Chapter 5

Looking back over the long series of partial victories, vexatious delays and humiliating failures, and considering the inadequate organization and defective staff arrangements for which Grant was mainly responsible, it is evident that the terrible losses in the Union army in the overland campaign were due quite as frequently to the latter causes as to incompetency or lack of vigor on the part of the subordinate commanders. The blind grapplings in the forests of the Wilderness could not be helped, when both armies were marching through it, for they could not see each other through the tangled underbrush till they were almost face to face, but it is now certain that if the marches of the Union army corps had been properly timed and properly conducted, they could have reached the open country before the Confederate corps could have engaged them. But when the senseless assaults of fortified positions, which occurred in endless succession, from Spottsylvania Court House to Petersburg are considered, it will be impossible to find sufficient excuse for them. They were in nearly every case the direct result of defective staff arrangements and the lack of proper prevision. In a few instances they were due to positive incompetency on the part of subordinate commanders, while on several notable occasions there was a woeful lack of responsible oversight and supervision on the part of those whose duty it should have been to exercise both. Before the campaign was half over it had come to be an axiom among both officers and men that a well-defended rifle trench could not be carried by a direct attack without the most careful preparation nor even then without fearful loss. Such undertakings were far too costly, and far too frequently ended in failure, to justify them when they could be avoided. But no experience, however frequent or bloody, no remonstrance however forcible, could eradicate the practice of resorting to them occasionally. Rawlins was utterly opposed to them and never failed to inveigh against them but the advice of more than one trusted and influential staff officer was uniformly in favor of assaulting fortified positions. The favorite refrain at general headquarters is said to have been "Smash `em up! Smash `em up!"

It was with special reference to the application of this method of procedure at Cold Harbor, that General Smith afterwards gave vent to his indignation in words of the bitterest criticism. It will be remembered that the entire army confronting the enemy had advanced on that fatal day in compliance with a general order to attack "all along the line," which was done in a half-hearted, desultory manner, foreboding failure and defeat. Not a soul among the generals or in the fighting line dreamed of success and not a commander from highest to lowest except Smith and Upton, made any adequate preparation to achieve it. Officers and men alike felt that they had been ordered to a sure defeat. Knowing intuitively what awaited them, they wrote their names on scraps of paper and pinned them to their coats in order that their bodies might be identified after the slaughter was over. This done they advanced in long and wavering lines of blue against the enemy's bristling breastworks and rifle pits, and were mowed down like ripe grain before the scythe. In almost as short a time as it takes to recount the useless sacrifice, over twelve thousand Union soldiers were killed and wounded, without shaking the enemy's position or inflicting serious injury upon him.

Smith and his gallant corps, did their part bravely in the futile attack. They were just back from Butler's abortive movement to Bermuda Hundred, in which by good management on the part of the General, and by steadiness on the part of the men, they had saved the expedition from a disgraceful defeat. They were not only hungry and tired, but disgusted with the incompetency of Butler and his abortive plans. The situation which confronted them was most discouraging. They were on new and unknown ground, but they had not yet worn themselves out against Lee's veterans and therefore they cheerfully took the position assigned them. Smith with his usual foresight and deliberation made haste to examine the ground in his front, and by availing himself of the advantages which his trained eye soon detected he was enabled to direct his main attack along a sheltering depression against a weak point, where he reached and broke through the enemy's line. He needed only the prompt and vigorous support that intelligent prevision and co-operation would have given, to make his lodgement safe and his victory certain. But as no one above him seems to have expected victory, no proper provision was made to ensure it. No supports were at hand. Each corps commander was looking out for his own front only, and not for his neighbor's. The Confederates were more wise and more alert, and seeing the danger which threatened the continuity of their line, made haste to concentrate their forces against Smith and of course hurled him back with terrible loss.

Smarting under this unnecessary disaster, and grieving over the useless loss and suffering of his gallant men, it was but natural that he should vent his feelings in sharp and caustic denunciation of all who were in any degree responsible for the blunder. He was especially outspoken with Grant and Rawlins, whose confidence he had won in the Chattanooga campaign, and with whom he had since been on terms of the closest intimacy and friendship. It is but just to note that they did not at that time appear to consider his criticism as in any sense directed against them nor did they rebuke or condemn it, but to the contrary they gave him every assurance of sympathy and approval.

