Chapter 2

_The Ministers tell us in the Declaration, That they asked of that Parliament the supporting the Alliances they had made for the Preservation of the general peace in Christendom, and had desir'd their advice and assistance for the preservation of_ Tangier: _had recommended to them, the farther examination of the Plot; and that his Majesty had offer'd to concurr in any Remedies for the security of the Protestant Religion, which might consist with the preserving the Succession of the Crown, in its due and legal course of descent, but to all this they met with most unsuitable returns._

Now mark what the Gentleman infers, _That the Ministers well knew, that their demands of Money for the ends abovesaid, were not to be complyed with, till his Majesty were pleas'd to change the hands and Councils by which his Affairs were managed_.--that is, nothing must be given but to such men in whom they could confide, as if neither the King, nor those whom he employed were fit any longer to be Trusted. But the supream power, and the management of all things, must be wholly in their Party, as it was in _Watt Tyler_, and _Jack Cade_ of famous memory, when they had got a King into their possession: for this Party, will never think his Majesty their own, till they have him as safe, as they had his Father. But if they could compass their Designs, of bringing the same Gentlemen into play once more, who some years since were at the Helm; let me ask them, when the Affairs of the Nation were worse manag'd? who gave the rise to the present greatness of the _French_? or who counsel'd the dissolution of the Tripple League? 'Tis a miracle to me that the People should think them good Patriots, only because they are out of humour with the Court, and in disgrace. I suppose they are far other principles, than those of Anger and Revenge, which constitute an honest Statesman. But let men be what they will before, if they once espouse their Party, let them be touch'd with that Philosophers stone, and they are turn'd into Gold immediately. Nay, that will do more for them, than was ever pretended to by Chymistry; for it will raise up the shape of a worthy Patriot, from the ashes of a Knave. 'Tis a pretty juggle to tell the King they assist him with Money, when indeed they design only to give it to themselves; that is, to their own Instruments, which is no more, than to shift it from one hand into another. It will be a favour at the long run, if they condescend to acquaint the King, how they intend to lay out his Treasure. But our Author very roundly tells his Majesty, _That at present they will give him no supplyes, because they would be employ'd, to the destruction of his Person, and of the Protestant Religion, and the inslaving the whole Nation_, to which I will only add, that of all these matters next and immediately under God, he and his Party, constitute themselves the supream Judges.

_The Duke of_ York, _the Queen, and the two French Dutchesses are the great support and protectors of the Popish interest in these Kingdoms_.

How comes it to pass that our Author shuffles the two French Dutchesses together? of which the one is an _Italian_, the other a _French_ Woman, and an _English_ Dutchess? Is he grown so purblind, that he cannot distinguish Friends from Foes? Has he so soon forgotten the memory of past benefits, that he will not consider one of them as her, to whom all their applications were so lately made? Is she so quickly become an old acquaintance, that none of the politick assignations at her Lodgings are remembred? After this, who will trust the gratitude of a Common-wealth? or who will blame the Conduct of a silly Court, for being over-reach'd by the whole _French_ Council, when the able part of the Nation, the designing heads, the gray wisdom, and the Beaux Garcons, are all foil'd by a single _French_ Woman, at their own Weapon, dissimulation? for the other _French_ Dutchess, since I perceive our Author is unacquainted with her Character, I will give it him; she is one who loves her ease to that degree, that no advantages of Fortune can bribe her into business. Let her but have wherewithall to make Merry adays, and to play at Cards anights, and I dare answer for her, that she will take as little care to disturb their business, as she takes in the management of her own. But if you will say that she only affects idleness, and is a grand Intriguer in her heart, I will only Answer, that I should shew you just such another as I have describ'd her Grace, amongst the heads of your own Party: indeed I do not say it is a Woman, but 'tis one who loves a Woman.

As for the Dutchess of _M._ either she is a very sincere lover of downright idleness, or she has cousen'd all parts of Christendom, where she has wandred for these last Ten years. I hope our solid Author will pardon me this digression; but now we have had our dance, let us to our serious business.

