Part 240

Thus the war of the Bavarian Succession broke out (1778-79). ... By the death of Maria Theresa, November 29, 1780, her son Joseph II. became sole monarch of Austria. ... Joseph II. was a man of large mind and noble aims. Like Frederick, he was unwearying in labor, accessible to everyone, and eager to assume his share of work or responsibility. The books and the people's memory are full of anecdotes of him, though he was far from popular during his life. But he lacked the strong practical sense and calculating foresight of the veteran Prussian king. In his zeal for reforms he hastened to heap one upon another in confusion. Torture was abolished, and for a time even the death penalty. Rigid equality before the law was introduced, and slavery done away.

See SLAVERY, MEDIÆVAL: GERMANY.

His reforms in the Church were still more sweeping. He closed more than half of the monasteries, and devoted their estates to public instruction; he introduced German hymns of praise and the German Bible. By his Edict of Toleration, June 22, 1781, he secured to all Protestants throughout the Austrian states their civil rights and freedom of worship, 'in houses of prayer without bells or towers.' ... He zealously followed up Maria Theresa's policy of consolidating Austria into one state; and it was this course which made him enemies. He offended the powerful nobility of Hungary by abolishing serfdom (November 1, 1781), and the whole people by the measures he took to promote the use of the German language. In the Netherlands, he alienated from him the powerful clergy by his innovations; and they stirred up against him the people, already aggrieved by the loss of some of their ancient liberties. A revolution broke out among them in 1788, and was threatening to extend to Hungary and Bohemia, when the emperor suddenly died, still in the full vigor of manhood, at the age of forty-nine, February 20, 1790. ... After his death, the progress of reform was checked in Austria; but he had awakened new and strong forces there, and a complete return to the ancient system was impossible. ... Leopold II. (1790-1792), who succeeded his brother Joseph II., both in Austria and as emperor, was a self-indulgent but prudent ruler."

_C. T. Lewis, History of Germany, book 5, chapter 24, sections 8-18._

GERMANY: A. D. 1772-1773. The first Partition of Poland.

See POLAND: A. D. 1763-1773.

GERMANY: A. D. 1787. Prussian intervention in Holland. Restoration of the expelled stadtholder.

See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1746-1787.

GERMANY: A. D. 1791. The forming of the Coalition against French democracy.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1790-1791; and 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1791-1792. The question of war with France, and the question of the Partition of Poland. Motives and action of Prussia and Austria.

