part 3, chapter 3, section 4.

_E. Abbott, History of Greece, part 11, chapter 3._

_G. Grote, History of Greece, chapter 11._

_Plutarch, Solon._

_Aristotle, On the Constitution of Athens (translated by E. Poste), chapters 5-13._

See, also, AREOPAGUS, PRYTANES, HELIÆA, and DEBT.

{149}

ATHENS: B. C. 560-510. The tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.

"The constitution which he [Solon] framed was found to be insufficient even in his own life-time. ... The poor citizens were still poor, in spite of the Seisachtheia and the reform of the constitution. At the same time the admission of the lowest class in the scale of property to the rights of Athenian citizenship, and the authority given to the General Assembly, had thrown a power into the hands of the masses which filled the more conservative citizens with resentment and alarm. And so the old party quarrels, which had divided Attica before the reforms of Solon, reappeared after them with even greater violence. The men of the plain were led by Miltiades, a grandson of the tyrant of Corinth, and Lycurgus, the son of Aristolaidas; the men of the shore by Megacles, the Alcmæonid, who had recently strengthened the position of his family by his marriage with Agariste, the daughter of Clisthenes of Sicyon. At the head of the mountaineers stood Pisistratus, a descendant of the royal stock of Nestor, who ... had greatly distinguished himself in the Salaminian war. As he possessed property in the neighborhood of Marathon, Pisistratus may have been intimately known to the inhabitants of the adjacent hills. ... Solon watched the failure of his hopes with the deepest distress. He endeavoured to recall the leaders of the contending parties to a sense of their duty to the country, and to soothe the bitterness of their followers. With a true instinct he regarded Pisistratus as by far the most dangerous of the three. Pisistratus was an approved general, and the faction which he led was composed of poor men who had nothing to lose. ... Pisistratus met the vehement expressions of Solon by driving wounded into the market-place. The people's friend had suffered in the people's cause; his life was in danger. The incident roused the Athenians to an unusual exercise of political power. Without any previous discussion in the Council, a decree was passed by the people allowing Pisistratus to surround himself with a body-guard of fifty men, and to arm them with clubs. Thus protected, he threw off all disguises, and established himself in the Acropolis as tyrant of Athens [B. C. 560]. ... Herodotus tells us that Pisistratus was a just and moderate ruler. He did not alter the laws or remove the existing forms of government. The Council was still elected, the Assembly continued to meet, though it is improbable that either the one or the other was allowed to extend its functions beyond domestic affairs. The archons still continued to be the executive magistrates of the city, and cases of murder were tried, as of old, at the Areopagus. The tyrant contented himself with occupying the Acropolis with his troops and securing important posts in the administration for his family or his adherents." Twice, however, Pisistratus was driven from power by the combination of his opponents, and into exile, for four years in the first instance and for ten years in the last; but Athens was compelled to accept him for a ruler in the end. "Pisistratus remained in undisturbed possession of the throne till his death in 527 B. C. He was succeeded by his eldest son Hippias, with whom Hipparchus and Thessalus, his younger sons, were associated in the government." But these younger tyrants soon made themselves intolerably hateful, and a conspiracy formed against them by Harmodius and Aristogeiton was successful in taking the life of Hipparchus. Four years later, in 510 B. C., with the help of Delphi and Sparta, Hippias was driven from the city. Clisthenes, at the head of the exiled Alcmæonids, was the master-spirit of the revolution, and it was under his guidance that the Athenian democratic constitution was reorganized.

_E. Abbott, History of Greece, volume 1, chapter 15._

ALSO IN: _G. Grote, History of Greece, chapter 11 and 30._

ATHENS: B. C. 510-507. The constitution of Cleisthenes. Advance of democracy.

