volume 1, chapter 4 and 7.

BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1785-1801. Piratical depredations upon American commerce. Humiliating treaties and tribute. The example of resistance given by the United States.

"It is difficult for us to realize that only 70 years ago the Mediterranean was so unsafe that the merchant ships of every nation stood in danger of being captured by pirates, unless they were protected either by an armed convoy or by tribute paid to the petty Barbary powers. Yet we can scarcely open a book of travels during the last century without mention being made of the immense risks to which everyone was exposed who ventured by sea from Marseilles to Naples. ... The European states, in order to protect their commerce, had the choice either of paying certain sums per head for each captive, which in reality was a premium on capture, or of buying entire freedom for their commerce by the expenditure of large sums yearly. The treaty renewed by France, in 1788, with Algiers, was for fifty years, and it was agreed to pay $200,000 annually, besides large presents distributed according to custom every ten years, and a great sum given down. The peace of Spain with Algiers is said to have cost from three to five millions of dollars. There is reason to believe that at the same time England was paying an annual tribute of about $280,000. England was the only power sufficiently strong on the sea to put down these pirates; but in order to keep her own position as mistress of the seas she preferred to leave them in existence in order to be a scourge to the commerce of other European powers, and even to support them by paying a sum so great that other states might find it difficult to make peace with them. When the Revolution broke out, we [of the United States of America] no longer had the safeguards for our commerce that had been given to us by England, and it was therefore that in our very first negotiations for a treaty with France we desired to have an article inserted into the treaty, that the king of France should secure the inhabitants of the United States, and their vessels and effects, against all attacks or depredations from any of the Barbary powers. It was found impossible to insert this article in the treaty of 1778, and instead of that the king agreed to 'employ his good offices and interposition in order to provide as fully and efficaciously as possible for the benefit, conveniency and safety of the United States against the princes and the states of Barbary or their subjects.'"

Direct negotiations between the United States and the piratical powers were opened in 1785, by a call which Mr. Adams made upon the Tripolitan ambassador. The latter announced to Mr. Adams that "'Turkey, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco were the sovereigns of the Mediterranean; and that no nation could navigate that sea without a treaty of peace with them.' ... The ambassador demanded as the lowest price for a perpetual peace 30,000 guineas for his employers and £3,000 for himself; that Tunis would probably treat on the same terms; but he could not answer for Algiers or Morocco. Peace with all four powers would cost at least $1,000,000, and Congress had appropriated only $80,000. ... Mr. Adams was strongly opposed to war, on account of the expense, and preferred the payment of tribute. ... Mr. Jefferson quite as decidedly preferred war." The opinion in favor of a trial of pacific negotiations prevailed, and a treaty with the Emperor of Morocco was concluded in 1787. An attempt at the same time to make terms with the Del of Algiers and to redeem a number of American captives in his hands, came to nothing. "For the sake of saving a few thousand dollars, fourteen men were allowed to remain in imprisonment for ten years. ... In November, 1793, the number of [American] prisoners at Algiers amounted to 115 men, among whom there remained only ten of the original captives of 1785." At last, the nation began to realize the intolerable shame of the matter, and, "on January 2, 1794, the House of Representatives resolved that a 'naval force adequate for the protection of the commerce of the United States against the AIgerine forces ought to be provided.' In the same year authority was given to build six frigates, and to procure ten smaller vessels to be equipped as galleys. Negotiations, however, continued to go on," and in September, 1795, a treaty with the Dey was concluded. "In making this treaty, however, we had been obliged to follow the usage of European powers--not only pay a large sum for the purpose of obtaining peace, but an annual tribute, in order to keep our vessels from being captured in the future. The total cost of fulfilling the treaty was estimated at $992,463. 25."

_E. Schuyler, American Diplomacy, part 4._

"The first treaty of 1795, with Algiers, which was negotiated during Washington's administration, cost the United States, for the ransom of American captives, and the Dey's forbearance, a round $1,000,000, in addition to which an annuity was promised. Treaties with other Barbary States followed, one of which purchased peace from Tripoli by the payment of a gross sum. Nearly $2,000,000 had been squandered thus far in bribing these powers to respect our flag, and President Adams complained in 1800 that the United States had to pay three times the tribute imposed upon Sweden and Denmark. {264} But this temporizing policy only made matters worse. Captain Bainbridge arrived at Algiers in 1800, bearing the annual tribute money for the Dey in a national frigate, and the Dey ordered him to proceed to Constantinople to deliver Algerine dispatches. 'English, French, and Spanish ships of war have done the same,' said the Dey, insolently, when Bainbridge and the American consul remonstrated. 'You pay me tribute because you are my slaves.' Bainbridge had to obey. ... The lesser Barbary States were still more exasperating. The Bashaw of Tripoli had threatened to seize American vessels unless President Adams sent him a present like that bestowed upon Algiers. The Bashaw of Tunis made a similar demand upon the new President [Jefferson]. ... Jefferson had, while in Washington's cabinet, expressed his detestation of the method hitherto favored for pacifying these pests of commerce; and, availing himself of the present favorable opportunity, he sent out Commodore Dale with a squadron of three frigates and a sloop of war, to make a naval demonstration on the coast of Barbary. ... Commodore Dale, upon arriving at Gibraltar [July, 1801], found two Tripolitan cruisers watching for American vessels; for, as had been suspected, Tripoli already meditated war. The frigate Philadelphia blockaded these vessels, while Bainbridge, with the frigate Essex, convoyed American vessels in the Mediterranean. Dale, in the frigate President, proceeded to cruise off Tripoli, followed by the schooner Experiment, which presently captured a Tripolitan cruiser of 14 guns after a spirited action. The Barbary powers were for a time overawed, and the United States thus set the first example among Christian nations of making reprisals instead of ransom the rule of security against these commercial marauders. In this respect Jefferson's conduct was applauded at home by men of all parties."

_J. Schouler, History of the U. S.,