part 1, chapter 2.

In Greek myth, Æolus, the fancied progenitor of the Æolians, appears as one of the three sons of Hellen. "Æolus is represented as having reigned in Thessaly: his seven sons were Kretheus, Sisyphus, Athamas, Salmoneus, Deion, Magnes and Perieres: his five daughters, Canace, Alcyone, Peisidike, Calyce and Permede. The fables of this race seem to be distinguished by a constant introduction of the God Poseidon, as well as by an unusual prevalence of haughty and presumptuous attributes among the Æolid heroes, leading them to affront the gods by pretences of equality, and sometimes even by defiance."

_G. Grote, History of Greece, part 1, chapter 6._

See, also, THESSALY, DORIANS AND IONIANS, and ASIA MINOR: THE GREEK COLONIES.

ÆQUIANS, The.

See OSCANS; also LATIUM; and ROME; B. C. 458.

ÆRARIANS.

Roman citizens who had no political rights.

See CENSORS, ROMAN.

ÆRARIUM, The.

See FISCUS.

ÆSOPUS INDIANS.

See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

ÆSTII, or ÆSTYI, The.

"At this point [beyond the Suiones] the Suevic Sea [the Baltic], on its eastern shore, washes the tribes of the Æstii, whose rites and fashions and styles of dress are those of the Suevi, while their language is more like the British. They worship the mother of the gods and wear as a religious symbol the device of a wild boar. ... They often use clubs, iron weapons but seldom. They are more patient in cultivating corn and other produce than might be expected from the general indolence of the Germans. But they also search the deep and are the only people who gather amber, which they call glesum."--"The Æstii occupied that part of Prussia which is to the north-east of the Vistula. ... The name still survives in the form Estonia."

_Tacitus, Germany, translated by Church and Brodribb, with note._

See, also, PRUSSIAN LANGUAGE, THE OLD.

ÆSYMNETÆ, An.

Among the Greeks, an expedient "which seems to have been tried not unfrequently in early times, tor preserving or restoring tranquility, was to invest an individual with absolute power, under a peculiar title, which soon became obsolete: that of æsymnetæ. At Cuma, indeed, and in other cities, this was the title of an ordinary magistracy, probably of that which succeeded the hereditary monarchy; but when applied to an extraordinary office, it was equivalent to the title of protector or dictator."

_C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 10._

ÆTHEL.--ÆTHELING.

See ETHEL, and ADEL.

ÆTHELBERT, ÆTHELFRITH, ETC.

See ETHELBERT, etc.

ÆTOLIA.--ÆTOLIANS.

"Ætolia, the country of Diomed, though famous in the early times, fell back during the migratory period almost into a savage condition, probably through the influx into it of an Illyrian population which became only partially Hellenized. The nation was divided into numerous tribes, among which the most important were the Apodoti, the Ophioneis, the Eurytanes and the Agræans. There were scarcely any cities, village life being preferred universally. ... It was not till the wars which arose among Alexander's successors that the Ætolians formed a real political union, and became an important power in Greece."

_G. Rawlinson, Manual of Ancient History, book 3._

See also, AKARNANIANS, and GREECE: THE MIGRATIONS.

ÆTOLIAN LEAGUE, The.

"The Achaian and the Ætolian Leagues, had their constitutions been written down in the shape of a formal document, would have presented but few varieties of importance. The same general form of government prevailed in both; each was federal, each was democratic; each had its popular assembly, its smaller Senate, its general with large powers at the head of all. The differences between the two are merely those differences of detail which will always arise between any two political systems of which neither is slavishly copied from the other. ... If therefore federal states or democratic states, or aristocratic states, were necessarily weak or strong, peaceful or aggressive, honest or dishonest, we should see Achaia and Ætolia both exhibiting the same moral characteristics. But history tells another tale. The political conduct of the Achaian League, with some mistakes and some faults, is, on the whole, highly honourable. The political conduct of the Ætolian League is, throughout the century in which we know it best [last half of third and first half of second century B. C.] almost always simply infamous. ... The counsels of the Ætolian League were throughout directed to mere plunder, or, at most, to selfish political aggrandisement."