"The expulsion of the Pisistratides left the democratical party, which had first raised them to power, without a leader. The Alcmæonids had always been considered as its adversaries, though they were no less opposed to the faction of the nobles, which seems at this time to have been headed by Isagoras. ... Cleisthenes found himself, as his party had always been, unable to cope with it; he resolved, therefore, to shift his ground, and to attach himself to that popular cause which Pisistratus had used as the stepping stone of his ambition. His aims, however, were not confined to a temporary advantage over his rivals; he planned an important change in the constitution, which should forever break the power of his whole order, by dissolving some of the main links by which their sway was secured. For this purpose, having gained the confidence of the commonalty and obtained the sanction of the Delphic oracle, he abolished the four ancient tribes, and made a fresh geographical division of Attica into ten new tribes, each of which bore a name derived from some Attic hero. The ten tribes were subdivided into districts of various extent, called demes, each containing a town or village. ... Cleisthenes appears to have preserved the ancient phratries; but as they were now left insulated by the abolition of the tribes to which they belonged, they lost all political importance. ... Cleisthenes at the same time increased the strength of the commonalty by making a great many new citizens, and he is said to have enfranchised not only aliens--and these both residents and adventurers from abroad--but slaves. ... The whole frame of the state was reorganized to correspond with the new division of the country. {150} The Senate of the Four Hundred was increased to Five Hundred, that fifty might be drawn from each tribe, and the rotation of the presidency was adapted to this change, the fifty councillors of each tribe filling that office for thirty-five or thirty-six days in succession, and nine councillors being elected one from each of the other tribes to preside at the Council and the Assembly of the People, which was now called regularly four times in the month, certain business being assigned to each meeting. The Heliæa was also distributed into ten courts: and the same division henceforth prevailed in most of the public offices, though the number of the archons remained unchanged. To Cleisthenes also is ascribed the formal institution of the ostracism. ... These changes, and the influence they acquired for their author, reduced the party of Isagoras to utter weakness, and they saw no prospect of maintaining themselves but by foreign aid." Isagoras, accordingly, applied for help to Cleomenes, one of the kings of Sparta, who had already interfered in Athenian affairs by assisting at the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ. Cleomenes responded by coming to Athens with a small force [B. C. 508], which sufficed to overawe the people, and, assuming dictatorial authority, he established Isagoras in power, with an attempted rearrangement of the government. "He began by banishing 700 families designated by Isagoras, and then proceeded to suppress the Council of the Five Hundred, and to lodge the government in the hands of Three Hundred of his friend's partisans. When, however, the councillors resisted this attempt, the people took heart, and, Cleomenes and Isagoras having occupied the citadel, rose in a body and besieged them there. As they were not prepared to sustain a siege, they capitulated on the third day: Cleomenes and Isagoras were permitted to depart with the Lacedæmonian troops, but they were compelled to abandon their adherents to the mercy of their enemies. All were put to death, and Cleisthenes and the 700 banished families returned triumphantly to Athens." Cleomenes soon afterwards raised a force with which to subdue Athens and restore Isagoras. The Athenians in their alarm sent an embassy to Sardis to solicit the protection of the Persians. Fortunately, nothing came of it, and Cleomenes was so much opposed in his project, by the Corinthians and other allies of Sparta, that he had to give it up.

_C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 11._

ALSO IN: _G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 31._

_E. Abbott, History of Greece, chapter 15._

_Aristotle, On the Constitution of Athens (translated by E. Poste), chapter 20-22._

ATHENS: B. C. 509-506. Hostile undertakings of Kleomenes and Sparta. Help solicited from the Persian king. Subjection refused. Failure of Spartan schemes to restore tyranny. Protest of the Corinthians. Successful war with Thebes and Chalcis.

