book 7 (volume 4)_.

_Plutarch, Themistocles._

_G. W. Cox, The Greeks and Persians._

ATHENS: B. C. 479-478. Protection of Ionia assumed. Siege and capture of Sestus. Rebuilding and enlargement of the city and its walls. Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles.

"The advantages obtained by the Hellenes [in their war with Persia] came upon them so unexpectedly as to find them totally unprepared, and accordingly embarrassed by their own victories. What was to be done with Ionia? Was the whole country to be admitted into the Hellenic confederation? Too great a responsibility would, in the opinion of the Peloponnesians, be incurred by such a step. ... It would be better to sacrifice the country, and establish the Ionians in settlements in other parts, at the expense of those who had favoured the Medes, i. e., of the Argives, Bœotians, Locrians, and Thessalians. ... The Athenians, on the other hand, espoused the cause of the cities. ... Ionia ought to be a bulwark against the Barbarians, and to belong to the Hellenes. {155} ... The Athenians found a support in the feeling prevalent among the Ionians, who were naturally opposed to any forced settlement. Accordingly, in the first instance, Samos, Lesbos, Chios, and a number of other island-towns, were admitted into the confederation ... and a new Hellas was formed, a Greek empire comprehending both sides of the sea. Considerations of caution made it necessary, above all, to secure the passage from Asia to Europe; for it was universally believed that the bridge over the Hellespont was either still in existence or had been restored. When it was found to have been destroyed, the Peloponnesians urged the termination of the campaign. ... The Athenians, on the other hand, declared themselves resolved ... not to leave unfinished what they had begun. Sestus, the strongest fortress on the Hellespont, ought not to be left in the hands of the enemy; an attack on it ought to be risked without delay, before the city had prepared for a siege. They allowed the Peloponnesians to take their departure, and under the command of Xanthippus united with the ships of the Ionians and Hellespontians for the purpose of new undertakings." The Persians in Sestus resisted obstinately, enduring a long siege, but were forced to surrender at last. "Meanwhile, the main point consisted in the Athenians having remained alone in the field, in their having fraternized with the Ionians as one naval power, and having after such successes attained to a confidence in victory, to which no enterprise any longer seemed either too distant or too difficult. Already they regarded their city as the centre of the coast-lands of Greece. But what was the condition of this city of Athens itself? A few fragments of the ancient city wall, a few scattered houses, which had served the Persian commanders as their quarters, were yet standing; the rest was ashes and ruins. After the battle of Platææ the inhabitants had returned from Salamis, Trœzene, and Ægina; not even the fleet and its crews were at hand to afford them assistance. They endeavoured to make shift as best they could, to pass through the trials of the winter. As soon as the spring arrived, the restoration of the city was commenced with all possible activity. ... But even now it was not the comforts of domesticity which occupied their thoughts, but, above all, the city as a whole and its security. To Themistocles, the founder of the port-town, public confidence was in this matter properly accorded." It was not possible "to carry out a new and regular plan for the city; but it was resolved to extend its circumference beyond the circle of the ancient walls, ... so as to be able, in case of a future siege, to offer a retreat to the country-population within the capital itself. ... But the Athenians were not even to be permitted to build their walls undisturbed; for, as soon as their grand plan of operations became known, the envy and insidious jealousy of their neighbours broke out afresh. ... The Peloponnesian states, above all Ægina and Corinth, hastened to direct the attention of Sparta to the situation of affairs. ... As at Sparta city walls were objected to on principle, and as no doubts prevailed with regard to the fact that z well-fortified town was impregnable to the military art of the Peloponnesians, it was actually resolved at any price to prevent the building of the walls in Attica." But, for shame's sake, the interference undertaken by Sparta was put upon the ground that in the event of a future invasion of the country, only the peninsula could be successfully defended; that central Greece would necessarily be abandoned to the enemy; and that every fortified city in it would furnish him a dangerous base. "At such a crisis craft alone could be of avail. When the Spartans made their imperious demand at Athens, Themistocles ordered the immediate cessation of building operations, and with assumed submissiveness, promised to present himself at Sparta, in order to pursue further negotiations in person. On his arrival there, he allowed one day after the other to go by, pretending to be waiting for his fellow envoys." In the meantime, all Athens was toiling night and day at the walls, and time enough was gained by the audacious duplicity of Themistocles to build them to a safe height for defence. "The enemies of Athens saw that their design had been foiled, and were forced to put the best face upon their discomfiture. They now gave out that they had intended nothing beyond good advice."

_E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 2 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN _G. W. Cox, History of Greece,