_While these, and their Creatures are at the Helm, what can we expect for the security of the Protestant Religion, or what opposition to the ambitious designs of_ France?

I suppose more reasonably on the other side, that no such persons are at the Helm, and that what he has assum'd is but precarious. But I retort upon him, that if some of his Party were the Ministers, the Protestant Religion would receive but very cold assistance from them, who have none at all themselves. And for the growth of the _French_ Monarchy, I have already told you, to whose Counsels we are beholden for it.

_He goes on; you will tell me that the supplyes so given may be appropriated, to these particular ends of supporting our Alliances, and the relief of_ Tangier: _And it may be so limited by Act of Parliament, that it cannot be diverted to other uses. But he answers that Objection by a Story of_ Monsieur de Sully's _telling of_ H. 4th _of_ France: _let the States raise the Money, and tye it as they please; when they are dissolved, you may dispose of it as you please_.

All this is to confirm his first unalterable principle, that the King must be sure to finger nothing; but be us'd as Fishers do their Cormorant, have his mouth left open, to swallow the prey for them, but his throat gagg'd that nothing may go down. Let them bring this to pass, and afterwards they will not need to take away his Prerogative of making War: He must do that at his own peril, and be sent to fight his Enemies with his hands bound behind him. But what if he thinks not their Party fit to be intrusted, least they should employ it against his Person? why then, as he told you _they will give him nothing_. Now whose will be the fault in common reason, if the Allyances be not supported, and _Tangier_ not relieved? If they will give him nothing, before they bring him to a necessity of taking it upon their terms, asmuch as in them lyes they dissolve the Government: and the Interest of the Nation abroad must be left in the Suds, till they have destroy'd the Monarchy at home. But since God, and the Laws have put the disposing of the Treasury into his Majesties hands, it may satisfie any reasonable _Englishman_, that the same Laws have provided for the mispending of the Treasury, by calling the publick Officers into question for it before the Parliament. For God be thanked we have a House of Commons, who will be sure, never to forgoe the least tittle of their Priviledges, and not be so meal-mouth'd as the States of _France_, of whom neither Monsieur _Sully_, nor any of his Successors, have never had any cause of apprehension. But since the wisdom of our Ancestors have thought this Provision sufficient for our security, What has his present Majesty deserv'd from his Subjects, that he should be made a Minor at no less than fifty years of age? or that his House of Commons should Fetter him beyond any of his Predecessors? _where the Interest goes, you will say, there goes the power_. But the most ingenious of your Authors, I mean _Plato Redivivus,_ broaches no such principle as that you should force this Prerogative from the King, by undue courses. The best use which can be made of all, is rather to support the Monarchy, than to have it fall upon your Heads. If indeed there were any reasonable fear of an Arbitrary Government, the adverse Party had somewhat to alledge in their defence of not supplying it; but it is not only evident, that the Kings temper is wholly averse from any such Design, but also demonstrable, that if all his Council, were such as this man most falsely suggests them to be, yet the notion of an absolute power in the Prince is wholly impracticable, not only in this Age, but for ought any wise man can foresee, at any time hereafter. 'Tis plain, that the King has reduc'd himself already to live more like a private Gentleman than a Prince; and since he can content himself in that condition, 'tis as plain, that the supplies which he demands are only for the service of the publick, and not for his own maintenance. Monsieur _de Sully_ might give what Council he thought convenient for _Henry_ the Fourth, who was then designing that Arbitrary power, which his Successors have since compass'd, to the ruine of the Subjects liberty in _France_; but I appeal to the Consciences of those men, who are most averse to the present Government, if they think our King would put his Peace and Quiet at this time of day, upon so desperate an issue. What the necessities, which they are driving him into, may make him part with on the other hand, I know not. But how can they answer it to our Posterity, that for private Picques, self Interest, and causeless jealousies, they would destroy the foundation of so excellent a Government, which is the admiration and envy of all _Europe_?