"After the acceptance of the Constitution by Louis XVI. [September--see FRANCE: A. D. 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER)], the Emperor indulged for a time a confident hope, that the French question was solved, and that he was relieved from all fear of trouble from that quarter. He had cares enough upon him to make him heartily congratulate himself on this result. ... In foreign affairs, the Polish question--the next in importance to the French--was still unsettled, and daily presented fresh difficulties. ... The fact that Russia began to show the greatest favour to the Emigrés, and to preach at Berlin and Vienna a crusade against the wicked Jacobins, only served to confirm the Emperor in his peaceful sentiments. He rightly concluded that Catharine wished to entangle the German Powers in a struggle with France, that she might have her own way in Poland; and he was not at all inclined to be the dupe of so shallow an artifice. ... At the same time he set about bringing his alliance with Prussia to a definite conclusion, in order to secure to himself a firm support for every emergency. On the 17th of November--a week after the enactment of the first edict against the Emigrés--Prince Reuss made a communication on this subject to the Prussian Ministry, and on this occasion declared himself empowered to commence at any moment the formal draft of an alliance. ... 'We are now convinced,' wrote the Ministers to their ambassador at Vienna, 'that Austria will undertake nothing against France.' This persuasion was soon afterwards fully confirmed by Kaunitz, who descanted in the severest terms on the intrigues of the Emigrés on the Rhine, which it was not in the interest of any Power to support. It was ridiculous, he said, in the French Princes, and in Russia and Spain, to declare the acceptance of the constitution by the King compulsory, and therefore void; and still more so to dispute the right of Louis XVI. to alter the constitution at all. He said that they would vainly endeavour to goad Austria into a war, which could only have the very worst consequences for Louis and the present predominance of the moderate party in France. ... Here, again, we see that without the machinations of the Girondists, the revolutionary war would never have been commenced. It is true, indeed, that at this time a very perceptible change took place in the opinions of the second German potentate--the King of Prussia. Immediately after the Congress of Pillnitz, great numbers of French Emigrés, who had been driven from Vienna by the coldness of Leopold, had betaken themselves to Berlin. At the Prussian Court they met with a hospitable reception, and aroused in the King, by their graphic descriptions, a warm interest for the victims of the Revolution. ... He loaded the Emigrés with marks of favour of every kind, and thereby excited in them the most exaggerated hopes. {1504} Yet the King was far from intending to risk any important interest of the State for the sake of his protégés; he had no idea of pursuing an aggressive policy towards France; and the only point in which he differed from Leopold was in the feeling with which he regarded the development of the warlike tendencies of the French. His Ministers, moreover, were, without exception, possessed by the same idea as Prince Kaunitz; that a French war would be a misfortune to all Europe." As the year 1791 drew towards its close, "unfavourable news arrived from Paris. The attempts of the Feuillants had failed; Lafayette had separated himself from them and from the Court; and the zeal and confidence of victory among the Democrats were greater than ever. The Emigrés in Berlin were jubilant; they had always declared that no impression was to be made upon the Jacobins except by the edge of the sword, and that all hopes founded on the stability of a moderate middle party were futile. The King of Prussia agreed with them, and determined to begin the unavoidable struggle as quickly as possible. He told his Ministers that war was certain, and that Bischoffswerder ought to go once more to the Emperor. ... Bischoffswerder, having received instructions from the King himself, left Berlin, and arrived in Vienna, after a speedy journey, on the 28th of February. But he was not destined again to discuss the fate of Europe with his Imperial patron; for on the 29th the smallpox showed itself, of which Leopold died after three days sickness. The greatest consternation and confusion reigned in Vienna. ... No one knew to whom the young King Francis--he was as yet only king of Hungary and Bohemia--would give his confidence, or what course he would take; nay, his weakly and nervous constitution rendered it doubtful whether he could bear--even for a short period--the burdens of his office. For the present he confirmed the Ministers in their places, and expressed to them his wish to adhere to the political system of his father. ... He ... ordered one of his most experienced Generals, Prince Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, to be summoned to Vienna, that he might take council with Bischoffswerder respecting the warlike measures to be adopted by both Powers, in case of a French attack. At the same time, however, the Polish question was, if possible, to be brought to a decision, and Leopold's plan in all its details was to be categorically recommended for adoption, both in Berlin and Petersburg. ... The Austrian Minister, Spielmann, had prepared the memorial on Poland, which Prince Reuss presented at Berlin, on the 10th of March. It represented that Austria and Prussia had the same interest in stopping a source of eternal embarrassment and discussion, by strengthening the cause of peace and order in Poland. That herein lay an especially powerful motive to make the crown of that country hereditary; that for both Powers the Elector of Saxony would be the most acceptable wearer of that crown. ... The important point, the memorial went on to say, was this, that Poland should no longer be dependent on the predominant influence of any one neighbouring Power. ... When the King had read this memorial, in which the Saxon-Polish union was brought forward, not as an idea of the feeble Elector, but as a proposal of powerful Austria; he cried out, 'We must never give our consent to this.' He agreed with his Ministers in the conclusion that nothing would be more dangerous to Prussia, than the formation of such a Power as would result from the proposed lasting union of Poland and Saxony--a Power, which, in alliance with Austria, could immediately overrun Silesia, and in alliance with Russia, might be fatal to East Prussia. ... In the midst of this angry and anxious excitement, which for a moment alienated his heart from Austria, the King received a fresh and no less important despatch from Petersburg. Count Golz announced the first direct communication of Russia respecting Poland. 'Should Poland' [wrote the Russian Vice Chancellor] 'be firmly and lastingly united to Saxony, a Power of the first rank will arise, and one which will be able to exercise the most sensible pressure upon each of its neighbours. We are greatly concerned in this, in consequence of the extension of our Polish frontier; and Prussia is no less so, from the inevitable increase which would ensue of Saxon influence in the German Empire. We therefore suggest, that Prussia, Austria, and Russia, should come to an intimate understanding with one another on this most important subject.' ... This communication sounded differently in the ears of the King from that which he had received from Austria. The fears which agitated his own mind and those of the Russian chancellor were identical. While Austria called upon him to commit a political suicide, Russia offered her aid in averting the most harassing danger, and even opened a prospect of a considerable territorial increase. The King had no doubt to which of the two Powers he ought to incline. He would have come to terms with Russia on the spot, had not an insurmountable obstacle existed in the new path which was opened to the aggrandizement of Prussia,--viz., the Polish treaty of 1790; in which Prussia had expressly bound herself to protect the independence and integrity of Poland. ... He decided that there was no middle course between the Russian and Austrian plans. On the one side was his Polish treaty of 1790, the immediate consequence of which would be a new breach, and perhaps a war, with Russia, and the final result such a strengthening of Poland, as would throw back the Prussian State into that subordinate position, both in Germany and Europe, which it had occupied in the seventeenth century. On the other side there was, indeed, a manifest breach of faith, but also the salvation of Prussia from a perilous dilemma, and perhaps the extension of her boundaries by a goodly Polish Province. If he wavered at all in this conflict of feeling, the Parisian complications soon put an end to his doubts. In quick succession came the announcements that Delessart's peaceful Ministry had fallen; that King Louis had suffered the deepest humiliation; and that the helm of the State had passed into the hands of the Girondist war party. A declaration of war on the part of France against Francis· II. might be daily expected, and the Russian-Polish contest would then only form the less important moiety of the European catastrophe. Austria would now be occupied for a long time in the West; there could be no more question of the formation of a Polish-Saxon State; and Austria could no longer be reckoned upon to protect the constitution of 1791, or even to repel a Russian invasion of Poland. Prussia was bound to aid the Austrians against France, and for many months the King had cherished no more ardent wish than to fulfil this obligation with all his power. {1505} Simultaneously to oppose the Empress Catharine, was out of the question. ... The King wrote on the 12th of March to his Ministers as follows: ... 'Russia is not far removed from thoughts of a new partition; and this would indeed be the most effectual means of limiting the power of a Polish King, whether hereditary or elective. I doubt, however, whether in this case a suitable compensation could be found for Austria; and whether, after such a curtailment of the power of Poland, the Elector of Saxony would accept the crown. Yet if Austria could be compensated, the Russian plan would be the most advantageous for Prussia,--always provided that Prussia received the whole left bank of the Vistula, by the acquisition of which that distant frontier--so hard to be defended--would be well rounded off. This is my judgment respecting Polish affairs.' This was Poland's sentence of death. It was not, as we have seen, the result of a long-existing greed, but a suddenly seized expedient, which seemed to be accompanied with the least evil, in the midst of an unexampled European crisis. ... On the 20th of April the French National Assembly proclaimed war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. A fortnight later the Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirchberg appeared in Berlin to settle some common plan for the campaign; and at the same time Kaunitz directed Prince Reuss to enter into negociations on the political question of expenditure and compensation. Count Schulenburg ... immediately sent a reply to the Prince, to the effect that Prussia--as it had uniformly declared since the previous summer--could only engage in the war on condition of receiving an adequate compensation. ... Both statesmen well knew with what secret mistrust each of these Powers contemplated the aggrandizement of the other; their deliberations were therefore conducted with slow and anxious caution, and months passed by before their respective demands were reduced to any definite shape."