"With Sparta it was obvious that the Athenians now had a deadly quarrel, and on the other side they knew that Hippias was seeking to precipitate on them the power of the Persian king. It seemed therefore to be a matter of stern necessity to anticipate the intrigues of their banished tyrant; and the Athenians accordingly sent ambassadors to Sardeis to make an independent alliance with the Persian despot. The envoys, on being brought into the presence of Artaphernes, the Satrap of Lydia, were told that Dareios would admit them to an alliance if they would give him earth and water,--in other words, if they would acknowledge themselves his slaves. To this demand of absolute subjection the envoys gave an assent which was indignantly repudiated by the whole body of Athenian citizens. ... Foiled for the time in his efforts, Kleomenes was not cast down. Regarding the Kleisthenian constitution as a personal insult to himself, he was resolved that Isagoras should be despot of Athens. Summoning the allies of Sparta [including the Bœotian League headed by Thebes, and the people of Chalcis in Eubœa], he led them as far as Eleusis, 12 miles only from Athens, without informing them of the purpose of the campaign. He had no sooner confessed it than the Corinthians, declaring that they had been brought away from home on an unrighteous errand, went back, followed by the other Spartan King, Demaratos, the son of Ariston; and this conflict of opinion broke up the rest of the army. This discomfiture of their enemy seemed to inspire fresh strength into the Athenians, who won a series of victories over the Boiotians and Euboians"--completely overthrowing the latter--the Chalcidians--taking possession of their city, and making it a peculiar colony and dependency of Athens.--See KLERUCHS. The anger of Kleomenes "on being discomfited at Eleusis by the defection of his own allies was heightened by indignation at the discovery that in driving out his friend Hippias he had been simply the tool of Kleisthenes and of the Delphian priestess whom Kleisthenes had bribed. It was now clear to him and to his countrymen that the Athenians would not acquiesce in the predominance of Sparta, and that if they retained their freedom, the power of Athens would soon be equal to their own. Their only safety lay, therefore, in providing the Athenians with a tyrant. An invitation was, therefore, sent to Hippias at Sigeion, to attend a congress of the allies at Sparta, who were summoned to meet on the arrival of the exiled despot." The appointed congress was held, and the Spartans besought their allies to aid them in humbling the Athenian Democracy, with the object of restoring Hippias to power. But again the Corinthians protested, bluntly suggesting that if the Spartans thought tyranny a good thing they might first try it for themselves. Hippias, speaking in his own behalf, attempted to convince them that the time was coming "in which they would find the Athenians a thorn in their side. For the present his exhortations were thrown away. The allies protested unanimously against all attempts to interfere with the internal administration of any Hellenic city; and the banished tyrant went back disappointed to Sigeion."

_G. W. Cox, The Greeks and the Persians, chapter 4._

ALSO IN: _G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 31 (volume 4)._

{151}

ATHENS: B. C. 501-490. Aid to Ionians against Persia. Provocation of King Darius. His wrath and attempted vengeance. The first Persian invasions. Battle of Marathon.