_The rest of my Authors Paragraph, is only laying more load upon the Ministers, and telling us, that if a sum of Money sufficient for those ends were given, while they were Managers of Affairs, it would be only to set them free from any apprehensions of account to any future Parliament_. But this Argument having only the imaginary fear of an Arbitrary power for its foundation, is already answer'd, he adds in the close of it, _That the Prince has a cheap bargain, who gives Paper-Laws in exchange of Money and Power. Bargains, he tells us, there have always been, and always will be, betwixt Prince and People, because it is in the Constitution of our Goverment, and the chief dependance of our Kings is in the love and liberality of their People_.

Our present King, I acknowledge has often found it so; though no thanks I suppose to this Gentleman and his Party. But though he cry down Paper and Parchment at this Rate, they are the best Evidence he can have for his Estate, and his friends the Lawyers will advise him to speak with less contempt of those Commodities. If Laws avail the Subject nothing, our Ancestors have made many a bad Bargain for us. Yet I can instance to him one Paper, namely, that of the _Habeas Corpus_ bill; for which the House of Commons would have been content to have given a Million of good _English_ money, and which they had Gratis from his Majesty. 'Tis true, they boast they got it by a Trick; but if the Clerk of the Parliament had been bidden to forget it, their Trick of telling Noses might have fail'd them. Therefore let us do right on all sides: The Nation is oblig'd both to the House of Commons for asking it, and more especially to his Majesty, for granting it so freely.

_But what can we think of his next Axiome, that it was never known that Laws signified any thing to a People, who had not the sole guard of their own Prince, Government and Laws?_

Here all our Fore-fathers are Arraign'd at once for trusting the Executive power of the Laws in their Princes hands. And yet you see the Government has made a shift to shuffle on for so many hundred years together, under this miserable oppression; and no man so wise in so many ages to find out, that _Magna Charta_ was to no purpose, while there was a King. I confess in Countreys, where the Monarck governs absolutely, and the Law is either his Will, or depending on it, this noble maxim might take place; But since we are neither _Turks_, _Russians_, nor _Frenchmen_, to affirm that in our Countrey, in a Monarchy of so temperate and wholsom a Constitution, Laws are of no validity, because they are not in the disposition of the People, plainly infers that no Government but that of a Common-wealth can preserve our Liberties and Priviledges: for though the Title of a Prince be allow'd to continue, yet if the People must have the sole guard and Government of him and of the Laws, 'tis but facing an whole hand of Trumps, with an insignificant King of another sute. And which is worst of all, if this be true, there can be no Rebellion, for then the People is the supream power. And if the Representatives of the Commons shall Jarr with the other two Estates, and with the King, it would be no Rebellion to adhere to them in that War: to which I know that every Republican who reads this, must of necessity Answer, _No more it would not_. Then farewell the Good Act of Parliament, which makes it Treason to Levy Arms against the present King, upon any pretences whatsoever. For if this be a Right of Nature, and consequently never to be Resign'd, there never has been, nor ever can be any pact betwixt King and People, and Mr. _Hobbs_ would tell us, _That we are still in a state of War_.

_The next thing our Author would establish, is, That there is nothing in Nature or in Story so ridiculous, as the management of the Ministers, in the Examination of the Popish Plot. Which being prov'd by_ Coleman's _and others Letters, and by both Houses by declaring the King's Life to be in danger_, &c. _Yet they have persuaded the King to believe nothing of this danger; but to apprehend the Plot to be extreamly improv'd, if not wholly contriv'd by the Presbyterians. And to think it more his concernment to have an end of all; then to have it search'd to the bottom: and that this was the true reason, why four Parliaments, during the Examination of the Plot have been dissolv'd:_