_E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Government, chapter 6_.

The plundering aggressions of the Ætolians involved them in continual war with their Greek kindred and neighbours, and they did not scruple to seek foreign aid. It was through their agency that the Romans were first brought into Greece, and it was by their instrumentality that Antiochus fought his battle with Rome on the sacredest of all Hellenic soil. In the end, B. C. 189, the League was stripped by the Romans of even its nominal independence and sank into a contemptible servitude.

_E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Government, chapter 7-9._

ALSO IN _C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 63-66._

{11}

AFGHANISTAN: B. C. 330. Conquest by Alexander the Great. Founding of Herat and Candahar.

See MACEDONIA, &c.: B. C. 330-323; and INDIA: B. C. 327-312.

AFGHANISTAN: B. C. 301-246. In the Syrian Empire.

See SELEUCIDÆ; and MACEDONIA, &c.: 310-301 and after.

AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 999-1183. The Ghaznevide Empire.

See TURKS: A. D. 999-1183; and INDIA: A. D. 977-1290.

AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 13th Century. Conquests of Jinghis-Khan.

See MONGOLS: A. D. 1153-1227; and INDIA: A. D. 977-1290.

AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 1380-1386. Conquest by Timour.

See Timour.

AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 1504. Conquest by Babar.

See INDIA: A. D. 1399-1605.

AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 1722. Mahmoud's conquest of Persia.

See PERSIA: A. D. 1499-1887.

AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 1737-1738. Conquest by Nadir Shah.

See INDIA: A. D. 1662-1748.

AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 1747-1761. The Empire of the Dooranie, Ahmed Abdallee. His Conquests in India.

See INDIA; A. D. 1747-1761.

AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 1803-1838. Shah Soojah and Dost Mahomed. English interference.