"It is undeniable that the extension of the Persian dominion over Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt gave a violent check to the onward movement of Greek life. On the other hand, it seemed as if the great enterprise of Darius Hystaspis against the Scythians ought to have united the Greeks and Persians. It was of a piece with the general policy of Darius that, after defeating so many other adversaries, he undertook to prevent for all succeeding time a repetition of those inroads with which, some centuries before, the Scythians had visited Asia and the civilized world. He possessed authority enough to unite the different nations which obeyed his sceptre in a great campaign against the Scythians. ... The Greeks were his best allies in his campaign; they built him the bridge by which he crossed the Bosporus, and also the bridge of boats over the Danube by which he made his invasion into the enemy's territory. The result was not one which could properly be called unfortunate; yet it was certainly of a very doubtful character. ... A great region, in which they had already obtained very considerable influence, was closed to them once more. The Persian army brought the populations upon the Strymon, many in number and individually weak, under the dominion of Persia; and even Amyntas, the king of Makedonia, one of a race of rulers of Greek origin, was compelled to do homage to the Great King. Thus the movement which had thrust back the Greeks from Egypt and Asia Minor made advances even into the regions of Europe which bordered upon Northern Hellas. It was an almost inevitable consequence of this that the Greeks were menaced and straitened even in their proper home. A pretext and opportunity for an attack upon the Greek islands was presented to the Persians by the questions at issue between the populations of the cities and the tyrants. ... The instrument by whom the crisis was brought about was not a person of any great importance. It is not always great natures, or natures strong in the consciousness of their own powers, that bring on such conflicts; this is sometimes the work of those flexible characters which, being at the point of contact between the opposing forces, pass from one side to the other. Such a character was Aristagoras of Miletus. ... Morally contemptible, but gifted intellectually with a range of ideas of unlimited extent, Aristagoras made for himself an imperishable name by being the first to entertain the thought of a collective opposition to the Persians on the part of all the Greeks, even contemplating the possibility of waging a great and successful offensive war upon them. ... He announced in Miletus his own resignation of power and the restoration to the people of their old laws. ... A general overthrow of tyranny ensued [B. C. 501], involving a revolt from Persia, and Strategi were everywhere appointed. The supreme power in the cities was based upon a good understanding between the holders of power and the Persians; the fact that one of these rulers found the authority of the Persians intolerable was the signal for a universal revolt. Aristagoras himself voluntarily renounced the tyranny, the other tyrants were compelled to take the same course; and thus the cities, assuming at the same time a democratic organization, came into hostility with Persia. ... The cities and islands which had so often been forced to submission could not hope to resist the Persians by their own unaided efforts. Even Aristagoras could not have expected so much. ... He visited Lakedæmon, the strongest of the Greek powers, in person, and endeavored to carry her with him in his plans. ... Rejected by Sparta, Aristagoras betook himself to Athens. ... The Athenians granted Aristagoras twenty ships, to which the Eretrians, from friendship to Miletus, added five more. The courage of the Ionians was thus revived, and an attack upon the Persian dominion commenced, directed, not indeed against Susa, but against Sardis, in their immediate neighborhood, the capital of the satrapy which imposed on them their heaviest burdens. ... By the burning of Sardis, in which a sanctuary of Kybele had been destroyed, the Syrian nations had been outraged in the person of their gods. We know that it was part of the system of the Persians to take the gods of a country under their protection. Nor would the great king who thought himself appointed to be master of the world fail to resent an invasion of his dominions as an insult calling for revenge. The hostile attempts of the Ionians made no great impression upon him, but he asked who were the Athenians, of whose share in the campaign he had been informed. They were foreigners, of whose power the king had scarcely heard. ... The enterprise