But Smith although one of the heaviest sufferers, was not the only or even the severest critic, of the mismanagement or lack of management which characterized that disastrous day. The result was most demoralizing to the army. Officers of every grade were unreserved in their condemnation. The newspaper criticism was wide-spread and continuous.

It was with special reference to the useless slaughter at Cold Harbor that the gallant and invincible Upton, then coming to be widely recognized as the best practical soldier of his day, immediately wrote in confidence to his sister.

"I am disgusted with the generalship displayed. Our men have in many instances been foolishly and wantonly sacrificed. Thousands of lives might have been spared by the exercise of a little skill; but as it is, the courage of the men is expected to obviate all difficulties. I must confess that so long as I see such incompetency, there is no grade in the army to which I do not aspire."

Later referring to the same battle, he adds:

"On that day [at Cold Harbor] we had a murderous engagement. I say murderous, because we were recklessly ordered to assault the enemy's entrenchments knowing neither their strength nor position. * * * I am very sorry to add that I have seen but little generalship during the campaign. Some of our corps commanders are not fit to be corporals. Lazy and indifferent they will not even ride along their lines, yet without hesitancy they will order us to attack the enemy, no matter what their position or numbers."

As the assault on Cold Harbor was a general one, it follows of course that it must have been ordered by someone higher in authority than either Smith of the Eighteenth or Upton of the Sixth Corps.

It was doubtless in allusion to this and to similar instances that the veracious and outspoken Humphreys, at that time Meade's Chief of Staff, and afterwards the peerless commander of the Second Army Corps, wrote:

"The incessant movements day and night for so long a period, the constant close contact with the enemy during all that time, the almost daily assaults upon intrenchments having entanglements in front and defended by artillery and musketry in front and flank, exhausted both officers and men."

Although all the orders which brought about this unfortunate condition of affairs must have passed through Humphreys himself, it is obvious that they could not have originated with him, but must have come from higher authority.

If the imperturbable and painstaking Smith, fresh from the triumphs and confidences of Chattanooga, should have lost his patience under these distressing circumstances, and declared to General Grant, frankly and fearlessly as he did as was clearly his duty, that "there had been a fearful slaughter at Cold Harbor," surely it should not have been brought up against him later as one of the reasons for relieving him from the command of the troops of the Department of the James, to which he had been assigned after this criticism had been made. If in the same interview Grant acknowledged, as it is credibly stated he did, "that there had been a butchery at Cold Harbor, but that he had said nothing about it, because it could do no good," his remembrance of the circumstance to the prejudice of Smith, must be regarded as an afterthought which had its origin in some cause not yet fully explained.

It is altogether likely that Smith's criticism was repeated to others less entitled to speak than himself and that it was exaggerated into a direct attack upon both Meade and Grant, which could not be passed over lightly. Be this as it may, it must be apparent that it was fully justified as a mere matter of military criticism and quite independent of both Smith and Upton, it was generally approved both by the army and the country at large.

It was shortly after the assault in question, while I was commanding a division of cavalry, that I visited Grant's headquarters. During the conversation which followed the Lieutenant General asked me: "What is the matter with this army?" To which I replied:

"It will take too long to explain, but I can tell you how to cure it. Give Parker [the Indian Chief] a tomahawk, a supply of commissary whiskey and a scalping knife and send him out with orders to bring in the scalps of general officers."

During this same visit and frequently afterwards Rawlins, in a white rage, inveighed against the desperate practice of blindly assaulting fortified lines, and denounced in unmeasured terms all who favored them or failed to make adequate preparation for success, where any just excuse could be found for resorting to them. It is worthy of remark, without reference to the origin of the practice, or to the persons who were responsible for it, that General Grant alone had the power to stop it, and that later there was a noticeable change in the Army of the Potomac in regard to that practice, although it should be noted that Sherman followed it as an example in his desperate, but unsuccessful assault of the enemy's impregnable fortifications on Kenesaw Mountain, for the purpose, as he frankly explained, of showing that his army could also assault strongly fortified lines.