_H. von Sybel, History of the French Revolution, book 4, chapter 1 (volume 2)._

GERMANY: A. D. 1792. Accession of the Emperor Francis II.

GERMANY: A. D. 1792-1793. War with Revolutionary France. The Coalition.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1791-1792; 1792 (APRIL-.JULY), and (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER); 1792-1793 (DECEMBER-FEBRUARY); 1793 (FEBRUARY-APRIL), (MARCH-SEPTEMBER), and (JULY-DECEMBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1192-1796. The second and third Partitions of Poland.

See POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792; and 1793-1796.

GERMANY: A. D. 1794. Withdrawal of Prussia from the Coalition. French conquest of the Austrian Netherlands and successes on the Rhine.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH-JULY).

GERMANY: A. D. 1795. Treaty of Basle between Prussia and France. Crumbling of the Coalition.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1794-1795 (OCTOBER-MAY).

GERMANY: A. D. 1796-1797. Expulsion of Austria from Italy. Bonaparte's first campaigns. Advance of Moreau and Jourdan beyond the Rhine. Their retreat. Peace preliminaries of Leoben.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL-OCTOBER); and 1796-1797 (OCTOBER-APRIL).

GERMANY: A. D. 1797 (October). The Treaty of Campo Formio between Austria and France. Austrian cession of the Netherlands and Lombardy and acquisition of Venice.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY-OCTOBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1798. The second Coalition against Revolutionary France. Prussia and the Empire withheld from it.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST-APRIL).

GERMANY: A. D. 1799. The Congress at Rastadt. Murder of French envoys.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1800 (May-December). The disastrous campaigns of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (MAY-FEBRUARY).

GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803. The Peace of Luneville. Territorial cessions and changes. The settlement of indemnities in the Empire. Confiscation and secularization of the ecclesiastical principalities. Absorption of Free Cities. Re-constitution of the Electoral College.