of Aristagoras had meanwhile caused general commotion. He had by far the larger part of Cyprus, together with the Carians, on his side. All the country near the Propontis and the Hellespont was in revolt. The Persians were compelled to make it their first concern to suppress this insurrection, a task which, if attempted by sea, did not promise to be an easy one. In their first encounter with the Phœnicians the Ionians had the advantage. When, however, the forces of the great empire were assembled, the insurrection was everywhere put down. ... It must be reckoned among the consequences of the battle of Lade, by which the combination against the Persian empire had been annihilated, that King Darius, not content with having consolidated his dominion in Ionia, once more resumed the plan of pushing forward into Europe, of which his enterprise against the Scythians formed part. With the execution of this project he commissioned one of the principal persons of the empire and the court, ... Mardonius by name, whom he united to his family by marrying him to his daughter. ... This general crossed the Hellespont with a large army, his fleet always accompanying him along the shore whilst he pushed on by the mainland. He once more subdued Makedonia, probably the districts which had not yet, like the Makedonian king, been brought into subjection, and gave out that his aim was directed against Eretria and Athens, the enemies of the king. ... In the stormy waters near Mount Athos, which have always made the navigation of the Ægean difficult, his fleet suffered ship-wreck. But without naval supports he could not hope to gain possession of an island and a maritime town situated on a promontory. Even by land he encountered resistance, so that he found it advisable to postpone the further execution of his undertakings to another time. ... In order to subdue the recalcitrants, especially Athens and Eretria, another attempt was organized without delay. Under two generals, one of whom, Datis, was a Mede, the other, Artaphernes, the son of the satrap of Sardis of the same name, and brother of the Darius who was in alliance with Hippias, a maritime expedition was undertaken for the immediate subjugation of the islands and the maritime districts. {152} It was not designed for open hostility against the Greeks in general. ... Their design was to utilize the internal dissensions of Greece in conquering the principal enemies upon whom the Great King had sworn vengeance, and presenting them as captives at his feet. The project succeeded in the case of Eretria. In spite of a brave resistance it fell by treachery into their hands, and they could avenge the sacrilege committed at Sardis by plundering and devastating Grecian sanctuaries. They expected now to be able to overpower Athens also without much trouble. ... It was a circumstance of great value to the Athenians that there was a man amongst them who was familiar with the Persian tactics. This was Miltiades, the son of Kimon. ... Although a Thracian prince, he had never ceased to be a citizen of Athens. Here he was impeached for having held a tyranny, but was acquitted and chosen strategus, for the democracy could not reject a man who was so admirably qualified to be at their head in the interchange of hostilities with Persia. Miltiades was conducting his own personal quarrel in undertaking the defence of Attica. The force of the Persians was indeed incomparably the larger, but the plains of Marathon, on which they were drawn up, prevented their proper deployment, and they saw with astonishment the Athenian hoplites displaying a front as extended as their own. These troops now rushed upon them with an impetus which grew swifter at every moment. The Persians easily succeeded in breaking through the centre of the Athenian army; but that was of no moment, for the strength of the onset lay in the two wings, where now began a hand-to-hand fight. The Persian sword, formidable elsewhere, was not adapted to do good service against the bronze armor and the spear of the Hellenes. On both flanks the Athenians obtained the advantage, and now attacked the Persian centre, which was not able to withstand the onslaught of men whose natural vigor was heightened by gymnastic training. The Persians, to their misfortune, had calculated upon desertion in the ranks of their opponents; foiled in this hope, they retreated to the shore and to their ships. Herodotus intimates that the Persians had secret intelligence with a party in Athens, and took their course round the promontory of Sunium toward the city, in the hope of surprising it. But when they came to anchor the Athenians had arrived also, and they saw themselves once more confronted by the victors of Marathon."