"Shah Soojah-ool Moolk, a grandson of the illustrious Ahmed Shah, reigned in Afghanistan from 1803 till 1809. His youth had been full of trouble and vicissitude. He had been a wanderer, on the verge of starvation, a pedlar, and a bandit, who raised money by plundering caravans. His courage was lightly reputed, and it was as a mere creature of circumstance that he reached the throne. His reign was perturbed, and in 1809 he was a fugitive and an exile. Runjeet Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjaub, defrauded him of the famous Koh-i-noor, which is now the most precious of the crown jewels of England, and plundered and imprisoned the fallen man. Shah Soojah at length escaped from Lahore. After further misfortunes he at length reached the British frontier station of Loodianah, and in 1816 became a pensioner of the East India Company. After the downfall of Shah Soojah, Afghanistan for many years was a prey to anarchy. At length in 1826, Dost Mahomed succeeded in making himself supreme at Cabul, and this masterful man thenceforward held sway until his death in 1863, uninterruptedly save during the three years of the British occupation. Dost Mahomed was neither kith nor kin to the legitimate dynasty which he displaced. His father Poyndah Khan was an able statesman and gallant soldier. He left twenty-one sons, of whom Futteh Khan was the eldest, and Dost Mahomed one of the youngest. ... Throughout his long reign Dost Mahomed was a strong and wise ruler. His youth had been neglected and dissolute. His education was defective, and he had been addicted to wine. Once seated on the throne, the reformation of our Henry V. was not more thorough than was that of Dost Mahomed. He taught himself to read and write, studied the Koran, became scrupulously abstemious, assiduous in affairs, no longer truculent, but courteous. ... There was a fine rugged honesty in his nature, and a streak of genuine chivalry; notwithstanding the despite he suffered at our hands, he had a real regard for the English, and his loyalty to us was broken only by his armed support of the Sikhs in the second Punjaub war. The fallen Shah Soojah, from his asylum in Loodianah, was continually intriguing for his restoration. His schemes were long inoperative, and it was not until 1832 that certain arrangements were entered into between him and the Maharaja Runjeet Singh. To an application on Shah Soojah's part for countenance and pecuniary aid, the Anglo-Indian Government replied that to afford him assistance would be inconsistent with the policy of neutrality which the Government had imposed on itself; but it unwisely contributed financially toward his undertaking by granting him four months' pension in advance. Sixteen thousand rupees formed a scant war fund with which to attempt the recovery of a throne, but the Shah started on his errand in February, 1833. After a successful contest with the Ameers of Scinde, he marched on Candahar, and besieged that fortress. Candahar was in extremity when Dost Mahomed, hurrying from Cabul, relieved it, and joining forces with its defenders, he defeated and routed Shah Soojah, who fled precipitately, leaving behind him his artillery and camp equipage. During the Dost's absence in the south, Runjeet Singh's troops crossed the Attock, occupied the Afghan province of Peshawur, and drove the Afghans into the Khyber Pass. No subsequent efforts on Dost Mahomed's part availed to expel the Sikhs from Peshawur, and suspicious of British connivance with Runjeet Singh's successful aggression, he took into consideration the policy of fortifying himself by a counter alliance with Persia. As for Shah Soojah, he had crept back to his refuge at Loodianah. Lord Auckland succeeded Lord William Bentinck as Governor-General of India in March, 1836. In reply to Dost Mahomed's letter of congratulation, his lordship wrote: 'You are aware that it is not the practice of the British Government to interfere with the affairs of other independent States;' an abstention which Lord Auckland was soon to violate. He had brought from England the feeling of disquietude in regard to the designs of Persia and Russia which the communications of our envoy in Persia had fostered in the Home Government, but it would appear that he was wholly undecided what line of action to pursue. 'Swayed,' says Durand, 'by the vague apprehensions of a remote danger entertained by others rather than himself, he despatched to Afghanistan Captain Burnes on a nominally commercial mission, which, in fact, was one of political discovery, but without definite instructions. Burnes, an able but rash and ambitious man, reached Cabul in September, 1837, two months before the Persian army began the siege of Herat. ... The Dost made no concealment to Burnes of his approaches to Persia and Russia, in despair of British good offices, and being hungry for assistance from any source to meet the encroachments of the Sikhs, he professed himself ready to abandon his negotiations with the western powers if he were given reason to expect countenance and assistance at the hands of the Anglo-Indian Government. ... The situation of Burnes in relation to the Dost was presently complicated by the arrival at Cabul of a Russian officer claiming to be an envoy from the Czar, whose credentials, however, were regarded as dubious, and who, if that circumstance has the least weight, was on his return to Russia utterly repudiated by Count Nesselrode. The Dost took small account of this emissary, continuing to assure Burnes that he cared for no connection except with the English, and Burnes professed to his Government his fullest confidence in the sincerity of those declarations. {12} But the tone of Lord Auckland's reply, addressed to the Dost, was so dictatorial and supercilious as to indicate the writer's intention that it should give offence. It had that effect, and Burnes' mission at once became hopeless. ... The Russian envoy, who was profuse in his promises of everything which the Dost was most anxious to obtain, was received into favour and treated with distinction, and on his return journey he effected a treaty with the Candahar chiefs which was presently ratified by the Russian minister at the Persian Court. Burnes, fallen into discredit at Cabul, quitted that place in August 1838. He had not been discreet, but it was not his indiscretion that brought about the failure of his mission. A nefarious transaction, which Kaye denounces with the passion of a just indignation, connects itself with Burnes' negotiations with the Dost; his official correspondence was unscrupulously mutilated and garbled in the published Blue Book with deliberate purpose to deceive the British public. Burnes had failed because, since he had quitted India for Cabul, Lord Auckland's policy had gradually altered. Lord Auckland had landed in India in the character of a man of peace. That, so late as April 1837, he had no design of obstructing the existing situation in Afghanistan is proved by his written statement of that date, that 'the British Government had resolved decidedly to discourage the prosecution by the ex-king Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, so long as he may remain under our protection, of further schemes of hostility against the chiefs now in power in Cabul and Candahar.' Yet, in the following June, he concluded a treaty which sent Shah Soojah to Cabul, escorted by British bayonets. Of this inconsistency no explanation presents itself. It was a far cry from our frontier on the Sutlej to Herat in the confines of Central Asia--a distance of more than 1,200 miles, over some of the most arduous marching ground in the known world. ... Lord William Bentinck, Lord Auckland's predecessor, denounced the project as an act of incredible folly. Marquis Wellesley regarded 'this wild expedition into a distant region of rocks and deserts, of sands and ice and snow,' as an act of infatuation. The Duke of Wellington pronounced with prophetic sagacity, that the consequence of once crossing the Indus to settle a government in Afghanistan would be a perennial march into that country."

