Part 193

On Wellington's return to Quatre Bras from his interview with Blücher, he found, as stated above, that the Prince of Orange had already became desperately engaged with the superior forces of Ney. "The Duke's presence gave new life to the battle, and when Picton's division, followed by the Brunswickers and Van Merle's Belgian horse, arrived, he took the offensive, pushing forward right up to the edge of the farm of Gemioncourt. Ney, reinforced by the rest of Reille's corps and part of Kellerman's cavalry, violently retorted, and in the charge, which partially broke into spray before the squares, Wellington ran the risk of death or capture. But he leaped his horse over the 92d Highlanders lining the ditch on the Namur road, while his gallant pursuers, cut up by the infantry fire, were killed or driven off. Ney was further reinforced by more guns and cavalry, and Wellington's brigades continued to arrive in parcels. The Marshal was always superior in horsemen and cannon, but after 5 o'clock his opponent had larger numbers of foot. Holding firmly to the cross-roads and, the highway to Namur, Wellington became the stronger as the day waned; and when the Guards emerged from the Nivelles road and the Allies pressed forward, Ney, who had no fresh troops, was driven back, and his antagonist remained at sundown master of the whole field of battle. The position was maintained, but the cost was great, for there were no fewer than 4,600 killed and wounded, more than half being British soldiers. The thunder of cannon to the eastward had also died away, but none knew as yet at Quatre Bras how Blücher had fared at the hands of his redoubtable foe. Wellington, who slept at his head-quarters in Genappe, was on the field and scrutinising his outposts at daybreak an the 17th. Soon after came a report, confirmed a little later, that the Prussians had retreated on Wavre. ... Napoleon had a belief that Blücher would retreat upon Liège, which caused him at a late hour in the day to despatch Grouchy to that side, and thus touch was lost. While the French were cooking and Napoleon was pondering, definite intelligence was brought to Wellington, who, learning for certain that Blücher was at Wavre, promised to stand fast himself at Mont St. Jean and fight, if Blücher would support him with two corps. The intrepid Marshal replied that he would came with his whole army, and Wellington got the famous answer before night. Thus was made, between generals who thoroughly trusted each other, that combination which led to the Battle of Waterloo. It was no chance combat, but the result of a deliberate design, rendered capable of execution, even when Blücher was wounded, by his resolve to retreat upon Wavre, and by Napoleon, who acted on conjecture that the Prussians would hurry towards their base at Liege. The morning at Quatre Bras was peaceful; the Allies cooked their food before starting rearward. Wellington, it is said, lay down for a moment, and snatched perhaps a little sleep. There was no stir in front or on the exposed left flank; and, covered by a strong display of horsemen, the Allied divisions tramped steadily towards Mont St. Jean. ... The retreat continued all day. A thunderstorm, so often a precursor of Wellington's battles, deluged the fields with rain, and pursuer and pursued struggling through the mire, were drenched to the skin by nightfall. ... The results of two days' warfare may be thus summed up. Napoleon had inflicted a defeat, yet not a decisive defeat, upon the Prussians, who escaped from his ken to Wavre. He had then, at a late hour on the 17th, detached Grouchy with 33,000 men to follow them, and Grouchy at night from Gembloux reported that they had retired in three directions. Moving himself in the afternoon, Napoleon, uniting with Ney, had pursued Wellington to Mont St. Jean, and slept in the comfortable belief that he had separated the Allies. At that very time Wellington, who had assembled his whole force except 17,000 men, ... was in close communication with Blücher, and intended on the 18th to stop Napoleon by delivering battle, and to hold him fast until Blücher could cut in on his right flank and rear. Thus it was the Allies who were united practically, and the French army which was separated into two groups unable to support each other. ... The tempest which burst over the retreating columns on the 17th followed them to their bivouacs and raged all night, and did not cease until late on the fateful Sunday. Wellington, mounting his faithful Copenhagen at break of day, rode from the village of Waterloo to the field, where the armies on both sides, protected by watchful sentries, were still contending with the mischiefs inflicted by the storm. The position was the crest of a gentle slope stretching from Smohain to the Nivelles road, having upon and in advance of its right the château, garden, and wood of Hougoumont, and in the centre, where the Charleroi road cut through the little ridge, the farm of La Haye Sainte. Both these posts were occupied, but the latter, unfortunately, not so solidly as Hougoumont. ... The position was well filled by the 69,000 men of all arms and 156 guns which were present that day. Napoleon, who slept at the farm of Caillou, and who had been out on foot to the front during the night, was also early in the field, and glad of the gift which he thought fortune had placed in his hands. When Reille had joined him from Genappe, he had 72,000 men, all admirable soldiers, and 240 guns, with which to engage in combat, and he reckoned that the chances were ninety to ten in his favour. He mounted his charger, reconnoitred his opponent's position, and then gave the orders which, promptly and finely obeyed, disclosed the French array. ... It was now nearly eleven o'clock, and, although his opponent knew it not, Wellington had got news of the march from Wavre of Bulow, whose leading troops were