Part 228

"The late campaign had been so unfortunate [to the Spaniards] that they felt their only possibility of obtaining reasonable terms, or of continuing the war with the hope of a change in fortune, was to break the alliance between Holland and France. A long debt of gratitude, assistance rendered in the struggle with Spain when assistance was valuable, the treaty of 1635 renewed in 1644, forbade Holland making a peace, except jointly with France. On the other hand, the States-General were weary of war, and jealous of the power and ambition of the French. … This disposition was skilfully fostered by the Spanish envoys. Pau and Knuyt, plenipotentiaries from Holland to the Congress at Münster [where, in part, the negotiations of the Peace of Westphalia were in progress—see GERMANY: A. D. 1648], were gained to the Spanish interest, as Mazarin claimed, by the promise to each of 100,000 crowns. But, apart from bribes, the Spanish used Mazarin's own plans to alarm the Hollanders. … It was intimated to the Hollanders that France was about to make a separate peace, that the Spanish Netherlands were to be given her, and that perhaps with the hand of the infanta might be transferred what claims Spain still made on the allegiance of the United Provinces. The French protested in vain they had never thought of making any treaty unless Holland joined, and that the proposed marriage of Louis with the infanta had been idle talk, suggested by the Spanish for the purpose of alarming the States-General. The Hollanders were suspicious, and they became still more eager for peace. … In the spring of 1646, seventy-one proposed articles had been submitted to the Spanish for their consideration. The French made repeated protests against these steps, but the States-General insisted that they were only acting with such celerity as should enable them to have the terms of their treaty adjusted as soon as those of the French. The successes of 1646 and the capture of Dunkirk quickened the desires of the United Provinces for a treaty with their ancient enemy. … In December, 1646, articles were signed between Spain and Holland, to be inserted in the treaty of Münster, when that should be settled upon, though the States-General still declared that no peace should be made unless the terms were approved by France. Active hostilities were again commenced in 1647, but little progress was made in Flanders during this campaign. Though the Hollanders had not actually made peace with Spain, they gave the French no aid. … On January 30, 1648, the treaty was at last signed. 'One would think,' wrote Mazarin, 'that for eighty years France had been warring with the provinces, and Spain had been protecting them. They have stained their reputation with a shameful blemish.' {2282} It was eighty years since William of Orange had issued his proclamation inviting all the Netherlands to take up arms 'to oppose the violent tyranny of the Spaniards.' Unlike the truce of 1609, a formal and final peace was now made. The United Provinces were acknowledged as free and sovereign states. At the time of the truce the Spaniards had only treated with them 'in quality of, and as holding them for independent provinces.' By a provision which had increased the eagerness for peace of the burghers and merchants of the United Provinces, it was agreed that the Escaut [Scheldt] should be closed. The wealth and commerce of Antwerp were thus sacrificed for the benefit of Amsterdam. The trade with the Indies was divided between the two countries. Numerous commercial advantages were secured and certain additional territory was ceded to the States-General."

_J. B. Perkins, France under [Richelieu and] Mazarin, chapter 8 (volume 1)._

"It had … become a settled conviction of Holland that a barrier of Spanish territory between the United Provinces and France was necessary as a safeguard against the latter. But the idea of fighting to maintain that barrier had not yet arisen, though fighting was the outcome of the doctrine. All that the United Provinces now did, or could do, was simply to back out of the war with Spain, sit still, and look passively upon the conflict between her and France for possession of the barrier, until it should please the two belligerents to make peace."

_J. Geddes, History of the Administration of John De Witt, book 2, chapter 1, section 1 (volume 1)._

NETHERLANDS: (Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1647-1648. The Spanish war with France. Siege and Battle of Lens.

"While Condé was at the head of the army of the Netherlands, it at least suffered no disaster; but, while he was affording the enemy a triumph in Spain [by his failure at Lerida,—the army which he left behind him was equally unfortunate].

See SPAIN: A. D. 1644-1646.