_L. von Ranke, Universal History, chapter 6._

ALSO IN: _Herodotus, History, book 6._

_V. Duruy, History of Greece, chapter 16 (volume 2)_.

See, also, PERSIA: B. C. 521-493, and GREECE: B. C. 492-491, and 490.

ATHENS: B. C. 489-480. Condemnation and death of Miltiades. The Æginetan war. Naval power created by Themistocles.

"The victory of Marathon was chiefly due to Miltiades; it was he who brought on the engagement, and he was chief in command on the day when the battle was fought. Such a brilliant success greatly improved his position in the city, and excited in his enemies a still deeper hatred. Ever on the watch for an opportunity to pull down their rival, it was not long before they found one. Soon after his victory, Miltiades came before the Athenians with a request that a squadron of 70 ships might be placed at his disposal. The purpose for which he required them he would not disclose, though pledging his word that the expedition would add largely to the wealth and prosperity of the city. The request being granted, he sailed with the ships to Paros, an island which at this time was subject to Persia. From the Parians he demanded 100 talents, and when they refused to pay he blockaded the city. So vigorous and successful was the resistance offered that, after a long delay, Miltiades, himself dangerously wounded, was compelled to return home. His enemies, with Xanthippus at their head, at once attacked him for misconduct in the enterprise. ... Miltiades was unable to reply in person; he was carried into court, while his friends pleaded his cause. The sentence was given against him, but the penalty was reduced from death to a fine of 50 talents. So large a sum was more than even Miltiades could pay; he was thrown into prison as a public debtor, where he soon died from the mortification of his wound. ... His condemnation was one in a long series of similar punishments. The Athenians never learnt to be just to those who served them, or to distinguish between treachery and errors of judgment. ... We have very little information about the state of Athens immediately after the battle of Marathon. So far as we can tell, for the chronology is most uncertain, she was now engaged in a war with Ægina. ... Meanwhile, a man was rising to power, who may be said to have created the history of Athens for the rest of the century,--Themistocles, the son of Neocles. ... On the very day of Marathon, Themistocles had probably made up his mind that the Persians would visit Greece again. What was to keep them away, so long as they were masters of the Ægean? ... With an insight almost incredible he perceived that the Athenians could become a maritime nation; that Athens possesses harbours large enough to receive an enormous fleet, and capable of being strongly fortified; that in possession of a fleet she could not only secure her own safety, but stand forth as a rival power to Sparta. But how could Themistocles induce the Athenians to abandon the line in which they had been so successful for a mode of warfare in which even Miltiades had failed? After the fall of the great general, the conduct of affairs was in the hands of Xanthippus ... and Aristides. ... They were by no means prepared for the change which Themistocles was meditating. This is more especially true of Aristides. He had been a friend of Clisthenes; he was known as an admirer of Spartan customs. ... He had been second in command at Marathon, and was now the most eminent general at Athens. From him Themistocles could only expect the most resolute opposition. Xanthippus and Aristides could reckon on the support of old traditions and great connections. Themistocles had no support of the kind. He had to make his party ... conscious of their own position, Aristides and Xanthippus looked with contempt upon the knot of men who began to gather round their unmannerly and uncultivated leader. And they might, perhaps, have maintained their position if it had not been for the Æginetan war. That unlucky struggle had begun, soon after the reforms of Clisthenes, with an unprovoked attack of the Æginetans on the coast of Attica (506 B. C.), [Ægina being allied with Thebes in the war mentioned above--B.C. 509-506]. {153} It was renewed when the Æginetans gave earth and water to the heralds of Darius in 491, and though suspended at the time of the Persian invasion, it broke out again with renewed ferocity soon afterwards. The Æginetans had the stronger fleet, and defeated the Athenian ships. "Such experiences naturally caused a change in the minds of the Athenians. ... It was clear that the old arrangements for the navy were quite inadequate to the task which was now required of them. Yet the leaders of the state made no proposals." Themistocles now "came forward publicly with proposals of naval reform, and, as he expected, he drew upon himself the strenuous opposition of Aristides. ... It was clear that nothing decisive could be done in the Æginetan war unless the proposals of Themistocles were carried; it was equally clear that they never would be carried while Aristides and Xanthippus were at hand to oppose them. Under these circumstances recourse was had to the safety-valve of the constitution. Ostracism was proposed and accepted; and in this manner, by 483 B. C., Themistocles had got rid of both of his rivals in the city. He was now master of the situation. The only obstacle to the realization of his plans was the expense involved in building ships. And this he was able to meet by a happy accident, which brought into the treasury at this time a large surplus from the silver mines from Laurium. ... By the summer of 480, the Athenians ... were able to launch 180 vessels, besides providing 20 for the use of the Chalcideans of Eubœa. ... At the same time Themistocles set about the fortification of the Peiræus. ... Could he have carried the Athenians with him, he would have made the Peiræus the capital of the country, in order that the ships and the city might be in close connection. But for this the people were not prepared."

_E. Abbott, Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens, chapter 2._

ALSO IN: Plutarch, _Aristides.--Themistocles._

ATHENS: B. C. 481-479. Congress at Corinth. Organized Hellenic Union, under the headship of Sparta.

See GREECE: B. C. 481-479.

ATHENS: B. C. 480-479. The second Persian invasion. Thermopylæ, Artemisium, Salamis, Platæa. Abandonment of the City.