Reasonable People will conclude, that his Majesty and his Ministers have proceeded, not ridiculously, but with all that caution which became them. For in the first heat and vehemence of the Plot, the Avenues of _White-Hall_ were more strictly Guarded: His Majesty abstaining from Places of publick Entertainment, and the Ministers taking all necessary Care in Council, both to discover Conspiracies and to prevent them. So, that simply considered, the Popish Plot has nothing to do with the Dissolution of Four Parliaments. But the Use which has been made of it by the House of Commons to Dis-inherit the Duke, to deny the King Supplies, and to make some Votes, which the King declares to be illegal, are the real and plain occasions of dissolving those Parliaments. 'Tis only affirm'd, but never will be prov'd by this Author, that the King or his Ministers have ever been desirous to stifle the Plot, and not to have it search'd into the bottom. For to what end has his Majesty so often offer'd the Popish Lords to be brought to their Trial, but that their innocence or guilt, and consequently, that of the whole party might be made manifest? Or why, after the execution of the Lord _Stafford_, did the House of Commons stop at the other Lords, and not proceed to try them in their turns? Did his Majesty stifle the Plot when he offered them, or did they refuse to sound the depth of it, when they would not touch upon them? If it were for want of Witnesses, which is all that can be said, the case is deplorable on the part of the accused; who can neither be bail'd, because impeach'd in Parliament, nor admitted to be tryed, for fear they should be acquitted for want of evidence. I do not doubt but his Majesty, after having done what in him lies for the utmost discovery of the Plot, both by frequent Proclamations of Indemnity, and Reward, to such as would come in, and discover more, and by several others too long to repeat, is desirous (for what good man is not?) that his care and trouble might be over. But I am much deceiv'd, if the Antimonarchical Party be of the same opinion; or that they desire the Plot should be either wholly discover'd, or fully ended. For 'tis evidently their Interest to keep it on foot, as long as possibly they can; and to give it hot water, as often as 'tis dying; for while they are in possession of this Jewel, they make themselves masters of the people. For this very reason I have often said, even from the beginning of the Discovery, that the Presbyterians would never let it go out of their hands, but manage it to the last inch upon a Save-all. And that if ever they had tryed one Lord, they would value themselves upon that Conquest, as long as ever it would last with the Populace: but whatever came on't, be sure to leave a Nest Egg in the _Tower_: And since I doubt not, but what so mean a Judge as I am could so easily discover, could not possibly escape the vigilancy of those who are at the Helm; I am apt to think, that his Majesty saw at least as great a danger arising to him from the discontented spirits of the popular Faction, as from the Papists. For is it not plain, that ever since the beginning of the Plot, they have been lopping off from the Crown whatever part of the Prerogative they could reach? and incroaching into Soveraignty and Arbitrary Power themselves, while they seem'd to fear it from the King? How then could his Majesty be blam'd, if he were forc'd to dissolve those Parliaments, which instead of giving him relief, made their Advantages upon his Distresses; and while they pretended a care of his Person on the one hand, were plucking at his Scepter with the other?

After this, the Pamphleteer gives us a long Bead-roll of _Dangerfield's_ Plot, Captain _Ely_, young _Tongue_, _Fitz-Gerard_ and Mr. _Ray_, rails at some, and commends others as far as his skill in Hyperbole will carry him. Which all put together, amounts to no more than only this, that he whom they called Rogue before, when he comes into their party, pays his Garnish, and is adopted into the name of an honest man. Thus _Ray_ was no Villain, when he accus'd Colonel _Sackvile_, before the House of Commons; but when he failed of the reward of godliness at their hands, and from a Wig became a tearing Tory in new Cloaths, our Author puts him upon the File of Rogues, with this brand, _Than whom a more notorious and known Villian lives not_.