"By the treaty of Luneville, which the Emperor Francis was obliged to subscribe, 'not only as Emperor of Austria, but in the name of the German empire,' Belgium and all the left bank of the Rhine were again formally ceded to France; Lombardy was erected into an independent state, and the Adige declared the boundary betwixt it and the dominions of Austria; Venice, with all its territorial possessions as far as the Adige, was guaranteed to Austria; the Duke of Modena received the Brisgau in exchange for his duchy, which was annexed to the Cisalpine republic; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Emperor's brother, gave up his dominions to the infant Duke of Parma, a branch of the Spanish family [who was thereupon raised to royal rank by the fiat of Bonaparte, who transformed the grand-duchy of Tuscany into the kingdom of Etruria], on the promise of an indemnity in Germany; France abandoned Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein, on condition that these forts should remain in the situation in which they were when given up; the princes dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine were promised an indemnity in the bosom of the Empire; the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine and Ligurian republics was guaranteed, and their inhabitants declared 'to have the power of choosing whatever form of government they preferred.' These conditions did not differ materially from those contained in the treaty of Campo Formio, or from those offered by Napoleon previous to the renewal of the war. ... The article which compelled the Emperor to subscribe this treaty as head of the empire, as well as Emperor of Austria, gave rise in the sequel ... to the most painful internal divisions in Germany. By a fundamental law of the empire, the Emperor could not bind the electors and states of which he was the head, without either their concurrence or express powers to that effect previously conferred. ... The emperor hesitated long before he subscribed such a condition, which left the seeds of interminable discord in the Germanic body; but the conqueror was inexorable, and no means of evasion could be found. He vindicated himself to the electors in a dignified letter, dated 8th February 1801, the day before that when the treaty was signed. ... The electors and princes of the empire felt the force of this touching appeal; they commiserated the situation of the first monarch in Christendom, compelled to throw himself on his subjects for forgiveness of a step which he could not avoid; and one of the first steps of the Diet of the empire, assembled after the treaty of Luneville was signed, was to give it their solemn ratification, grounded on the extraordinary situation in which the Emperor was then placed. {1506} But the question of indemnities to the dispossessed princes was long and warmly agitated. It continued for above two years to distract the Germanic body; the intervention both of France and Russia was required to prevent the sword being drawn in these internal disputes; and by the magnitude of the changes which were ultimately made, and the habit of looking to foreign protection which was acquired, the foundation was laid of that league to support separate interests which afterwards, under the name of the Confederation of the Rhine, so well served the purposes of French ambition, and broke up the venerable fabric of the German empire."

_Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789-1815, chapter 32 (volume 7)._

"Germany: lost by this treaty about 24,000 square miles of its best territory and 3,500,000 of its people; while the princes were indemnified by the plunder of their peers. But the hardest task, the satisfactory distribution of this plunder, remained. While the Diet at Regensburg, after much complaint and management, assigned the arrangement of these affairs to a committee, the princely bargainers were in Paris, employing the most disgraceful means to obtain the favor of Talleyrand and other influential diplomatists. On the 25th of February, 1803, the final decision of the delegation or committee of the empire was adopted by the Diet, and promulgated with the approval of the emperor, Francis II., and of Prussia and Bavaria. It confiscated all the spiritual principalities in Germany, except that the Elector of Mayence, Charles Theodore of Dalberg, received Regensburg, Aschaffenburg, and Wetzlar, as an indemnity, and retained a seat and a voice in the imperial Diet. Of the 48 free cities of the empire, six only remained--Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Frankfort, Nuremburg, and Augsburg. Austria obtained the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen; Prussia, as a compensation for the loss of 1,018 square miles with 122,000 inhabitants west of the Rhine, received 4,875 square miles, with 580,000 inhabitants, including the endowments of the religious houses of Hildesheim and Paderborn, and most of Münster; also Erfurt and Eichsfeld, and the free cities of Nordhausen, Mülhausen, and Goslar; Hanover obtained Osnabruck; to Bavaria, in exchange for the Palatinate, were assigned Würzburg, Bamberg, Freisingen, Augsburg, and Passau, besides a number of cities of the empire, in all about 6,150 square miles, to compensate for 4,240, vastly increasing its political importance. Wirtemberg, too, was richly compensated for the loss of the Mömpelgard by the confiscation of monastery endowments and free cities in Suabia. But Baden made the best bargain of all, receiving about 1,270 square miles of land, formerly belonging to bishops or to the Palatinate, in exchange for 170. After this acquisition, Baden extended, though in patches, from the Neckar to the Swiss border. By building up these three South German states, Napoleon sought to erect a barrier for himself against Austria and Prussia. With the same design, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau were much enlarged. There were multitudes of smaller changes, under the name of 'compensations and indemnities.' Four new lay electorates were established in the place of the three secularized prelacies, and were given to Baden, Wirtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Salzburg. But they never had occasion to take part in the election of an emperor."

_C. T. Lewis, History of Germany, chapter 25, sections 26-27._