with a slaughter of 5,000 (some say 8,000) men; against 320 killed and 2,000 wounded on our side. The Maharajah submitted, the road to Lahore lay open, and the Governor-General could make his own terms. He flattered himself that he had arranged a protectorate of the Punjaub which would render annexation unnecessary; and all who could believe in it rejoiced that means had been found to escape the necessity of adding new conquests to a territory already much too large. As the Punjaub could not pay its amount of tribute to the Company, Cashmere and some other territory was accepted instead, and given, as a kingdom, to Gholab Singh … on his paying a portion of the debt, thus reimbursing the Company, and lessening the overgrown power of the Punjaub rulers. When, at the close of 1846, the English troops should be withdrawing from Lahore, the Sikh chiefs begged that they might remain, and take care of the Punjaub till the young Maharajah should grow up to manhood."

_H. Martineau, British Rule in India, chapter 20._

"Lord Hardinge entrusted the government of the Punjab to a Council of Regency, consisting of Sikh nobles under the guidance of Sir Henry Lawrence as British Resident. He refused to create a subsidiary army, but he left a British force to protect the government until the boy Dhuleep Singh reached his majority. Two-thirds of the Sikh army of the Khalsa were disbanded. The Jullunder Doab between the Sutlej and the Beyas was added to the British empire. … Lord Dalhousie succeeded Lord Hardinge in 1848. Shortly afterwards the Punjab was again in commotion. Sikh government under British protection had failed to keep the peace. The army of the Khalsa had disappeared, but the old love of license and plunder was burning in the hearts of the disbanded soldiery. The Sikh governor of Multan revolted; two Englishmen were murdered. A British force besieged the rebels in Multan. It was joined by a Sikh force in the service of the Council of Regency commanded by Shere Singh. So far the revolt at Multan was regarded as a single outbreak which would be soon suppressed by the capture of the fortress. In reality it was the beginning of a general insurrection. Shere Singh, who commanded the Sikh force in the besieging army, suddenly deserted the British force and joined his father Chutter Singh, who was already in open rebellion. The revolt was secretly promoted by the queen mother, and spread over the Punjab like wildfire. The old soldiers of the Khalsa rallied round Shere Singh and his father. The half-and-half government set up by Lord Hardinge was unable to cope with a revolution which was restoring the old anarchy. In November, 1848, Lord Gough advanced against the rebel army. Then followed the famous campaign between the Chenab and Jhelum rivers about 100 miles to the north of Lahore. In January, 1849, Lord Gough fought the dubious battle of Chillianwallah, near the spot where Alexander the Great crossed the Jhelum and defeated the army of Porus. Meanwhile Multan surrendered, and the besieging force joined Lord Gough. In February the Sikh army was utterly defeated at Gujerat."

_J. T. Wheeler, Indian History, chapter 11._

"Gujrat was essentially a forenoon battle, with the whole day before the combatants to finish their work. It commenced with a magnificent duel of artillery; the British infantry occupying post after post as they were abandoned by the enemy; and the British cavalry breaking up the Sikh masses and scattering them by pursuit. Of the sixty Sikh guns engaged, fifty-three were taken. Lord Dalhousie resolved to make the victory a final one. 'The war,' he declared, 'must be prosecuted now to the entire defeat and dispersion of all who are in arms against us, whether Sikhs or Afghans.' General Gilbert hurried out with a pursuing force of 12,000, horse, foot and artillery, the day after the battle. In the breathless chase which followed across the plains of the Punjab to the frontier mountain-wall, the Sikh military power was destroyed for ever. On the 12th of March, 1849, General Gilbert received the submission of the entire Sikh army at Rawal Pindi, together with the last forty-one of the 160 Sikh cannon captured by the British during the war. While the Sikh army heaped up their swords and shields and matchlocks in submissive piles, and salamed one by one as they passed disarmed along the British line, their Afghan allies were chased relentlessly westwards, and reached the safety of the Khaibar Pass panting, and barely twenty miles in front of the English hunters. The horsemen of Afghanistan, it was said, 'had ridden down through the hills like lions and ran back into them like dogs.' The question remained what to do with the Punjab. The victory of Sobraon in 1846 gave to Lord Hardinge the right of conquest: the victory at Gujrat in 1849 compelled Lord Dalhousie to assert that right. Lord Hardinge at the end of the first Punjab war in 1846, tried, as we have seen, an intermediate method of ruling the province by British officers for the benefit of the infant prince. This method had failed. … In determining the future arrangements for the Punjab, Lord Dalhousie had as his advisers the two Lawrences. Sir Henry Lawrence, the former Resident at Lahore; hurried back from his sick-leave in England on the breaking out of the war. He was of opinion that the annexation of the Punjab might perhaps be just, but that it would be inexpedient. His brother John, afterwards Lord Lawrence, who had also acted as Resident, although as much averse in general principle to annexation as Henry, was convinced that, in this case, annexation was not only just, but that its expediency was 'both undeniable and pressing.' {1738} Lord Dalhousie, after a full review of the efforts which had been made to convert the Sikh nation into a friendly power without annexation, decided that no course now remained to the British Government but to annex. … The annexation of the Punjab was deliberately approved of by the Court of Directors, by Parliament, and by the English nation."