That such a costly practice could spring up and obtain imitation in our army is a striking commentary upon the lack of intelligent supervision over the essential details of its daily operations. It affords ample justification for again calling attention to the fact that in this respect the Confederate Army was much better off and more fortunate than the Union Army. Its generals, although not without fault, were much more careful in the management of their military details than ours were. Jefferson Davis was himself an educated soldier of great capacity, and selected none but educated and experienced military men for high command. While Lee's staff was far from faultless in organization, he had supreme authority in the field, with no army or independent corps commanders between him and the troops. His army corps were led by generals of the first rank, who took their orders directly from him, and no unnecessary time was lost in their transmission or execution, nor was there any uncertainty as to whose duty it was to work out and superintend the details of attack and defence. But whatever may be said in further elucidation of this important subject, I cannot help expressing regret that General Smith, who had shown such rare talents in another field, for planning and executing the most complicated movements, should not have had in this an opportunity to add to his fame, instead of being sent out as a subordinate to a general who, however great his talents as a lawyer and a militiaman, had developed no special aptitude as an army commander. In this connection the important fact should he recalled that Generals Barnard and Meigs, officers of the highest training and distinction, at the request of General Grant, shortly after the fiasco of Bermuda Hundred, had been sent by the Washington authorities to make an investigation of General Butler's fitness for command in the field, and had with due deliberation reported that while "General Butler was a man of rare and great ability, he had not had either the training or experience to enable him to direct and control movements in battle." It was doubtless the verification of this report to Grant's satisfaction that caused him finally to relieve that General from duty in the field, and in doing so to incur both his active and his covert hostility.

Meanwhile however valid and important, in either a military or a political sense, the considerations may have been which sent Butler out in command of an army with such men as Smith and Gilmore, both professional soldiers of the highest standing, as his subordinates, the arrangement was unfortunate from beginning to end, and from its very nature it was foredoomed to failure. It is to be observed that while these admirable soldiers were constantly with their troops moving against or confronting the enemy, Butler was generally at Fortress Monroe, or at a more central point some distance in the rear, and when his orders were not ill-timed or inapplicable to the case in hand, they were not infrequently deemed impracticable, or at cross purposes with the convictions of the generals whose duty it was to carry them into effect. The simple and incontrovertible fact is that General Butler's presence with that army was from the start embarrassing if not absolutely unnecessary. It interposed an intermediate commander between the generalissimo and two entire army corps, and however good the intentions of that commander or great his abilities, his principal influence was necessarily to derange and delay the orderly conduct and development of the campaign. It was productive of no good whatever, and was besides in direct violation of the rule of experience which teaches that better results are to be expected with one poor commander in full authority than with two or more good ones liable to pull against each other.

The chief conclusion to be reached from these considerations, and from a study of the records, in connection with the writings and unpublished memoirs of General Smith, is that his conduct during the continuance, of the arrangement was not only natural and blameless, but that the failure of Butler's army to play an important and decisive part, was due primarily, if not entirely, to Butler's own misunderstanding or mismanagement of what was entrusted to him, or the inherent defects in the organization and staff arrangements of the Union forces operating in Virginia. Under the conditions as they actually existed, effective co-operation and control, it has been shown, could not have been reasonably expected, and for this the verdict of the military critic and historian must be that the Lieutenant General who had ample power, if he chose to exercise it, was primarily responsible. Under the incontrovertible facts of the case it is difficult to see how this conclusion can be avoided.

It will he recalled by those who have read "Butler's Book," that in addition to a number of trivial derelictions of duty, General Smith was charged with the more serious one of having failed through negligence and an untimely cessation of operations, to capture Petersburg, when it was claimed that all the conditions were favorable to success. It should also be recalled that several weeks after this failure had taken place and all the necessary explanations had been made and considered, the President had, on Grant's recommendation, relieved Butler from further service in the field and had assigned General Smith to the command of the Eighteenth Corps which was composed of the troops from Butler's department, serving with the Army of the Potomac. It should be remembered at the same time that before General Smith received this order he had applied for and been granted leave of absence on account of illness, or as he explained, "because of his old trouble with his head," and that while he was absent, the Lieutenant General was by some means never fully or satisfactorily explained, induced to restore Butler to his former command and to dispense entirely with the services of General Smith. In reply to a letter from Smith, he authorized Colonel Comstock of his staff to inform him that he had been relieved "because of the impossibility of his getting along with General Butler," who was his senior in rank. But General Grant assured me about this time that it was with great regret that he had taken this action; that he had tried in vain to utilize Smith's great talents; that he had been too free in his criticisms, and that Smith himself had made it necessary that either he should be relieved or that Meade, Burnside and Butler should he deprived of command and sent out of the army. Some conversation followed, in which it was suggested that he should have given the preference to the alternative as a means of simplifying the organization and increasing the efficiency of the army, and it is a singular coincidence at least, that this suggestion was partly carried into effect, with most excellent results, by the relief of both Butler and Burnside, shortly afterwards, from the command of troops in that theatre of operations. It has besides long been a question among military men whether still better results would not have been obtained if Grant had at the same time relieved Meade, who was certainly a most competent and loyal general, from the immediate command of the Army of the Potomac and placed him instead at the head of an army corps.