actually, at that time, close to the wood of St. Lambert on the French right; while Grouchy was at Sart les Walhain, between Gembloux and Wavre. It is not practicable here to give a full account of the battle of Waterloo; we can only describe its broad outlines. The first gun was fired about twenty or thirty minutes past eleven, and preluded a dashing and sustained attack an Hougoumont, which failed to carry the house, garden, or orchard, but did gain the wood. It was probably intended to divert attention from the attack on the left and centre, which Ney, massing his guns opposite the British left, was preparing to execute. Wellington watched and in some measure controlled the fight for Hougoumont, and then rode off to the centre, taking post at a solitary tree which grew near the Charleroi road above La Haye Sainte. {1364} Ney at half past one sent forward the whole of D'Erlon's corps, and although some of them pushed close up to and over the Wavre road, stormed the orchard of La Haye Sainte and took the Pappelotte farm, yet at the critical moment Sir William Ponsonby's Union Brigade of horse charged into the French infantry, already shattered by the fire of Picton's troops, and the net result of the combined operation was that two eagles and 3,000 prisoners were captured, while nearly that number of killed and wounded remained on the ground. On the other side of La Haye Sainte the Household Brigade, led by Lord Anglesea in person, charged in upon and routed a large body of French cuirassiers. The grand attack thus completely failed, and the centre, like the right, remained intact. It was just before this combat began that Napoleon saw something like troops towards St. Lambert and despatched two brigades of light cavalry to reconnoitre. A Prussian staff officer was caught beyond Planchenoit, and from him came the unexpected and unwelcome information that the whole Prussian army was approaching. ... The signs of danger on his right flank, the punishment of D'Erlon's corps, the ineffectual attempt upon the British Guards in and about Hougoumont, were followed by a kind of pause and the combat reverted to cannonading and skirmishing. But towards four o'clock Napoleon, increasing the fire of his artillery, threw forward a mass of cavalry, forty squadrons, and then began that series of reiterated onsets of horse which lasted for two hours. ... Twice they were driven down the slope, and the third time, when they came on, they were strengthened by Kellerman and Guyot until they reached a force of 77 squadrons, or 12,000 men; but these also were repulsed, the British horse, what remained of them, charging when the French were entangled among the squares and disordered by the musketry and guns. Four times these fine troopers charged, yet utterly failed to penetrate or move a single foot battalion. But some time before the final effort, Ney by a fierce attack got possession of La Haye Sainte, and thus, just as the cavalry were exhausted, the French infantry were established within sixty yards of the Allied centre. And although the Emperor was obliged to detach one-half of his Guard to the right, because Blucher had brought into play beyond Planchenoit against Lobau nearly 80,000 men, still the capture of La Haye Sainte was justly regarded as a grave event. Wellington during the cavalry fight had moved three brigades on his right nearer to Hougoumont, and had called up Chassé and his Belgians to support them; and it was a little before this time that he cried out to Brigadier-General Adam, 'By G--, Adam, I think we shall beat them yet! ... The crisis of the battle had come for Napoleon. Unable after eight hours' conflict to do more than capture La Haye Sainte; hardly pressed by the Prussians, now strong and aggressive; owing such success as he had obtained to the valour and discipline of his soldiers--the Emperor delivered his last stroke, not for victory--he could no longer hope to win--but for safety. He sent forward the last ten battalions of his Guard to assail the British right, and directed the whole remaining infantry force available to attack all along the line. The Guard marched onward in two columns, which came successively in contact with their opponents. Napier's guns and the British Guards, who rising from the ground showed across the head of the first column, fired heavily and charging drove them in confusion back towards La Belle Alliance; and the second column, struck in flank by the musketry of the 52nd and 95th was next broken by a bayonet charge and pursued by Colonel Colborne to and beyond the Charleroi road. As Ziethen's Prussians were falling upon the French near Pappelotte, and Pirch and Bulow wrestling with the Imperial Guard in Planchenoit, Wellington ordered the whole of the British line to advance. The cheers arising on the right where he was, extended along the front and gave new strength to the wearied soldiers. He led the way. As he neared the Charleroi road, the riflemen, full of Peninsular memories, began to cheer him as he galloped up, but he called out, 'No cheering, my lads; forward and complete your victory.' He found that good soldier, Colborne, halted for a moment before three squares of the rallied Imperial Guard. 'Go on, Colborne,' he said; 'better attack them, they won't stand.' Nor did they. Wellington then turned to the right, where Vivian's Light Cavalry were active in the gloom, and we next find him once more with the 52nd near Rossomme, the farthest point of the advance, where that regiment halted after its grand march over the battlefield. Somewhere on the highway he met Blucher, who had so nobly kept his word, and it was then that Gneisenau undertook to chase the fugitives over the frontier. The French, or perhaps we should say the Napoleonic army, was destroyed, and the power which its mighty leader had built up on the basis of its astonishing successes was gone for ever."