_A. Forbes, The Afghan Wars, chapter 1._

ALSO IN; _J. P. Ferrier, History of the Afghans, chapter 10-20._

_Mohan Lal, Life of Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, volume 1._

AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 1838-1842. English invasion, and restoration of Soojah Dowlah. The revolt at Cabul. Horrors of the British retreat. Destruction of the entire army, save one man, only. Sale's defence of Jellalabad.

"To approach Afghanistan it was necessary to secure the friendship of the Sikhs, who were, indeed, ready enough to join against their old enemies; and a threefold treaty was contracted between Runjeet Singh, the English, and Shah Soojah for the restoration of the banished house. The expedition--which according to the original intention was to have been carried out chiefly by means of troops in the pay of Shah Soojah and the Sikhs--rapidly grew into an English invasion of Afghanistan. A considerable force was gathered on the Sikh frontier from Bengal; a second army, under General Keane, was to come up from Kurrachee through Sindh. Both of these armies, and the troops of Shah Soojah, were to enter the highlands of Afghanistan by the Bolan Pass. As the Sikhs would not willingly allow the free passage of our troops through their country, an additional burden was laid upon the armies,- the independent Ameers of Sindh had to be coerced. At length, with much trouble from the difficulties of the country and the loss of the commissariat animals, the forces were all collected under the command of Keane beyond the passes. The want of food permitted of no delay; the army pushed on to Candahar. Shah Soojah was declared Monarch of the southern Principality. Thence the troops moved rapidly onwards towards the more important and difficult conquest of Cabul. Ghuznee, a fortress of great strength, lay in the way. In their hasty movements the English had left their battering train behind, but the gates of the fortress were blown in with gunpowder, and by a brilliant feat of arms the fortress was stormed. Nor did the English army encounter any important resistance subsequently. Dost Mohamed found his followers deserting him, and withdrew northwards into the mountains of the Hindoo Koosh. With all the splendour that could be collected, Shah Soojah was brought back to his throne in the Bala Hissar, the fortress Palace of Cabul. ... For the moment the policy seemed thoroughly successful. The English Ministry could feel that a fresh check had been placed upon its Russian rival, and no one dreamt of the terrible retribution that was in store for the unjust violence done to the feelings of a people. ... Dost Mohamed thought it prudent to surrender himself to the English envoy, Sir William Macnaghten, and to withdraw with his family to the English provinces of Hindostan [November, 1840]. He was there well received and treated with liberality; for, as both the Governor General and his chief adviser Macnaghten felt, he had not in fact in any way offended us, but had fallen a victim to our policy. It was in the full belief that their policy in India had been crowned with permanent success that the Whig Ministers withdrew from office, leaving their successors to encounter the terrible results to which it led. For while the English officials were blindly congratulating themselves upon the happy completion of their enterprise, to an observant eye signs of approaching difficulty were on all sides visible. ... The removal of the strong rule of the Barrukzyes opened a door for undefined hopes to many of the other families and tribes. The whole country was full of intrigues and of diplomatic bargaining, carried on by the English political agents with the various chiefs and leaders. But they soon found that the hopes excited by these negotiations were illusory. The allowances for which they had bargained were reduced, for the English envoy began to be disquieted at the vast expenses of the Government. They did not find that they derived any advantages from the establishment of the new puppet King, Soojah Dowlah; and every Mahomedan, even the very king himself, felt disgraced at the predominance of the English infidels. {13} But as no actual insurrection broke out, Macnaghten, a man of sanguine temperament and anxious to believe what he wished, in spite of unmistakable warnings as to the real feeling of the people, clung with almost angry vehemence to the persuasion that all was going well, and that the new King had a real hold upon the people's affection. So completely had he deceived himself on this point, that he had decided to send back a portion of the English army, under General Sale, into Hindostan. He even intended to accompany it himself to enjoy the peaceful post of Governor of Bombay, with which his successful policy had been rewarded. His place was to be taken by Sir Alexander Burnes, whose view of the troubled condition of the country underlying the comparative calm of the surface was much truer than that of Macnaghten, but who, perhaps from that very fact, was far less popular among the chiefs. The army which was to remain at Candahar was under the command of General Nott, an able and decided if somewhat irascible man. But General Elphinstone, the commander of