As he had taken some regiments with him to Spain, it did not exceed 16,000 men; and in 1647 was commanded by the two marshals, Gassion and Rantzau," who exercised the command on alternate days. Both were brave and skilful officers, but they were hostile to one another, and Rantzau was, unfortunately, a drunkard. "The Spanish army had been raised to 22,000 men, and besides being superior in numbers to them, was now under the command of a singularly active leader, the Archduke Leopold. He took town after town before their face; and towards the end of June laid siege to Landrecies. The danger of so important a place stimulated Mazarin to send some strong battalions, including the royal guards, to reinforce the army: and the two marshals made skilful dispositions to surprise the Spanish camp. By a night march of great rapidity, they reached the neighbourhood of the enemy without their presence being suspected; but the next morning, when the attack was to be made, it was Rantzau's turn to command; and he was too helplessly drunk to give the necessary orders. Before he had recovered his consciousness daylight had revealed his danger to the archduke, and he had taken up a position in which he could give battle with advantage. Greatly mortified, the French were forced to draw off, and leave Landrecies to its fate. As some apparent set-off to their losses, they succeeded in taking Dixmude, and one or two other unimportant towns, and were besieging Lens, when Gassion was killed; and though, a few days afterwards, that town was taken, its capture made but small amends. … Though the war was almost at an end in Germany, Turenne was still in that country; and, therefore, the next year there was no one who could be sent to replace Gassion but Condé and Grammont, who fortunately for the prince, was his almost inseparable comrade and adviser. … Though 16,000 men had been thought enough for Gassion and Rantzau, 30,000 were now collected to enable Condé to make a more successful campaign. The archduke had received no reinforcements, and had now only 18,000 men to make head against him; yet with this greatly inferior force he, for a while, balanced Condé's successes; losing Ypres, it is true, but taking Courtrai and Furnes, and defeating and almost annihilating a division with which the prince had detached Rantzau to make an attempt upon Ostend. At last, in the middle of August, he laid siege to Lens, the capture of which had, as we have already mentioned, been the last exploit of the French army in the preceding campaign, and which was now retaken without the garrison making the slightest effort at resistance. But, just as the first intelligence of his having sat down before it reached Condé, he was joined by the Count d'Erlach with a reinforcement of 5,000 men from the German army; and he resolved to march against the archduke in the hope of saving" the place. "He arrived in sight of the town on the 20th of August, a few hours after it had surrendered; and he found the archduke's victorious army in a position which, eager as he was for battle, he could not venture to attack. For Leopold had 18,000 men under arms, and the force that Condé had been able to bring with him did not exceed 14,000, with 18 guns. For the first time in his life he decided on retreating;" but early in the retreat his army was thrown into disorder by an attack from the archduke's cavalry, commanded by General Beck. "All was nearly lost, when Grammont turned the fortune of the day. He was in the van, but the moment that he learnt what was taking place behind him, he halted the advanced guard, and leading it back towards the now triumphant enemy, gave time for those regiments which had been driven in to rally behind the firm line which he presented. … It soon came to be a contest of hard fighting, unvaried by manœuvres on either side; and in hard fighting no troops could stand before those who might be lead by Condé. … At last victory declared for him in every part of his line. He had sustained a heavy loss himself, but less than that of the enemy, who left 3,000 of their number slain upon the field; while 5,000 prisoners, among whom was Beck himself, struck down by a mortal wound, and nearly all their artillery and baggage, attested the reality and greatness of his triumph."

_C. D. Yonge, History of France under the Bourbons, chapter 10 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN: _Sir E. Cust, Lives of the Warriors of the Civil Wars, part 1, pages 149-152._

{2283}

NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1647-1650. Suspension of the Stadtholdership. Supremacy of the States of Holland.