_W. W. Hunter, The Marquess of Dalhousie, chapter 3._

ALSO IN: _Sir H. B. Edwardes and H. Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence._

_R. B. Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, volume 1, chapters 7-11._

_E. Arnold, The Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India, volume 1, chapters 1-7._

_H. B. Edwardes, A Year on the Punjab Frontier, 1848-49._

_Sir R. Temple, Men and Events of My Time in India, chapters 3-4._

INDIA: A. D. 1848-1856. Lord Dalhousie's minor annexations. The lapse of dependent Native States. The case of Nana Sahib.

"In applying the doctrine of lapse to the Hindu chiefdoms, on default of natural successors or of an heir legally adopted with the sanction of the Ruling Power, Lord Dalhousie merely carried out the declared law of the case, and the deliberately formulated policy of the Government of India, years before he arrived in the country. In so doing, however, Lord Dalhousie became the unconscious but effective instrument by which the old India of Lord Wellesley at the beginning of the century was prepared for its conversion, in 1858, into the new India of the Queen. … The fundamental question was whether we should allow the government of a dependent State, in absence of natural heirs, to pass like mere private property to an adopted son. The Court of Directors had at one time permitted the adoption of a successor in special cases to a principality on failure of natural heirs. It declared, however, in 1834, that such an 'indulgence should be the exception, not the rule.' … As the evils of the old system of government by sham royalties further developed themselves, the Government of India determined in 1841 to enforce a more uniform policy. … What Lord Dalhousie did, therefore, was not to invent a new principle of Indian law, but to steadily apply an old principle. … The first case in which this principle came to be applied, shortly after Lord Dalhousie's arrival, was the Native State of Satara. That Maratha principality had been constituted by the British Government on the general break up of the Maratha power in 1818, and confirmed to the 'sons and heirs, and successors' of the recipient in 1819. In 1839 the reigning prince was deposed for misconduct by the British Government in the exercise of its Suzerain rights. By the same rights the British Government then set up the brother of the deposed prince on the throne. … The Raja, whom in 1839 we had placed on the throne, applied for permission to adopt a son. The British Government deliberately withheld the permission; and in the last hours of his life the Raja, in 1848, hastily adopted a son without the consent of the Government." Lord Dalhousie, with the advice of the Court of Directors, declared in this case that the territory of Satara had lapsed, on the death of the Raja, by failure of heirs, to the Power which deposed, and it was annexed, accordingly, to the British dominions. Under kindred circumstances the Native States of Sambalpur, on the south-western frontier of Lower Bengal, and Jhansi, a fragment of the Maratha dominions in Northern India, were absorbed. "The same principle of lapse on failure of heirs was applied by Lord Dalhousie to several other dependent States. Jaitpur in Bundelkhand, Baghat a petty hill Chiefdom of 36 square miles in the Punjab, Udaipur on the Western frontier of Lower Bengal, and Budawal in Khandesh, passed under direct British rule from this cause. The fort and military fief of Tanjore were annexed after Lord Dalhousie's departure from India, but practically on the grounds set forth by his government. … By far the largest accession of territory made during Lord Dalhousie's rule, to the British dominions on the failure of heirs, was the great central tract of India known as Nagpur. This Maratha principality as now constituted into the Central Provinces, and after various rectifications of frontier, has an area of 113,279 square miles, with a population of 12,000,000 souls. The territories annexed by Lord Dalhousie in 1854 make nearly four-fifths of the present Central Provinces. … It is difficult to find any ground for the charge which Mr. Kaye brought in 1865 against Lord Dalhousie, for 'harshness' towards the man afterwards known as the infamous Nana Sahib [see below: A. D. 1857 (MAY-AUGUST)]. As this charge, however, is still occasionally repeated, and as it has even been suggested that Lord Dalhousie was to some extent responsible for the Mutiny of 1857, in consequence of his action towards Nana Sahib in 1851, I must briefly state the facts. In 1818, the Peshwa of the Marathas, completely beaten in the field, threw himself on the generosity of the British. Sir John Malcolm, then the Governor-General's Agent in the Deccan, assured him of his protection, and engaged that he should receive an allowance of £80,000 a year for his support. … There could not be the slightest pretension that it was ever anything more than a personal annuity; and from first to last all mention of heirs is carefully excluded. The records show that the ex-Peshwa, Baji Rao, was well aware of this. Baji Rao lived until 1851, leaving to his adopted son, Nana Sahib, an immense fortune admitted to amount to £280,000, and believed by the Government of the North-western Provinces to greatly exceed that sum. The Government of India at once acknowledged the adopted son's title to this splendid heritage, and out of its own beneficence added to it the Jaghir, or grant of land, on which his father had resided in the North-western Provinces. But the pension, paid out of the tax-payers' pockets, lapsed upon the death of the annuitant."

_Sir W. W. Hunter, The Marquess of Dalhousie, chapters 6-7._

_Duke of Argyll, India under Dalhousie and Canning._

INDIA: A. D. 1849-1893. The life in exile of Dhuleep Singh, heir to the Sikh throne.