It may not be out of place here to call attention to the fact that while no specific limitations were ever put upon the responsibilities of Meade as an army commander, Grant thenceforth took upon himself a closer supervision of the details of the campaign, while upon many occasions during the final operations, he gave his orders directly to the corps commanders, instead of sending them through the regular official channels. The result of this practice after it became confirmed, was in every case beneficial, though it should he observed that it was far from increasing the cordial relations between Grant and Meade or between their respective headquarters.

But to return to the breach between Grant and Smith, to the exact state of facts which led up to it, and to the immediate pressure which finally brought about Smith's relief from further command in the field. Much that is as well forgotten, has been written about this unfortunate episode. Smith felt to the day of his death that he had been misrepresented to Grant and unjustly injured by his action. He always contended that the whole truth had not been told, and it must be confessed that no consecutive and exhaustive analysis of the case has ever been made. Perhaps none can be made. But from such information as I have been able to gather, I have always supposed that Grant's action was based upon Smith's criticisms, exaggerated reports of which were made by certain officers of Butler's staff with whom Smith dined and spent the night at Fortress Monroe on his way home, that Butler presented these reports in person to General Grant, without the knowledge or concurrence of Meade or Burnside, and made them the basis of a demand for Smith's immediate relief. Exactly what took place at the interview must for reasons which will appear hereafter, always remain a matter of conjecture. It however seems to be probable that had General Smith deferred his leave of absence till he had seated himself firmly in his new command, or had he been sent for and allowed to make his own explanation, he would have been spared the humiliation, which ended his military career, while the country would have continued to receive the assistance of one of its greatest military minds.

General Smith, by his military writings, has not only refuted the unjust criticisms of General Butler's Book, but he has modestly and conclusively set forth his own military services during the various campaigns in which he took part. He points out with pardonable pride the friendship which sprang up during the Chattanooga campaign, between himself and General Grant. He makes it clear that his failure to capture Petersburg was due to a number of causes more or less potential and altogether beyond his control. First among them was the physical exhaustion of himself and his troops; second, an order which was sent to him through the signal corps from General Butler, who was all day June 15 at Point Lookout Signal Station, to stay his advance; and, third, the failure of General Hancock, who was with the Second Corps within supporting distance, to take up the movement and give the finishing stroke to the day's work. To these should be added the defective staff arrangements by which the various forces in the field of operations were controlled, the inadequate strength of Smith's command, which was inexcusable where such a vast force was within call, the lack of engineer officers and of exact information as to the character of the ground over which the troops were compelled to operate, and the total absence of proper support and co-operation on the part of the Army of the Potomac. Above all, it should be kept in mind that the enemy held the defensive and had interior lines upon which he could throw his troops from point to point on his threatened front, with greater celerity than the attacking force could be concentrated by outside lines and across wide rivers against him.

When Smith began his movement against Petersburg, which was to be in the nature of a surprise, the greater part of Grant's army was still north of the James River, and both Meade and Hancock allege that they were not notified that a new effort was to be made to capture Petersburg by Smith alone, after Butler had tried and failed with his whole army to isolate and cut it off from Richmond by the movement to Bermuda Hundred. Both of these able officers declare that if they had known in time that Petersburg was to have been captured, Petersburg would have been captured. This simple statement, without reference to its truth, which has never been questioned, is conclusive evidence that the staff arrangements and the organization of the machinery of command were fatally defective, for had it been otherwise, every officer who could have been called upon to take part in the movement, or could have been expected to co-operate with it, would have been so clearly instructed as to make his duty entirely plain.