The next thing be falls upon, is the Succession: which the King declares, _He will have preserved in its due descent_. Now our Author despairing, it seems, that an Exclusion should pass by Bill, urges, _That the Right of Nature and Nations will impower Subjects to deliver a Protestant Kingdom from a Popish King_. The Law of Nations, is so undoubtedly, against him, that I am sure he dares not stick to that Plea: but will be forc'd to reply, that the Civil Law was made in favour of Monarchy: why then did he appeal to it? And for the Law of Nature, I know not what it has to do with Protestants or Papists, except he can prove that the English Nation is naturally Protestant; and then I would enquire of him what Countrymen our Fore-fathers were? But if he means by the Law of Nature, self-preservation and defence; even that neither will look but a squint upon Religion; for a man of any Religion, and a man of no Religion, are equally bound to preserve their lives. But I answer positively to what he would be at; that the Law of self-preservation impowers not a Subject to rise in Arms against his Soveraign, of another Religion, upon supposition of what he may do in his prejudice hereafter: for, since it is impossible that a moral certainty should be made out of a future contingency, and consequently, that the Soveraign may not extend his Power to the prejudice of any mans Liberty or Religion: The probability (which is the worst that they can put it) is not enough to absolve a Subject who rises in Arms, from Rebellion, _in foro Conscientiae_. We read of a divine Command to obey Superior Powers: and the Duke will lawfully be such, no Bill of Exclusion having past against him in his Brother's life: Besides this, we have the Examples of Primitive Christians, even under Heathen Emperors, always suffering, yet never taking up Arms, during ten Persecutions. But we have no Text, no Primitive Example encouraging us to rebel against a Christian Prince, tho of a different Perswasion. And to say there were then no Christian Princes when the New Testament was written, will avail our Author little; for the Argument is a _Fortiori_: if it be unlawful to rebel against a Heathen Emperor, then much more against a Christian King. The Corollary is this, and every unbiassed sober man will subscribe to it, that since we cannot pry into the secret Decrees of God, for the knowledge of future Events, we ought to rely upon his Providence, for the Succession; without either plunging our present King into necessities, for what may never happen; or refusing our obedience to one hereafter, who in the course of nature may succeed him. One, who if he had the will, could never have the power to settle Popery in _England_, or to bring in Arbitrary Government.

_But the Monarchy will not be destroyed, and the Protestant Religion will be preserved, if we may have a Protestant Successor_.

If his party had thought, that this had been a true Expedient, I am confident it had been mentioned in the last Parliament at _Westminster_. But there, _altum silentium_ not one word of it. Was it because the Machine was not then in readiness to move! and that the Exclusion must first pass? or more truly was it ever intended to be urged? I am not ashamed to say, that I particularly honour the Duke of _Monmouth_: but whether his nomination to succeed, would, at the bottom be pleasing to the Heads of his Cabal, I somewhat doubt. To keep him fast to them by some remote hopes of it, may be no ill Policy. To have him in a readiness to head an Army, in case it should please God the King should die before the Duke, is the design; and then perhaps he has reason to expect more from a Chance Game, than from the real desires of his party to exalt him to a Throne. But 'tis neither to be imagined, that a Prince of his Spirit, after the gaining of a Crown, would be managed by those who helped him to it, let his ingagements and promises be never so strong before, neither that he would be confin'd in the narrow compass of a Curtail'd Mungril Monarchy, half Common-wealth. Conquerors are not easily to be curbed. And it is yet harder to conceive, that his pretended Friends, even design him so much as that. At present, 'tis true, their mutual necessities keep them fast together; and all the several Fanatick Books fall in, to enlarge the common stream: But suppose the business compassed, as they design'd it, how many, and how contradicting Interests are there to be satisfied! Every Sect of High Shooes would then be uppermost; and not one of them endure the toleration of another. And amongst them all, what will become of those fine Speculative Wits, who drew the Plan of this new Government, and who overthrew the old? For their comfort, the Saints will then account them Atheists, and discard them. Or they will plead each of them their particular Merits, till they quarrel about the Dividend. And, the Protestant Successor himself, if he be not wholly governed by the prevailing party, will first be declared no Protestant; and next, no Successor. This is dealing sincerely with him, which _Plato Redivivus_ does not: for all the bustle he makes concerning the Duke of _M._ proceeds from a Commonwealth Principle: he is afraid at the bottom to have him at the Head of the party, lest he should turn the absolute Republick, now designing, into an arbitrary Monarchy.