_G. Hooper, Wellington, chapter 9._

ALSO IN: _D. Gardner, Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo._

_Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Chesney, Waterloo Lectures._

_W. Siborne, History of the War in France and Belgium in 1819._

_General Sir J. S. Kennedy, Notes on the Battle of Waterloo._

_W. H. Maxwell, Life of Wellington, volume 8, chapters 28-32._

_G. R. Gleig, Story of the Battle of Waterloo._

_W. O'C. Morris, Great Commanders of Modern Times, and the Campaign of 1815._

FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (June-August). Napoleon's return to Paris. His final abdication. His surrender of himself to the English. His captivity at St. Helena.

"The vanquished army had lost 200 pieces of ordnance, and 80,000 men hors de combat or prisoners; as many more remained, independently of Grouchy's 85,000 men; but the difficulty was to rally them in presence of an enemy, that had taken lessons in audacity and activity from Napoleon himself. The loss of the allies was not less considerable, but there remained to them 150,000 men, the confidence of victory, and the certainty of being seconded by 300,000 allies, who were crossing the Rhine from Mentz to Bäle. Such was the issue of this struggle, commenced under such happy auspices, and which resulted more fatal to France than the battles of Poitiers and Azincourt. It must be admitted, that this disaster was the work of a multitude of unheard-of circumstances: if Napoleon can be reproached for certain faults, it must be allowed that fortune dealt cruelly with him in the lesser details, and that his enemies, in return, were as fortunate as they showed themselves skillful. {1365} However unjust be the spirit of party, we are forced to render homage to the merits of two generals, who, unexpectedly attacked in their cantonments extending from Dinant and Liège to Renaix, near Tournay, had taken such wise measures as to be in condition next morning for giving battle to equal forces, and for afterwards conquering by an able concentration of the two armies. ... In the very battle of Waterloo, the French might be censured for having attempted the first attack in masses too deep. This system was never successful against the murderous fire of English infantry and artillery. ... There were likewise extraordinary charges of cavalry, which, being devoid of support, became heroic but useless struggles. Notwithstanding all this, it is almost certain that Napoleon would have remained master of the field of battle, but for the arrival of 65,000 Prussians on his rear; a decisive and disastrous circumstance, that to prevent was not entirely in his power. As soon as the enemy led 130,000 men on the battle-field, with scarcely 50,000 to oppose them, all was lost. ... Napoleon had but one course left him, which was to direct Grouchy through the Ardennes on Laon; to collect at this point all that could be drawn from the interior, from Metz and from Rapp's corps, leaving but garrisons in Lorraine and Alsace. The imperial cause was very much shaken, put not entirely lost; should all Frenchmen determine on opposing Europe with the courage of the Spartans of Leonidas, the energy of the Russians in 1812, or of the Spaniards of Palafox. Unfortunately for them, as·for Napoleon, opinion was very much divided on this subject, and the majority still believing that the struggle interested only the power of the emperor and his family, the fate of the country seemed of little consequence. Prince Jerome had collected 25,000 men in rear of Avesnes: he was ordered to lead them to Laon; there remained 200 pieces of artillery, beside those of Grouchy. ... Reaching Loon on the 19th, where he had at first resolved to await the junction of Grouchy and Jerome, the emperor discussed, with the small number of the trustworthy who had followed him, the course he should adopt after this frightful disaster. Should he repair to Paris, and concert with the chambers and his ministers, or else remain with the army, demanding of the chambers to invest him with dictatorial power and an unlimited confidence, under the conviction that he would obtain from them the most energetic measures, for saving France and conquering her independence, on heaps of ruins? As it always happens, his generals were divided in opinion; some wished him to proceed to Paris, and deposit the crown into the hands of the nation's delegates, or receive it from them a second time, with the means of defending it. Others, with a better appreciation of the views of the deputies, affirmed, that far from sympathizing with Napoleon, and seconding him, they would accuse him of having lost France, and would endeavor to save the country by losing the emperor. ... Lastly, the most prudent thought that Napoleon should not go to Paris, but remain at the head of the army, in order to treat with the sovereigns himself, by offering to abdicate in favor of his son. It is said, that Napoleon inclined to the idea of remaining at Laon with the army; but the advice of the greatest number determined him, and he departed for Paris."

_Baron de Jomini, History of the Campaign of Waterloo, pages 184-189._