"The last days of Darius were clouded by the disaster of Marathon; 'that battle formed the turning point of his good fortune,' and it would seem that the news of it led to several insurrections, particularly that of Egypt; but they were soon put down. Darius died (Olymp. 73, 3), and Xerxes, who succeeded him, was prevented from taking revenge on the Athenians by the revolt of Egypt, which engaged his attention during the first years of his reign. But he completely conquered the insurgents after they had maintained themselves about four or five years; and he then made preparations for that vengeance on Athens for which his barbarian pride was longing. The account of the three years' preparations of Xerxes, how he assembled his army in Asia Minor, how he made a bridge across the Hellespont, how he cut a canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos to prevent his fleet being destroyed by storms--all this is known to everyone who has read Herodotus. History is here so much interwoven with poetry, that they can no longer be separated. ... The Greeks awaited the attack (Olymp. 75, 1), 'but they were not agreed among themselves. The Argives from hatred of Sparta joined the Persians, and the miserable Boeotians likewise supported them. The others kept together only from necessity; and without the noble spirit of the Athenians Greece would have been lost, and that from the most paltry circumstances. A dispute arose as to who was to be honoured with the supreme command; the Athenians gave way to all, for their only desire was to save Greece. Had the Persians moved on rapidly, they would have met with no resistance, but they proceeded slowly, and matters turned out differently.' A Greek army was encamped at Tempe, at the entrance of Thessaly, and at first determined on defending Thessaly. But they must have seen that they could be entirely surrounded from Upper Thessaly; and when they thus discovered the impossibility of stopping the Persians, they retreated. The narrative now contains one inconceivable circumstance after another. ... It is inconceivable that, as the Greeks did make a stand at Thermopylae, no one else took his position there except King Leonidas and his Spartans, not including even the Lacedaemonians, for they remained at home! Only 1,000 Phocians occupied the heights, though that people might surely have furnished 10,000 men; 400 of the Boeotians were posted in the rear, as a sort of hostages, as Herodotus remarks, and 700 Thespians. Where were all the rest of the Greeks? ... Countless hosts are invading Greece; the Greeks want to defend themselves, and are making active preparations at sea; but on land hundreds of thousands are met by a small band of Peloponnesians. 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans as hostages, and 1,000 Phocians, stationed on the heights! A pass is occupied, but only that one, and the others are left unguarded. ... All this is quite unintelligible; it would almost appear as if there had been an intention to sacrifice Leonidas and his men; but we cannot suppose this. These circumstances alone suggest to us, that the numbers of the Persian army cannot have been as great as they are described; but even if we reduce them to an immense extent, it still remains inconceivable why they were not opposed by greater numbers of the Greeks, for as afterwards they ventured to attack the Persians in the open field, it was certainly much more natural to oppose them while marching across the hills. But however this may be, it is an undoubted fact, that Leonidas and his Spartans fell in the contest, of which we may form a conception from the description of Herodotus, when after a resistance of three days they were surrounded by the Persians. A few of the Spartans escaped on very excusable grounds, but they were so generally despised, that their life became unendurable, and they made away with themselves. This is certainly historical. ... After the victory of Thermopylae all Hellas lay open before the Persians, and they now advanced towards Athens, a distance which they could march in a few days. Thebes opened her gates, and joyfully admitted them from hatred of Athens. Meantime a portion of the army appeared before Delphi. It is almost inconceivable that the Persians did not succeed in taking the temple. ... The miracles by which the temple is said to have been saved, are repeated in the same manner during the attack of the Gauls. {154} But the temple of Delphi was certainly not plundered.' ... The city of Athens had in the meantime been abandoned by all the people; the defenceless had taken refuge in the small island of Salamis, or of Troezen, 'and all the Athenians capable of bearing arms embarked in the fleet.' ... The Persians thus took Athens without any resistance. ... During the same days on which the battle of Thermopylae was fought, the Greek fleet was engaged in two indecisive but glorious battles near the promontory of Artemisium. 