the troops at Cabul, was of quite a different stamp. He was much respected and liked for his honourable character and social qualities, but was advanced in years, a confirmed invalid, and wholly wanting in the vigour and decision which his critical position was likely to require. The fool's paradise with which the English Envoy had surrounded himself was rudely destroyed. He had persuaded himself that the frequently recurring disturbances, and especially the insurrection of the Ghilzyes between Cabul and Jellalabad, were mere local outbreaks. But In fact a great conspiracy was on foot in which the chiefs of nearly every important tribe in the country were implicated. On the evening of the 1st of November [1841] a meeting of the chiefs was held, and It was decided that an immediate attack should be made on the house of Sir Alexander Burnes. The following morning an angry crowd of assailants stormed the houses of Sir Alexander Burnes and Captain Johnson, murdering the inmates, and rifling the treasure-chests belonging to Soojah Dowlah's army. Soon the whole city was in wild insurrection. The evidence is nearly irresistible that a little decision and rapidity of action on the part of the military would have at once crushed the outbreak. But although the attack on Burnes's house was known, no troops were sent to his assistance. Indeed, that unbroken course of folly and mismanagement which marked the conduct of our military affairs throughout this crisis had already begun. Instead of occupying the fortress of the Bala Hissar, where the army would have been in comparative security, Elphlnstone had placed his troops in cantonments far too extensive to be properly defended, surrounded by an entrenchment of the most insignificant character, commanded on almost all sides by higher ground. To complete the unfitness of the position, the commissariat supplies were not stored within the cantonments, but were placed in an isolated fort at some little distance. An ill-sustained and futile assault was made upon the town on the 3d of November, but from that time onwards the British troops lay with incomprehensible supineness awaiting their fate in their defenceless position. The commissariat fort soon fell into the hands of the enemy and rendered their situation still more deplorable. Some flashes of bravery now and then lighted up the sombre scene of helpless misfortune, and served to show that destruction might even yet have been averted by a little firmness. ... But the commander had already begun to despair, and before many days had passed he was thinking of making terms with the enemy. Macnaghten had no course open to him under such circumstances but to adopt the suggestion of the general, and attempt as well as he could by bribes, cajolery, and intrigue, to divide the chiefs and secure a safe retreat for the English. Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Mohamed, though not present at the beginning of the insurrection, had arrived from the northern mountains, and at once asserted a predominant influence in the insurgent councils. With him and with the other insurgent chiefs Macnaghten entered into an arrangement by which he promised to withdraw the English entirely from the country if a safe passage were secured for the army through the passes. ... While ostensibly treating with the Barrukzye chiefs, he intrigued on all sides with the rival tribes. His double dealing was taken advantage of by Akbar Khan. He sent messengers to Macnaghten proposing that the English should make a separate treaty with himself and support him with their troops in an assault upon some of his rivals. The proposition was a mere trap, and the envoy fell into it. Ordering troops to be got ready, he hurried to a meeting with Akbar to complete the arrangement. There he found himself in the presence of the brother and relatives of the very men against whom he was plotting, and was seized and murdered by Akbar's own hand [December 23]. Still the General thought of nothing but surrender. The negotiations were entrusted to Major Pottinger. The terms of the chiefs gradually rose, and at length with much confusion the wretched army marched out of the cantonments [January 6, 1842], leaving behind nearly all the cannon and superfluous military stores. An Afghan escort to secure the safety of the troops on their perilous journey had been promised, but the promise was not kept. The horrors of the retreat form one of the darkest passages in English military history. In bitter cold and snow, which took all life out of the wretched Sepoys, without proper clothing or shelter, and hampered by a disorderly mass of thousands of camp-followers, the army entered the terrible defiles which lie between Cabul and Jellalabad. Whether Akbar Khan could, had he wished it, have restrained his fanatical followers is uncertain. As a fact the retiring crowd--it can scarcely be called an army--was a mere unresisting prey to the assaults of the mountaineers. Constant communication was kept up with Akbar; on the third day all the ladies and children with the married men were placed in his hands, and finally even the two generals gave themselves up as hostages, always in the hope that the remnant of the army might be allowed to escape."