The fourth stadtholder, William II., who succeeded his father, Frederick Henry, in 1647, "was young and enterprising, and not at all disposed to follow the pacific example of his father. … His attempt at a coup d'état only prepared the way for an interregnum. … He was brother-in-law to the Elector of Brandenburg … and son-in-law to Charles I. of England and Henrietta Maria, the sister of Louis XIII. … The proud descendant of the Stuarts, the Princess Mary, who had been married to him when hardly more than a child, thought it beneath her not to be the wife of a sovereign, and encouraged her husband not to be satisfied to remain merely 'the official of a republic.' Thus encouraged, the son of Frederick Henry cherished the secret purpose of transforming the elective stadtholdership into an hereditary monarchy. … He needed supreme authority to enable him to render assistance to Charles I. … Finding in the opposition of the States an insurmountable obstacle to his wish of intervention, he sought the support of France, … and was now ready to come to an understanding with Mazarin to break the treaty of Munster and wrest the Netherlands from Spain. Mazarin promised in return to help him to assert his authority over the States. … But if William desired war, the United Provinces, and in particular the province of Holland, could not dispense with peace. … The States of Holland … fixed the period for the disbanding of the twenty-nine companies whose dismissal had been promised to them. After twelve days of useless deliberations they issued definite orders to that effect. The step had been provoked, but it was precipitate and might give rise to a legal contest as to their competency. The Prince of Orange, therefore, eager to hasten a struggle from which he expected an easy victory, chose to consider the resolution of the States of Holland as a signal for the rupture of the Union, and the very next day solemnly demanded reparation from the States-General, who in their turn issued a counter order. The Prince made skilful use of the rivalry of power between the two assemblies to obtain for himself extraordinary powers which were contrary to the laws of the Confederation. By the terms of the resolution, which was passed by only four provinces, of which two were represented by but one deputy each, he was authorised to take all measures necessary for the maintenance of order and peace, and particularly for the preservation of the Union. 'The States-General consequently commissioned him to visit the town councils of Holland, accompanied by six members of the States-General and of the Council of State, with all the pomp of a military escort, including a large number of officers. He was charged to address them with remonstrances and threats intended to intimidate the provincial States.' This was the first act of the coup d'état that he had prepared, and his mistake was quickly shown him." The Prince gained nothing by his visitation of the towns. At Amsterdam he was not permitted to enter the place with his following, and he returned to the Hague especially enraged against that bold and independent city. He planned an expedition to take it by surprise; but the citizens got timely warning and his scheme was baffled. He had succeeded, however, in arresting and imprisoning six of the most influential deputies of the Assembly of Holland, and his attitude was formidable enough to extort some concessions from the popular party, by way of compromise. A state of suspicious quiet was restored for the time, which William improved by renewing negotiations for a secret treaty with France. "Arrogating to himself already the right to dispose as he pleased of the republic, he signed a convention with Count d'Estrades, whom he had summoned to the Hague. By this the King of France and the Prince of Orange engaged themselves 'to attack conjointly the Netherlands on May 1, 1651, with an army of 20,000 foot and 10,000 horse, to break at the same time with Cromwell, to re-establish Charles II. as King of England, and to make no treaty with Spain excepting in concert with each other.' The Prince of Orange guaranteed a fleet of 50 vessels besides the land contingent, and in return for his co-operation was promised the absolute possession of the city of Antwerp and the Duchy of Brabant or Marquisate of the Holy Roman Empire. William thus interested France in the success of his cause by making ready to resume the war with Spain, and calculated, as he told his confidants, on profiting by her assistance to disperse the cabal opposed to him. … The internal pacification amounted then to no more than a truce, when three months later the Prince of Orange, having over-fatigued and heated himself in the chase, was seized with small-pox, of which in a few days he died. He was thus carried off at the age of 24, in the full force and flower of his age, leaving only one son, born a week after his father's death. … His attempt at a coup d'état was destined to press heavily and long upon the fate of the posthumous son, who had to wait 22 years before succeeding to his ancestral functions. It closed the succession to him for many years, by making the stadtholdership a standing menace to the public freedom. … The son of William II., an orphan before his birth, and named William like his father, seemed destined to succeed to little more than the paternal name. … Three days after the death of William II., the former deputies, whom he had treated as state prisoners and deprived of all their offices, were recalled to take their seats in the Assembly. At the same time the provincial Town Councils assumed the power of nominating their own magistrates, which had almost always been left to the pleasure of the Stadtholder, and thus obtained the full enjoyment of municipal freedom. The States of Holland, on their side, grasped the authority hitherto exercised in their province by the Prince of Orange, and claimed successively all the rights of sovereignty. The States of Zealand … exhibited the same eagerness to free themselves from all subjection. … Thus, before declaring the stadtholdership vacant, the office was deprived of its prerogatives. To complete this transformation of the government, the States of Holland took the initiative in summoning to the Hague a great assembly of the Confederation, which met at the beginning of the year 1651. … The congress was called upon to decide between two forms of constitution. The question was whether the United Provinces should be a republic governed by the States-General, or whether the government should belong to the States of each province, with only a reservation in favour of the obligations imposed by the Act of Union. Was each province to be sovereign in itself, or subject to the federal power?" The result was a suspension and practical abolition of the stadtholdership. "Freed from the counterbalancing power of the Stadtholder, Holland to a great extent absorbed the federal power, and was the gainer by all that that power lost. … {2284} The States of Holland, … destined henceforward to be the principal instrument of government of the republic, was composed partly of nobles and partly of deputies from the towns. … The Grand Pensionary was the minister of the States of Holland. He was appointed for five years, and represented them in the States-General. … Called upon by the vacancy in the stadtholdership to the government of the United Provinces, without any legal power of enforcing obedience, Holland required a statesman who could secure this political supremacy and use it for her benefit. The nomination of John de Witt as Grand Pensionary placed at her service one of the youngest members of the assembly."

_A. L. Pontalis, John de Witt, chapters 1-2 (volume 1)._

NETHERLANDS: (Spanish Provinces): A. D. 1648. Still held to form a part of the Empire.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

NETHERLANDS: (United Provinces): A. D. 1648-1665. Prosperity and pre-eminence of the Dutch Republic. The causes.