'In a third the Persians gained the upper hand, and when the Greeks at the same time heard of the defeat at Thermopylae, they withdrew, and doubling Cape Sunium sailed towards Salamis.' God sent them a storm whereby the Persians in their pursuit suffered shipwreck. ... While the Greek fleet was stationed in the channel between the island of Salamis and Attica, towards Piraeeus, discord broke out among the Greeks. The Peloponnesians thought only of themselves; they had fortified the Isthmus; there they were assembled, and there they wanted to offer resistance to the Persians. In their folly they forgot, that if the enemy with his superior fleet, should turn against Peloponnesus, they might land wherever they liked. ... But Themistocles now declared, that all the hopes of the Athenians were directed towards the recovery of their own city; that, if the Peloponnesians should sacrifice them, and, thinking of themselves only, should abandon Attica to the barbarians, the Athenians would not be so childish as to sacrifice themselves for them, but would take their women and children on board their ships, and sail far away from the Persians to the island of Sardinia, or some other place where Greek colonies were established; that there they would settle as a free people, and abandon Peloponnesus to its fate; and that then the peninsula would soon be in the hands of the enemy. This frightened the Peloponnesians, and they resolved to stand by Athens. It is evident that, throughout that time, Themistocles had to struggle with the most intolerable difficulties, which the allies placed in his way, as well as with their jealousy, meanness, and insolence. 'The rudeness of the Spartans and Corinthians is nowhere more strongly contrasted with the refinement of the Athenians, than on that occasion.' But after he had tried everything, and overcome by every possible means a hundred different difficulties, he yet saw, that he could not rely on the perseverance of the Peloponnesians, and that they would turn to the Isthmus as soon as Xerxes should proceed in that direction. He accordingly induced the Persian king, by a false message, to surround the Greek fleet, for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the Peloponnesians. He declared himself ready to deliver the whole of the Greek fleet into his hands. This device was quite to the mind of the Persians; Xerxes believed him, and followed his advice. When Themistocles was thus sure of the Peloponnesians, the ever-memorable battle of Salamis commenced, which is as certainly historical as that of Cannae, or any modern battle, 'whatever the numbers may be.' The battle proceeded somewhat in the manner of the battle of Leipzig: when the issue was decided, a portion of those who ought to have joined their countrymen before, made common cause with the Greeks. ... Their accession increased the victory of the Greeks. ... Certain as the battle of Salamis is, all the accounts of what took place after it, are very doubtful. This much is certain, that Xerxes returned, 'leaving a portion of his army under Mardonius in Greece;' ... Winter was now approaching, and Mardonius withdrew from ravaged Attica, taking up his winter-quarters partly in Thessaly and partly in Boeotia. ... The probability is, that the Athenians remained the winter in Salamis in sheds, or under the open sky. Mardonius offered to restore to them Attica uninjured, so far as it had not already been devastated, if they would conclude peace with him. They might at that time have obtained any terms they pleased, if they had abandoned the common cause of the Greeks; and the Persians would have kept the peace; for when they concluded treaties they observed them: they were not faithless barbarians. But on this occasion again, we see the Athenian people in all its greatness and excellence; it scorned such a peace, and preferred the good of the Peloponnesians. ... Mardonius now again advanced towards Athens; the Spartans, who ought to have proceeded towards Cithaeron, had not arrived, and thus he again took possession of Attica and ravaged it completely. At length, however (Olymp. 75, 2), the Athenians prevailed upon the Peloponnesians to leave the Isthmus, and they gradually advanced towards Boeotia. There the battle of Plataeae was fought. ... In regard to the accounts of this battle, it is historically certain that it was completely won by the Greeks, and that the remnants of the Persian army retreated without being vigorously pursued. It must have reached Asia, but it then disappears. It is also historically certain, that Pausanias was the commander of the allied army of the Greeks. ... After their victory, the Greeks advanced towards Thebes. In accordance with a vow which they had made before the war, Thebes ought to have been destroyed by the Greeks. But their opinions were divided. ... On the same day on which the battle of Plataeae was fought, the allied Greeks gained as complete a victory at sea. ... After this victory of Mycale, the Ionian cities revolted against the Persians."

_B. G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient History,