_J. F. Bright, History of England, volume 4, pages 61-66._

{14}

"Then the march of the army, without a general, went on again. Soon it became the story of a general without an army; before very long there was neither general nor army. It is idle to lengthen a tale of mere horrors. The straggling remnant of an army entered the Jugdulluk Pass--a dark, steep, narrow, ascending path between crags. The miserable toilers found that the fanatical, implacable tribes had barricaded the pass. All was over. The army of Cabul was finally extinguished in that barricaded pass. It was a trap; the British were taken in it. A few mere fugitives escaped from the scene of actual slaughter, and were on the road to Jellalabad, where Sale and his little army were holding their own. When they were within sixteen miles of Jellalabad the number was reduced to six. Of these six five were killed by straggling marauders on the way. One man alone reached Jellalabad to tell the tale. Literally one man, Dr. Brydon, came to Jellalabad [January 13] out of a moving host which had numbered in all some 16,000 when it set out on its march. The curious eye will search through history or fiction in vain for any picture more thrilling with the suggestions of an awful catastrophe than that of this solitary survivor, faint and reeling on his jaded horse, as he appeared under the walls of Jellalabad, to bear the tidings of our Thermopylae of pain and shame. This is the crisis of the story. With this at least the worst of the pain and shame were destined to end. The rest is all, so far as we are concerned, reaction and recovery. Our successes are common enough; we may tell their tale briefly in this instance. The garrison at Jellalabad had received before Dr. Brydon's arrival an intimation that they were to go out and march toward India in accordance with the terms of the treaty extorted from Elphinstone at Cabul. They very properly declined to be bound by a treaty which, as General Sale rightly conjectured, had been 'forced from our envoy and military commander with the knives at their throats.' General Sale's determination was clear and simple. 'I propose to hold this place on the part of Government until I receive its order to the contrary.' This resolve of Sale's was really the turning point of the history. Sale held Jellalabad; Nott was at Candahar. Akbar Khan besieged Jellalabad. Nature seemed to have declared herself emphatically on his side, for a succession of earthquake shocks shattered the walls of the place, and produced more terrible destruction than the most formidable guns of modern warfare could have done. But the garrison held out fearlessly; they restored the parapets, re-established every battery, retrenched the whole of the gates and built up all the breaches. They resisted every attempt of Akbar Khan to advance upon their works, and at length, when it became certain that General Pollock was forcing the Khyber Pass to come to their relief, they determined to attack Akbar Khan's army; they issued boldly out of their forts, forced a battle on the Afghan chief, and completely defeated him. Before Pollock, having gallantly fought his way through the Khyber Pass, had reached Jellalabad [April 16] the beleaguering army had been entirely defeated and dispersed. ... Meanwhile the unfortunate Shah Soojah, whom we had restored with so much pomp of announcement to the throne of his ancestors, was dead. He was assassinated in Cabul, soon after the departure of the British, ... and his body, stripped of its royal robes and its many jewels, was flung into a ditch."

_J. McCarthy, History of our own Times,